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Abstract
The Icelandic economy was transformed in the late 19th century onwards when 
economic resources were shifted from pastoral farming towards mechanised fishing, 
because this meant urbanisation, growth of new social classes, formation of new power 
relations, a positive turn in the number o f population, and a rise in the level o f 
technology. The principal aim of the present research is to examine the general relevance 
o f foreign trade for the start o f  the economic transformation and for the transformatory 
process until 1914. A supplementary aim is to generalise the findings by looking into the 
Icelandic experience in international context.
The research is conducted through a sequence o f three main steps. First, shifts 
that occurred in foreign trade are identified, and since foreign trade could affect the 
economy through the trade flow and the institutional framework of trade, both aspects 
are examined. The trade flow is analysed with a detailed investigation o f trade statistics, 
and the economic context o f exports and imports is outlined. The institutional framework 
is analysed as o f 1870 and subsequent major shifts described, mainly with the use o f 
secondary sources. The second step is meant to analyse systematically which of the 
shifts observed were relevant and important for the economic transformation. This 
examination is based on one hand on existing literature and the historical evidence 
produced here, and on the other hand on two analytical frameworks that I use in a 
synthesised way to explore the economic implications o f the shifts observed. One 
framework is A.O. Hirschman’s linkages approach and the other is an economic 
determinants model which is informed by the staples theory. The final step is a 
discussion about Iceland’s economic performance in international comparison, including 
a sketch o f the interplay between external elements and internal elements for economic 
stasis and change in the case o f Iceland.
The findings show that significant shifts occurred in Iceland’s foreign trade in 
the research period, both in the trade flows and the institutional framework o f trade. 
Furthermore, their economic implications were such that they were in fact all-important 
for a reorganisation of the utilisation o f economic resources and for the transformation of 
the economy. The findings in turn indicate that the causes o f the transformation have 
partly been overlooked, that its nature has been oversimplified, and that its timing differs 
from that in the literature. Furthermore, the findings suggest that the cumulative impact 
o f the shifts and their long-term historical relevance was so profound and pervasive that 
the term modernisation is apt. In international comparison, Iceland appears to have 
gained very much from foreign trade, and it is maintained that institutional elements in 
Iceland’s external relations affected the economy’s factor markets in such a way as to 
uphold economic stasis while entrance o f ‘outsiders’ in foreign trade was decisive in 
breaking it.
I, the undersigned, being the copyright owner o f  the abstract o f  this present thesis, 
hereby grant to all reference sources permission to publish and disseminate the 
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The Icelandic form of spelling has been retained for all Icelandic proper names and 
places referred to in the thesis. They often include letters peculiar to the Icelandic 
language and alphabet, and they should be pronounced broadly as expressed here:
A and a pronounced as o in ‘power’
D and d pronounced as th in ‘then’
E and e pronounced as ye in ‘yet’
/, z, Y, andy pronounced as ea in ‘seat’
O and o pronounced as oa in ‘coast’
U and u pronounced as oo in ‘pool’
P and p pronounced as th in ‘thin’
JE and# pronounced as / in ‘time’
0  and d pronounced as u in ‘fur’
In accordance with the Icelandic patronymic custom and recommendations of handbooks 
concerning the use of personal names, Icelanders are referred to by their first name 
throughout the thesis and listed in that way in the Bibliography.
Unless otherwise stated, all growth rates are calculated as compound rates of growth.
Values are presented in Icelandic kronur (pi.) or Danish kroner (pi.), which were of 
equal nominal and real value in the research period. £1 was equivalent to 18.15 kr. until 
31 March 1896, and 18.12 kr. from 1. April 1896 onwards.
Note that titles of sources in footnotes are shortened from the first reference onwards.
See also note on Meaning and Use of Symbols at the beginning of the Appendices.
Chapter I 
Introduction: The Economic Transformation of 
Iceland and the Relevance of Foreign Trade
1.1. Significance of the Subject: The Economic 
Transition of Iceland
The period comprising the late 19th and early 20th centuries is one of the most 
transitional epochs in the history of Iceland. Important changes in the constitutional 
status of Iceland, its economy, demography, social structure, and cultural landscape 
occurred at the time. To quote a recent, general history of Iceland, ‘medieval modes and 
institutions were finally abandoned ...’ between 1874 and 1904.1 This shift marked the 
beginning of Iceland’s overall modernisation although Icelandic historians have 
traditionally shied away from using the term to describe the ensuing changes. However, 
modernisation certainly is an meaningful interpretation of the history of Iceland since the 
late 19th century onwards, which is comparatively in stark contrast to earlier periods, 
and lately the term has more often been used by Icelandic scholars.2 Perhaps as a sign of
1 In Icelandic: ‘A landshofbingatimanum [1874—1904] voru miSaldahaettir og stofiianir loks 
kvaddar See Bjom borsteinsson and Bergsteinn Jonsson, Islcmdssaga til okkar daga, p 301.
2 See, for instance, the following works. Magnus S. Magnusson, Iceland in Transition, p 37 cf. 
endnote 48. SigurSur G. Magnusson, ‘Hugarfarid og samtiminn,’ p 28. Gudmundur
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growing recognition of this, a special debate in the first Icelandic history congress in 
1997 was devoted to this theme and called the ‘Advent of Modernity in Iceland.’3
Along this general modernisation of Icelandic society, the economy was 
transformed. The scale of this change is indicated by one economic historian who said 
that in 1880-1930 ‘Iceland was drastically changed from economic archaism to a 
dynamic capitalist economy,’ and another wrote that ‘the country was transformed from 
an extremely poor and backward dependency of Denmark into an independent, capitalist 
state’ in 1870—1930.4 The preponderance of economic change in the modernisation 
process has long been recognised among Icelandic historians. In fact, they generally 
agree that the Icelandic modernisation or overall transformation was economic in origin 
and propelled by economic change. The start of this process has traditionally been traced 
to more efficient fishing vessels, first decked sailing ships in the 1880s and later machine 
powered boats and ships in the 1900s, because over a few decades it shifted the base of 
the economy from low-technology, pastoral farming and dispersed population to high- 
technology fishing that gave great impetus to the growth of urban areas. Consequently, it 
is claimed, urban based secondary industries and tertiary activities started to grow 
significantly, and although rural subsistence practices persisted, they relatively declined 
as the urban areas formed markets for agricultural surplus. Also, because of increasing 
urban wage labour, division of work increased. The exodus of labour from farming to 
urban activities put pressures on the farming sector, who went through a crisis but 
gradually put into use labour-saving methods and implements.
Halfdanarson and Svanur Kristj&nsson, ‘Formali’ to Islensk pjodfelagsproun, ed. by 
Gudmundur Halfdanarson and Svanur Kristjansson, p 8. Helgi Skuli Kjartansson, ‘History and 
Culture,’ p 86.
3 In Icelandic: ‘InnreiS nutimans a Islandi’. See Islenska sogupingid... 1997: Radstefnurit, vol. 
2 .
4 See Magnus S. Magnusson, Iceland in Transition, p 15, and Gudmundur Jonsson, ‘The State 
and the Icelandic Economy,’ p 2, respectively.
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The historical interpretation of the economic transition has tended to emphasise 
the significance of the mechanisation in this process. However, Magnus S. Magnusson 
(1985) has offered a more profound understanding of the initial transitory phase and in 
turn underscored its importance. He argues that the economic and social consequences of 
the mechanisation only were an acceleration of a process already begun with the rise of 
outfit of decked fishing vessels around 1880. Magnus stresses that with this outfit the 
production relations between fishermen and the means of production began to change in 
that the fishermen became increasingly alienated from ownership of the boats, vessels, 
and the fishing gear, thereby producing proletariat on one hand and capitalists (often 
merchants) on the other. Thus, Magnus argues that capitalist modes of production, the 
engine of economic change in modem times, emerged in a proto-type form much earlier 
and the mechanisation was not their beginning, only their full materialisation.
As this description of the economic transition indicates, it was economic 
development in the sense of economics. By definition, development consists of economic 
change that emerges in a new composition of inputs (given fixed output) or a new 
composition of outputs (possibly concomitant with an altered input structure). In other 
words, development refers to a relatively significant change in the type of goods and 
services produced (output), or, if output does not change, then in the kind of means that 
are used for that production (inputs). Possibly, the composition of inputs and outputs can 
change concurrently. Also, reference is implicitly also made to certain kind of structural 
changes such as replacements of labour for capital and rise of manufacturing industries 
and service industries with falling primary sector activities.5 Casting Iceland in these 
terms and looking at the output side first, it emerges that service industries grew fast in
5 C. Pass, B. Lowes, and L. Davies, Dictionary o f Economics, pp 149-50. G. Bannock, R.E. 
Baxter, and R. Rees, The Penguin Dictionary o f Economics, 3rd ed., p 136. G.N. von 
Tunzelmann, Technology and Industrial Progress, p 30.
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the research period and the share of primary industries fell substantially over time, 
indicating that the fall in the agricultural sector was larger still because the fishing sector 
grew.6 These changes alone hardly qualify as a structural change (development), but 
looking at the input side, however, a very clear picture emerges. Machines and other 
durable capital goods replaced much labour in fishing, the leading industry. 
Furthermore, the input structure in manufacturing industries probably changed 
relatively. Although one-men workshops continued onwards, workshops with several 
men and more equipment became ever more common, and a few factories were built. 
Given all this, the transition of the Icelandic economy even before 1914 clearly was 
economic development in its proper sense.
1.2. Focus of the Study: Foreign Trade and 
the Economic Transition
1.2.1. Aim of the Research and Period of Study
The present thesis sets itself to examine the general relevance of foreign trade for the 
transition of the Icelandic economy until 1914. In doing so, the thesis also probes into the 
transition itself, that is, why and how the shift from stasis to a state of continuous change 
happened and why the transition proceeded in the way it did. This examination will
6 Gudmundur Jonsson, Hagvdxtifr og idnvceding, p 161 (table 15.2).
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subsequently be supported with a basic discussion about the Icelandic experience in 
international comparison.
There are broadly two motives for studying possible links between foreign trade 
and the economic transition until 1914 First, there is lack of knowledge about the initial 
phase of the transition relative to historians’ knowledge about the transition after it had 
entered the mechanisation stage in the 1900s. Magnus S. Magnusson’s research provided 
a better understanding of the transitory process during the research period, but the timing 
of some major events in his account has not yet been explained convincingly. 
Furthermore, his research necessarily could not include every aspect of or angle on the 
economic transition. Thus, foreign trade, for example, is left out in the analysis, so its 
role has not been ascertained. Incidentally, however, Magnus’s findings indicated that 
merchants were of considerably important at the onset of the transition.
Second, there exist theoretical constructs and historical evidence that associate 
foreign trade with economic change in general, and they immediately suggest themselves 
for consideration in the Icelandic case. As happens, there is a considerable body of 
literature in economics and economic history dealing with the links between trade flows 
and economic change, whether economic growth or development. According to this 
theoretical literature, there can be influential links from the exchange of exports for 
imports to development, although favourable institutional structures in the economy are 
influential for their materialisation. Apart from these theoretical considerations, there is 
ample historical evidence that suggests that foreign trade can be influential for economic 
change. This evidence dates not only from the research period, which was a part of a 
longer era of unprecedented expansion and integration of the world economy through 
trade, but there is also evidence from the 20th century where the economic history of the 
third world is a case in point. Given this, examination of Iceland’s foreign trade and its 
possible impact on the economic transition seems to be not only a timely venture and of
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considerable significance but also highly relevant for historians’ understanding of this 
process.
The period of research is that from 1870 until the outbreak of World War I in 
1914. The start of the period is somewhat arbitrarily selected, but since the aim is to 
examine the causes of the overall shift in the economy and the relevance of foreign trade, 
and historians agree that not much happened in the Icelandic economy until after 1880, 
the advent of the transition is well within the research period. Furthermore, since the 
transition had appeared in so many ways and forms in the economy by 1914, and the 
transitory process had gained its own momentum, the final year is appropriate although 
it is partly self-evident because of the start of the war.
To underpin my research questions, it is necessary, first, to explicate the current 
historical interpretation of the shift from stasis to effective motion in the Iceland 
economy. Then, I introduce one of two basic elements of foreign trade and discuss them 
in relation to Iceland. One element is the institutional framework and the other is the 
trade flows where I describe shortly the theoretical links between the different types of 
exports and imports on one hand and economic development on the other hand. Finally, 
to complement the theoretical approach just described, I touch on various other factors 
affecting trade flows, and sketch some of the main features of international trade and 
core-periphery relations in the research period. It should be noted that sometimes 
elementary matters are included in the following text. While I hope the reader will bear 
with me for their inclusion, I consider them, nevertheless, relevant for the discussion and 
that they need to be commented on in the description of the research plan for the thesis.
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1.2.2. The Causes and the Process of the Economic Transition: 
Current Historical Interpretation
The most extensive study on the economic transition until 1914 is definitely Magnus S. 
Magnusson’s doctoral thesis, Iceland in Transition: Labour and Socio-Economic 
Change Before 1940 (1985). Other studies have touched upon more specific facets of 
the transition, and Magnus’s findings and conclusions broadly present current 
interpretation of the overall transition among historians. Magnus describes the era before 
1880 as the pre-transitional epoch. It was marked by the ‘old’ or traditional Iceland 
when the economy stood at a standstill in developmental terms. By far the largest part of 
the population belonged to peasant households.7 The economy was based on pastoral 
farming where ownership or occupation of land (in return for rent) was the basic unit of 
production and reproduction. Fishing was prosecuted part time by those living nearby 
the coast and on a seasonal basis by those living farther off. The need for labour in the 
farming and the fishing sectors was seasonal in character and coincided rather 
conveniently. The labour requirement peak in farming was during the summer for hay­
making, but the most lucrative seasons in the fishing were during the winter, and labour 
was geographically moved to meet those peaks.8
What then constituted a check on conceivable changes in the Icelandic economy? 
Essentially, it was of double origin, Magnus S. Magnusson claims. First, a key element
7 Throughout the thesis, the term ‘peasant’ is used for the Icelandic term bondi, whether 
sveitabondi (‘inland peasant’) or utvegsbondi (‘seaside peasant’). As Jon 6lafur Isberg points 
out in ‘Hugleidingar um soguskodun Islendinga,’ p 137, the term ‘farmer,’ which is usually 
used by Icelandic historians, it not entirely appropriate. Farmers are a product of capitalistic 
societies while peasants exist in pre-capitalistic societies, like Iceland. For further clarification 
of the socio-economic position of peasants, see, for example, F. Ellis, Peasant Economics: 
Farm Households and Agrarian Development, ch. 1.
8 Magnus S. Magnusson, Iceland in Transition, pp 16, 17, 38-9, 274-6.
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was labour bondage, i.e., the ‘legal obligation of the propertyless classes to commit 
themselves as domestic servants ...’ at the homes of peasants, officials, and other 
recognised households.9 Here, Magnus refers to the fact that by far the largest number of 
those who were did not want to or were unable for various reasons to start farming, and 
could not enter other socially accepted occupations based on learning or artisan skills, 
had to serve as bonded labour for peasants and were hired usually on annual basis. 
Because of this, Magnus argues that a free and unrestricted flow of people into 
permanent fishing throughout the year was blocked. Thus, effectively labour bondage 
barred off the growth of the fishing sector and, thereby, urban areas by the coast.10
Second, Magnus S. Magnusson points out that Iceland had become isolated in 
terms of technology and production relations.11 Pastoral farming had long assumed 
hegemony and certain production relations within it had entrenched themselves over time, 
producing low organisational and technological level in the absence of foreign influence. 
In spite of its geographical location, even in ocean navigation Iceland persisted on a low 
technological level. Magnus ascribes an important role to the low technology in fishing 
in maintaining the archaic structure of the economy. This was to be expected, he says, 
because there were no social or business groups present in Icelandic society to promote 
conceivable changes in the economy. The most likely group to do so, merchants in the 
foreign trade, restricted themselves to exchange, not production.12 Magnus says: ‘The 
existence of institutional factors, such as the Danish monopoly trade, combined with the 
efforts of the native landowning/ruling class effectively prevented any major technical
9 Magnus S. Magnusson, Iceland in Transition, pp 16-17.
10 Magnus S. Magnusson, Iceland in Transition, pp 16-17, 53.
11 Indeed, Magnus uses the term ‘modes of production’ (p 17) in this context, but he admits (p 
227, fn 12) that he sometimes uses this term inaccurately instead of production relations which 
determine the economic structure, the basis of the economy, according to Marx (see pp 219 and 
221). Magnus’s use o f‘modes of production’ in p 17 seems to be such an incidence.
12 Magnus S. Magnusson, Iceland in Transition, pp 17, 48.
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and economical improvements.’13 By Danish monopoly trade, Magnus refers to the 
monopoly of Denmark in Iceland’s foreign trade from the 17th century until the late 19th 
century.
By way of summing up, internal forces were channelled towards upholding the 
status quo and external forces for change were weak or non-existent. What then initiated 
change in the Icelandic economy? According to Magnus, the beginning lay in substantial 
amounts of capital that began to be invested in cod fishing, taking the form of a rapidly 
growing number of decked vessels from around 1880 onwards. This capital came from 
seaside peasants (Icel. utvegsbcendur) and, more important in the long run, from 
merchants of both Icelandic and Danish origin.14 Previously, profits generating from land 
had mostly been circulated within the agricultural sector, and merchants’ profits had 
almost entirely been expatriated to Denmark, but for some reason, which neither Magnus 
nor any other historian has probed into, this changed around 1880.15
The significance of the rise in the number of decked vessels after 1880, Magnus 
says, was that labour was drawn away from agriculture to a greater extent than before 
because the ships conducted their operations during the summer, which coincided with 
the peak season in the farming. Incidentally, as Magnus points out, this entailed less 
conflicts with the farming sector than one might have expected because circumstances 
there generally were at a low ebb in the 1880s. This was evident in, for example, mass 
emigration to America, cold weather and arctic ice, and demographic pressure. The flow 
of people from farming to urban areas meant the emergence of a proletarianisation 
process. Urban areas grew slightly faster than before, the division of labour slowly
13 Magnus S. Magnusson, Iceland in Transition, p 40.
14 Generally, translations of terms for social groups in Iceland are in line with those used in 
Gisli Agust Gunnlaugsson, Family and Household, pp 33—4. However, the term ‘peasant’ is 
always used for the Icelandic term bondi, cf. an earlier footnote in this chapter.
15 Magnus S. Magnusson, Iceland in Transition, pp 17-18,48-9.
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increased, and the first attempts to organise and unite workers were made. These 
changes accelerated in the wake of the unparalleled spurt in the outfit of decked vessels 
in the 1890s onwards but the economy was still at a ‘proto-factory stage,’ because the 
farming dominated and the outflow of people partly was seasonal. Hence, the decked 
vessels did not break the umbilical cord between the farming and fishing, as Magnus S. 
Magnusson puts it.16
Around 1905 — initially, Magnus put the break at about 1910 — the economy 
finally moved into the industrial era when steam trawlers and motor boats were 
introduced into cod fishing. Also, in 1904 the Bank of Iceland was started and Iceland 
received Home Rule, two episodes marking the start of a new age, says Magnus.17 Here, 
Magnus subscribes to historians’ traditional interpretation of the causes of the 
mechanisation and, effectively, industrialisation, and neither he nor any other historian 
has investigated any further why this mechanisation was launched or offered any 
explanation for the timing of this change.18 In the view of some historians, this course of 
events is not self-evident, more profound explanations are needed, and the significance of 
the Bank of Iceland has been doubted.19 In any case, the advent of trawlers and motor 
boats meant a full mechanisation in the fishing, as Magnus points out, while the fish 
processing remained practically the same, involving labour-intensive methods. In terms 
of labour, the relation with farming was finally broken, because the trawlers were 
engaged in fishing activities almost the whole year round, and motor boats made fishing 
a much more stable way of living. Consequently, urban areas grew fast, the division of
16 Magnus S. Magnusson, Iceland in Transition, pp 18-19, 55-6, 87-8, 90-96, 276-7.
17 Magnus S. Magnusson, ‘Innreid nutimans i islenskri efiiahagssogu,’ p 362.
18 Jon I>. For, ‘Velvaeding l islenskum atvinnuvegum,’ p 43.
19 Gisli Gunnarsson, ‘Kenningar urn um utbreidslu f>r6ads hagkerfis,’ pp 20-22. 6lafur 
Asgeirsson, ‘Framsaga Olafs Asgeirssonar BA,’ p 44.
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work increased markedly, proletarianisation was completed, and workers’ unions were 
organised. In a word, the economy entered a new era, which Magnus says grew along
these lines until about 1930, when the great depression set the economy off on a new
20course.
Later studies by other historians generally have complemented the findings of 
Magnus S. Magnusson. However, Gudmundur Halfdanarson has identified an interesting 
shift in the mid 19th century concerning urban areas, and its implications are highly 
relevant in the present context. From the 1850s onwards, the population in urban areas 
(hamlets) in Iceland grew at 1.9-2.8% per annum, when it was ‘only’ 0.75-1.0% per 
annum in the first half of the century. As Gudmundur points out, this seems to be quite 
unrelated to swings in the number of decked vessels, because there is no causal 
connection between the two factors. Gudmundur’s explanation is that farming 
communities were experiencing a heavy population pressure because of a comparatively 
rapid population growth in the first half of the century. Hence, people increasingly were 
forced to find a livelihood outside the countryside, namely by the seaside where the 
population tended to gather in hamlets. Urban labour was necessary for industrialisation 
to materialise, and Gudmundur’s findings indicate that labour was not in short supply. 
But while he stresses the seemingly ample supply of urban labour as a stimulating factor 
for the advent of Iceland’s industrialisation, he acknowledges that it only was one 
prerequisite among many other.21 Gudmundur identified a very important push factor in 
the creation of urban areas in Iceland, but further examination of pull factors is lacking. 
Hence, some historians have pointed out that the role of foreign trade, which is a pull 
factor, may be underestimated in the advent of the economic transformation.22 The
20 Magnus S. Magnusson, Iceland in Transition, pp 15, 19-20, 86, 88-9, 90-96, 277-9.
21 Gudmundur Halfdanarson, ‘Addragandi idnbyltingar,’ pp 29-32.
22 Gunnar Karlsson, ‘Framsaga Gunnars Karlssonar,’ p 33.
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findings of Gudmundur can comply with those of Magnus, but they suggest that out of 
Magnus’s two main explanations for the economic stasis, the bondage labour is less 
plausible than the relative isolation of Iceland. In fact, Magnus’s own findings implicitly 
support this because new capital in the fishing sector (a pull factor) accelerated the 
exodus of people from fanning, and made the labour bondage (a push factor because it 
restricted the freedom of people) irrelevant.
1.2.3. The Institutional Framework of Foreign Trade
According to the reproduction of Magnus S. Magnusson’s findings above, the 
engagement of merchants into operation of decked fishing vessels around 1880 was of 
considerable significance, at least in the long run. Incidentally, this has not spurred any 
particular interest among historians into the causes of this. Neither has it drawn 
historians’ attention to the role of mercantile activity in the Iceland economy nor aroused 
sensitivity for the overall institutional framework of foreign trade. By institutional 
framework reference is made to the structure or organisation of trade. More precisely, it 
includes both formal rules and regulations, such as laws, and business practices and 
procedures that have been formed over time by those engaging in the exchange of goods 
(merchants and their customers) and that have become effectively institutionalised. It 
also includes issues such as concentration of power (number and ownership of merchant 
houses), competition, etc.
This neglect about the institutional framework of Iceland’s foreign trade is all 
the more remarkable since there is at hand an interesting opinion of a contemporary on
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this aspect. The archivist Jon Sigurdsson (1811-79), a man of learning and great 
knowledge of Icelandic history, adamantly maintained that changes in the institutional 
framework of Iceland’s trade were all-important for revitalising the Iceland economy in 
the mid and late 19th century. Jon was at the forefront of the nationalistic movement in 
Iceland, and that may have led him to exaggerate the importance of this matter and 
caused Icelandic historians to brush off his arguments as polemic. Nevertheless, it is 
slightly remarkable that Icelandic historians have not examined his arguments, because 
he is not only a prominent figure in the history of Iceland and in Icelandic 
historiography, but also a national hero because of his leading position in the early 
independence struggle, and his life and work has been recounted many times.
But even if neither the findings of Magnus S. Magnusson nor the writings of Jon 
Sigurdsson had suggested that the structure of trade might be important in relation to the 
economic transition, the very fact that structure matters should have suggested itself for 
research. After all, mercantile activity is not a neutral or impartial transmitter of goods. 
It is an industry to perform a certain function, that is, to exchange exports for imports. 
For that purpose, merchants rely on a set of practices and customary procedures. Just as 
any other industry, its overall structure (the institutional framework), can influence the 
economy no less than its substance or content, which is the trade flows themselves.
1.2.4. Foreign Trade and Economic Development in Theory
Scholars have entertained an interest over time in the relations between exchange of 
goods in foreign trade and economic development. The literature on this subject has
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accumulated as the theoretical constructs have been advanced and refined, and various 
disciplines contributed to this. The core of these ideas is usually associated with gains- 
ffom-trade arguments. In spite of various empirical work based on theory, few hard and 
fast patterns have emerged, partly because methodologies vary and partly because of 
diverse institutional frameworks in foreign trade. Because of this and the fact that my 
aim is to highlight the theoretical relevance of trade flows for the Icelandic transition, the 
discussion below mainly outlines how trade flows can cause a major shift in terms of 
industrial composition in economy. Furthermore, the discussion below about gains from 
trade will be confined to semi-dynamic gains since static and dynamic gains have greater 
relevance for examination of economic growth although they can also affect economic 
development as will be commented on in Chapter III.
While exports are important to provide incomes and cash for any economy 
(trade surplus), their role in providing imports is even more significant because of the 
developmental implications of imports. This is because imports offer the chance to 
overcome limitations of and restrictions in the resource base. Note in this context that it 
is irrelevant whether imports are supplied through exports or whether they come in the 
form of capital investments by foreign parties. Imports are typically grouped into 
consumer goods and producer goods, depending on their use rather than their product 
characteristics, and services. Of these three valuables, the development potential of 
consumer imports is perhaps the smallest. Basically, those consumer imports in greatest 
demand may provide a stimulus either for their production internally (import 
substitution) or for consumers to produce more exports, to satisfy rising wants for these 
consumer imports. Hence, consumer imports can cause diversification in the industrial 
base or increase exports in a spiral way. The developmental implications of consumer 
goods are possibly larger in the latter case in that they do not necessarily simply cause a 
greater export production. Instead, they may stimulate specialisation in the economy
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where economic resources are directed into production of goods where the economy has 
the greatest comparative advantages (or the least comparative disadvantages).
Producer goods, however, have more direct relevance for development in that 
they provide the means of production, that is, capital goods and intermediate goods for 
the purposes of production of goods. And since economic development for the past two 
centuries or so has mainly been propelled by mechanisation of production processes and 
rising relative production of manufactures, the acquisition and employment of producer 
goods is of major importance in terms of development. With no less development 
potentials are services that are supplied through exports, because they provide skills, 
knowledge, and ideas for the production purposes they are meant to serve, but they may 
also feed into other activities in the economy. Besides, the introduction of capital goods 
may require service imports as well, if the capital goods are to be used properly and 
efficiently. Finally, to put exports and imports in a perspective, the size of the export 
sector is a variable that one must also pay attention to when examining semi-dynamic 
gains from trade.
No scholar has examined this particular theoretical relationship between 
Iceland’s trade flows and the start of the economic transformation. However, one scholar 
has examined the relation between Iceland’s principal export sector, fishing and fish- 
processing, and the transformatory process in the early 20th century, after the transition 
was in full swing. This is the geographer Sigfus Jonsson and the venue was his doctoral 
thesis, ‘The Development of the Icelandic Fishing Industry 1900-1940 and Its Regional 
Implications’ (1981). The approach Sigfus employed is based on the staples theory with 
insights from the linkages approach; for further explication of these constructs, I refer to 
Chapter III. Briefly, the theory considers three component to be decisive for the 
economic history of newly settled regions, namely geography (natural resources), 
institutions, and technology. Production processes in the economy have their own
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particular production relations through individual patterns in the use of these three 
components in varying quantities. The theory assumes that export staples are more 
important than other production processes in the economy, and that they are highly 
influential for the economy in terms of the type and location of economic activities, 
infrastructure, social structure, etc. Also, the theory assumes that because of their 
extraordinary importance, shifts in export staples practically reshape the economy over 
time and cause new types and locations of economic activities, different infrastructure 
and social structure, etc.
Sigfus Jonsson’s application of the staples theory, as informed by the linkages 
approach, illustrates the central idea of the theory and the difference between my purpose 
in the present research and that of Sigfus in his doctoral thesis. Whereas I deal with the 
causes of the transition and its internal causal relationship until 1914, and concentrate on 
the significance of foreign trade in that process, Sigfus aims at analysing the principal 
export sector (fishing) over time. For this purpose he examines a host of issues and 
aspects, most of them lying within the export sector. They include the level of technology 
in fishing and fish processing, the organisation of fish exports, growth of infrastructure 
and industries serving the export sector, government intervention, national export 
incomes, and finally spatial or geographical implications of the growth of the fishing 
sector. In other words, I concentrate on the significance of foreign trade in toto for the 
transformatory process in the economy, while Sigfus in the main confines himself to 
analysing the only economic activity entirely devoted to exporting, both the activity itself 
and factors affecting its course over time. Hence, the outwards influences of the export 
sector, which I examine to some extent, are practically left out in Sigfus’s research, and 
he does not pay attention to other sectors in the economy that produce for export as well 
as the domestic market.
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Clearly, in comparison with the gains-from-trade arguments, the staples theory 
offers a relatively different approach to the interplay between trade flows and economic 
development. The theory does this by addressing new kinds of links between trade and 
the economy while leaving out other links. Leaving aside their differences, the main 
merits of both constructs is that they emphasise the need to examine trade flows when 
probing into economic development. With the exception of Sigfus Jonsson, this need has 
been eschewed or overlooked in Icelandic historical research, and Magnus S. 
Magnusson’s work is included because his methodology does not give him chance to take 
this aspect in. This is because foreign trade and the rest of the world is necessarily and 
effectively exogenous to the traditional historical materialism model, which Magnus 
uses. True, Magnus devotes several pages to Iceland’s foreign trade and shipping, and he 
tries to detect how it influenced the pattern of production relations he is arguing for in his 
study.23 However, this is a very brief discussion about some of the main trends and, more 
important, trade is viewed within the framework of historical materialism where it has no 
special place.24 In other words, Magnus’s treatment of the topic is no examination of 
foreign trade per se, and because of his model he misses the dynamics of foreign trade 
and its potential impact on the economy in terms of both the institutional framework and 
trade flows. This deficient of historical materialism as a research method, along with its 
tendency towards linear-stages thought, is well known in the theoretical literature as 
developmentalism.25 It has been criticised by many, but those advocating analytical or
23 Magnus S. Magnusson, Iceland in Transition, pp 40-43, 65-70.
24 Trade is nowhere explicit in the analytical framework Magnus employs, according to his 
explication of it (Magnus S. Magnusson, Iceland in Transition, pp 219-27).
25 P.J. T[aylor], ‘developmentalism,’ pp 130-31.
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‘rational choice’ Marxism have reacted by trying to take a more realistic account of 
foreign trade.26
1.2.5. The Contemporary World Economy: International Trade 
and Core-Periphery Relations
It is common knowledge in the international economic history literature that international 
trade was growing during the research period, and that peripheral regions were 
increasingly integrated into the world economy through trade. This understanding 
probably has escaped most Icelandic historians, even if they were aware of a 
considerable expansion in Iceland’s foreign trade compared to earlier times.27 Therefore, 
the foreign trade of Iceland has not been perceived or interpreted with much reference to 
this fact.28 However, with reference to the international context, Iceland’s foreign trade 
ought to be a highly relevant issue when examining the economic transition of Iceland,
26 T.J. B[ames], ‘analytical Marxism, geography and,’ pp 15-17, and H.D. Evans, 
Comparative Advantage and Growth, pp xiii, 2, 4, 212. An example of Marxist sensitivity to 
some extent towards foreign trade in economic development is J. Sender and S. Smith’s The 
Development o f Capitalism in Africa.
27 For instance, Gunnar Karlsson does not mention this world expansion in trade and suggests 
instead that changes in technology in neigbouring countries stimulated expansion in Iceland’s 
foreign trade in late 19th century. See Gunnar Karlsson, ‘Framsaga Gunnars Karlssonar,’ pp 
33-4.
28 A paper by the present author may be regarded as the first attempt, yet tentative, to highlight 
the relevance of foreign trade for the start of the economic transition. See Halldor Bjamason, 
‘Utanrikisverslun Islands a seinni hluta 19. aldar: Faein atridi um fjarmagn, verslun og 
hagbroun’ (1997). This assessment rests on the understanding that the economic transition was 
not merely in the form of a mechanisation (industrialisation) in the fishing sector (see Chapter 
X), as Sigfus Jonsson (1981) assumed in his studies. But to be sure, Sigfus departs from the 
traditional perception of Icelandic historians in that he is influenced by the staple theory and 
puts export staples and foreign markets in central place when explaining the economic history 
of Iceland after 1900.
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because it would be slightly remarkable if foreign trade did not in some way influence 
the Iceland economy in this era of rising international trade.
Also, foreign trade should be a very relevant issue for an island economy like 
Iceland, because findings in international economic history research suggested that 
economies with a relatively small natural resource base, and usually small in 
geographical size too, tended to have large export sectors. Other things equal, foreign 
trade, therefore, was relatively more influential in economic activity than in large 
economies. But there are even more intriguing reasons for examining this relationship 
between trade and the Icelandic transition.
The position of Iceland in international context during the research period has 
received negligible interest among Icelandic historians. Most often, the history of Iceland 
is compared to that of the other Nordic countries. This comparison is justifiable in many 
respects, but when it comes to their economic history, the Nordic countries are not the 
only or necessarily the ideal economies to compare with Iceland in a rigorous way. This 
is because Iceland’s economic position was considerably different from the Scandinavian 
countries, saving Finland. In name, Iceland was a dependency, but it will argued later in 
the thesis that the term colony is more apt, at least with regard to economic relations. 
Denmark and Sweden, on the other hand, were in my research period independent, and 
Norway practically so, although a part o f the Swedish kingdom. Norway, in any case, 
never came close to be a dependency or colony, while the status of Faroe Islands and 
Greenland, which were also Danish possessions, was more like that of Iceland. This 
difference in constitutional and, effectively, economic position is very important because 
it can be claimed that it heavily influenced the economic history of all these countries. 
More precisely, in Iceland, as well as in the Faroes and Greenland, archaic and partly 
restrictive characteristics in their factor markets and social structures persisted, while the
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societies of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden to a varying extent experienced economic 
development and modernisation akin to the one that took place in Western Europe.
Looking at this matter in a larger context, when the Iceland economy is 
compared with other contemporary societies that were also predominantly traditional and 
peripheral, it seems safe to suggest that the economic position of Iceland was much more 
like them than the Scandinavian countries. Note that I am speaking here about positions 
of the respective economies relative to the international context in terms of trade and 
politics. Hence, I am not referring to any direct similarities in their resource base or 
social structure, let alone culture, although there are no doubt numerous parallels in their 
history and in the elements of their societies, including economic systems. Taking a 
concrete example from the economic history of Iceland during my research period, 
Iceland had enclave activities that were owned by foreign entrepreneurs and companies, 
run partly with Icelandic labour, but actually operating on the boarder of the economy 
and with the profits of the enterprises expatriated. The enclaves in Iceland, herring 
fishing and whaling enterprises, are classic examples of enclaves that were common in 
many places in peripheral regions of the world in the research period. This fact seems to 
have escaped most Icelandic historians because these enclaves have at best only 
implicitly, and nowhere explicitly, been linked to this world-wide phenomenon to the best 
of my knowledge.29
All of this should in fact not surprise those familiar with the economic history of 
the world economy in the research period, but it may be a strange perspective with 
regard to Icelandic historiography.30 It seems rather evident that Iceland was a typical
29 The first instance of this realisation seems to be in Halldor Bjamason, ‘Utanrikisverslun 
Islands a seinni hluta 19. aldar: Faein atridi uni fjarmagn, verslun og hagbroun’ (1997).
30 Probably the first Icelandic historian to claim support for this world-wide comparative 
approach in historical research of traditional societies and peripherial regions is borsteinn 
Helgason, ‘Skilyrdi hradbrdunar’ (1986).
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periphery in terms of the world economy whereas the Scandinavian countries saving 
Finland were more like the Western European core countries. This perception of Iceland 
is based on the understanding that the world economy broadly was divided into two in 
the research period. On the one hand were the Western European core economies that 
industrialised one after another in the 19th century, with Britain starting in the 18th 
century. On the other hand were peripheral regions and they can be split broadly into the 
intra-European periphery, the tropics, and the temperate settlements. The trend in the 
world economy in the research period was that the core economies were extending their 
influence, not only economically and politically but also culturally, into peripheral 
regions — directly and indirectly. Hence, the economic history of the world economy in 
the period is one of integration, extension of power, and inter-dependence on a world 
scale. It is only logical to study the history of Iceland with due notice to the fact that the 
island was a part of the peripheral regions of the world and subject to similar patterns in 
its economic history.
1.2.6. Key Research Questions
The historical problem that the thesis focuses on may be restated in the following way. 
The start of the economic transformation of Iceland has been interpreted primarily with 
reference to selected internal elements, traditionally on the basis of the mechanisation in 
the fishing sector but later in terms of production relations in the sense of historical 
materialism. For a variety of reasons listed above, this is too a narrow approach and 
perhaps the most relevant matter not considered so far in relation to the economic
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transition is Iceland’s foreign trade. Therefore, the principal aim of the present research 
is to test the overall relevance of foreign trade for the process of the economic transition 
in Iceland from its beginning until the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Also, it was 
decided to put the findings in a broader context and tentatively consider the Icelandic 
case in terms of some of the literature about patterns in the contemporary world 
economy and international trade. These aims can be broken down to five sets of 
questions, and analytically the search for answers requires a five step procedure.
1) What major shifts occurred in the exports and imports of Iceland in terms of 
commodity composition, quantities, and prices?
2) How were Iceland’s balances of trade and terms of trade, and how did the 
levels of the volume and value of trade change over time?
3) In what ways did shifts in the trade flows affect the economy and, especially, 
the process of the economic transition as it has been described in the 
literature?
4) Similarly, in what ways did shifts in the institutional framework of trade 
affect the economy and, especially, the process of the economic transition as 
it has been described in the literature?
5) With reference to comparative research on the economic history of 
contemporary peripheral economies, how was Iceland’s performance in terms 
of economic growth and development? Also, what does comparative research 
suggest about the sources of and barriers to growth and, particularly, 
development? From this point of view, how well do existing explanations fit 
the Icelandic case?
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To analyse the impact of foreign trade on the economy and, especially, the 
economic transition, it is necessary, first, to perform a comprehensive trade analysis, 
which means that both exports and imports have to be examined closely. This entails in 
the first instance examination of the types of exports and imports, aggregated at different 
levels, the economic context of exports and imports in terms of existing production and 
consumption patterns respectively in Iceland, the quantities and values of exports and 
imports, their prices and market countries. In the case of export staples, shifts in their 
demand and their competitive position in the markets are discussed and explained. More 
general aspects of the trade flows will then be examined and there I compute and discuss 
Iceland’s trade balance by countries and in total, terms of trade by different criteria, as 
well as value and volume indices individually. By surveying the trade flows, an extensive 
picture will be offered of the impact of international markets on the Iceland economy in 
terms of both exports and imports. This will also give answers to many questions about 
production and consumption patterns in Iceland and how these patterns changed over 
times as a result of internal and external factors.
Following the trade analysis itself, the macro-economic implications of identified 
shifts in the trade flows will be examined in some detail with the help of the special 
research method employed in the thesis. In other words, the significance of the main 
shifts in the trade flows will be assessed by examining whether and how they had impact 
on the economy and the transitory process.
Subsequently, the focus will be moved to the institutional framework of trade. 
This means examination of many but not all aspects of the formal and informal section 
of trade. The focus will be on changes in the law and in voluntary practices, customs, 
and procedures that emerged in the exchange of goods over time. As happens, some 
changes in the institutional framework were specific to products while other changes 
applied to exports or imports in general, and both sides are included in the analysis in the
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thesis. As in the case of the trade flows, the shifts in the institutional framework of trade 
will be examined in more detail with the help of the research method to assess the 
significance of the main shifts in the institutional framework and examine whether and 
how they had impact on the economy and the transitory process.
Finally, to amplify and complement the findings of the analysis, the findings for 
Iceland are discussed with reference to some of the research on the contemporary world 
economy and the economic history of peripheral regions. The logic behind this was that 
it would be fruitful to look at the Icelandic experience in international comparison so that 
important similarities and dissimilarities between Iceland and other contemporary 
economies in transition could be identified better. This exercise partly required an 
approach based on the methodology of economics, such as factor market analysis, as 
well as discussion about historical models from economic history. It was considered 
worth the while to put the Iceland case in international context in this way, although the 
treatment of the subject is inevitably tentative.
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1.3. Review of Relevant Literature
It seems safe to say that scholarly research in the economic history of Iceland in the late 
19th century and the early 20th century is still in its infancy. Fifteen years ago Magnus 
S. Magnusson found the state of research in this field to be poor,31 and although the 
publication of useful studies and primary material has increased, research into, for 
instance, foreign trade in this period is still laborious and time-consuming because of 
lack of research and want of reproduction of primary sources.
With regard to the trade flows, it is short to say that the literature is small. There 
is no general account or historical survey with sufficient breakdown of either exports or 
imports over time, there are few solid studies on individual export branches, and there 
are no studies at all about individual imports. Probably the most useful studies about 
exports were Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason’s Saltfiskur i sogu 
pjodar, volume 1 (1997), which deals with Iceland’s saltfish industry, and Sveinbjorn 
Blondal’s Saudasalan til Bretlands (1982), which is about live sheep sales to Britain. 
An helpful work deserving mention is Matthias bordarson’s Sttdarsaga islands (2n ed. 
1939) about herring exports. Unlike the studies above, this is not a scholarly work but it 
is informative in spite of patchy and insufficient references. Also, Trausti Einarsson 
deals with exports of whaling products in his scholarly work Hvalveidar vid Island 
1600-1939 (1987). In spite of useful historical information from these sources, only the 
first two contained statistics that were useful. Hence, there was a limited help from 
existing literature in the trade analysis, and, moreover, the primary material that was 
analysed (trade statistics) had to be collected from the original sources (printed trade 
returns).
31 Magnus S. Magnusson, Iceland in Transition, pp 22-3.
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The state of research is not much better whereas the institutional framework of 
trade is concerned. In the first place, there is no account on either the formal or informal 
section of the institutional setting in my period. In the case of the law governing 
Iceland’s foreign trade, the information was gathered from primary sources. The only 
piece of writing containing some outline of the informal institutions is Matthias 
bordarson’s Dansk-Islandsk Samhandel 1787-1942 (1942), but it is very sketchy in 
treatment of the matter, and it only deals with the pre-transitional situation.32 True, there 
is a number of biographies, local histories, business histories, and special studies where 
issues belonging to the institutional framework are commented on, but they were not 
always meant to be scholarly and the treatment is often haphazard and rather unfocused. 
Also, these writings have usually preoccupied themselves with indigenous initiative, that 
is, Icelandic merchants and Icelandic trading associations, and only dealt superficially 
with Danish merchants. Given the preponderance of Danish merchant houses in Iceland’s 
foreign trade and the nature of these writings, they were considered of too limited a value 
to search for and scrutinise.
Besides, even if this literature is used as far as it goes, changes in informal 
institutions can only partly be sketched on the basis of these studies, and there was not 
time to work systematically on primary sources. Since, it was not possible to offer 
comprehensive account of the informal section of the institutional framework of trade, 
selected issues were chosen to discuss in the thesis, such as business practices between 
merchants and their customers, and both secondary sources and primary sources used 
somewhat randomly to fill in the picture.
In other parts of the thesis, when the links from foreign trade to the economy 
Iceland and the transition were traced, a number of sources were used, both primary and
32 Matth. Thordarson, Dansk-Islandsk Samhandel 1787-1942, pp 37-46.
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secondary. It goes without saying that there are also many gaps in the literature, but they 
were not equally as much burden for the research as the scarcity of literature about 
foreign trade.
1.4. Sources and Methods in General
1.4.1. The Trade Analysis
The purpose with the trade analysis essentially was to provide general and detailed 
information about the trade flows, their economic context, and a host of matters relating 
to both exports and imports, including product-specific changes in the institutional 
framework, for instance, new merchants or new producers of exports. This part of the 
research was relatively straightforward and empirical in nature because the objective 
was to gather relevant information and present them systematically. The sources for this 
part of the research were mainly trade returns although a range of other primary sources, 
literature, and reference works were used too.
The trade returns employed were predominantly returns of the countries trading 
with Iceland, but Icelandic returns were also used. A priori, the most obvious source was 
the Icelandic returns, but it was clear at the same time that they were problematic.33 This 
is because they are not a product of ordinary customs inspection as trade returns usually
33 See Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur i sogu pjodar, vol. 1, 
table appendix, and Gudmundur Jdnsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna. 
Icelandic Historical Statistics, Section 10.
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are. Instead, they were based on essentially voluntary reports from merchants and their 
collection by the central administration was not always entirely successful. Apart from 
this, the reports that were returned are subject to both systematic and accidental under­
reporting, besides lacking information about value of exports and imports until 1895. 
Instead of requesting information about values as well as quantities, separate reports 
were made about average prices. Also, the processing of the reports for publication as 
official trade returns was such that until 1895 no information was published about the 
countries trading with Iceland. Finally, whereas the specification of exports was 
satisfying, a large part of the imports was reported in the printed returns in compound 
commodity groups that are of restricted analytical value.
In spite of all the deficiencies of the Icelandic trade returns, an attempt was 
made to use them as a basis for the trade analysis during 1870 to 1895, after which the 
Icelandic returns became usable in technical sense. But the attempt was effectively futile, 
and I eventually ended up using trade returns of the countries trading with Iceland as a 
basis for the trade analysis for 1870 to 1895. Furthermore, when the Icelandic returns 
for 1896 to 1914 were inspected in comparison with the trade returns of Iceland’s 
trading partners, a considerable under-reporting was discovered in the Icelandic source, 
and the foreign returns were preferred. Also, the foreign returns excelled the Icelandic 
returns by far in terms of commodity specification, and while this advantage seemed not 
so important at first, it became extremely useful later in the research. Hence, the 
Icelandic trade returns ultimately only became a supplementary source, although the 
returns were very useful where they offered information not to be found elsewhere.
For further information about the trade datasets, I refer to Appendix A where 
they are more closely described. There, I also discuss various problems relating to the 
making of the returns, the processing of the data, and the varying qualities of the present 
datasets that were built up. If suffices to say here that extensive datasets were prepared
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and the information aggregated by various criteria for the purpose of the research, both 
in tables and graphs. The main summary tables are to be found in Appendix A while 
some of their aggregates are highlighted in a selection of graphs that accompany the 
main text.
1.4.2. Links from Trade to the Economy
A search in the theoretical and empirical literature in economic history showed that it did 
not offer any approach that clearly was suitable for the purpose of the research. The 
staples theory was feasible in that it was comparatively extensive as commented on 
above, and it integrated a number of important basic, economic components or 
determinants within a single explanatory framework. Nevertheless, it is a theory and as 
such, it rather is a statement of a particular causal relationship between the basic 
components than an extensive analytical framework to test actual relationships between 
the components, allowing for many types of economic outcomes. Besides, the 
preoccupation of the staples theory with exports, ignoring the role of imports, fitted 
uneasily with the gains-from-trade arguments that offered a wider and highly relevant 
perspective on the relation between trade and development. Because of these reasons, the 
staples theory as such was found somewhat restrictive and not suitable.
As time passed, a certain analytical construct had been fused into the original 
staples theory, and the theory used in this extended form by a number of scholars, 
including Sigfus Jonsson. This was the linkages idea, and this intrinsic part of the 
extended staples theory suggested itself as my principal research method. Further reading
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in economics, particularly development economics, and inspection of scholars’ 
application and criticism of the staples theory in economic history gradually convinced 
me of the applicability of the linkages approach as my basic research method. This idea 
of linkages is explicated in Chapter III but in brief, it claims that every economic activity 
can and does produce certain linkages, and these linkages are traced to their 
macroeconomic context. Thus, a particular line of production can have backwards, 
forwards, fiscal, and consumption linkages. They stand for the types of impact that this 
economic activity has on the economy with regard to possible provision of its producer 
goods and service inputs, further processing of its outputs, money revenues from exports 
and imports to the state, and rewards to factors of production (excluding producer 
goods).
The general linkages approach was very useful as a first step for the 
examination of links from trade to the economy. By its nature, however, it is far more 
suitable for scrutinising the flows of production and consumption, than for inspecting 
overall shifts in factor use. This is because it essentially is focused on flows in values, 
whichever products or money, and not on organisational change in the use of factors. 
Since the thesis was no less concerned with shifts in the way utilisation of factors of 
production is organised, another way had to be found to deal with this aspect. How I 
coped with this methodological problem is explained in Chapter III, but it suffices to say 
that a certain economic determinants model was used. In short, it assumes that all 
economic activity is based on utilisation of four elements or determinants, namely 
geography, population, technology, and institutions. The model is meant to analyse how 
industries form their own particular patterns in the use of these elements, which, thereby, 
become factors of production but at another level in the analysis. Shifts in the 
composition of industrial activities are reflected in a different pattern in the use of factors 
and, effectively thereby, in elements. In this way, the model gives an opportunity to
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analyse these patterns and how they change, for instance, in economic development. This 
economic determinants model was the deciding factor in attaining the ultimate aims of 
the research. Without it, the overall economic impact of either institutional change in 
foreign trade or trade flows could not have been analysed in as effective a way as I 
believe the outcome witnesses.
1.5. Disposition
Apart from this Introduction (Chapter I), Conclusions and Implications (Chapter X), and 
Appendices, thematically the thesis falls into three parts. The first part is where the scene 
of the research is set, empirically (Chapter II) and theoretically and methodologically 
(Chapter III). Chapter II conveys some background information about Iceland besides 
offering an introduction to historical circumstances in Iceland around 1870 and a brief 
historical account of selected themes until 1914. I start the chapter with a sketch of 
natural conditions, population, industries, infrastructure, and economic circumstances as 
of 1870, while I describe external relations from 1870 to 1914. Subsequently, I deal with 
foreign trade of Iceland by describing legal and natural conditions of trade from 1870 to 
1914, and by sketching the institutional framework in 1870. The chapter concludes with 
a few words about restraints in the Iceland economy in the 19th century.
In Chapter III, I first look at what has been said about the relevance of foreign 
trade and international markets for traditional economies like Iceland. Theories about 
gains from trade in terms of economic growth and development are discussed and so are 
trade policies. This is supplemented with a reproduction of an opinion of an Icelandic
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contemporary, Jon Sigurdsson, who wrote about growth and developmental potentials of 
Iceland with regard to its foreign trade. Having outlined the theoretical underpinnings of 
the research, its methods of research are described.
The second part of the thesis (Chapters IV-VI) is devoted to the examination of 
trade flows from a variety of angles and presents the results of the trade analysis. 
Chapter IV is a comprehensive survey of exports of Iceland. The level of total exports, 
their composition, and changes over time, both by value and quantity, and destinations of 
exports is examined. The economic context of exports over time is described, the level of 
export concentration is commented on, and attention is paid to circumstances in foreign 
markets by commenting on prices and principal competitors among other countries. 
Chapter V offers equivalent treatment of imports of Iceland. This part of the thesis is 
concluded by Chapter VI, which deals with balances of trade, externally-owned exports 
and imports that arose from enclave activities, storage of trade surpluses, volume and 
price trends, besides terms of trade, and gains from trade through labour reallocation. 
Also, the pattern in Iceland’s trade by countries is described, thus allowing to expose the 
system of trade surpluses and deficits.
The third part of the thesis (Chapters VII-IX) analyses the impact of Iceland’s 
foreign trade on the economy and, particularly, the economic transition with the help of 
the general linkages approach and the economic determinants model. It also puts the 
findings in international context. Chapter VII deals with the implications of trade flows 
for the Icelandic economy while Chapter VIII deals with the implications of institutional 
change in foreign trade for the Icelandic economy. The core of the first chapter is 
examination of live sheep exports and a fall in the prices of saltfish. In the second 
chapter, the institutional implications of the live sheep exports are first examined and 
then the focus is put on shifts in the levels of money supply. In Chapter IX, I attempt to 
interpret the findings for Iceland in terms of the international context. First, the theme
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from Chapter III about the alleged gains from grade is revisited. The historical evidence 
is outlined and the reasons why traditional economies fared very unevenly in this respect 
are discussed. Then, the Iceland economy and the findings presented in Chapters VII and 
VIII are cast in terms of the different explanatory frameworks that have been employed 
in the economic history literature on trade and development. Finally, the findings for 
Iceland are discussed in terms of two particular historical patterns scholars have found 
to exist, namely colonial relations on one hand and dualism and enclaves on the other.
Finally, Chapter X offers conclusions with reference to the research questions 
and a discussion of the implications of the findings of the thesis, after which a few words 
are added about various aspects and issues calling for further research in future. 
Concerning the core theme of the thesis — the relevance of foreign trade for the 
economic transition of Iceland until 1914 — it will be argued that foreign trade was all- 
important for the start of the transition and its onwards process that was characterised 
by two distinct forces of motion, capital investment in fishing and unprecedented money 
inflow, rather than the first only. In fact, the money inflow is considered to have started 
the monetisation of the economy and, in turn, modernisation of the economy as well. 
Therefore, it is maintained that the findings call for a re-assessment of the existing 
interpretation of the economic transition in the research period, that is, its causes, nature, 
timing, and wider historical implications.
For information about technical matters relating to the trade datasets and other 
series presented in the thesis, five Appendices are included for consultation. Appendix A 
comprises an explanatory text about the trade data followed by a selection of tables used 
for the trade analysis. The explanatory text is a relatively detailed account about the 
making of the trade datasets, the sources used, and the procedures followed in their 
building, for instance, explanations for estimates that were necessary, and how various 
problems were solved. Appendix B deals with externally-owned exports and imports 
(enclave activities). It discusses problems of definition and the sources about exports and
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imports of enclaves, and the methods used in the thesis. Appendix C has comments about 
practical and methodological issues relating to the choice of trade indices, and previous 
estimates of trade indices are compared with those produced in the present research. 
Appendix D explains how gross margins in Iceland’s trade with Denmark were 
computed. Finally, Appendix E contains the series underlying selected international 
commodity price series that are graphed in the thesis, together with references to the 
respective sources.
Chapter II 
The Icelandic Economy in the Late 19th Century
11.1. Natural Conditions
Iceland is an island in the North Atlantic ocean, lying between Norway and Greenland 
just south of the Arctic Circle. It has an area of 103,100 km . The geology of Iceland is 
determined by its location, because it is situated astride a plate boundary, which is a part 
of the mid-ocean, ridge-rift system. The plates are moving in divergent directions, 
causing volcanism across the country and outside the main rift line as well (Map II. 1). 
Besides volcanic eruptions of various kinds, earthquakes and geothermal activity is also 
a consequence of the volcanism. In spite of many volcanoes and eruptions in pre-historic 
and historic times, the country is largely a table land where the average height above sea- 
level is 500 m and one quarter of the land is below 200 m.1 There are also lowlands, the 
largest of which are in the southwest part of the country.
The geology of Iceland and the country’s location heavily influence the physical 
geography of the country. At the time of settlement in the 9th and 10th century AD, it is 
estimated that about half of the country was covered with vegetation and, thus, soils. The 
reasons for this relative nakedness of the country are several. In geological sense, the
1 Sigurdur horarinsson, ‘Geology and Physical Geography,’ pp 1, 3, 5-6. See also borleifur 
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country is comparatively young so vegetation had had a relatively short time to develop. 
Furthermore, the volcanism and the ice that more or less covered the country in glacial 
periods caused a destruction of soil and vegetation. Also, the geographical isolation of 
the country hindered immigration of flora.2
New findings indicate that the vegetation area contracted immediately after 
settlement after which the vegetation remained on a similar level over the centuries (Map 
II.2). The contraction was due to the habitation of man, for the vegetation cover was 
eroded through wood cutting for domestic use and wood burning to make charcoal. With 
the depletion of wood, which was mainly birch bushes, the soil was left uncovered, 
resulting in erosion of the soil where it was weak. This was because peat soils, which 
currently make up about 40% of the total soil cover, have a low percentage of clay, 
making its structure weak and susceptible to erosion by wind and water. This was 
especially unfortunate because of the generally cool climate of Iceland, chemical and 
biological processes work slowly in building up soil, and a deterioration in temperature 
in Iceland during ca 1300-1900 probably contributed to this process. Also, lava flows 
and distribution of ash from volcanic eruptions often destroyed tracts of land temporarily 
or permanently. Today it is estimated that about half of the initial size of the vegetation 
area still has soil cover. Thus, according to disputable official figures, about 1% of 
Iceland is cultivated, while 20% is used as grazing areas, about 50% is waste land, and 
the remaining 29% are glaciers, lakes, lava, and sands. The situation around 1870 
probably was in general similar to that of today (Map II.3).3
2 Sigurdur borarinsson, ‘Geology and Physical Geography,’ pp 2, 6-8. EyJ)6r Einarsson, ‘Flora 
and Vegetation,’ pp 25-6. See also borleifur Einarsson, Geology o f Iceland.
3 Ami Daniel Juliusson, ‘The Environmental Effects of Icelandic Subsistence Farming.’ 
Sigurdur borarinsson, ‘Geology and Physical Geography,’ pp 7-8. Icel., Nat. Ec. Inst., Basic 
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The climate of Iceland is best termed as cold-tempered oceanic because the 
summer is cool (10-11° C) and winter is mild (around 0° C). However, Iceland lies in 
climatic boundary zones because air masses coming to Iceland from south and north are 
of tropical and polar origin respectively, and so are oceanic currents. This causes 
regional variations in temperature, precipitation, and the extent and location of drift ice 
off Iceland, but seasonal movements are far larger and they depend on atmospheric 
depressions crossing the Atlantic.4 Economically, currents in the sea are perhaps of more 
importance for Iceland because they very much affect fishing in Icelandic waters (Map 
II.4). Therefore, it is not the surface geographical location of the country that has been 
most important for living conditions but the oceanic landscape. Between East Greenland 
and the British Isles there is a sub-oceanic ridge and Iceland is situated along it. Because 
of this, a particular sub-current of the massive tropical Gulf current, which moves east 
and northwards across the Atlantic ocean, takes a turn westwards along the south side of 
the Greenland-Scotland ridge. This is the Irminger current and it flows south off Iceland 
and then turns northwards between Greenland and Iceland. Off the northwest part of the 
country the Irminger current meets a cold Polar current with which it merges. Together 
they form an arctic current that moves eastwards north off Iceland and then turns 
southwards where it meets the Irminger current south of the ridge. This system of 
oceanic currents around Iceland, which also affects temperature and salinity of the sea, 
makes it possible for Atlantic-boreal species like cod to spawn and grow up south and 
west off Iceland, while Arctic-boreal species like herring live north and east of Iceland.5
It is safe to say that Iceland was a relatively barren country in our research 
period, both in terms of vegetation and terrestrial natural resources. Not only was
4 Sigurdur borarinsson, ‘Geology and Physical Geography,’ p 8.
5 Ingvar Hallgrimsson, ‘Life in the Iceland Seas,’ pp 9-11.
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vegetation already confined at the time of the settlement, but it contracted considerably 
afterwards. Owing to its geological history, Iceland was scarce in commercial, terrestrial 
natural resources. Hence, the economy’s potentials for diversification were considerably 
confined because of the resource base. Of viable raw materials, only sulphur could be 
found in considerable quantities, but transport difficulties and other reasons hindered any 
large-scale exploitation in the 19th century.6 The only natural resource in abundance in 
the 19th century was Icelandic waters, because they were underutilised and could 
support a larger population than lived in Iceland, even at the existing level of technology.
11.2. Socio-Economic Structure, Economic 
Circumstances, and External Relations
In the present chapter, sections two to five are devoted to a description and analysis of 
some of the most important aspects of Icelandic society. While external relations, besides 
legal and natural conditions of trade, will be discussed in relation to the whole period 
under study, socio-economic structure and business conditions will only be discussed as 
they were around 1870. This is because in my view, the socio-economic structure and 
general business conditions primarily developed because of shifts in the trade flow 
(exports) and the institutional framework of the foreign trade. And since the impact of 
exports and institutions in foreign trade on the economy will be specifically dealt with in
6 Saemundur Rognvaldsson, ‘Husavik fyrri tima: Verslun, brennisteinsnam og kirkja,’ pp 45- 
66. Frank Ponzi, Islandfyrir aldamot. Iceland: The Dire Years.
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the thesis, changes in socio-economic structure and business conditions are best 
described and analysed in connection with them (see Chapters VII- VIII).
2.1. Population, Industries, and Infrastructure Around 1870
Icelanders are descendants of Norwegian and Celtic people who settled in Iceland in the 
9th and 10th century AD, and there has been a relatively small influx of people of other 
nationalities over the centuries. The native tongue is Icelandic, which has changed 
comparatively little from Old-Norse, which was spoken in Scandinavia at the time of 
settlement and is the mother tongue of the modem Nordic languages. In spite of various 
contacts with other countries and influences from Europe over the centuries, including 
christianisation in 1000 AD, Iceland was still predominantly a traditional economy 
around 1870, broadly using R. Dasmann’s definition of ‘ecosystem people’ who are 
‘members of indigenous cultures who live within a single ecosystem, or at most two or 
three adjacent and closely related ecosystems.’7 While the kind of society referred to with 
such phrasing can be relatively easily grasped, the choice of an appropriate term is a
7 G.A. Klee, ‘Introduction’ to World Systems o f Traditional Resource Management, ed. by 
G.A. Klee, p 1.
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minefield.8 Nevertheless, in this thesis the term ‘traditional’ economy or society will be 
preferred to premodem or ‘subsistence’ economy, ‘self-sufficiency,’ or ‘household 
production’ to list a few other common terms. Household production is intrinsic to 
traditional societies, and references to subsistence and self-sufficiency obscure the trade 
element that is intrinsic in traditional economies.9 Hence, the definition must include 
internal and external trade, besides subsistence-orientation, and it does not imply any 
value-judgement whatsoever.10 The terms LDCs and Third World appear in the thesis 
also, the first referring primarily to transitional societies in this century (no longer wholly 
traditional), and the latter is a geographical shorthand for LDCs around the world.11
In 1870, the population in Iceland numbered 70,000 people. Practically all of 
them lived in rural areas (Map II.5) because pastoral farming formed the socio-economic 
basis of the economy. The farming was of a peasant type, each household forming the 
most common unit of production and the most important unit of consumption within the 
society.12 Peasants either owned or, more often, leased their farms, and in the latter case 
they sometimes came with a small livestock as well. Rent for the land and the animals 
was paid in kind. Young people and youngsters of both sexes from the age of 13 to 16 
years onwards always served first as domestic servants at their parents’ home or at other
8 [H. Alavi and T. Shanin], ‘Introduction’ to Introduction to the Sociology o f 'Developing 
Societies,’ pp 2-4. J.S. Hogendom, Economic Development, pp 10—11. R  Cameron, A Concise 
Economic History o f the World, 3rd ed., p 5.
9 See a discussion on terminology in L.G. Reynolds, Economic Growth in the Third World, pp 
15-17. In relation to this, see a definition of subsistence agriculture in M. Wfatts], ‘subsistence 
agriculture,’ p 605. — A relevant discussion about the role of trade in a traditional economy 
(19th century Norway) is in 0. Osterud, Agrarian Structure and Peasant Politics in 
Scandinavia, pp 189-94.
10 As an example of a systematic discussion on trade is R  Hodges, Primitive and Peasant 
Markets. Examples of trade in historic times are given in R  Cameron, A Concise Economic 
History o f the World, 3rd ed., pp 32-7, 62-8. For more vivid examples of trade in traditional 
societies, see, for example, L.G. Reynolds, Economic Growth in the Third World, pp 17-22.
11 Cf. L.G. Reynolds, Economic Growth in the Third World, p 5.
12 A lucid theoretical discussion about different kinds of units of production and units of 
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households. The law about labour bondage stipulated so that common people, 
irrespective of age, had to submit themselves as domestic servants, unless they had the 
means to start farming on their own or were unable to work. After having stayed in 
domestic servitude (usually 10 to 15 years), most people had acquired enough means to 
sustain themselves in farming and could start an independent household, i.e., get a tract 
of land and support themselves from the yields of the land, mainly through the products 
of the animals. In fact, people’s initial means often consisted of an animal stock into 
which they had transformed their wages (or been paid in kind). The step of forming an 
individual household signified not only an entrance into society as a fully independent 
person but it also was an economic precondition for a marriage and to have children.13
Perhaps the most important animal in the husbandry was the sheep, because it 
provided food and materials, both for domestic consumption and for export. This was 
primarily mutton, milk, wool, and tallow. In the countryside, hamlets or groupings of 
farms did not exist because land was utilised individually. Over time it had been split up 
into separate holdings, and all land that was needed to support a farm usually was one 
unit spatially. Apart from that, there were common lands in the highlands (moors and 
heathlands) where sheep grazed during the summer and were collected collectively in the 
autumn. The summer was the peak season in farming because of hay-making, which was 
no less in outfields (growing wild) than homefields (fertilised with manure) and required 
much labour for a relatively short time. Notwithstanding the hay crop, peasants 
depended also considerably on winter grazing (Icel. vetrarbeit) for sheep, but it tended to 
be a risky practice because of climatic reasons, i.e., frost and snow. Another important
13 Gisli Agust Gunnlaugsson, ‘Folksfjolda- og byggdabroun,’ p 84. Sigurdur G. Magnusson, 
‘Albydumenning a Islandi,’ pp 313-15, 317 (indented citation). Gudmundur Jonsson, 
Virmuhju, pp 17-19, 35-6. Gudmundur Halfdanarson, ‘Addragandi idnbyltingar,’ p 31. 
Gudmundur Halfdanarson, ‘Islensk bjddfelagsbroun,’ p 17.
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animal in the husbandry was the horse because it was vital for transportation. However, 
horses never were fed with hay or kept in houses so they grazed outside around the year.
Fishing was carried out to a varying degree by those living by the coast, and on 
a seasonal basis by many of those living in the countryside. It was mainly cod fishing for 
export, but other demersal species were also caught, both for domestic consumption and 
export. In 1870, the fishing was predominantly practised in open rowing boats, but their 
small size severely restricted the catches and the distance that could be rowed onto the 
fishing banks. The number of decked vessels was negligible, and, besides, they were 
mainly used for shark fishing to process the liver into oil. The cod was salted and dried 
before exportation, and this provided work for coastal farmers and their labourers, 
besides inhabitants of the small and few hamlets and townships at the time.
Omitting regional variations, ways of life were relatively similar, irrespective 
whether people lived in the countryside or by the coast. The food that inland people 
consumed was primarily a whole variety of diary products (milk, butter, whey, and 
skyr), while mutton and suet (Icel. mor), blood and liver pudding, and imported cereals 
were consumed to a lesser extent. Those living by the coast consumed far less in the way 
of diary products, and mutton was a rarity. Conversely, cereals were important, and 
various fish and fish products constituted the staple items. Cultivation of potatoes and 
other vegetables were only just starting in Iceland in the mid 19th century onwards. 
Relative scarcities of particular types of food in the countryside and by the coast were 
met through traditional barter exchange between inland and coastal peasants — so dried 
fish was eaten to some extent in the countryside and people by the coast acquired various 
farmed products.14
14 Gudmundur Jonsson, ‘Changes in Food Consumption,’ pp 39-46, 50. Kristin Bjamadottir, 
‘Matfong ur sj6,’ pp 27-30.
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Because of the low level of division of labour in the economy, handicrafts and 
manufacturing were a part of people’s work generally, although some of it was bartered 
locally and through the traditional inland-coastal peasants’ exchange. External trade was 
all channelled through the urban areas (hamlets). They were situated along the coast, and 
owed their existence solely to this mercantile activity, with which the work of most urban 
dwellers was directly and indirectly connected.
The social overhead capital (infrastructure) of the country was minimal. Starting 
with human capital (education and skills), children only were supposed to be able to read 
by confirmation. All further primary education, which indeed was slowly increasing 
around 1870, was subject to private initiative, which relatively few were able to benefit 
from.15 Apart from this, Iceland had a grammar school and a seminary.16 There was no 
medical college but the director general of public health (Icel. landlceknir) had the right 
to teach students privately and qualify them. Doctors in Iceland in 1870 numbered only 
twelve, about one for every 5,800 people.17 Craftsmen mostly went to Denmark to learn 
their craft, although some became skilled with leaming-by-doing.
In housing, because of scarcity of wood, dwellings of people and buildings for 
domesticated animals were almost entirely made of peat, rocks, and brushwood 
branches. They were constructed by simple customary methods. As a way of keeping 
people’s dwellings warm during winter, they were often of a two-storey type (Icel. 
fjosbadstofa) where the cows (usually one or two) were in byres on the ground floor and 
the people stayed upstairs to benefit from the cows’ body heat.
15 Ingolfur A. Johannesson, Menntakerfi i motun, pp 5—7. See also Gunnar M. Magnuss, Saga 
alpydiifrcedslunnar a Islcmdi.
16 Gudni Jonsson, Saga Haskola Islands, pp 13, 16.
17 Einar Laxness, Islandssaga l-o, p 51. L&rus H. Blondal og Vilmundur Jonsson, Lasknar d 
Islandi, 2nd ed., vol. 2, pp 61-1 A.
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As for transportation, in 1870 there were no roads and only one bridge in the 
country. This was all the more detrimental because the country had many rivers, some of 
which large, as well as mountains, sands, and lava which constrained internal transport. 
On land, commodities and all items were either carried on a person’s back, on horseback 
or on small sledges. Rivers usually were crossed by making the horses swim, because 
rowing boats (with or without ferrymen) were available only in a relatively few places. 
So too were boxes (Icel. kldfferjur or kldfar) in which items were put and then pulled 
over the river, hanging on strings. The use of carriages of any sort was impractical in the 
circumstances and, anyway, a rarity in the country.
Coastal communication was poor, because no regular coastal shipping routes 
were operated, and they only started in the late 1870s. There were a few dozen decked 
vessels in the country, but they were used as much for fishing as for transportation. 
Besides, no lighthouses and navigation lights existed, and harbours only had small quays 
or piers, where passengers and cargoes had to be rowed between land and ship. The only 
place in Iceland in regular mail and navigation contact with the outside world was 
Reykjavik, with a population of 2,000 in 1870. It was also the administrative and the 
ecclesiastical centre in the country, the location of the schools and of publishing, etc. It 
had a number of craftsmen and people of various occupations, but it was mostly 
inhabited by fishermen and their families.
The only regular, internal communication was postal routes, operated by the 
administration and mainly for its own purposes. Thus, the postmen travelled by foot or 
on horseback primarily between homes of officials, and they only occasionally passed 
urban areas (the hamlets) where the trading centres were. Consequently, this service was 
of restricted use for businesses and trades, although the quantity of non-administrative
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post was on the rise. But the capacity of the postmen to carry post was limited and the 
postal trips were made at no more than two to three months’ interval in 1870.18
Because of the rural base of the economy, where peasant farming prevailed, 
transactions in valuables in the domestic sector had archaic features. Even token money 
was absent, and exchange was almost entirely in the form of barter and truck, both of 
which were based on certain regional price lists that were issued annually by local 
authorities.19 Also, financial services in Iceland were at a relatively low level. There was 
no commercial bank and only one savings fund in 1870. Those lending out money in the 
country were often rich land owners and high officials (lay and ecclesiastical). 
Sometimes public funds lent out money but it was limited and very often as mortgages.20
11.2.2. Organisation of External Relations, 1870-1913
11.2.2.1. Government and Administration
After four centuries of a chieftain form of government (Icel. godaveldi), Iceland was 
subsumed under the kingdoms of its more powerful neighbours, first Norway and later 
Denmark. In 1870, Iceland had formally been a part of the Danish monarchy since
18 Heimir borleifsson, Postsaga Islands 1776-1873.
19 The terms ‘truck’ and ‘truck system’ refer in the thesis to exchange of goods for labour.
20 Gunnar Karlsson, ‘Fyrsti sparisjodur a Islandi?,’ p 82. Benjamin Sigvaldason, ‘Mttur um 
Stefan “aumingja,”’ pp 108-14. Gudmundur Jonsson, ‘The State and the Icelandic Economy,’ 
pp 316-19, 322-3.
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1662.21 Administratively, Denmark proper was divided into prefectures (Dan. pi. amter) 
and Iceland and the Faroe Islands constituted two separate prefectures as well. However, 
of these two remote prefectures, only Iceland was called a biland (Dan.) or hjalenda 
(Icel.) in the late 19th century, both of which are approximately synonymous with the 
term ‘dependency,’ while Danish West Indies, for example, were called a colony.22 In 
line with the prefecture position of Iceland and a prolonged mercantilist policy towards 
Iceland, it was financially in 1870 still an integral part of the Danish administration and 
governed from Copenhagen. Apart from a number of small public funds, the high 
government authorities in Iceland practically did neither have any separate revenues nor 
expenditures for autonomous allocation. All major revenues generating in Iceland were 
centralised in the king’s Land Register Fund (Icel. jardabokarsjodur) in Iceland or in the 
state treasury in Copenhagen, and then reallocated in the interest of the state at large.23
In 1871 the Danish king and his ministers ended a long-standing constitutional 
conflict with Icelanders over the island’s position vis-a-vis Denmark by passing a law. 
There Iceland was defined as an inseparable part of the Danish state but with a right to 
limited autonomy in its own affairs. Shortly after, at the millennium anniversary of the 
Alpingi in 1874, the parliament and the king of Denmark granted Iceland a constitution, 
which shifted the role of the Alpingi from a consultative to an autonomous assembly in 
internal affairs. Hence, the Alpingi could now start to exercise its power according to the 
1871 legislation. This meant that it was free to draft bills, and no law for Iceland could 
be passed without the consent of the Alpingi, but the Danish government had a veto to 
block Icelandic bills. Also, through administrative adjustments the AlJ>ingi now had
21 Magnus Hauksson, ‘Einveldisskuldbindingin 1662,’ pp 76-81.
22 [Einar Amorsson], ‘Yfirlit yfir stjom Islands,’ pp 216-17.
23 Gudmundur Jonsson, ‘The State and the Icelandic Economy,’ p 314. Einar Laxness, 
Islandssaga a-k, 2nd ed., p 227.
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increased control of executive matters in Iceland. As time passed, the autonomy in 
internal matters proved to be an undisputed improvement, because it enabled an 
independent revenue raising (for example, the introduction of property and income 
taxes), and the spending was more according to the needs of the country. Nevertheless, 
internal legislative affairs onwards were subject to the consent of a Danish ministry and 
the king, who repeatedly used his veto. Also, Iceland exercised no power in its external 
affairs, which were completely at the discretion of the Danish Foreign Ministry. 
Furthermore, Danish administration of executive affairs at the top level inevitably added 
to Iceland’s subservience to a foreign country.
This arrangement was to remain until 1904 when Iceland received Home Rule. 
This came about as a result of a change in Denmark in 1901 from a constitutional 
monarchy to democracy where ministers became responsible to the parliament only. This 
ended a long-standing conflict between a relatively liberal parliament and conservative 
cabinets, which constitutionally had only been responsible to the king.24 The essence of 
the Home Rule was that the executive power was fully moved to Iceland while the 
Alf>ingi gained full autonomy in those matters that had been defined as Icelandic 
(internal) in 1871. Foreign affairs, however, remained in the hands of the Danish 
government. In consequence, the higher levels of the executive power were reorganised 
and centralised in an Icelandic ministry situated in Reykjavik, headed by a minister of 
Icelandic nationality. He had a chair in the Danish state council, which was composed of 
the ministers of state and the king, and where decisions of the Danish and Icelandic 
parliaments were signed by the king. Further attempts of Alpingi for more independence 
for Iceland, with which political debate in Iceland in the 1900s was very much occupied, 
were futile until 1918 when the Danish parliament and the Alpingi terminated their
24 Magnus Hauksson, ‘PingraeSi og radherraabyrgS,’ pp 96-8.
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disagreement and Iceland gained almost full autonomy. During the research period, the 
arrangements for the judicial power remained unaltered. The lower courts of law were 
located in Iceland but the High Court in Copenhagen was the highest judiciary. In 
retrospect, the constitutional changes in 1874 were far larger and more important than 
those of 1904, although the latter traditionally have been hailed as new step in the 
renaissance in Icelandic history. This is mostly because of concurrent economic 
prosperity and progress, but in terms of Iceland’s constitutional rights and capabilities, 
the shift in 1874 was more significant.
11.2.2.2. Currency and Communications
In 1870, the legal tender in Iceland was the Danish rigsdal, which was a silver currency, 
but in 1875, it was replaced with the krone that was backed with gold. In the 1870s, 
Norway and Sweden also switched to krone and made them convertible into gold, all 
three currencies being at par. These three currencies, besides the British pound sterling 
and possibly other gold coins too, were all circulated in Iceland in our research period. In 
1885, the AlJ)ingi founded the National Bank of Iceland {Landsbanki Islands) — the 
first commercial bank in Iceland — and decided also that the bank would issue notes to 
use domestically. Then, the Icelandic krona came into existence, and the notes were 
fiduciary, i.e., inconvertible. This bank note issue was no revolution in spite of constant 
money scarcity. The issue was relatively small, equivalent to half of Iceland’s trade 
surplus in 1886 which, moreover, was a year of depression, and the bank’s lending 
policy was rather conservative. Hence, foreign currencies, presumably mainly Danish,
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remained widely in use, and they dominated all small exchange because the Icelandic 
currency consisted of notes only, not coins. In 1904, a privately-owned bank started 
operation in Iceland, the Bank of Iceland. It was in the ownership of a Danish and a 
Norwegian bank and of a Danish stockbroker firm, and the Aljringi granted the Bank of 
Iceland permission to issue Icelandic bank notes that were convertible in gold. This bank 
issue was comparatively much larger than that of the National Bank of Iceland and it 
generated considerable amounts of money into the economy.
In 1870, communication with the outside world was of two kinds only, a postal 
service and scheduled shipping routes, which were subsidised by the Danish government. 
This was so because the shipping voyages were planned for the postal service, which 
was vital for the governance of the country. Hence, the ships were not particularly large 
but they could take cargoes and a few passengers. Until 1851, there had only been one 
annual return trip between Copenhagen and Reykjavik, without any stopover. During 
1852 to 1857 the trips were increased to three a year and one return trip was scheduled 
between Liverpool and Reykjavik. All these trips were made with sailing ships where a 
one way trip took about three to four weeks. In 1858, there was a radical change because 
a steam ship was from now on used for the trips (making a one way trip last for two 
weeks). Also, the size of the ship was substantially larger than that of the sailing ships, 
the number of trips became six a year, and a stopover was made in Torshavn, the 
Faroes, and in Leith. The Liverpool line was terminated. This arrangement for sheduled 
shipping lasted until 1870, when there was a change. The voyages became seven 
annually and an additional stopover was made in Seydisfjordur on the east coast of 
Iceland and in Lerwick, but a much smaller steam ship was now deployed.25 In the long 
run, from 1870 throughout to 1913, the number of return trips between Iceland and
25 Heimir borleifsson, Postsaga Islands 1776-1873.
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Copenhagen gradually increased from seven to twenty and the tonnage of the steam 
ships employed rose substantially. By contrast, scheduled shipping to other countries 
than Denmark (Copenhagen), Britain (Leith/Granton), and the Faroe Islands (Torshavn) 
practically were none until 1896. Except for the years 1870-73, there were no scheduled 
journeys made between Norway and Iceland until after 1896, and only in 1910-12 were 
scheduled trips made to Germany (Hamburg-Leith-Reykjavlk).26
In spite of considerable interest among some Icelanders and foreign businessmen 
in establishing telecommunications with Iceland in the late 19th century, and 
notwithstanding grants of temporary privileges and contracts pertaining to this, Iceland 
did not become a part of the telecommunications network in the world until 1905. In 
1905-06, marconigrams or wireless telegraphs were sent by the Marconi company for 
demonstration and to promote the technology in Iceland. However, the Icelandic 
government chose the wire telegraph technology, and in 1906 a sub-marine cable was 
laid from Shetland to Torshavn in the Faroes to Seydisfjordur in Iceland. By the end of 
the year, a regular telegraphic and telephonic connection had been installed, and over the 
next years the telecommunications network was improved and expanded internally.27
26 GuQni Jonsson, Eimskipafelag Islands, pp 24-35. B. Kolltveit, ‘Rutefart mellom Norge og 
Island.’
27 J6n Gudnason, Verkmenning Islendinga, vol. 3, Fjarskipti. See also articles in Landssimi 
Islands: Minningarrit.
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11.3. Foreign Trade
11.3.1. Legal and Natural Conditions, 1870-1913
11.3.1.1. Provisions of the Law
As a result of legislation passed in the Danish parliament in 1854 and taking effect in 
1855, subjects of other states were freely allowed to participate in the foreign trade of 
Iceland from 1855 onwards. Before that time, indeed since 1602, only Danish subjects 
and enterprises had had the right to engage in Iceland’s foreign trade, and Icelanders had 
been forbidden to trade with other than Danish merchants. Hence, people were barred 
from trading with, for example, French fishermen, who fished in Icelandic waters and 
sometimes touched land for provisions and other reasons. In the law of 1854, the 
operation of foreign trade was confined to certain ports of entry (Icel. loggiltar 
verslmarhafhir). They were about thirty in 1870, spread along the coast of Iceland, and 
grew in number over time. Six of the ports of entry were distinguished from the other, 
because all ships transporting merchandise between Iceland and other countries had to 
make their first arrival in one of them. This was because of sanitary reasons and for 
payment of dues.28
The importance of foreign trade for the economy is augmented by the fact that 
until 1880, domestic or inland trade in imports was banned in Iceland.29 Apart from
28 Lovsamlingfor Island, vol. 15, pp 613-16. On the number of ports of entry in 1870, see PA11 
Lindal, Bceimir byggjast, p 35, 39-40, and Icel., Gov. Gen., ‘Verzlunarskyrslur [arin 1878 og 
1879],’ p 75.
29 Icel., Gov. Gen., Stjomartidindi 1879, sect. A, p 86.
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acting as a deterrent against the formation of inland urban areas, this rendered the 
mercantile activities in the ports of entry all-important. A relatively lively internal trade 
in domestic products is regarded by some scholars as an important and complementary 
precondition for economic growth and for the forming of a domestic, commercial 
framework.30 But trade in domestic products, all of which was by barter, was carried out 
by the producers themselves (peasants and craftsmen), rather than traders, i.e., people 
that made a living partly or wholly by trading commodities they had not produced. There 
were no specialist intermediaries in the internal trade of Iceland, and shops doing 
business in domestic produce were non-existent — although there was a demand for the 
services of traders in Iceland, as in every other traditional economy.31 The practical lack 
of traders in Iceland no doubt added to the economic stasis in the early and mid 19th 
century.
The merchants doing business with Icelanders around 1870 were mainly of two 
types. Permanent merchants (Icel. fastakaupmem) were those who bought a burgess 
licence in the ports of entry and had a shop there open throughout the year. Usually they 
lived in Copenhagen and conducted their businesses there, employing an agent (Dan. 
faktor), often an Icelander, to run their shops in Iceland.32 Permanent merchants were 
free to trade with Icelanders in ports of entry, other than where they had their shops, but 
in that case only on board their ship. The other type of merchants were travelling or 
seasonal merchants (Icel. lausakaupmenri). They did not have to buy a burgess licence in
30 P. Bauer, ‘Subsistence, Trade, and Exchange: Understanding Developing Economies.’ P. 
Bauer and G.M. Meier, ‘Traders and Development.’
31 An vivid example of a craftman’s trade in Iceland around 1870 is Gunnar M. Magnuss, 
Dagar Magnusar a Grund, pp 51-5, 70. Vagrants sometimes traded in Iceland, see, for 
example, Benjamin Sigvaldason, ‘hattur af Poka-Siggu.’ For other traditional economies, more 
advanced in this regard, see L.G. Reynolds, Economic Growth in the Third World, pp 17-22.
32 The Danish word faktor also exists in English where factor means either ‘a doer or 
transactor of business for another person’ or ‘a person or organization that buys and sells goods 
for others, on commision’ {The Chambers Dictionary (1993), p 602).
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any of the ports of entry in Iceland, and, in turn, were not allowed to open a permanent 
shop there. Therefore, they made trips to Iceland only in the summer and traded with 
Icelanders on board their ships. However, they were only allowed to do so in the ports of 
entry, and they were subject to a four weeks’ maximum time per annum to do their 
trading in Iceland. Apart from permanent and seasonal merchants, a few Icelandic 
trading associations were operating around 1870. They were owned and run by peasants, 
mainly to sell their produce abroad.33
The legal framework for foreign trade in the legislation from 1854 was imbued 
with conservative regulation, which hindered trade in many respects. Therefore, in 1879 
concession was made that took effect in 1880. Certain paperwork and dues concerning 
the ships’ voyages were abandoned. It was no longer compulsory to call any of the six 
ports of entry at arrival. Seasonal merchants were no longer restricted to the four weeks’ 
maximum time. Also, preconditions for obtaining burgess licences were eased. In 1888, 
conditions for the operations of seasonal merchants were relaxed further still with new 
legislation from 1887. Now they were free to trade on board their ships wherever they 
saw fit, provided they took a licence (against a charge) to do this, and it was valid for the 
respective calendar year. Furthermore, they were allowed to sell alcoholic drinks in the 
ports of entry, a privilege that had until then been restricted to permanent merchants 
only. After the change in 1887, no significant alterations in the provisions of the law 
were made for the remainder of the research period.34 Iceland comparatively early on 
introduced customs and export levies, which was done in 1872 and 1881 respectively, 
and over time more commodities and goods became subject to such levies.35
33 Einar Laxness, Islandssaga 1-b, p 119.
34 Icel., Gov. Gen., Stjomartidindi 1879, sect. A, p 86; 1887, sect. A, p 130.
35 Icel., Gov. Gen., Stjomartidindi 1901, sect. A, p 178 (paragr. 14).
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In the light of the socio-economic structure of the country, its external relations 
and the legal framework for foreign trade, there is little wonder that legislation regarding 
businesses and trades was slight. In fact, it was lacking in most areas. It can be claimed 
that the traditional economy of Iceland did not need such commercial legislation. On the 
other hand, lack of legislation certainly did not encourage men to start businesses in 
Iceland or ease their troubles. Not until the 1890s and, especially, the 1900s was 
legislation passed that was necessary for, or facilitated, an Iceland-based conduct of 
ordinary trades and businesses, including foreign trade. The first special legislation 
concerning interests on loans was passed in 1890, while apprenticeship in commerce was 
first regulated, along with various manufacturing industries, in 1893. Then, in the 1900s 
there was a spurt of legislation concerning this province: use of cheques in 1901, ban on 
private currencies in 1901, restriction on truck practice in 1902, introduction of 
mercantile registration along with regulations for firms and procuratory in 1903, 
protection for trade marks in 1903, permission for operation of bonded warehouses in 
1907, regulations for commercial travellers and commission agents in 1907, regulations 
for bookkeeping in 1909, and regulations for chattel purchasing (Icel. lausajjarkaup) in 
1911.36
Evidently, the opening up of Iceland’s foreign trade for other countries than 
Denmark in 1855 was a very important step in advancing Iceland’s trade. However, the 
small changes for a long time afterwards testily to the situation that persisted, i.e., 
oligopoly of Danish merchant houses. Their stronghold was secured, for instance, in the 
way the Danish government sided with Danish merchants and refused to give consent to 
AlJjingi’s bills that made living in Iceland compulsory for all permanent merchants 
operating in the country. That is why AlJjingi resorted to improving the competitive
36 Icel., Gov. Gen., Stjomartidindi 1890, sect. A, p 24; 1893, sect. A, pp 38-46; 1901, sect. A,
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position of seasonal merchants as many of the changes in the legal framework in 1880 
and 1888 show. Also, relaxing the conditions for starting mercantile activities benefited 
particularly Icelanders, who almost certainly had access to less money and credit than 
Danes.
11.3.1.2. Economic and Natural Circumstances
Because of certain regional divisions in Iceland, there were regional differences in the 
types of commodities produced for export. Thus, the ports of entry traditionally were 
divided into two, fish ports (Icel. fiskihafnir) and sheep ports (Icel. sldturhafnir). 
Exports from the fish ports were all kinds of fisheries’ products and these came mainly 
from ports in the south and west parts of the country. On the other hand, exports from 
the sheep ports were dominated by agricultural products, especially from sheep. These 
agricultural products primarily came from ports in the north and east parts of the 
country. Only a few ports of entry were a mixture of both types. These ports of entry 
were irregularly spread along the coast of Iceland and none was on the southeast coast.
Mainly as a result of natural conditions in Iceland, the high season in foreign 
trade in 1870 was in the summer. In the spring, ships would come loaded to Iceland with 
imports, and during the summer they would be deployed for various purposes. They 
would be variably used for fishing, for transporting commodities, or for mercantile trips 
(Icel. ‘spekulantturaf) to harbours and havens in Iceland. In the autumn, they would 
return to Denmark and other countries with exports. During winter, weather tends to be
pp 182-6, 198; 1902, sect. A, p 10; 1903, sect. A, p 238-52, 254-62. Icel., Min. of Icel.,
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harsh in Icelandic waters and apt to sudden change. Voyages were more risky, especially 
off the eastern and northern parts of the country because of possible drift ice. Because of 
this, Danish merchants never made trips to Iceland during winter. Peasants, for their 
part, usually restricted their trips to the ports of entry to two a year, because of other 
work and transport difficulties, which sometimes coupled with long distances. These 
trips were made in the spring, mainly to buy imports, and in the autumn, to sell their 
produce besides adding to their winter provisions with imported goods. Sometimes, a 
winter trip was made in December to exchange woollens for imports.37 Over time and in 
particular in the 1890s onwards, trading practices changed. Peasants made more 
frequent trips to ports of entry and the idle time in shipping voyages to Iceland during 
winter gradually became shorter.
11.3.2. The Institutional Framework Around 1870
11.3.2.1. Concentration in the Structure of Foreign Trade
At this time, the foreign trade of Iceland was predominantly in the hands of Copenhagen- 
based merchant houses. Copenhagen was in a sense the capital of Iceland, and its 
hegemony in Denmark itself was unrivalled because it was the only major commercial 
city. Accessible information about the number of merchant houses operating in Iceland 
and their ownership does not exist, so we do not have a full account of the concentration
Stjomartidindi 1907, sect. A, pp 326-8, 472-4; 1909, sect. A, pp 232-6; 1911, sect. A, p 196.
37 Jon Sigurdsson, Sigurdur i Yztafelli, pp 71, 81-2.
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of trade. However, qualitative observations suggest that it was high, because some of the 
merchants doing business in Iceland had outlets in more than one port of entry and even 
dominated trade in large areas of the country. Figures about the number of shops or 
outlets in Iceland over time support this. In 1870, they were 62 in number, which means 
that on average each port of entry had just about two shops. But the larger ports of 
entry, especially Reykjavik, had more and, hence, many ports had one shop only, which 
effectively supported monopolistic business practices.38
According to figures about the homes of owners of the shops, 58% of them lived 
abroad, almost certainly exclusively in Denmark, and 42% lived in Iceland.39 However, 
these figures definitely are not representative of the division of the quantity or value of 
trade because owners of the largest shops all had their homes in Denmark (Copenhagen) 
while the owners of the smaller ones lived in Iceland. Because of the Danish monopoly of 
the trade for centuries, owners of the largest shops predominantly were Danish by origin 
and birth. But the reasons for their residence in Denmark were not only because of 
family ties and the ways of living they were accustomed to. The relative isolation of 
Iceland, both internally and especially externally, effectively made it almost impossible 
to run a business with a base in Iceland, even if merchants would have appointed 
representatives or agents abroad. Therefore, it was much more efficient to live in a place 
like Copenhagen where merchants could have a full and constant control of their 
mercantile activities. Because of this, Icelanders who were successful in their trading 
activities eventually moved to Copenhagen. Why then so many merchants chose to live in
38 borkell Johannesson, ‘Brot ur verzlunarsogu,’ part 2. Einar Laxness, islandssaga 1-6, pp 
118-19. Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna. Icelandic Historical 
Statistics, p 397. Klemens Jonsson, Saga Reykjavikur, vol. 2, p 95. Klemens Jonsson, Saga 
Akureyrar, p 116.
39 Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna. Icelandic Historical 
Statistics, p 397.
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Iceland is due to the fact that they were not in full control in the operation of their 
business and depended on Copenhagen-based parties. Most often, merchants living in 
Iceland were only able to start their commercial activity because Danish wholesalers 
extended credit in the form of merchandise. The risk was all on the side of the Icelandic 
merchant, and if his enterprise failed the wholesaler had it liquidated to get his claims 
paid. So, in name the Iceland based shop owners were masters of their business, but in 
reality they were at the mercy of Danish merchants in terms of supplies and prices.
In these circumstances, it was difficult for seasonal merchants to compete 
efficiently with permanent merchants. The latter had a dominant position in Iceland’s 
foreign trade, although changes were made in the legal framework to strengthen the 
competitive position of seasonal merchants. In any case, their trips to Iceland in the 
second half of 19th century show that they managed to attract business. The seasonal 
merchants were both Danish entrepreneurs, usually with general merchandise, and 
Norwegian entrepreneurs, whose cargo often was largely or wholly timber. Probably the 
strongest card for seasonal merchants with general merchandise was to offer attractive 
prices on imports rather than on exports, and it probably was not difficult to beat the 
Danish merchants in terms of prices of imports. As for Norwegian merchants, Icelanders 
alternatively paid in kind and cash, and the advantage of trading with the Norwegians 
was that timber tended to be a scarce commodity in shops of permanent merchants, and 
the Norwegians probably offered better prices.40 Altogether, however, seasonal 
merchants only played a supplementary role in the foreign trade of Iceland because the 
hegemony of permanent merchants was too strong.
40 Klemens Jonsson, Saga Akureyrar, p 117. Jon Sigurdsson, Sigurdur i Yztafelli, p 71. Jon 
Sigurdsson, Helga Sorensdottir, pp 85-7. B. Kolltveit, ‘Rutefart mellom Norge og Island,’ pp 
250-52, 275.
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11.3.2.2. Bookkeeping Barter and Pertinent Policies
One of the distinct features of the institutional framework in the foreign trade around 
1870 was the prevalence of barter. Practically all transactions between Icelandic 
producers and merchants took place on this basis, and to facilitiate this kind of exchange 
merchants employed bookkeeping barter.41 Thus, sales of exports and purchases of 
imports were made by crediting and debiting respectively the customer’s account. 
Merchants were in this business to make money and, thereforey, they eagerly accepted 
cash in exchange for imports, but they were very reluctant and usually refused to pay for 
exports in cash. Moreover, merchants were not keen on paying credits in cash, even if 
the customer had one.42 Hence, it was to their advantage to exchange imports, not cash, 
for exports, and merchants were sometimes accused of pushing people to buy imports to 
use up their credits. Besides, it was more profitable to sell imports and exports at the 
same time, rather than only exports or imports in return for cash. This way, they also 
maximised the potential gain from the business, because there were fixed costs and 
larger turnover made the business more profitable.
To minimise the risk of the merchant in this exchange, it was customary to fix 
the price of the exports only after they had been sold in external markets. Often, the 
procedure was that a certain minimum price was promised to the producer at delivery in 
the autumn, and if the commodities would fetch good prices, the customer would get a
41 The term is used by W.G. Huff in ‘Bookkeeping Barter, Money, Credit, and Singapore’s 
International Rice Trade, 1870-1939’ to describe this type of exchange.
42 Some have argued that inflation in the 19th century was the cause of reluctance by 
merchants to pay for exports in cash. Even if there had been an inflation or over-pricing, it has 
nothing to do with this reluctance.
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bonus. Thus, because of termination of communications over winter, usually the price 
was not settled until the spring the year after. On the other hand, imports always had a 
beforehand fixed price, which indeed often reflected the outcome of the merchant’s 
business last year. Naturally, there was a pressure on merchants to offer good prices for 
Icelandic products. For example, Icelandic papers quoted Copenhagen sales prices of 
Icelandic exports and from the mid-century onwards, peasants sometimes combined 
regionally or put up formal trading associations to demand fixed minimum prices for 
their products from the merchants. In the event that merchants’ costs on Icelandic 
products (purchase price plus expenses) exceeded their sales prices, any conceivable 
losses in the business were always compensated with higher margins on imports next 
year. This was easy because Icelandic customers had, of course, no information about 
merchants’ purchase prices.
Apart from this, customers were treated differently depending on social status 
and the quantity of their business with the respective merchant. Thus, merchants were 
more lenient towards land owners and rich customers, and merchants sometimes paid a 
part of their credits in cash, and even offered small interests on standing credits. Given 
the absence of savings funds and commercial banks, money could not be kept in entirely 
safe places and merchants no doubt were eager to keep the money for their customers, 
thereby getting cheap loan and working capital. Poor people, however, never or only 
temporarily were in credit and this precluded them from getting any cash. Besides, 
keeping the customer in debt was a way to secure that he would not take his custom at 
another merchant, provided that there was another merchant or shop available nearby. 
Here, poor communications came into play because people usually could not travel extra 
long distances to do business with other merchants.
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11.3.2.3. The Relationship Between Merchants and Their Customers
It is safe to assume that the overall consequences of the institutional framework of 
foreign trade were to constrain the Icelandic economy. The prevailing business practices 
formed a closed system from which Icelanders could barely escape. Common people 
were tied to merchants because of frequent debts, seasonally or generally. The 
unwillingness of merchants to pay in cash prevented Icelanders from taking their custom 
to another shop (if there was one), even if better terms of trade there conceivably enabled 
them to pay up their previous debt. In those cases where customers had a balance, 
merchants’ reluctance to pay in cash and some of their customers’ reluctance to have 
their credits disbursed no doubt effectively prevented people from spending money 
internally on things they could well afford and would have spent on if money had been 
ready to hand. Similar curbing impacts also were evident in the truck system, which 
mainly affected urban dwellers.43 Thus, day labourers working for merchants in the ports 
of entry were not paid in cash but by crediting their account. Moreover, wages and 
various transactions between people in Iceland were very often made with crediting 
customers’ accounts backwards and forwards across shops or, in any case, across 
accounts within the same shop.
Still another facet of foreign trade is that merchants’ profits were expatriated, 
and this aggravated the money shortage in the country. No less significant were the 
morally detrimental effects of the prevailing business practices. Instead of looking at the
43 In the thesis, the terms truck and truck system will be used for the practice of paying wages 
in goods. Cf. The Chambers Dictionary, p 1859 (under ‘truck1’).
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permanent merchants as useful and advantageous intermediaries in society — as, for 
example, the seasonal merchants — people sometimes considered the permanent 
merchants as an ill necessity. People, however, had no alternative but to do business with 
them, because people were so dependent on them for their subsistence. At the same time, 
people reviled them and accused for being merciless money-makers, exercising their 
power in every way to secure their dominance. For example, they were accused of 
forming cartels to annihilate competition, and imports customarily were more expensive 
during winter, when there was far less competition, than during the summer. Merchants 
also often were reproached for taking small account of variations in the quality of the 
exports when settling prices. Producers sometimes responded to this by deliberately 
spoiling the agricultural products — to make them heavier without a drop in price. Wool 
was dipped in water or sprinkled with sand, and stones were even put in the tallow. 
Possibly, the lack of prices reflecting quality of commodities may have been a 
consequence, no less than cause, of these practices. In any case, the outcome was that 
the price mechanism did not stimulate quality improvements, and careful producers were 
not rewarded for their efforts because of the practices of the unscrupulous.
11.4. The Depression of 1860s in Standards of Living
In 1870, the Icelandic economy clearly was traditional as most economies around the 
world at the time. Furthermore, nothing suggested that this was going to change in the 
near future. Indeed, at first glance nothing special or remarkable seemed to call for the 
necessity of development. Yet Icelanders needed development because standards of living
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had deteriorated markedly for the past 10-15 years. And they had potentials for 
development and, thereby, a chance to raise the standards of living by exploiting the 
under-utilised riches of the sea. Unfortunately, however, the socio-economic structure of 
Iceland and the nature of its external relations prevented realisation of these potentials. 
What supported the stasis is a question that the findings of the thesis indirectly will 
hopefully shed some light on. But first the depression in standards of living in the 1860s 
needs to be demonstrated.
When looking at several indicators of standards of living and quality of life after 
the mid 19th century, it emerges that living condition were worse than in past decades. 
Between the years 1855/60 and 1870/75 infant mortality was higher than before, number 
of weddings fell, age of brides and bridegroom rose, number of lodgers rose, and real 
wages fell.44 It cannot be a coincidence that so many trends, all witnessing significantly 
more difficult life than before, are evident for a decade or more. Besides, the explanation 
for this is at hand, namely population pressure.45 There had been a continuous natural 
population increase since the late 1780s, and the population was larger than it had been 
since the 17th century or further back. Because of this, the countryside had already 
become densely populated in the 1850s. People could hardly get land any more and since 
this was a prerequisite for marrriage, number of wedding fell and the age of those who 
could marry rose. People were forced to stay on as domestic servants if they could not 
find other forms of employment, and that is why real wages fell. One outlet in the 
countryside that had been long practised was lodging (Icel. husmennska). Lodgers had 
an individual household but not separate dwellings and rarely children. In return they had
44 Gudmundur J6nsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna. Icelandic Historical 
Statistics, pp 150-51, 155, 185. Gudmundur Halfdanarson, ‘Addragandi idnbyltingar,’ p 31. 
Gudmundur Jonsson, Vinnuhju, pp 44-5. Magnus S. Magnusson and Gisli Gunnarsson, 
‘Levnadsstandarden pk Island 1750-1914,’ pp 99-101.
45 Gudmundur Halfdanarson, ‘Islensk hjddfdlagshrdun,’ pp 20-27.
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to yield their service to the peasant of the farm. This was not feasible for young couples, 
although many turned lodgers as the figures show. In the circumstances small farms 
increasingly were formed in the interior over the 19th century, most of which belonged to 
the highland settlement (Icel. heidabyggd) in the northeast part of the country, but this 
probably was not an outlet for masses of people in other parts of the country.
Why did the depression in the standards of living not last after 1870/75? Was 
the socio-economic structure adapting to the new population level and finding ways to 
offer similar or better living conditions than before? The answer is negative because 
emigration provided the vent for the population pressure and in turn contributed towards 
the preservation of status quo. In the 1870s, emigration from Iceland to America started 
and became a mass exodus, primarily from the northern and eastern parts of the country 
where the population pressure was greatest.46 Although standards of living rose when 
emigration began, it was not a long-term solution. It only cured the sympthoms of the 
inflexible socio-economic structure and of the external relations, but it did not remidy the 
structure itself or change external relations, thereby opening up chances for more solid 
base for development. What provided such a base will be evident from the findings of the 
thesis and the subject will be revisited in the conclusions (Chapter X).
46 Jon Sigurdsson, Helga Sorensdottir, pp 27-8, 113-4. For literature on emigration from 
Iceland, see the works of Helgi Skuli Kjartansson, including his unpublished thesis ‘Vesturfarir 
af Islandi.’
Chapter III 
Foreign Trade and Economic Development in 
Theory: The Methodological Basis of the Thesis
111.1. General Remarks
In this chapter, the theoretical relevance of foreign trade to economic development in 
general will be outlined, after which the research method used in the thesis will be 
described. After having discussed the rationale behind the linkage between foreign trade 
and economic development, I will turn to relevant models and methods of past studies to 
underpin the methodology of the present thesis. Over time, scholars from various 
disciplines and intellectual quarters have applied very different methods in researching 
the causes of and hindrances to economic development in traditional economies and 
transitory economies. Consequently, this is a vast subject and I will briefly sketch only 
those methods that seem most relevant to the Iceland case and my purpose in the thesis 
Using this sketch as a methodological base, I then proceed to advance and explicate my 
particular method of analysis which is a synthesis of two existing theoretical constructs.
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111.2. Foreign Trade and Economic Development in 
Theory and Policy: An Outline
111.2.1. The Theoretical Gains from Trade and Trade Policy
111.2.1.1. Static Gains from Trade
In theory, foreign trade can relate to economic development through either exports or 
imports. Furthermore, granted that existing utilisation of economic resources in two 
scenarios is widely different, foreign trade can have two kinds of impact. Hence, trade 
can affect development in three different ways. Given full utilisation of resources, shifts 
in the demand for exports are usually described as producing static gains from trade. The 
term is based on comparative advantages, expounded by D. Ricardo, who in turn 
advanced his argument on the basis of A. Smith’s absolute advantages. To explain the 
theoretical basis of static gains from trade, we need to digress and discuss these and 
underlying terms briefly.
Why countries engage in trade was explained by Smith by linking trade with 
absolute advantages. If  country A produced a particular good cheaper than other 
countries and country B was able to produce another product more economically than 
other countries, the two countries A and B had advantages in exchanging their respective 
goods. D. Ricardo enhanced the theory by holding that absolute advantages were not 
necessary, because trade could possibly be based on comparative advantages. Countries 
could and often did produce the same goods but production costs varied, and these 
reflected variations in natural conditions and labour inputs, i.e., comparative advantages
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in each product. This he demonstrated with comparison of a pair of countries. Given free 
trade, he said, producers in both countries would seek to produce goods where they had 
the most comparative advantages or the least comparative disadvantages as measured by 
production costs. Even though one of the countries had absolute advantages in all 
products, it would still pay off for it to direct its producing capacity to the goods where it 
had the greatest comparative advantages. In turn, this gave the other country room for 
specialising in those products where it had the least comparative disadvantages. Thus, in 
the end both countries, and in fact all countries, would benefit most with specialisation.1
It seems plausible to say that comparative advantages play a role in determining 
exports of an economy. But they probably are rather based on different factor 
endowments, as E. Heckscher and B. Ohlin later maintained, than Ricardo’s inputs of 
labour quantities that he assumed were a function of natural conditions. In short, 
Heckscher and Ohlin claimed that varying quantities of the factors of production, 
especially labour and capital, across countries caused different factor prices, which in 
turn were reflected in different production costs. Furthermore, countries would export 
those goods that were intensive in their abundant factor.2 For instance, labour abundant 
economy would export goods intensive in labour, while a country abundant in capital 
(money) would export capital intensive goods. Without going into any details in the 
sources of comparative advantages, a certain modification of the factor endowments 
theory deserves mention. G. Haberler suggested that not all the factors were of equal 
importance but mainly those factors of production specific to industries. Some factors 
were more mobile than other, he pointed out, particularly labour and money capital, but 
fixed and physical capital tended to be less mobile because it was more tied to its
1 J. Williamson and C. Milner, The World Economy, pp 20-27. G.N. von Tunzelmann, 
Technology and Industrial Progress, p 46.
2 J. Williamson and C. Milner, The World Economy, pp 39-43.
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respective industries. Thereby, he added to Heckscher and Ohlin’s insight the role of 
relative factor supply elasticities, i.e., relative variations in the sensitivity of factors 
towards fluctuations in levels of factor rewards (factor ‘prices’). But he also maintained 
that specific factors matter more than other factors because the respective industries 
would tend to be on guard towards shifts that undermined their position. Thereby, he 
added elasticities in substitution to Heckscher and Ohlin’s insight. With reference to 
these two lines of arguments, Haberler claimed that the quantity of those factors specific 
to industries influenced foreign trade most.3
The nature of comparative advantages and their possible sources will not be 
discussed further. Trade does not take place entirely on the basis of production costs for 
it is partly subject to brands and other things. The theoretical constructs have mainly 
been sketched here because a convincing suggestion of the sources of comparative 
advantages, that of factor endowments, highlights the role of factors of production. The 
ideas about comparative advantages and factor endowments have a theoretical relevance 
to economic circumstances in traditional or transitory economies like Iceland during the 
period, where relative proportions of factors generally were changing fast. Furthermore, 
the theoretical discussion here serves as a background when this theme will be revisited 
later in this chapter and in Chapter IX. There, the empirical relevance of factor 
endowments and comparative advantages will be commented on in relation to historical 
evidence from international trade and Iceland’s experience of foreign trade in the 
research period.
Given comparative advantages and other causes for foreign trade, why are shifts 
in exports under conditions of full employment of resources called static gains from trade 
and what does the term stand for? The answer is that since economic resources are
3 J. Williamson and C. Milner, The World Economy, p 52.
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implicitly and explicitly assumed fully employed, changes in the type of exports only 
mean that the composition of total exports shifts, but not the overall export production. 
Employing the pertinent expression in economy theory, the shift produces a move along 
the production possibility curve or frontier, but not a move of the frontier itself, neither 
outwards nor inwards. The scale of this shift in exports evidently varies. In the case of a 
minor shift, the impact of the new circumstances may be confined to income generating 
effects in the economy. That is, it may only affect economic growth which measures 
fluctuations in the type and level of domestic production of an economy as measured by 
gross domestic production in national income accounting. However, a country may 
virtually be opened up for trade, for instance, when monopoly is removed. Similarly, a 
country may experience relatively huge shifts in supply or demand in its export markets. 
In these cases, the comparative advantages of the country may be so greatly affected that 
a relatively radical change is inevitable where new types of industries emerge and old 
ones go into decay. Note that economic development was defined in Chapter I as a 
question of what types of outputs are produced and their relative quantities, as well as 
what kinds of inputs are used for that production. Therefore, a shift of this kind may 
cause a long-run structural change in the economy. In sum, shifts in comparative 
advantages may ‘merely’ affect economic growth, but they may at other times 
conceivably have implications for economic development in the respective economy.
Why a change under the conditions of fully employed resources is called static 
gains from trade owes mainly to the fact that whatever the scale of that change, it 
primarily means a move along the production possibility frontier. A part of the reason 
may also be that historically, scholars have tended to examine economic development on 
the basis of economic growth. Moreover, economic growth was thought to generate 
economic development more or less automatically and by itself. Consequently, economic 
development has more often than not been studied implicitly and explicitly from the point
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of view of economic growth, and until the mid 20th century economic theory did not 
contribute very much to the understanding on the causes of development per se or the 
role of foreign trade in that process. Regarding our theme, probably owing to the 
alternative use of growth and development as effective synonyms, scholars have been 
less occupied with how trade could affect economic structure and thus have 
developmental implications than with the implications of trade for economic growth. 
Therefore, economic development is usually not associated with static gains from trade, 
although in principle it may occur under the assumptions made.
111.2.1.2. Dynamic Gains from Trade
Historically, the assumption of full employment of economic resources is an outgrowth 
of neo-classical economic theory, as all of the theorising above. However, economic 
resources may not necessarily be fully employed in every economy, as some of the 
classical economists maintained. This may happen particularly in traditional societies 
where hindrances can block, partly or wholly, utilisation of resources or they can lie idle 
out of ignorance of their existence. Anyway, existing (yet possibly unknown) resources 
can conceivably be more productive with another arrangement in utilisation of factors. 
Typically, this happens when trade is opened up or an economy is integrated more 
closely into the wider network of international trade through exports. Then, dynamic 
gains from trade can emerge because the shift in the composition of outputs moves the 
production possibility frontier outwards. That is, utilisation of available economic 
resources is rearranged without a noticeable drop in total production.
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More specifically, this can happen through (a) productivity gains from either 
specialisation or greater division of labour (supply side) or (b) vent-for-surplus gains 
because of underutilised resources (demand side), possibly both, as H. Myint has argued 
on the basis of A. Smith and J.S. Mill’s writings. In both cases the outcome is that the 
level of the aggregate production is raised.4 However, such a shift rests on the condition 
that factors are relatively mobile and they can be shifted rather easily between uses in 
production. In fact, mobility of factors is always a necessary condition for any major 
change take place at all, and this indicates that the degree of resource utilisation 
probably is a secondary issue to restrictions that may exist in the mobility of factors.
In the literature, the benefits of specialisation and division of labour has 
traditionally been linked with economic growth, in line with what was said above. But 
while division of labour in itself has small if any implications for economic development, 
specialisation does so. This is because previous utilisation of a particular resource may 
be abandoned and a new resource, relatively different, be employed instead. More 
obviously, the employment of an entirely new resource can produce a considerable 
change in the composition of outputs in the economy.
Evidently, dynamic gains ffom trade do not by definition mean that a significant 
event in terms of economic development has occurred. However, a shift of this kind can 
produce a considerable shift in the composition of outputs in the economy. In fact, this 
can offer a more radical change in industrial activities than when economic resources are 
fully employed, because there is more room for change and factors do not have to be 
pulled away from previous employment. Hence, dynamic gains from trade can very 
likely have greater developmental implications than static gains from trade.
4 B. Ingham, Economics and Development, pp 126-7. J.S. Hogendom, Economic 
Development, pp 334—5. See also A.G. Kenwood and A.L. Lougheed, The Growth o f the 
International Economy, 3rd ed., p 131.
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111.2.1.3. Semi-Dynamic Gains from Trade
As happens, static and dynamic gains ffom trade may possibly deliver nothing in terms 
of economic development. Besides, what change qualifies as development can be a 
matter of dispute. In any case, trade may leave comparative advantages unaffected for 
long periods of time, shifts in comparative advantages may be unimportant in terms of 
the economic structure, and even opening up for trade may have negligible structural 
effects on the economy. Therefore, various semi-dynamic gains ffom trade can be 
equally as or more important than static or even dynamic gains, in terms of economic 
development.5 Conveniently, sources of semi-dynamic gains ffom trade can be of three 
kinds, although they all revolve around imports, in contrast to static and dynamic gains 
ffom trade that rest on exports. One source is imports of consumer goods and 
intermediate goods for further processing, either in homes or by firms. These imports 
depend on, for instance, tastes, incomes, and income distribution of the population, and 
they have the developmental potential to change personal tastes and create new wants. 
Thus, they may possibly initiate domestic substitutes for those particular import goods to 
satisfy people’s wishes for future consumer goods. Conceivably, consumer goods can 
also be conducive to production of those products where the economy has the greatest 
comparative advantages (or the least comparative disadvantages). In that way, consumer 
goods may push the economy not only to export more but to specialise in products
5 The expression ‘semi-dynamic’ gains is my own in want of a better term for those particular 
gains from trade that produce a move along the production possibility frontier (and that are of 
different origin than static gains) rather than an outwards move of the frontier itself.
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making better use of economic resources. Which of the two possible developmental 
impacts of consumer imports is more likely to happen in reality is another matter, but the 
former is presumably more common.
Another source of semi-dynamic gains is imports of capital goods, and these 
imports depend on internal circumstances in factor and commodity markets. The 
potential of capital goods is huge in terms of advancing the level and type of 
infrastructure, besides rising production capacity and productivity of firms in the 
economy. Finally, the developing potential is obvious since economic development rests 
very much on employment of capital goods, especially machines, and production of 
manufactures. A third source of semi-dynamic gains from trade is service imports, i.e., 
imports o f ‘new ideas.’ For instance, capital goods are of limited usefulness unless skills 
to operate them and maintain them are imported too. Besides, managerial and technical 
know-how must often be imported at first instance to carry out new production 
combinations and new products. Entrepreneurship is also stimulated through imports of 
new ideas, which are copied and feed back into other activities. Evidently, there are 
numerous examples of semi-dynamic gains from service imports, and J.S. Hogendom 
remarks that this source can be the most important of all the semi-dynamic gains from 
trade.6 Note, however, that semi-dynamic forces unleashed with service imports can be 
equally as powerful in moving the production possibility frontier outwards, i.e., 
generating economic growth, as in implementing changes in terms of development.
All three sources of semi-dynamic gains from trade may operate simultaneously 
or in sequence. For instance, demand in international markets or rising imports of 
consumer goods may stimulate exports of existing products, and greater exports enable
6 J.S. Hogendom, Economic Development, pp 335-6. L. Sire, Outline o f International Trade, p 
38. See also B. Ingham, Economics and Development, p 335. — Hogendom seems to be 
referring to service imports only, but spillovers or positive externalities from enclave activities 
can also conceivably have similar effects on the economy.
C h a p t e r  I I I  -  74
capital goods to be imported, which in turn may gradually change the industrial structure 
by increasing relative production of manufactures, especially where machines can be 
employed. Provided that manufactures are exported, their share as of total exports or 
their composition may change, but altered industrial structure may not necessarily 
emerge in the type or quantity of manufactures among exports, because the products are 
marketed internally. A comparison of imports to exports would suggest whichever the 
case was, and examination of the economic context should produce suggestions as to the 
causal relationship between imports and exports.
In conclusion, the relevance of foreign trade for economic development is firmly 
backed up in the theoretical literature, mainly through the causal relationship described 
by semi-dynamic gains ffom trade. By their nature, static and dynamic gains ffom trade 
are more pertinent to economic growth than economic development. Besides, shifts in the 
types of exports and imports are dealt with in semi-dynamic gains from trade. However, 
static and dynamic gains from trade could not be dismissed from our discussion because 
they rest on the theory of comparative advantages which semi-dynamic gains are also 
implicitly built on. Furthermore, although growth and development are separate things 
and discussion about development has perhaps too often been in terms of growth, the two 
are close enough to warrant integrated discussion to a certain extent.
111.2.1.4. Trade Policy
In theory, foreign trade and economic development are highly related and integrated. 
This raises the question of foreign trade policy, namely whether it has been used to let
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this theoretical relation materialise, and what the results are. To illustrate this point, I 
will briefly comment on the late 20th century experience. In the era of laisser faire in the 
late 19th century and early 20th century, the free trade principle was an unquestioned 
wisdom among economists, and it formed the basis of foreign trade policy in most 
countries until the 1930s. But in the decolonisation era in the post war years, when 
former colonies in Africa and elsewhere gained independence, economists were charged 
with a new and unusual task. This was to find ways to initiate economic development to 
reduce the social and economic gap between the industrialised countries and their 
transitory economies (less developed countries or LDSs).
By then, it was obvious that industrialisation was the principal way to start and 
sustain economic development, confer the ideology of the Marshall Plan.7 With 
mechanisation of the production processes, foodstuffs and raw materials could be 
produced more efficiently, and later the LDSs could possibly move into production of 
capital goods for the home market or external markets. In principle, foreign trade should 
have been a fairly relevant measure to start this, that is to exchange primary goods for 
knowledge and skills (human capital) and light industrial goods on which to build an 
industrial base. However, economists eventually forming a new subdivision within 
economics, development economics, did not suggest this. Owing to the influence of 
Keynesian economics, and possibly British post-war circumstances, they opposed the 
narrow base of neo-classical economics. Also, they were sensitive to the structural 
framework of developed and less developed economies, and they believed there to be 
huge differences between the LDCs and the circumstances that prevailed before the now 
industrialised nations entered this phase of long-run development. Hence, they doubted 
the applicability of the ‘free’ and unrestricted trade model for LDCs. Instead, import
7 M.P. Todaro, Economic Development, 6th ed., p 71.
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substitution industrialisation was advocated, which meant that the countries should start 
their industrialisation by producing the very goods they had been importing. Often, these 
were consumer goods that did not demand heavy capital investments and seemed suitable 
as a stepping stone for capital-scarce countries to subsequent capital-intensive 
industrialisation. To serve this purpose, foreign trade in many LDCs was restricted and 
adapted to serve this economic policy.8
In the 1960s and around 1970 it became clear that the prescription of import 
substitution industrialisation was not working. Economic growth tended to be small and 
unstable, and if there was a growth, then there were few signs of improving living 
standards for the mass of people. Also, development was sometimes loop-sided and 
uneven, not producing the desired results. Development economics came under heavy 
criticism from two different quarters. Free market advocates argued that the de-linking 
with international markets had been fatal because that way a necessary corrective for the 
domestic market was barred off. On the other hand, some structural economists and 
Marxist and Neo-Marxist writers either saw structural deficiencies in the economic 
analysis and policy prescription for the LDCs, or they stressed that capitalist 
development caused (and had over the centuries caused) a detrimental economic 
dependency of the LDCs, if not downright underdevelopment.9 Since the 1970s, the 
pendulum has swung back and free trade policy has been prescribed, for good or worse, 
by development economists and international institutions and organisations involved in 
Third World development. However, the sanguine belief in industrialisation as the
8 B. Ingham, Economics and Development, pp 86, 136-8, 167-76, 335-6. D. Colman and F. 
Nixson, Economics o f Change in Less Developed Countries, 3rd ed., chap. 9. M.P. Todaro, 
Economic Development, 6th ed., chaps 12 and 13. See also C. Simmons, ‘Economic 
Development and Economic History.’
9 D. Colman and F. Nixson, Economics o f Change in Less Developed Countries, 3rd ed., pp 
48-60. M.P. Todaro, Economic Development, 6th ed., pp 82-90. J.S. Hogendom, Economic 
Development, pp 337ff. See also C. Simmons, ‘Economic Development and Economic History’ 
and B. Ingham, Economics and Development, pp 139-43, 185-6.
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panacea for economic growth and, thus, development and higher living standards has 
disappeared for economists now realise that economic growth does not necessarily mean 
economic development or rising living standards, as it had historically done in the long 
run in the West. Consequently, economic growth and development are no longer 
approximate synonymous in the vocabulary of economists, and other means are 
increasingly used to measure levels and variations in standards of living and quality of 
life.10
In conclusion, it is safe to say that although development economists are 
concerned and aware of the less benign effects of present world trade for the LDCs, they 
believe that foreign trade — and free trade to a large extent — are intrinsic for their 
economic development. There, imports of consumer goods, capital goods, and services 
are all well and rightfully recognised. But while the theoretical reasoning may be sound 
and empirical insights in abundance, world politics and global economic power 
imbalances seem to be in the way of significantly reducing the gap between the most 
advanced economies and the Third World.
10 C. Simmons, ‘Economic Development and Economic History,’ pp 12-15. F. Nixson, 
“‘Economic Development”: A Suitable Case for Treatment?’ J.S. Hogendom, Economic 
Development, pp 11-13.
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111.2.2. Jon Sigurdsson on the Significance of Foreign Trade for 
Iceland: A Contemporary View
With reference to the general explanatory framework of the thesis and the case in point, 
it is relevant to reproduce a view of an Icelandic contemporary on the relation of foreign 
trade to the Icelandic economy. This was the archivist Jon Sigurdsson (1811-1879), a 
man of great knowledge about Icelandic history and his times. His view supplements my 
account of Iceland’s foreign trade in Chapter II, and since he was a liberal (in fact, a 
national-liberal), he puts to some extent the arguments of free trade advocates and 
classical economists in Icelandic context. In turn, the exposition of his ideas concerning 
Iceland is pertinent to the discussion on the historical experience of peripheral economies 
from foreign trade.
J6n Sigurdsson was far from being the only contemporary who wrote about the 
foreign trade of Iceland in the mid and late 19th century,11 but few elaborated their 
views as extensively as he did. His ideas deserve close attention for a number of reasons. 
First, apart from a brief first hand experience, when he worked as an assistant in a shop 
in Reykjavik, he gained important insights into foreign trade at second hand through his 
friendship with his countrymen among merchants. This he supplemented with own 
studies of the history of Iceland’s foreign trade over the centuries.12 Second, among 
Icelanders he held a unique knowledge of contemporary political economy, and he has 
been called the first Icelandic economist, although he was not an economist by
11 Sverrir Jakobsson, ‘Jon Sigurdsson forseti,’ p 57 (Olafur E. Johnsen). Tryggvi Gunnarsson is 
quoted by J6n Sigurdsson, ‘Um verzlun og verzlunarsamtdk,’ p 238. See, for example, also 
Einar Asmundsson, Um framfarir Islands, pp 72-5.
12 Sverrir Jakobsson, ‘Jon Sigurdsson forseti,’ pp 12, 56. Einar Laxness, ‘Sagnfraedingurinn 
Jon Sigurdsson.’
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education.13 He had attended university lectures in political economy in Copenhagen, 
where he spent most of his life, and he had studied the writings of liberal economists and 
philosophers. Among them were works by A. Smith, D. Ricardo, J.B. Say, J.R. 
McCulloch, K.H. Rau, M.L. Nathanson, and T. Twiss, who all advocated liberalism. 
Jon Sigurdsson is also known to have been familiar with the ideas of Jeremy Bentham in 
his early years.14 Because of this, Jon’s understanding of the role and significance of 
foreign trade, as this was perceived at the time, probably was more profound than among 
any of his contemporaries.
From the overall context of Jon Sigurdsson’s political ideology, it is clear that he 
saw foreign trade as a paramount issue for the economy. It was the way by which the 
economy should be revitalised and expanded. To quote Jon, an unrestricted, external 
trade was the ‘basis of all other improvements in Iceland,’15 and ‘the key to the progress 
of Iceland.’16 Also, ‘economic conditions of the country, as far as industries and their 
progress is concerned, depend on optimum conditions of trade.’17 Furthermore, ‘all
13 horvaldur Gylfason, Ad byggja land, pp 17-18. — The first Icelandic economist by 
education, Amljotur Olafsson, studied political economy at Copenhagen University in the early 
1850s and was a liberal like Jon Sigurdsson. However, notwithstanding authoring the first 
textbook in political economy, Amljotur directed his energy towards purely economic and 
social studies of the history of Iceland, rather than polemical writings for contemporary debate 
like J6n, although Jon’s writings were based on extensive research and study of Icelandic 
history. Next to study political economy was Indridi Einarsson, in the 1870s. See Bjami 
Jonsson, Islenzkir Hafnarstudentar, pp 198, 217 and Indridi Einarsson, Sed og lifad, [2nd ed.], 
p 142.
14 Pall Eggert Olason, Jon Sigurdsson, pp 101-2. Sverrir Jakobsson, ‘Jon Sigurdsson forseti,’ p 
57.
15 In Icel.: ‘undirrot og grundvoll allra annarra endurbota a Islandi ...’ Quoted in Sverrir 
Jakobsson, ‘Jon Sigurdsson forseti,’ p 41.
16 In Icel.: ‘lykillinn til Islands ffamfarar ...’ Quoted in Sverrir Jakobsson, ‘Jon Sigurdsson 
forseti,’ p 60.
17 In Icel.: ‘allur hagur landsins, ad {wi sem vidvikur bjargraedisvegum og framfdr beirra, er 
undir ]m komin, ad verzlanin sd 1 [m bezta horfi sem audid er ...’ Quoted in Sverrir 
Jakobsson, ‘Jon Sigurdsson forseti,’ p 56.
C h a p t e r  I I I  -  80
industries and all prosperity of nations stands and falls with trade,’18 and ‘merchants 
practically generate industries.’19 Numerous other, similar comments of Jon show the 
decisive role he assigns to foreign trade for any economy.20 But exactly through what 
sequence was foreign trade to revive the economy?
According to Jon Sigurdsson, the basis of external trade was differences in 
resources. Each country produced and exported those commodities and goods it had in 
abundance, in exchange for those items that it lacked or did not have in enough 
quantities. This was, as Jon frequently put it, the nature of trade generally. By doing this, 
each country found a way to overcome its deficiencies of nature. External trade 
effectively substituted for them. Within each country, merchants found their business 
niches and while pursuing their interests, they in turn served the interests of their 
country.21 Hence, through the agency of foreign trade, hitherto closed resources would be 
opened up and many other advantages would follow, because, for example, the profit 
motive would be more effective than any decree in improving the qualities of 
commodities.22 Evidently, Jon was echoing classical economists and liberals when he 
referred to comparative advantages of economies and Smith’s system of natural liberty, 
within which self-interest of businessmen and markets operated.23
Similarly, in true liberal tradition Jon Sigurdsson stressed the importance of
minimal government intervention (laissez faire). He claimed that all progress and
18 In Icel.: ‘allir atvinnuvegir og oil velmegun bjodanna stendur og fellur med verzlaninni...’ 
J6n Sigurdsson, ‘Um verzlun d Islandi,’ p 184.
19 In Icel.: ‘kaupmenn skapa ad kalla ma atvinnuveguna 1 hendi sdr.’ Jon Sigurdsson, ‘Um 
verzlun a Islandi,’ p 183.
20 See, for example, his ‘Um verzlun a Islandi,’ pp 163-4, and his ‘Um verzlun og 
verzlunarsamtok,’ pp 230, 232.
21 Jon Sigurdsson, ‘Um verzlun a Islandi,’ pp 164, 165, 180-81, 184, 194, 199.
22 Jon Sigurdsson, ‘Um verzlun a Islandi,’ pp 190,209.
23 Lord Robbins, The Theory o f Economic Development, pp 99-101, discusses the relation of 
Smith’s system of natural liberty to the self-interest of businessmen and markets.
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prosperity of man and nations depended on the exchange of merchandise because ‘when 
trade is free, purchases and sales grow spontaneously, industries and all kinds of 
provisions and produce are generated, and all parts harmonise, provided that the 
government keeps back except for the sake of stimulation and guidance.’24 In his view, 
this principle had been utterly violated in the case of Iceland from the 17th century 
through to his own times. In consequence, a general decline of the Iceland economy was 
inevitable, and Icelandic society had generally fallen into a decay. Iceland was an 
example of what always happened when foreign trade was restricted, especially when, as 
was the case in Iceland, it was limited to an exchange with one country only. True, the 
harm would be less if the country in question ran a substantial external trade all over the 
world, excelled in education, and was at the forefront in science. But some ill effects 
would, nevertheless, emerge. Generally, by restricting trade to one country only, the 
‘light of education merely shone from one side,’ this would undermine the progress of the 
subordinate nation, make it ignorant and prejudiced. It would then belittle itself, the 
metropolis country would exploit this situation to its advantage, and this would end in 
oppression of the nation in question.25
This is what had happened in Iceland, Jon Sigurdsson claimed. From 1602 to 
1787, subjects of foreign states had not been allowed to participate in the Iceland trade, 
and until 1855, they had been kept outside through technical hindrances. Moreover, 
foreign trade had not only been confined to Danish subjects but had been firmly 
channelled through Copenhagen.26 Hence, other countries were precluded and the
24 In Icel.: ‘J>egar verzlanin er fij&ls l>a vaxa kaup og solur af sjaltum ser, atvinnuvegir og 
allskonar addraettir og aflabrogd baedi a sjo og landi spretta upp, og allt lagar sig hvad eftir
odru, ef ekki er gripid fram 1 af stjomarinnar hendi nema til ad hvetja og leidbeina ...’ J6n
Sigurdsson, ‘Um verzlun a Islandi,’ p 208.
25 Jon Sigurdsson, ‘Um verzlun & Islandi,’ pp 164, 180-81, 189.
26 Jon Sigurdsson, ‘Um verzlun a Islandi,’ pp 158-9, 159-60, 175-7.
C h a p t e r  I I I  -  82
commercial centre of Iceland was located outside the country. This was most unfortunate 
for Iceland because Denmark was one of the smallest nations in Europe, and 
comparatively inferior in industries and trades. It needed to copy others and lagged 
behind. Therefore, Danes had to import a great deal for their consumption, and imports 
from Iceland were used only marginally in Denmark, so they had to be re-exported. For 
Iceland, this meant delays, repeated gluts in the market, and lower prices of exports and 
higher prices of imports because of extra warehouse costs, damage and shrinkage of 
merchandise, loading and unloading costs, middlemen costs, etc. Furthermore, merchants 
understandably had their homes in Copenhagen and this caused the profits of trade to be 
reinvested there instead of Iceland.27
The repercussions of this situation ranged even further. Jon Sigurdsson claimed 
that because the merchants resided in Copenhagen, they had become insensitive and 
unaware of the needs and wishes of their customers in Iceland, and also indifferent to 
industries and trades in the country. They focused more on selling imports in Iceland 
than Iceland’s exports in Copenhagen, and they operated their business irrespective of 
what might best suit Icelandic interests. Consequently, their thrift decreased as the 
economy declined. Moreover, in these circumstances inefficient merchants might persist, 
holding the illusion that the Iceland economy rested on their activities, and nobody would 
trade with Iceland if they did not. They would make other people believe this in 
Copenhagen and Iceland, even their customers. At that point, the degree of oppression 
was reached where merchants treated Icelanders practically as their livestock, a situation 
which the state of foreign trade in the mid 19th century witnessed, Jon said.28
27 Jon Sigurdsson, ‘Um verzlun a Islandi,’ pp 165, 177-80.
28 Jon Sigurdsson, ‘Um verzlun a Islandi,’ pp 183, 184-5. Jon Sigurdsson, ‘Um verzlun og 
verzlunarsamtok,’ p 228.
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It is easy to understand now why and in what way Jon Sigurdsson perceived the 
role of external trade to be so decisive for any economy, and how it could have both 
destructive and constructive impacts, depending on the degree of freedom that external 
trade enjoyed. However, he did not naively suppose that the shift from a monopoly in 
Iceland to free trade would happen automatically and without fraction. The greatest 
obstacle he saw was the perennial debt of Icelandic customers with merchants. Even if 
indigenous merchants or merchants from other countries than Denmark would gradually 
engage in Iceland’s foreign trade, Icelanders would have difficulties in transferring their 
custom from the established Danish merchant houses to the new competitors precisely 
because of the debts. To solve this dilemma, Jon advised his countrymen to be provident 
and frugal, try to use domestic materials and foods, reduce their imports, and slowly pay 
up their debts. But since it could be a long while before ordinary merchants would throw 
themselves into competition with the Danes, he stressed that Icelanders should also form 
trading associations to which they should as much as possible divert their custom to. 
Using these two means, Icelanders would gradually get off the hook they were hanging 
on at the Danish merchants and be free to manage their sales and purchases as they saw 
fit.
With reference to the discussion about the experience of traditional and 
transitory economies in the late 19th century and in the post war years, it is noteworthy 
that Jon does not worry about too little demand or too a small export sector. He is 
convinced that the single change from a monopoly to a free trade system in Iceland’s 
foreign trade will be progressive for the economy. After all, a monopoly prevailed and its 
retreat, not matter how small, was a step forwards, and Jon was speaking of its total 
abandonment so his optimism is understandable. Also, it is interesting to note that he 
believed that a change in the institutional framework of foreign trade did not only mean
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an improvement in the system itself — for example, the locus of trade would move to 
Iceland — because he assumed that it would affect the levels and types of production in 
the economy, including exports. He spoke directly of new industries, and he almost 
certainly had in mind manufacturing industries above all, although not factories but 
rather workshops. In doing so, he in fact anticipated some changes in terms of economic 
development, although he does not uses that expression. The extent to which he expected 
such process to happen is unclear, and he probably was not referring to a radical change 
such as a structural change in the economy. Rather, it seems plausible that he was 
thinking of a kind of a progress within the existing economic base, in the form of a 
certain amount of diversification.
It is also noteworthy that Jon does not envisage any particular obstacles in factor 
markets. However, even though he did not mention them, he almost certainly realised at 
least some of those that existed, but did not want to comment on them, so as not to spoil 
his case for free trade. After all, his writings on foreign trade had polemical purposes, 
and were an input into political debate among Icelanders, and between Icelanders and 
Danes. Therefore, in spite of his silence about this matter, it is plausible to assume that 
he tacitly consented with a number of his contemporaries who criticised many practices 
and customs that they deemed detrimental for the economy in one way or another. For 
instance, only a blind man did not notice the severe money shortage in Iceland with all its 
repercussions, and Jon was well aware of this.29 In conclusion, Jon adamantly believed 
that the monopoly system in Iceland’s foreign trade was the single most important cause 
of all the defects in trade and the economy. Hence, by destroying it and shifting to 
effective free trade, Jon claimed this change in the organisational framework of trade
29 Indri6i Einarsson, Sed og I if ad, [2nd ed.], p 145.
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would regenerate the economy and put it on the track of progress. In Chapter X, his 
views will be revisited in the light of the findings of the thesis.
111.3. The Method of Analysis
111.3.1. The Trade Analysis
It is evident that in examining the impact of foreign trade on any economy, two separate 
aspects of trade must be studied since foreign trade can affect economies in broadly two 
ways (Fig. III.l). One aspect is the trade flows over time, not only quantities and values 
besides prices, but also the types of exports and imports, etc. The other aspect that must 
be studied is the institutional framework of trade. Examination of trade flows is 
relavitely straightforward and empirical in nature, because its purpose is to accumulate 
relevant information and present them in an orderly way. But since the outcome of the 
trade analysis was to be used as input into the examination of the links between foreign 
trade and the economic transition, it was considered necessary to perform a rather 
detailed examinaion. Therefore, it was decided to describe the economic context of the 
exports and imports as well, that is, discuss exports and imports in relation to their 
respective production and consumption patterns. This would put subsequent examination 
of the links between trade and the economy on a firmer ground and make it more 
rigorous.
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In this detailed examination of Iceland’s exports and imports, changes in the 
institutional structure of trade specific to goods inevitably came to discussion. However, 
they were described in a rather elementary way and to the extent that was deemed 
suitable in each case. This meant that changes in the institutional framework of trade 
were not examined systematically and that general changes in the institutions of trade 
were not discussed at all. The latter problem was solved by discussing these general 
changes in relation with the macro-economic implications of the product-specific 
changes. But the first problem could only be solved with the application of a systematic 
method at the point when the macro-economic implications of institutional changes 
would be analysed. As will be discribed below, the solution was to develop a research 
method that could be applied to the trade flows and to institutional change within the 
same analytical approach.
To underpin the analytical framework that was developed, I will start by 
discussing models and theories that are relevant for the core research questions of the 
thesis. This discussion serves as a platform for the next step where the research model or 
method of analysis is explicated. The restrictions and the potentials of the model are first 
outlined shortly, and then its overall structure is detailed and what parts of the model are 
employed in the present research.
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111.3.2. The Relation of Trade and Development: A Sketch of 
Relevant Historical Models and Theories
Before I probe into the thickets of relevant theoretical constructs, it is useful to make a 
notice of a simple fact about economic growth and development in history. It is common 
knowledge that development is comparatively recent while growth almost certainly has 
recurred through history. From this point of view, the Western European development 
experience, which has been repeated with great variations in other parts of the world in 
the 19th and 20th century, is a deviation from the ‘regular’ pattern, not the other way 
around.30 This is not rhetoric, because acknowledging this fact affects our ideological 
viewpoint. This saves us from taking an Eurocentric view and becoming fixated on the 
‘failures’ of traditional and transitory societies to modernise, initiate economic growth 
and ultimately develop. Also, this way of thinking puts traditional and modem societies 
on an equal footing.31
As it happens, there has not emerged a clear and distinct strand in the economic 
history literature on Western Europe that has offered historical models and theories to 
explain in fundamental terms their unique and ‘deviant’ evolution since the early modem 
period. This may partly be because of the Eurocentric view commented on, but it no 
doubt is a massive task too, which also counts for the situation. There are, of course, 
fairly abstract theories about specific aspects of this evolution, based on empirical
30 J.L. Anderson, Explaining Long-Term Economic Change, p 67. R  Brenner, ‘Economic 
Backwardness,’ p 15. M.P. Todaro, Economic Development, 6th ed., p i l l .  S.D. Neumark, 
Foreign Trade and Economic Development in Africa, p ix.
31 This stance is mainly based on empirical observations (see last footnote), but it is echoed 
more generally by postcolonialism and deconstruction method, such as exercised by M.
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research.32 They include the Brenner debate over the fall of feudal system, M. Weber’s 
and R.H. Tawney’s works on the Protestant ethic and the rise of capitalist behaviour, 
and the world system analysis of I. Wallerstein and others.33 Also, there are various 
models of economic change, such as that about economic backwardness by A. 
Gerschenkron, but they tend to be country-specific.34 Hence, general, theoretical 
interpretative studies with regard to the overall economic context across countries seem 
to be relatively few.35 This fact is highlighted here to explain why the literature on the 
‘core’ countries of Europe does not provide us with an economic model or a theory to 
compare with other parts of the world. Therefore, we cannot see if the ‘core’ countries 
differed fundamentally from countries modernising later and what factors were 
specifically strategic in their case.
Consequently, it appears that there is more of general interpretations in the 
theoretical literature on the economic history of the Americas, Africa, Asia, and Oceania, 
than of Europe. Scholars have proffered models and theories to explain the economic 
history of the Extra-European parts of the world in the medium and long-term, mainly by 
studying their responses to the economic stimulus of the ‘core’ countries of Western 
Europe. For this research, the theoretical literature on the economic history of the 
temperate settlements is perhaps most relevant for us. In addition to the immense 
geographical size of the United States and their wealth of natural resources, which makes 
them less dependent than otherwise on foreign trade, they are often largely regarded as
Foucult. See D. Gfregory]. ‘discourse,’ p 136; P.A. Jfackson], ‘postcolonialism,’ pp 465-6; 
G. P[ratt], ‘poststructuralism (including deconstruction),’ p 468.
32 Cf. C. Trebilcock, The Industrialization o f the Continental Powers, pp 1-21.
33 See J.L. Anderson, Explaining Long-Term Economic Change. See also P. G[lennie], 
‘Brenner debate,’ pp 37-9; P.J. T[aylor], ‘world-systems analysis,’ pp 677-9.
34 C. Trebilcock, The Industrialization o f the Continental Powers, p 425.
35 An example, however, of this kind of literature is J.L. Anderson, Explaining Long-Term 
Economic Change.
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an variant of the Western European model of industrialisation. But the economic history 
of Canada, Argentina, and Australia has to a varying extent been explained with 
reference to staples. This applies especially to the economic history of Canada, which is 
the home country of the staples theory. The essence of the theory is that ‘national 
economic and social develment is based upon the export of unprocessed or semi­
processed primary resources (staples).’36 Furthermore, exports of staples function as ‘the 
leading sector of the economy, and set the pace for economic growth.’37 Export staples, 
which depend on geographical/ecological, insitutional, and technological factors, 
dominate the economy and changes in leading staples over time reshape the structure of 
the economy according to the special economic and social functions of the predominant 
staple at each time. The theory is carved out from the historical experience of Canada, 
which is a relatively resource abundant country and was colonised to harness its natural 
endowments to make commodities for export to Europe.
Although H.A. Innis, who is usually credited for the theory, was not first to 
write about staples in relation to Canada, he was first to emphasise their importance for 
the general course of Canadian economic history. His works were in the form of rather 
loosely connected studies on staples rather than an explicit theory, but M.H. Watkins in 
1963 advanced Innis’ insights by infusing into them a certain linkages typology, besides 
benefiting from work of other scholars. This he produced in the form of a cohesive 
theory of staples, applicable to ‘new’ countries like Canada.38 The linkages typology 
derived from A.O. Hirschman’s The Strategy o f Economic Development (1958), written 
within development economics. There he forwarded it as a tool for analysing and
selecting suitable development strategies, for instance, choosing new industries to
36 T.J. Bfames], ‘staples theory,’ p 589.
37 M.H. Watkins, ‘A Staple Theory of Economic Growth.’
38 M.H. Watkins, ‘A Staple Theory of Economic Growth.’
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initiate, for traditional and transitional economies. He distinguished between two types of 
linkages that a new industry (‘master industry’) might induce. Backward linkage referred 
to the stimulus that the master industry might produce in the way of inducing domestic 
production by a ‘satellite industry’ whose products were inputs for the master industry. 
That way, inputs were produced internally instead of being imported, and fully processed 
imported inputs could be replaced by imported raw materials that were processed 
internally. Effectively, these are examples of semi-dynamic gains from trade because the 
start of new industries inevitably is based on imports of either capital goods or 
knowledge (services), possibly both. Forward linkage referred to a possible stimulus 
towards the start of a satellite industry that used as inputs the products of the master 
industry.39 That way, they would be further processed internally, instead of being 
exported right away and processed externally. This is sometimes called up-stream or 
resource-based industrialisation in the development literature.40 Watkins employed this 
linkages approach and added a new type, namely final demand linkage (consumption 
linkage). This new type of linkage described the effects that payments to factors of 
production, employed in each industry, had on the domestic economy through their 
allocation of the payments.
By the time Watkins published his paper, the insights of Innis’ staples theory 
and literature in human geography had spurred D.C. North in 1955 to advance a theory 
to explain the economic development of the United States. Amplifying it in later works, 
he called it the export base theory, applicable to ‘new’ countries with a favourable man 
to ‘land’ ratio and that had been built up within a capitalist framework. Adopting a 
stages approach and suggesting a spiral sequence of events, he theorised how the 
American economy had developed from, first, a subsistence stage to one where regional
39 A.O. Hirschman, The Strategy o f Economic Development, pp 100, 102.
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trade and village industries started. Then an interregional trade emerged, which resulted 
in diminished returns in agriculture and forced the region to industrialise. As the 
industrial base diversified, the region engaged more and more into external sales and 
finally ended in selling to other regions (or countries) products, services, labour, and 
capital.41 Explicitly modelled on the United States experience, which irrefutably was in 
many regards unique among temperate settlements, the export base theory has had 
limited applicability or relevance for other temperate settlements, judging from the 
economic history literature. Hence, the staples theory and not the export base theory has 
been tested on Argentina and Australia. The conclusions have been mixed, some scholars 
considering it useful while other have been more doubtful.42
Tropical countries, with their frequent industrial enclave activities, have 
sometimes been denoted as dual economies in the theoretical literature. This means that 
they generally were unable to generate a stable economic growth or significant 
development, because of the isolation of capitalist activities within the economy. Japan, 
which had a dualistic economy according to A.C. Kelley, J.G. Williamson and R.J. 
Cheetham, is an exception because it initiated an industrialisation.43 Furthermore, in 
describing the economic history of many tropical countries, including those that escaped 
enclaves, scholars have often referred to the vent-for-surplus phenomenon which J.S. 
Mill coined and is traceable to A. Smith. This term is used to describe economies that 
started exporting but without any detectable fall in domestic production. This could only 
happen when the factors of production were not fully utilised, because of structural
40 M. Gillis et al., Economics o f Development, 4th ed., p 475.
41 D.C. North, ‘Location Theory and Regional Economic Growth,’ pp 244-5. See also D.C. 
North, The Economic Growth o f the United States, 1790-1860.
42 See, for example, D.C.M. Platt and G. di Telia, eds, Argentina, Australia and Canada, pp 3- 
4.
43 A.C. Kelley, J.G. Williamson, and RJ. Cheetham, Dualistic Economic Development.
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obstacles in factor markets, small infrastructure, or low level of technology. In the case 
of the tropics, inefficient allocation of factors applied especially to labour but also 
sometimes to ‘land’ (natural resources).44
Until recently, most scholars presumably thought of the staples theory and the 
vent-for-surplus theory as being incompatible.45 However, in a novel paper in 1994, R. 
Findlay and M. Lundahl showed that the staples theory, which had been applied to ‘land’ 
abundant economies, essentially rested on one underutilised factor, namely ‘land.’46 
Hence, the staples theory could be reinterpreted and perceived as a particular example of 
vent-for-surplus situation. Furthermore, the authors synthesised the theories within the 
neoclassical formulation of comparative advantages.47 It appeared then that the tropical 
countries and the temperate settlements were subject to the same logic of having at least 
one, yet not identical, underutilised factor of production. This brings us back to the 
theory of comparative advantages, Heckscher and Ohlin’s theory, Haberler’s theory and 
W.A. Lewis’ analysis, which all are based on a quantitative, and sometimes qualitative, 
studies of the three conventional factor markets (‘land,’ labour, and capital). Useful as 
these observations are, they are not entirely satisfactory as many scholars have 
remarked.48 For instance, why did the United States diverge from the other temperate 
settlements economies, and why was Japan so unique among tropical countries? Besides, 
factor market analysis is inadequate to explain the Western European ‘deviation’ since 
the early modem period. Surely, variations in the economic history of countries, be they 
traditional or modem, can be explained within the same analytical or explanatory
44 B. Ingham, Tropical Exports and Economic Development.
45 An example is R  Caves, cf. R  Findlay and M. Lundahl, ‘Natural Resources,’ p 69.
46 Indeed, labour and capital tended to be relatively abundant compared to other parts of the 
world outside Western Europe but they were, after all, mobile factors, opposite to land. Hence, 
land clearly was more underutilised factor than labour or capital.
47 R. Findlay and M. Lundahl, ‘Natural Resources.’
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framework. After all, one of the aims of historical enquiry is to aid our understanding of 
causes of change, both those that are common and dissimilar. Note, however, that this 
does not mean that just one explanatory framework is valid. On the contrary, a variety of 
equally valid frameworks can exist and should be used to understand the past, because 
history is not uni-linear but multi-linear process.49 In any case, there is a need for an 
additional tool in economic history, one that offers more intuitive approach into the 
mechanism of structural change in economies.
Incidentally, the linkages approach comes to consideration here. Several 
scholars, including Hirschman himself, have been making attempts to integrate the 
staples theory and the linkages approach. In a noteworthy discussion by F.S. Weaver in 
his book about the economic history of South America (1980), he observed that the 
staples theory essentially was a typology rather than a theory, because its application 
entailed a survey of backward, forward, and consumption linkages of an export activity. 
Moreover, the theory can ‘provide a systematic organising device with which one can 
relate economic activity to other dimensions of social life ...,5° Here, Weaver was under 
the heavy influence of R.E. Baldwin, in particular a paper from 1956, where he 
compared a hypothetical plantation production with family small-holdings production 
and synthesised economic and social aspects of both methods into a convincing argument 
in favour of the latter.51 Antedating Hirschman’s book in 1958, Baldwin did of course 
not employ a linkages approach but his paper shows he clearly was thinking along 
similar lines.
48 R  Findlay and M. Lundahl, ‘Natural Resources,’ p 68.
49 In fact, it would perhaps be better to speak of a multi-dimensional process since the use of 
‘linear’ phrasing suggests linear thought, which I am not oriented towards.
50 F.S. Weaver, Class, State, and Industrial Structure, p 86.
51 RE. Baldwin, ‘Patterns of Development in Newly Settled Regions.’
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Weaver, however, seems to be unaware that the linkages approach had been 
significantly advanced since 1958. In a study by S.R. Pearson in 1970, the term fiscal 
linkage had been adopted to describe fiscal revenues of a state accruing to it through 
export duties and import tariffs.52 Also, Hirschman in 1977 had reviewed and advanced 
his linkages approach for the purpose of development studies and there he modestly 
proffered it as a tool in economic historical research. Hirschman’s main addition to the 
approach was in introducing inside and outside linkages, which was a new subdivision 
and cut across production linkages (backward and forward) and consumption linkage. 
This suggested subset described the connections between already operating industries (or 
firms) and the start of new activities in the economy or activities in new locations in the 
country. If those behind the new activity were indigenous to the former industries and 
firms, this showed inside linkage. If those initiating the new activities were foreigners or 
the state, this showed outside linkage.53 Hence, the distinction between inside and outside 
linkage was a measure of the relations of new activities to previous industries or firms. 
Unfortunately, Hirschman did not make clear how he perceived domestic entrepreneurs 
who were external to previous industries or firms, for example, young men engaging in 
business for the first time.
Several years later (1987), Hirschman gave a concise and more systematic 
presentation of his linkages approach.54 Interestingly, he dropped inside and outside 
linkages. Whatever his reason, the distinction he made between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ 
is useful, although this set of linkages cannot be quantified in the same way as the other 
linkages. Provided that there is information available, production linkages (forward and 
backward) can be computed in standard input-output tables and, indeed, this fact has
52 A.O. Hirschman, ‘linkages,’ p 209.
53 A.O. Hirschman, ‘A Generalized Linkage Approach,’ p 81.
54 A.O. Hirschman, ‘linkages.’
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secured them a place in the toolbox of development economics.55 However, in historical 
research and in particular when an industry is starting, sources about this can be scarce 
if they exist at all. Hence, the study of production linkages presumably tends to be 
similar to the study of inside-outside linkages, which can only be studied in qualitative 
terms.
In the 1987 paper, Hirschman stressed the historical relevance of his linkages 
approach more strongly. He linked it in particular with the staples theory as he had done 
in the 1977 paper. Why he focused so on the staples theory probably is because 
development studies sometimes tend to assign in a slightly deterministic way particular 
economic and social structures with particular products. In other words, the production 
of a good and its pertaining technology (production function) is supposed to determine 
the economic and social structure. This way of thinking was at the heart of Baldwin’s 
paper in 1956, and this is one of the issues Hirschman discusses in 1977 and 1987.56 But 
this way of thinking was also a very central theme to the staples theory when it was 
applied to Canada. H.A. Innis’ view was that Canadian export staples over time had 
permeated the economy, heavily influencing it each time a new export staple emerged. 
Moreover, this legacy is still very much alive in Canadian economic historiography, and 
is partly infused with debates concerning to what extent Canada’s economic history has 
been desirable and why the economy has evolved so. Some have suggested that Canada 
is locked in a staples trap, a stand that is analogous to debates about the economic 
experience of LDCs in the post-war world.57
55 Input-ouput tables are described in, for example, M. Gillis et al., Economics o f Development, 
4th ed., pp 137-45.
56 See a discussion about Baldwin’s stance in J.T. Thobum, Primary Commodity Exports, pp 
33-5.
57 J. Richards, ‘The Staple Debates.’ G.D. Taylor, “‘A Multitude of Solitudes”: The Pursuit of 
Business History in Canada.’ T.J. B[ames], ‘staples theory,’ pp 589-91.
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111.3.3. The Potentials and Restrictions of the Linkages 
Approach for Historical Research
The linkages approach is a very promising complementary tool in economic history 
analysis, not only on microeconomic but also macroeconomic level. This is because it 
offers a relatively extensive method to understand and relate changes in economic 
variables to one another over a wide range in the economic spectrum. Furthermore, the 
method is dynamic because shifts — disequilibria — in the economy as well as foreign 
markets are integral to its mechanism. Hence, it is far removed from static equilibrium 
neoclassical analysis and much more apt for economic history analysis. To the best of 
my knowledge, the potential of the linkages approach has yet not been fully explored in 
the literature with a full-fledged execution of it, and I am not aware of any formal, 
comprehensive presentation of the method. 58 Therefore, an attempt will be made to 
present the methodology in general, discuss its components, and explain its application.
First, however, I briefly want to comment on its potentials and restrictions with 
regard to historical research, and say a few words about the relevant terminology. The 
linkages approach seems to be suitable for whichever short, medium, or long-term
58 Apart from F.S. Weaver and a few writers referred to in Hirschman’s 1977 and 1987 papers,
I am aware of only a few scholars who have employed the linkages approach to some extent, 
implicitly or expliticly, and no one has used in its full version. Bulmer-Thomas is aware of the 
approach but does not use it explicitly, while D. Senghaas states it formally and uses its basics 
in his reasoning. J. Sender and S. Smith explicitly use a part of the linkages approach, and so 
does Sigfus Jonsson (in relation to the staples theory). E. Horesh and S. Joekes, unlike all the 
others, specifically study leakages. Note that the listing is no doubt defective. For the works of 
those authors, see the bibliography.
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analysis. Also, in spite of the dynamic nature of the approach, it seems to cope equally 
well with stasis as with change in the economy. However, it does not deal with changes 
in social phenomena that feed into the economy, for instance, long-term changes in 
technology.59 Rather, the approach follows up the impact of impulses into the economy, 
wherever they trickle. Another point is that the linkages approach seems to be applicable 
to countries irrespective of their level of industrialisation or modernisation. Of course, its 
executions become more complicated in ‘advanced’ economies, but its logic should 
remain unaffected. Also, although the approach originally was aimed at an analysis of 
the industry level, there is nothing to preclude an analysis of the firm level or the national 
level like in this research. Similarly, it can be applied as well on the regional level, in 
which its boundaries are treated as state boundaries in an ‘ordinary’ economy-wide 
analysis. The last point to make is that it is only a complementary tool of analysis. For 
example, surveys of factor markets grasp certain aspects that the linkages approach 
misses. Furthermore, by its nature it does not explain various institutional structures in 
society or their changes, and it does not deal with the political nature of external 
relations. The strength of the linkages approach primarily lies in the survey of the overall 
context of production and consumption flows, which are two side of the same coin, for 
no other approach within economic history seems to provide equally as extensive and 
systematic method of analysis of this particular aspect of an economy. Besides, it offers 
a dynamic interpretation of economic change.
In line with Hirschman, the term ‘linkages approach’ will be retained for this 
particular kind of analysis, instead of calling it an ‘expanded staples theory’ as Weaver
59 An interesting literature about technology changes and economic growth is within the new 
growth theory and the evolutionary growth theory which are two competing paradigms in 
explaining long term economic growth. An extensive application of the second method, 
stretching from the 18th century to the 1990s, is G.N. von Tunzelmann, Technology and 
Industrial Progress: The Foundations o f Economic Growth.
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suggests.60 Apart from causing confusion, because the ‘staples theory’ and ‘expanded 
staples theory’ would mean quite different things, the connotation obscures the true 
essence of this analytical approach. Although it has only been discussed in relation with 
the staples theory, as far as I know, it can just as well be tested in relation to any other 
historical model or theory, as Hirschman indirectly suggests. After all, a study of the 
linkages of a particular economic activity in a specific place and at a specific point of 
time does not by any logic entail that the outcome will be an example of an economy that 
scholars happen to have explained with the staples theory. The outcome of such an 
analysis could just as well be an economy that economic historians have until now called 
a dual economy (or with dualistic features). Or, it could be an example of an economy 
that happened to industrialise relatively successfully, like the United States, where the 
domestic market was no less important than external markets. The range of outcomes of 
such an analysis is endless, at least hypothetically so, and the relevance of the linkages 
approach is by no means confined to economies that have large export sectors. In 
principle, the approach is applicable to all economies. Whatever term economic 
historians would prefer to use in reference to any particular outcome is quite a different 
matter, and it does not have any bearing on the kind of analysis that the linkages 
approach offers. This particular line of thought is pursued here, because Hirschman 
offers a fresh look at this matter, when he chooses to term the sum of linkages observed 
in economy at a particular point of time as its specific constellation o f  linkages. 
Essentially, this is what historical models and theories dealing with economic change are 
trying to describe, and in order to identify similarities and differences in constellations of 
linkages, they have to be employed widely and systematically enough.61
60 F.S. Weaver, Class, State, and Industrial Structure, p 87.
61 The need for comparative, systematic, economic history research across countries is also 
expounded in C. Trebilcock, The Industrialization o f the Continental Powers, pp 425-6. In the
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111.3.4. The Methodology of the Linkages Approach and its Use 
in the Present Research
Let us now move onto the methodology of the linkages approach and discuss its 
components. Since neither Hirschman nor other writers have, to my knowledge, 
explicitly set out a graphical illustration for the approach, Fig. HI.2 must be taken as an 
attempt to such formulation. It serves the purpose of forming a basis for my selective 
analysis of the Icelandic economy in the thesis. Precisely because of my analysis is not 
employed to the fullest, it is necessary to show that it is not haphazard but based on a 
systematic methodology.
The purpose of the linkages approach is to examine changes in economic activity 
over time. Hence, it does not matter whether all the linkages existing initially are 
scrutinised before studying later developments (or moving on to the next sample year), or 
whether a particular subset of linkage is studied over time before moving on to the next 
subset of linkage. To facilitate explication and understanding of the approach, it will be 
broken into subset below. To begin with, the initial production in the economy, whether 
in primary, secondary, or tertiary sector, is studied. Hence, production of services is 
included, such as mercantile activities in the foreign trade. Regarding the branches of 
economic activity, the following aspects need to be scrutinised: a) the types of industries
context of Icelandic scholarship, this need is underscored in Bjom S. Stefansson, ‘Framsaga 
Bjoms S. Stefanssonar,’ pp 22-3.
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(businesses and enterprises) with regard to their use of producer goods and services,62 b) 
their particular use of land, labour, money capital, and entrepreneurship, and c) their 
particular use of and need for social overhead capital. This examination would chart 
some of the general characteristics of the economic activity and show, for example, if 
and to what extent it was dependent on external supplies of inputs (producer goods, 
services, and the factors of production listed above). It would also reveal its need for 
social overhead capital. Furthermore, it would be possible to study the use of factors in 
terms of their quantity and quality, identify relative factor intensities by industries (G. 
Haberler), etc., but the need for such an extensive analysis would, of course, depend on 
the type and purpose of the respective research.
62 Producer goods are durable or capital goods, such as machines, and intermediate products, 
for example, fuel. (See C. Pass, B. Lowes, and L. Davies, Dictionary o f Economics, pp 61, 256, 
411.)
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Source: A.O. H irschm an, ‘A Generalized Linkage A pproach,’ A.O. H irschm an, ‘linkages’ 
* Money capital only
The next step would be to investigate new activities (production of new goods) 
over time, new ways of producing previous products and services, and study their 
outward relations (listed under the checklist a-c above). In particular, we would pay 
attention to any possible relations to the ongoing activity (‘master’ industry) and check if 
it provided product and service inputs for the ‘master’ industry (backward linkages) or if 
it used the ‘master’ industry’s goods as such inputs (forward linkages). We would also 
pay attention to conceivable destructive impacts on the domestic economy (backwash
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effects), which could happen if the products of the new activity or its inputs had 
detrimental effects on domestic industries. Also, we would look for possible production 
of ‘indirect’ inputs, such as services and products of craftsmen and skilled workers, 
commercial and state agents, etc., which former and new activities had stimulated in 
emerging in the economy.63 This particular sequence of checking would be done each 
time we observed any new activity being initiated.
Assuming we had studied all new economic activities and production lines in the 
economy during the research period, we would then examine more closely the 
consumption linkage created by of each of the particular activities observed, including 
the initial activities. More precisely, we would scrutinise who were the recipients of the 
factor rewards over time, and follow up the eventual allocation of the rewards (Fig.
III.3). Note that mercantile activity in foreign trade, like any other industry in the 
economy, would be included. Perhaps the first concern here would be to identify 
conceivable leakages of any sort, i.e., non-refimdable money transfers from the economy. 
In economics, the term leakages is sometimes used instead of externalities, which 
describe positive indirect influences outside their intended purpose (such as education) 
and negative indirect influences on other factors or agents (such as pollution).64 But since 
externalities are an established term for this phenomenon, many have unequivocally used 
the term leakages in the special meaning discussed here, and I will do so too.65 It applies
63 The term is borrowed from E. Horesh and S. Joekes, ‘The Impact of Primary Exports,’ p 
181, who use it when referring in fact to positive externalities, cf. below in the main text of the 
thesis. The existence of this particular type of linkage was, however, brought to my attention by 
J.T. Thobum, Primary Commodity Exports, p 51 (endnote 42), quoting a paper by F. Stewart 
and P. Streeten, who called it horizontal linkage.
64 C. Pass, B. Lowes, and L. Davies, Dictionary o f Economics, p 184.
65 M.H. Watkins, ‘A Staple Theory of Economic Growth,’ p 145. A.O. Hirschman, ‘A 
Generalized Linkage Approach,’ p 71 (footnote 7). J.T. Thobum, Primary Commodity Exports, 
pp 32, 41. F.S. Weaver, Class, State, and Industrial Structure, p 90. E. Horesh and S. Joekes, 
‘The Impact of Primary Exports,’ pp 181, 182.
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to all possible drains of capital (mainly money) from the economy under study to other 
countries. This can be in the form of remittances, wages to foreign workers (returning 
home), interest, dividends, and profits to foreign residents. Besides leakages, we would 
also want to trace the domestic allocation of the profit part of the rewards into savings 
(hoarded and in savings funds, banks, etc.), investment, and consumption. Evidently, 
these links are extremely important because they are the source of money capital in the 
economy, unless it receives donations of some kind, loans, or has incomes of money 
capital either invested or loaned abroad.



















The final step in the linkages analysis would be to examine fiscal linkages, i.e., 
possible state levies in the form of export duties (direct fiscal linkage) and import tariffs 
(indirect fiscal linkage). Because the state usually does not take any part in ordinary 
market production, state finances per se are not an integral part of the linkages approach 
analysis. However, since the state usually receives dues from exports and imports, the
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relative significance of these particular revenues as of the total revenues of the state is 
interesting. So too is the expenditure pattern of the state, such as appropriations to social 
overhead capital (infrastructure) and industries (typically agriculture).66 Furthermore, the 
purpose of such levies has a bearing to economic development and the policy of the state 
towards development. In general, the usefulness of fiscal linkages mainly lies in putting 
in focus the links between the state and economic development.
In the present research, not all of the linkages of the approach were examined. I 
concentrated on backwards and forwards linkages, besides consumption linkages. Except 
for fiscal linkages, the other linkages are my own extension to Hirschman’s model and 
there was no special need to survey them for the purposes of the present research. 
Besides, time and room prevented me from probing into the remaining linkages, although 
they would almost certainly have added noteworthy features to the overall picture. It 
would have been impossible to examine them too, given the state of research in Iceland’s 
economic history. Rather, my aim was to outline the salient characteristics of each set of 
principal linkages (saving for fiscal linkages) for the main export staples.
The general linkages approach was extremely useful as a basic tool in 
identifying or charting links from foreign trade to the economy. The strong side of the 
approach is that it is powerful in providing an overview of the economy in a certain way 
by explaining links between a number of economic variables. Hence, it highlights how 
industries (processes of production) connect through inputs and outputs, how industries 
feed into consumption of consumer goods through factor rewards, and how this system is 
affected by imports. Also, the approach aptly addresses links from trade to state 
revenues, besides including leakages. The weak side of the approach, however, is that it 
cannot analyse various organisational shifts in use of factors of production. In other
66 As defined in R. L[ee], ‘infrastructure1,’ p 288.
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words, it is suitable to deal with flows that production and consumption — supply and 
demand — generate, but incapable of portraying shifts in the way utilisation of factors 
of production is organised. Hence, the approach is well equipped in dealing with the 
dynamics from the interplay between production and consumption, but at a loss when 
dealing with how use of factors is organised. Since the thesis dealt with a process of 
economic development, it was no less focused on the latter than the former, and this 
caused a certain problem for the analysis of the overall impact of trade. Hence, although 
the flow dynamics were an inseparable part of the analysis, to show where links from 
trade to the economy lay and how factor intensities were affected, it no less was 
concerned with organisational shifts in the economy, to show how trade affected the 
structural aspects of the economy. The linkages approach dealt admirably with the 
former, but was inadequate for the latter, and this called for a remedy.
111.3.5. The Economic Determinants Model
The problem with the general linkages approach with regard to the long-term change in 
the use of factors was located in its consumption linkages because it was found that they 
did not fully envelope the overall impact of shifts in economic activity on the four factors 
of production. Recall that consumption linkages only deal with the intensity or the extent 
to which a specific industry uses individual factors of production. In a statistical survey 
of consumption linkages, this would be measured by computing the sums of the rewards 
to factors, but in the present research, only verbal description of relative factor 
intensities was offered, based on judgement of qualitative sources and the historical
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literature. However, this procedure is insufficient in an overall analysis because it 
excludes changes in the way factors are employed in the production process and what 
impact this has on factor markets. More precisely, it ignores possible locational and 
organisational changes in the employment of ‘land’ (natural resources), labour, and 
capital. Furthermore, it ignores the social implications of changes in the use of the 
entrepreneurial factor. For instance, a change in the economy may cause an industry to 
move the location of its production process, employ labour on different terms than 
before, find other sources of money capital, and cause an inflow of entrepreneurs from a 
new social group. Useful as the general linkages approach is in providing a systematic 
and dynamic interpretation of the causal interaction between production and 
consumption in economy, the inability of the approach to deal with these aspects is a 
major restriction of the method.
In solving this problem, the H.A. Innis’ staples theory was of initial help 
because it stresses the interaction between geography, institutions, and technology in 
economic activity. In turn, it underscores the use of these sources for purposes of 
production. The advantages of the theory is that its three basic elements correspond to 
three factors of production. Geography is the determinant of ‘land,’ institutions relate to 
the entrepreneurial factor, and technology is the basis of production of capital goods. 
The main asset of this insight from the staples theory was that it related the slightly 
narrow perception of factors of production to their sources and a broader context. 
However, in terms of my methodology, the obvious weakness of the staples theory was 
that it did not include the population from which labour was drawn. Therefore, a certain 
model was built (Fig. III.4), consisting of four major economic determinants: geography, 
population, technology and capital, and institutions and culture. Incidentally, a broadly 
similar formalisation of the same basic idea was found in R. Cameron’s A Concise
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Economic History o f the World, so this typology and its name (economic determinants) 
is no novelty in the literature.67 Notwithstanding, it perhaps is less common than it 
deserves, and in the context of this research, the economic determinants model is 
extremely useful.










Cameron only employs this idea of economic determinants as a general platform 
for the treatment of the topic in his textbook, and he neither implicitly nor explicitly uses 
the staples theory or any other theory in his book. But given the linkages approach used 
in the present research, the model is an extremely useful supplement to the approach. 
This is because it opens up the possibility of examining the overall changes in the use of 
factors of production. While the linkages approach focuses on intensities in the use of 
factors and, effectively, pecuniary relations of individual production processes with 
factors, the economic determinants model as used here gives a chance to include 
examination of organisational or structural aspects. Hence, both form and content in the 
economy is studied. In fact, it is safe to say that with reference to the present study, the
67 R. Cameron, A Concise Economic History o f the World, 3rd ed., pp 9-11.
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essence of the economic transition cannot be fully grasped without employment of the 
economic determinants model. Of course, this claim is based on the fact that my focus 
was on the elements of the economic development of Iceland, rather than on shifts in 
intensities in factor use which is a far more circumscribed topic and suitable for study by 
examining consumption linkages.
The economic determinants model is relatively straightforward and does not 
require much elaboration. Therefore, only the salient points will be briefed. The model 
assumes that the economy is essentially conditioned by four principal components, which 
interact with each other in every economic activity. Note that the interaction consists of 
flows of substance or content but it is also conditioned by the social structures that have 
been built over time in monitoring each of the components. For instance, use of land for 
the purposes of production is not only subject to its quantities but also to law and the 
organisation of ownership. Labour is not only subject to the size of the population but 
also to the level of human capital which depends on the educational system among other 
things. The availability of money capital is not only subject to the supply of money in 
circulation, but also to the fmancial framework of the economy. The availability of 
capital goods and intermediate goods is not only subject to technology and the existence 
of merchants and traders, but also to social or institutional structures and external 
relations. Finally, he human agency factor, entrepreneurship, is more dependent on the 
type of social stratification and cultural traits than on the forces influencing the 
population component.
Evidently, the application of the economic determinants model can mean a very 
extensive survey of not only factor markets but also purely social aspects, provided that 
the latter can be shown to influence economic activity. In the present research, the 
economic determinants model was not used to map the entire economy in terms of the
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economic determinants typology, because that would have been a pointless accumulation 
of information. To paraphrase Hirschman, the aim was to identify differences in 
constellations of the determinants over time, and examine these differences across export 
industries since constellations are presumably similar within industries. Hence, the model 
was used to distinguish between the initial constellations as described in Chapter II and 
in the trade analysis, and the subsequent constellations resulting from the seemingly 
important shifts later on. The procedure was to (a) identify if and how a shift in a 
industry affected its use of the components in terms of both content and organisation, 
and (b) assess whether the shift meant a significant break with its previous use. The first 
step is taken in Chapter IV on exports, while the second step is taken in Chapters VII- 
VIII, which analyse the relevance of the shifts in foreign trade (trade flows and 
institutional framework) for the economic transition. In addition, the implications of 
these differences in constellations of determinants are explored more profoundly in 
Chapter IX on Iceland in international context and Chapter X on conclusions.
My application of the economic determinants model may appear somewhat 
complicated. However, it actually is very straightforward as my examples below will 
illustrate. The shifts in foreign trade that seemed to be important in terms of the 
economic transition were examined component by component. Concerning the geography 
component, it was observed whether or not the shifts meant utilisation of new economic 
resources, a move in the location of the industrial activity, and had spatial implications 
(concentration or dispersion). Regarding the population component, it was observed 
whether or not the shifts entailed a change in the demand for labour by type (mainly 
unskilled vs. skilled), influenced the relations between labour and means of production, 
changed the ownership of the raw materials processed, and altered the terms of 
employment (mainly wage labour vs. piece labour). In the case of technology as 
embodied in technical skills and capital goods, it was observed whether or not the shifts
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required new technical and managerial skills to operate, for instance, machines and new 
types of production units (outcomes of diversification in the economy, specialisation 
among firms, vertical integration within firms). In the case of money capital, it was 
observed whether or not the shifts involved more or less capital intensity than before, 
what type of capital, and what implications this had for the financial structure. Finally, 
regarding social institutions and culture, it was observed whether or not the shifts had 
any impact on, most important, power balances in the social context, either through the 
entrepreneurial function or as societal side-effects from other components, not already 
discussed. This outline shows that the application of the economic determinants model is 
relatively simple and logical, and indicates what sort of issues were examined in relation 
to each component or economic determinant.
Chapter IV  
Exports of Iceland, 1870-1913
IV.1. Exports of Iceland and the International Context
IV.1.1. Values and Growth Rates of Exports: Levels, Shifts, and 
their Causes
When the outlines of Iceland’s exports during 1870-1913 are studied, one of the most 
salient features is the marked increase that occurred. The value of exports rose from 4 
million kroner in 1870 to 21.7 million kroner in 1913 — or by more than five times over 
(Table IV. 1, see Fig. IV. 1). Comparing the average of 1870-74 with the average of 
1910-13, the increase was slightly less — a rise of 4.2 times over.1 In terms of annual 
compound growth,2 exports by value grew by 4.0% per annum from 1870 to 1913, and 
by 3.4% per annum from the 1870-74 average to the 1910-13 average. This expansion 
was even more evident in the quantities of exports, which rose by between six and seven 
times over (Fig. IV.2).
1 Table A.EXP/ALL-5.
2 Unless otherwise stated in the thesis, calculation of growth rates in text and tables always 
refers to annual compound rates.
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Table IV. 1. Exports of Iceland, 1870 to 1913: Values, Quantities, and Growth 
Rates
From 1870 to 1913
1870 1913 Times over Growth per annum
Absolute figures:
Quantity (Tonnes) 9 264 63 940 6.9 4.6%
Value (Thous. kr.) 3 968 21 746 5.5 4.0%
Per capita:
Quantity (Tonnes) 0.1 0.7 5.5 4.1%
Value (kr.) 57 250 4.4 3.5%
From 1870-74 to 1910-13
1870-74 1910-13 Times over Growth per annum
Absolute figures:
Quantity (Tonnes) 9 356 58 447 6.2 4.4%
Value (Thous. kr.) 4 580 19 370 4.2 3.4%
Per capita:
Quantity (Tonnes) 0.1 0.7 5.1 3.9%
Value (kr.) 65 224 3.4 2.9%
Sources: Tables A.EXP/ALL-1 and A.EXP/ALL-5.
To put this into a more meaningful perspective, we might consider the 
relationship of the population of the country to the exports. This is a crude measure of 
the extent to which people were engaged in production for export. By that measure, the 
value of exports per capita increased between three and four times over during the 
period, depending on which years are compared. The annual growth rate was 3.5% per 
annum from 1870 to 1913 whereas the rate was 2.9% per annum on 1870-74 and 1910— 
13 averages. All the evidence, therefore, points to a relatively lively period of export 
activity from Iceland between 1870 and 1913.
In terms of value, the exports of Iceland seem to have been growing more or less 
constantly throughout the period. Only two sub-periods of setbacks are evident, a large 
reduction in the export value in 1886 over the previous sample year and a relatively 
smaller contraction in 1898 compared to the previous sample year (see Fig. IV. 1). 
However, in relation to the export values in 1902 onwards and the fast rate of growth at
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the time, the first three decades clearly form a separate sub-period of a modest export 
growth. The main spurt in the exports came only after the turn of the century and, 
therefore, our research period falls into two in this respect.
Looking at the wider context, i.e., the international scene, we see that in the very 
beginning, the early 1870s, there was a boom in intra-European trade as well as 
Europe’s trade with other countries. Then, from the mid 1870s or ca 1873 onwards there 
was a marked deceleration of the rate of growth of exports and a concurrent price fall for 
a decade or so. Trade resumed again in the late 1880s and prices rose but then, in ca 
1890, another recession settled in and lasted until the mid 1890s or so with deterring 
effects on trade and with prices contracting. From ca 1896 onwards there was a more or 
less continuous acceleration in the rate of growth of exports and prices moved upwards.3 
This ‘highly subjective, though widely held, version of the general course of the world’s 
business’ affected economies world-wide to a varying extent and at different points of 
time, depending on social and economic factors, such as the type of exports.4 And the 
pattern in Iceland’s exports by value is a point in case because it partly diverged from 
this international pattern. As Fig. IV. 1 demonstrates, the deceleration in growth of 
exports took place in Iceland only during the 1880s and 1890s. All this testifies to 
Icelandic variants of the international pattern. However, a striking similarity in 
movements in national wholesale price levels across a range of countries in Europe 
(Denmark, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) legitimates the understanding 
that in spite of their simplification they give a general impression of the major swings of
3 S.B. Saul, The Myth o f the Great Depression, pp 11-15, 27-8. W. Ashworth, A Short History 
o f the International Economy since 1850 (4th ed.), pp 215-16, 221. S.B. Saul, Studies in 
British Overseas Trade, Chapter V.
4 W. Ashworth, A Short History o f the International Economy since 1850 (4th ed.), p 221.
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world trade at the time, especially when the large share of European countries in world 
trade is considered.5
IV.1.2. The Background: General Swings in International Trade 
and their Causes
What were the causes of these ups and downs in world trade and prices? First it must be 
emphasised that these general trends affected individual branches in world trade to a 
varying extent, each having it own special course because of different suppliers, location 
of manufacturing or production, and market countries. But the very fact that so many 
different goods in world trade had so much in common in terms of rates of growth and of 
prices indicates that there were some common causes also.6 Of those explanations still 
put forward, the oldest is the monetary explanation or the impact of the supply of money 
and, moreover, gold and silver.7 An example of that is the boom in the early 1870s, 
which was due to the Franco-Prussian war in 1870-71 and its aftermath, when trade was 
reviving and prices going up, directly and indirectly fuelled by France’s huge war 
indemnities to Germany.8 There was ‘wild, speculative investment’ that in 1873 ended
5 For price levels, see J. Foreman-Peck, A History o f the World Economy (2nd ed.), pp 73 (Fig.
5.3), 156 (Fig. 9.1); and Denm., State Bur. of Stat., Danmarks Vareindfersel og -TJdforsel 
1906, p 11*-12*, and 1913, p 6* (table). For share of Europe in world trade, see A.G. 
Kenwood and A.L. Lougheed, The Growth o f the International Economy (3rd ed.), p 81 (Table 
8).
6 S.B. Saul, The Myth o f the Great Depression, p 15.
7 S.B. Saul, The Myth of the Great Depression, p 16.
8 R. Cameron, A Concise Economic History o f the World (3rd ed.), pp 302, 306.
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in a ‘series of severe crisis’ in Europe and America, namely shortage of money.9 Also, 
many countries were adopting the gold standard in the 1870s onwards, accumulating 
gold with the same effect.10 By contrast, prices and trade revived after discoveries of 
gold in South Africa in 1886 and in Australia, Alaska, Canada, and Siberia around the 
turn of the century.11 With many countries on the gold standard, the supply of money 
and gold was necessarily very important for the trade and movements of prices.12
Another explanation that has been put forward is the shift between home and 
foreign investment over time, especially in the case of Britain which was by far the 
largest investor in late 19th century and as late as 1914 still held 43% of all foreign 
investments in the world.13 The thesis is that increase in foreign investment eventually 
brought up domestic prices, while an increase in home investment would bring down 
prices. According to S.B. Saul, this seems to hold true only for the period until 1887 
after which other forces in the world economy overruled or blurred this mechanism.14 
This, however, is a much debated issue and the relationship between investment, trade, 
prices, and migration in the Western hemisphere needs further research before this 
relationship can be asserted or fully explained.15
9 S.B. Saul, Studies in British Overseas Trade, p 95. R. Cameron, A Concise Economic History 
o f the World (3rd ed.), p 302.
10 R. Cameron, A Concise Economic History o f the World (3rd ed.), pp 306-7. A.G. Kenwood 
and A.L. Lougheed, The Growth o f the International Economy (3rd ed.), pp 106-8. J. 
Foreman-Peck, A History o f the World Economy (2nd ed.), pp 154, 162-3.
11 S.B. Saul, Studies in British Overseas Trade, p 105. R. Cameron, A Concise Economic 
History o f the World (3rd ed.), pp 302, 306. S.B. Saul, The Myth o f the Great Depression, p 
27.
12 R. Cameron, A Concise Economic History o f the World (3rd ed.), p 306.
13 A.G. Kenwood and A.L. Lougheed, The Growth o f the International Economy (3rd ed.), pp 
26-7.
14 S.B. Saul, The Myth o f the Great Depression, pp 19-20. S.B. Saul, Studies in British 
Overseas Trade, pp 90-94, 131-2.
15 A.G. Kenwood and A.L. Lougheed, The Growth o f the International Economy (3rd ed.), pp 
149-54.
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The third set of explanations for the swings in prices and trade has to do with 
supply or cost related factors. One of the most important was the sharp fall in freight 
rates after 1880 onwards. This was due to technical advances, increased productivity in 
shipping, opening up of the Suez canal in 1869, etc. Cost reductions in land transport did 
also take place. Even if prices did not fall instantly when costs were diminishing, such a 
prolonged situation with good profits was conducive to increased production, which 
eventually would force the prices down.16 Only in the very end of our period, after 1910, 
did freight rates move markedly upwards.
The last set of explanations is related to demand factors. Demand is difficult to 
measure but S.B. Saul’s point is that since demand for manufactured products seem to 
have decelerated in many industrial countries from the 1870s to 1890s that may be 
interpreted as having brought prices generally down to some extent. Conversely, the 
demand rose from the late 1890s or around 1900 with would explain partly for rising 
prices and mounting trade.17 Both trends would, of course, apply to manufactures, i.e., 
domestic produce, as well as imported goods from primary producing countries, namely 
foodstuffs and raw materials.
It is against this background sketched here that the general movements of 
exports of primary products and their prices in our period must be studied. The period 
was one of many variations despite the general trends described above, and through this 
interplay world trade was transforming. The period 1873-1896 has often been termed 
the Great Depression, especially in British historiography. The studies of S.B. Saul have 
largely undermined the use of such label for analytical purposes although this particular 
era may appear to have been characterised by a similar development of certain economic
16 S.B. Saul, The Myth o f the Great Depression, pp 21—4.
17 S.B. Saul, The Myth o f the Great Depression, pp 25-6.
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indicators, namely contracting prices and decelerating rate of growth of production and 
world trade. Saul’s findings also suggest that development of world trade underwent or 
had undergone by ca 1890 profound organisational changes along the lines illustrated 
above.18 What is certain is that this particular era is not served justice with the labelling 
of a depression, and it is highly misleading for the analysis of the many currents in world 
trade at the time. Similarly, the labelling of the 1850s and 1860s as a period of a 
particular boom is not very meaningful or helpful in the view of R.A. Church.19 Hence, 
the era of 1873-96 is not in such a stark contrast to the 1850s and 1860s as has 
sometimes been assumed.
Focusing on world trade in primary products, both foodstuffs and raw materials, 
we should first note that its fluctuations were much less than in the trade of 
manufactures.20 However, both types of trade underwent concurrent movements in the 
same directions. Hence, after the boom in the early 1870s, the rate of growth of exports 
of primary commodities slowed also down from the mid 1870s or so until the mid or the 
late 1880s, and prices fell in absolute terms. Contracting trade in Europe owing to 
decreasing money and gold supplies, and falling investment in primary producing 
countries with necessarily falling imports on their behalf21 are a part of the explanation. 
Whereas these factors were affecting trade in general, both in manufactures and in 
primary commodities, particular cost factors were at work in the 1880s, which had 
special importance in the case of primary products. Then, imports of foodstuffs from 
primary producing countries to Europe soared in quantity because of significant and
18 His argument is most strongly presented in his Studies in British Overseas Trade, pp 110— 
33. For arguments against the validity of the depression notion, see his The Myth o f the Great 
Depression, pp 9-11,17, 28, 32, 54.
19 R.A. Church, The Great Victorian Boom, p 76-8.
20 W. Ashworth, A Short History o f the International Economy since 1850 (4th ed.), p 216 
(Table 10).
21 S.B. Saul, Studies in British Overseas Trade, pp 61-2, 68-70.
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continuous falls in freight rates at the time. This was first spelled out in the rapidly rising 
quantities of wheat from Russia, Asia, South and North America,22 and of meat, both as 
live animals and refrigerated, from United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and 
Argentina.23 As facilities for cooling and freezing on board advanced, other kinds of 
‘perishable foods’ like butter, eggs and fruit increased too in quantity.24 This had 
significant impacts on agriculture in developed, European countries, causing a decline in 
farming and brought down prices of domestic produce25 This fuelled demands for 
protection against imports and tariffs that were subsequently increased, for example, in 
France and Germany, but not in Britain or Denmark.26 Tariffs and contracting prices in 
developed countries in Europe had retarding impact on demand for primary products, 
and increased real wages (what could be bought for nominal wages) moved consumption 
towards more expensive, domestic foodstuffs rather than imported foods, which were 
often of inferior quality to the home production.27
With changing circumstances in supply of money and gold in the late 1880s, 
prices and trade mounted, spilling over into imports of primary products. The 
downswing of the early 1890s had no doubt damaging effects of trade in primary 
commodities but world trade was by now getting much more complicated as we have 
indicated earlier, and imports of raw materials from new parts of the world greatly 
increasing in world trade, so the general impact of the downswing is difficult to
22 M.A. O’Connor, ‘World Supply of Wheat,’ p 292. S.B. Saul, Studies in British Overseas 
Trade, p 23. R. Perren, Agriculture in Depression, p 7.
23 S.B. Saul, Studies in British Overseas Trade, pp 23-4.
24 R. Perren, Agriculture in Depression, p 7.
25 R. Perren, Agriculture in Depression, p 8-9 (text and tables).
26 R. Cameron, A Concise Economic History o f the World (3rd ed.), pp 302-5. J. Foreman-
Peck, A History o f the World Economy (2nd ed.), pp 113-16.
27 R. Perren, Agriculture in Depression, p 10, 13. S.B. Saul, The Myth o f the Great
Depression, p 35. S.B. Saul, Studies in British Overseas Trade, pp 24-6.
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ascertain. According to W. Ashworth, the rate of growth of value of primary exports 
started in the 1890s to rise slowly again to a level that remained very much the same 
until the end of the period.28
Linking this overall development of world trade in primary commodities in the 
research period with our statistics in the beginning of the chapter, there is no wonder 
why the downswing of the late 1870s and the 1880s hit the regions of East and South 
Europe harder than Iceland. Wheat and other cereals were a significant item in their 
exports while exports of Iceland consisted of animal and fish products mainly.29 Also, 
although Iceland did not fare as well as the temperate settlement countries as a group in 
terms of the rate of growth of exports, most of them sagged in the middle of the period in 
terms of export earnings per capita. Only Argentina and Chile showed similarities to 
Iceland in having higher levels of per capita export earnings in 1890 than in 1870.30 This 
suggests that Iceland fared better than many temperate settlement countries.
28 W. Ashworth, A Short History o f the International Economy since 1850 (4th ed.), p 216 
(Table 10).
29 I.T. Berend and G. Ranki, Economic Development in East-Central Europe, pp 53-7, 150 
(Table 6-16). R. Cameron, A Concise Economic History o f the World (3rd ed.), p 302.
30 No information about South Africa in 1870 or 1890 are available to me but then it represents 
a very extreme or unusual case because of its resource and exports, namely diamonds and gold. 
Therefore, it is sometimes exluded in world-wide comparisons, see for example L.G. Reynolds, 
Economic Growth in the Third World, p 5.
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IV.2. Iceland’s Commodity Structure and Export 
Concentration
One of the most eye-catching features in Iceland’s exports during the period is the 
predominance not just of primary products but even more of foodstuffs (Fig. IV. 1). By 
value, foodstuffs accounted for 40-50% of total exports in the 1870s and then rose to a 
stable 72-79% level after 1900 (Fig. IV.3), but this change owed more to changes in 
prices than production in Iceland because the share of foodstuffs remained rather stable 
over time (Fig. IV.4).31 Foodstuffs can, therefore, rightfully be called the staple exports 
of Iceland. Within the category of foodstuffs, exports were overwhelmingly fisheries’ 
products, which were usually around 80% of all foodstuffs’ exports by value (Fig. IV.5). 
These fisheries’ products consisted almost wholly of saltfish, varying from ca 50 to 80% 
of all foodstuffs by value, and salted herring. Exports of herring increased from the 
1880s onwards, albeit fluctuating heavily, but in 1906-13, when they were especially 
large, they occupied close to 20-30% of all foodstuffs by value. In spite of these 
developments, saltfish remained the dominant export good.32
Other foodstuffs’ exports were practically of one kind only, namely agricultural 
products. Their share in foodstuffs’ exports was equally as large in the end of the period 
as in the beginning of it, 10-15% by value.33 However, having said that, there was a 
booming period in-between, with a peak in 1890, when they amounted to round about 
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sheep exports but the staple agricultural export good was salted mutton with live horses 
coming as third in significance.34
Crude materials’ exports ranked second in terms of value after foodstuffs. 
Nevertheless, their share in Iceland’s exports declined by value from 33-44% in the 
1870s to 10-15% after 1900 (Fig. IV.3). These crude materials consisted primarily of 
wool and, to a much lesser degree, skins and hides besides eiderdown and feathers (Fig.
IV.6). From the late 1890s onwards, however, crude materials produced from whaling 
(whale bones, bone meal, guano, and baleens) increased significantly among the crude 
materials’ exports, overtaking wool in terms of quantity although not of value.35 The 
share of the third largest group of commodities among exports by value, animal oils and 
fats, remained much the same throughout the period, fluctuating between 10 and 15% of 
export value (Fig. IV.3).36 Their quantities, however, tripled but a substantial fall in 
their prices over time caused them to stay on the same level by value (Fig. IV.7). The 
animal oils and fats were mainly of two kinds — tallow from sheep and all sorts of fish 
oil (cod liver oil, shark liver oil, seal oil, and whale oil).37
Overall, there was much continuity in Iceland’s exports. The commodity 
structure represented by SITC groups changed very little over time, except that 
foodstuffs grew at the expense of crude materials. This continuity is well illustrated in a 
graph of the value of the staple commodities (Fig. IV. 8), summarising the earlier graphs. 
Some four commodities were very constant among the exports and made up 70-90% of 
their value: saltfish ranging from 40 to 50% of exports; wool with diminishing share
34 Table A.EXP/ALL-7.
35 Tables A.EXP/ALL-2, A.EXP/ALL-3, A.EXP/ALL-6 and A.EXP/ALL-7.
36 Table A.EXP/ALL-5.
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from 30% down to 10%; fish oils and tallow with 10-15%; and mutton with 5-10%. 
Other major commodities fluctuated more strongly among the exports: most typically 
herring, whose catches were very uneven, but also live sheep exports, which boomed in 
the 1880s and early 1890s. The value of these six commodities made up round about 
90% of Iceland’s exports during the whole period 1870-1913.38
The relatively few export commodities of Iceland turn our attention to export 
concentration, which is one economic indicator of a country’s dependence on its export 
trade. This measures the significance of the largest export commodity by value. There is 
nothing that prevents one from considering the two or more largest commodities and then 
adding up their shares, although a more extensive version of that kind of measure is the 
Hirschman index, which takes into account the shares of all exports of total export value 
according to a special equation.39 Iceland’s export concentration will not be tested here 
with the Hirschman index but the single largest commodity method is more easily 
employed and gives us a general indication of the degree of export concentration of 
Iceland compared with other countries. If  we look at a number of developed countries 
first, their export concentration in 1900 was ranging between 10 and 30%.40 For a host 
of developing countries in the world in 1900 and around 1913, their degree of export 
concentration ranged usually between ca 30 and 65 or even 70%; very few had lower or 
higher percentages.41 The percentages for Iceland in 1902 and 1913 were 56 and 45%
38 Tables A.EXP/ALL-2, A.EXP/ALL-3, A.EXP/ALL-6 and A.EXP/ALL-7.
39 See, for example, J.R. Hanson II, Trade in Transition, pp 40-41.
40 J.R. Hanson II, Trade in Transition, p 39 (Table 3.2). The countries Hanson includes are 
Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, the United 
States, Argentina, and Cape of Good Hope.
41 J.R. Hanson II, Trade in Transition, p 39 (Table 3.2). V. Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic 
History o f Latin America, p 59 (Table 3.2). I.T. Berend and G. R&nki, Economic Development 
in East-Central Europe, p 150 (Table 6-16).
C h a p t e r  I V  - 1 2 3
respectively.42 This may suggest a change towards lesser degree of a single commodity 
export concentration but the ratio was in fact lower than in the 1870s, 35-40% (Fig. 
IV. 8). However, in spite of being a rough indicator of export concentration this method 
of the largest commodity shows clearly how dependent primary producing countries were 
on a single or a few commodities in their exports, and Iceland was certainly no exception 
to that.
IV.3. Exports of Iceland and their Context in the 
Economy
IV.3.1. Agriculture and Agricultural Products: Iceland and its 
Market Countries
Because of the predominance of sheep raising in the Iceland agriculture, most of the 
agricultural exports derived from sheep. This is reflected in the exports of the largest 
agricultural commodities around 1870, which were in order of significance wool and 
salted mutton (Fig. IV.8); tallow in the category ‘Fish Oil, Tallow’ was also an 
agricultural commodity from sheep. In 1913, wool and mutton still were the staple 
agricultural exports. Over time only one other agricultural commodity ranked really high 
among the aggregate exports and that was live sheep. Among the smaller items of 
agricultural products exported were hides and skins, feathers and eiderdown, woollen
42 Table A.EXP/ALL-7.
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goods, live horses, and butter (Fig. IV.9 and IV. 10). From a macro-economic 
perspective, the export of these smaller items was of relatively little consequence. 
However, two of them deserve brief treatment here in connection with the agricultural 
staples; woollen goods because of their relationship to wool, and live horses because of a 
certain common feature with the live sheep trade.
As already noted, all the main exports were related or interlocked because of the 
prominence of sheep raising. Animal husbandry such as was practised in Iceland is 
almost certainly more conducive to such linkages than arable.43 Sheep were uniquely 
positioned in Icelandic agriculture. Not only were they a highly important source of 
domestic food and material for clothing, in most cases they were also the source of the 
main agricultural export product. Looking into the first aspect, sheep not only gave 
people meat and wool, they also produced a number of items that were purely used 
internally and were not merchandise in foreign markets. Among these were foods from 
blood, liver, lung, heart, head, and feet.44 Considering the second aspect, wool and 
woollens, skins, mutton, and tallow were all products of sheep and constituted by far the 
largest part of Iceland’s agricultural exports. As a consequence of the strong links to 
both domestic consumption and the export trade, exports of live sheep necessarily 
constrained the supply of individual products that would otherwise have been available, 
both for export and domestic consumption. Exports of live sheep decreased not only the 
available quantity of wool, mutton, and hides for export but also reduced domestic 
consumption of these goods.
Before we probe into the exports of Iceland it is of relevance for our subject to 
say a few words about the development of agriculture in the countries where Iceland
43 This view cannot be fully expounded here but the logic behind this notion is that more 
diverse products can be acquired from animals than cereals.
44 J6nas Jonasson, Islenzkirpjodhcettir (3rd ed.), pp 45, 90-92, 175.
Figure >















□  Other Animals, Live
■  Live Horses
■ Live Sheep
Figure j_jA_VO
Exports of Crude Animal Materials (Value), 
1870-1913
4 000 000 
3 500 000 





1 500 000 
1 000 000 
500 000 
0
1870 1874 1878 1882 1886 1890 1894 1898 1902 1906 1910 1913
Years
□  Bird Materials
□  Intestines
□  Soundbladder
□  Bones, Baleens; Bone Meal and Guano as Fertilizer
□  Feathers and Down
■  Wool
■ Hides and Skins
C h a p t e r  I V  - 1 2 5
marketed its agricultural products, Denmark, Norway, and Britain. As the export 
structure by agricultural commodities above showed, Iceland was by the beginning of 
our period predominantly a producer of animal foodstuffs and animal crude materials. 
Moreover, it continued to be so throughout the period. This is in rather stark contrast to 
the development of agriculture in Iceland’s market countries where there was a 
transition, to a varying degree, from crop growing to livestock farming in all three 
countries.
British farming was mixed, some farmers raising livestock (sheep and cattle) and 
growing fodder crops to feed them with, while other farmers concentrated on grain crops 
for human consumption. Neither domestic meat nor cereals were sufficient to the 
population, the reliance on imports being far more in the case of cereals. With the 
general price fall in the 1870s and huge wheat and other cereal imports in the 1880s 
onwards, which also pressed down prices, arable agriculture in Britain was squeezed and 
had to tackle a difficult and prolonged process of adjustment. Subsequent rise of meat 
imports, both of live animals and various kinds of fresh meat (chilled or frozen), did also 
put a pressure on livestock farmers in Britain but they were more fortuitous because 
domestic meat was largely of higher quality than imported. It catered for different 
consumers and kept its price better than cereals although imported meat increased and 
real wages (not necessarily nominal wages) were rising. A higher level of consumption in 
Britain did also find outlets by growing domestic production and imports of milk, butter, 
cheese, eggs, and fruit, to name a few. By and large, there was, however, a depression 
felt in British agriculture in our period, prices fell until the late 1890s onwards when the 
turned upwards, and in line with Britain’s adherence to free trade policy it did not 
hamper imports by tariffs or other measures. The main raw material in terms of 
merchandise from sheep was wool, and there was fierce competition there from other
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countries in the world, which forced down prices of wool by as much as wheat; both are 
examples of goods that fell more violently in price than prices in general.45
In Denmark an arable farming dominated, which catered well for domestic 
demand and there were usually surpluses for export. Denmark was hard hit by the flood 
of cheaper cereals from other parts of the world, and it reacted rather quickly to the new 
circumstances by shifting towards livestock farming, mainly poultry and pigs.46 In the 
words of S.B. Saul, ‘Denmark rapidly turned herself into a butter, bacon and egg 
factory’ for Britain, especially from the late 1880 onwards because of an import ban in 
Germany on live pigs.47 Hence, Danes escaped a prolonged and painful adjustment and 
adhered also to free trade policy as the British. In Norway, the situation was rather 
different because the mountainous landscape, the soil and other natural circumstances 
did not allow for great farming, except in restricted areas, and that is way most farmers 
also lived on other activities, such as fishing or hunting. Although there was cereal 
growing it was relatively small and Norwegian agriculture had small need to protect 
herself against cheep cereals. Norway experienced rising cereal imports in the second 
half of 19th century, and, thus, cereal growing diminished and farmers turned to raising 
livestock for meat and dairy production.48
45 See R. Perren, British Agriculture in Depression, Chapters 1-3 and 7. See also M. Tracy, 
Government and Agriculture (3rd ed.), Chapter 2.
46 M. Tracy, Government and Agriculture (3rd ed.), pp 110-14.
47 S.B. Saul, Studies in British Overseas Trade, p 27 (quotation). M. Tracy, Government and 
Agriculture (3rd ed.), p 114.
48 F. Hodne, Norges ekonomiske historie, pp 174, 185-6.
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IV.3.1.1. Wool and Woollens
Sheep in Iceland were of an indigenous stock offering three different colours of fleece: 
white, black, and mixed. By contrast, many foreign breeds of sheep in our period had 
predominantly white wool. Another characteristic of the wool was its mix of long, 
straight, coarse hairs on one hand and short, curly, fine hairs on the other. This was also 
distinctive from many of the large foreign sheep breeds where there was relatively small 
difference between the two types of hair. That kind of wool is well suited for all kinds of 
woollens with fine and even texture, whereas the Icelandic wool is better suited for other 
types.49 Available records about the numbers of sheep vastly underreport them 
throughout the period but it is safe to claim, nevertheless, that the sheep population 
increased by 60-70% between 1870 and 1913 (although there were great setbacks in the 
1880s and again from the mid 1890s to ca 1900). The number of sheep per capita 
increased from nearly seven sheep per inhabitant in 1870 to nearly nine sheep in 1913.50
Exporting wool was a very important business for farmers. This was not only 
because it was one of their largest commodities by value in the exports but also because 
the overwhelming share of Iceland’s wool production, perhaps as much as 60 to 80%, 
was marketed abroad.51 Whatever the exact proportion over time was, qualitative
49 Magnus Gudmundsson, Ull verdur gull, pp 156-60, 177. Stefan Adalsteinsson, Saudkindin, 
p 19.
50 Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, pp 280, 282, see p 909 
(Fig. 22). The range of increase, 60-70%, depends on whether underreporting or not is taken 
into account. Underreporting was definitely some 20-30% (same source, p 252 cf. 255-6) and 
the 70%, which are based on computation of underreporting, are more representative of the 
livestock increase than the 60%.
51 The marketed share is estimated followingly. The livestock is assumed understated by 30% 
in 1870 and 1890, and 25% in 1910 (Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, 
Hagskinna, p 252). Then, we assume that each sheep gave ca 2 kg of wool which is based on 
20th century data (Ami G. Petursson, ‘Saudfjarraekt,’ p 94, and Magnus Gudmundsson, Ull 
verdur gull, p 171). From this estimated total production of wool the proportion of export 
quantity is calculated. One source claims the quantity of wool per sheep to be only 1.0-1.25 kg
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sources confirm that the majority was exported.52 In the early 1870s, most of Icelandic 
wool was exported to the country group ‘UK and others,’ i.e., the United Kingdom, but 
substantial quantities went also to Denmark, which from the late 1870s onwards turned 
into the main importing country.53 The quantity of wool from Iceland was only a drop in 
the ocean of wool that was imported into the UK in the period and, therefore, mattered 
for nothing.54 In Denmark, the Icelandic wool fluctuated roughly between a third and a 
half of the total wool imports in the 1870s and 1880s, Germany being the other main 
supplier. In the early or mid 1890s the wool imports of Denmark started to rise and 
rocketed into the late 1900s. The increased wool quantities came first from Germany and 
the United Kingdom (the wool from the latter no doubt partly re-exports), but then 
Russia suddenly became a very large supplier also, and later France. By 1910 
Denmark’s total wool imports had fallen sharply, Russia had dropped out, and the UK 
and Germany were the main suppliers until only Iceland was left in 1913, being then 
practically the only wool supplier to Denmark.55 In contrast to wool, woollen goods 
were throughout the period almost exclusively exported to Denmark.56
It is noteworthy that there was clearly a high degree of homogeneity in prices of 
wool exported from Iceland and of prices of wool imported to Denmark and the UK (Fig. 
IV. 11). First, there was a similar trend in the pricing of all three, which testifies to a 
single, yet multinational, wool market of which Iceland was a part. Second, although the 
export prices of Icelandic wool were initially on a much lower level than the other two,
(borvaldur Thoroddsen, Lysing islands (2nd ed.), p 85) but it is not based on scientific 
computations.
52 horvaldur Thoroddsen, Lysing islands (2nd ed.), p 84.
53 Table A.EXP/ALL-3.
54 British trade returns, see bibliography at the end of the thesis.
55 Danish trade returns, see bibliography at the end of the thesis.
56 Table A.EXP/ALL-3.
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the difference gradually diminished and by 1906 it was practically non-existent. The 
reason for this is, however, not clear to me.
The relation between the total production of wool, the share of domestic 
consumption, and the quantities exported over time will not be discussed, mainly because 
the number of sheep over time are substantially under-reported in the relevant records, 
and this makes their use very difficult. Besides, no obvious long-term trend can be 
identified in the exports of wool over time (Fig. IV. 12). However, exports of woollen 
goods, which were a minor export product, are more interesting, because significant 
shifts occurred in the export quantities over time (Fig. IV. 13). It is unclear whether the 
huge exports of woollens in 1870 were an exception or the end of an era of great woollen 
goods exports. But it is evident that after 1870, their exports fall into eras. In 1874-86 
the export quantities usually fluctuated between ca 15 and 20 tonnes per annum, but they 
were on a far higher level than after 1886, when the quantities fell down to 5-10 tonnes a 
year. This call for an explanation, and the reason for this decline in woollens exports is 
almost certainly a reduction in the supply of labour available to farmers, because other 
activities in the economy had attracted it, and also because of higher wages than before 
to those who continued to be employed in agriculture.57 A complementary reason is also 
the emigrations from Iceland. As it happens, woollens were predominantly produced in 
the northern and eastern part of the country.58 It is hardly a mere incidence that from 
these very parts of the country the emigration in the second half of the 19th century was 
by far most and it reached its height in the late 1880s.59
57 On wages of workforce in agriculture, see Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, 
eds, Hagskinna, p 607 (Table 12.2), and Gudmundur Jonsson, Vinnuhju, pp 40-41.
58 See the printed Icelandic trade returns.
59 Junius H. Kristinsson, Vestitrfaraskra 1870-1914, p xix (Fig. 7), xx-xxi (Table 1).
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IV.3.1.2. Mutton and Live Sheep
The exports of mutton and live sheep will be discussed here in one section because of 
how related they were. Wool was indeed a product of sheep like mutton, but the wool 
supply was neither in terms of quantity nor value as contingent on the exports of live 
sheep as the supply of mutton was.60 Also, live sheep were mainly bought to acquire 
meat and, therefore, are more pertinent to the mutton exports.61 Mutton62 was consumed 
internally and exported, and the share of each is difficult to estimate, but it is probably 
safe to assume that only a small part of the mutton production was exported in the 
1870s. Then, almost no mutton was exported from the southern part of the country and 
only a marginal quantity from the western part. In the northern and eastern parts of the 
country, where most of the Iceland mutton came from, possibly about one third of it was 
marketed abroad.63 Shortly after 1900, this still was the situation in general except that 
export of mutton from the northern and eastern parts was presumably somewhat less
60 The value of wool per sheep was somewhat less than the value of mutton if it is granted that 
the average quantity of wool was 2 kg (Ami G. Petursson, ‘Saudfjarraekt,’ p 94, and Magnus 
Gudmundsson, Ull verdur gull, p 171) and the average quantity of mutton is set at 10 kg per 
sheep (Ami G. Petursson, ‘Saudfjarraekt,’ p 94). It should, however, be noted that the estimated 
quantities of wool and mutton are based on 20th century data.
61 True, a contemporary source from the early 1870s speaks o f‘wool merchants’ in relation to 
those merchants buying live sheep in Iceland (Jon Sigurdsson to Eirfloir Magnusson, 26 April 
1872, J6n Sigurdsson, Bref Jons Sigurdssonar: Nytt sqfn, p 151) and possibly the first 
merchants buying Icelandic sheep were mainly after the wool. This, however, changed later in 
the 1870s or around 1880s when acquisition of meat became the prime objective.
62 When speaking of exported meat from Iceland, the word mutton will be used in the thesis 
although it encompasses also game, prepared meat, tongues, intestines, and other meat. This is 
justified by the fact that more than 90% of all the meat exports were mutton according to my 
datasets and almost exclusively salted mutton.
63 See the printed Icelandic trade returns for geographical distribution of the mutton exports. 
For the division between domestic consumption and export, see Jon Sigurdsson, Sigurdur I 
Yztafelli, pp 64, 72, 80, 116-17.
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judging by qualitative sources.64 All things considered, and even allowing for wide 
margins because of varying consumption over time and by regions, the majority of the 
mutton production was consumed internally, rather than exported.
Exporting of salted mutton had been under way long before 1870, and thereafter 
it continued to be one of the staples in agricultural exports. By contrast with wool, which 
was a large item in trade in 1870 and fell subsequently, mutton was less significant 
throughout the period as a whole but its share in aggregate exports was much more 
stable (Fig. IV. 14). It counted usually for 5-8% of the exports by value, which indicates 
that the mutton exports expanded generally at a similar rate as total exports. The mutton 
was predominantly exported to Denmark and until the mid or late 1880s the Icelandic 
produce amounted to about two thirds of all meat imported to Denmark; Sweden and 
Germany were the other main suppliers. Then, the meat imports of Denmark soared, 
mainly because of huge quantities from the United States, and around 1890 the meat 
imports from Iceland were only a fraction of the total quantities (ca 7%). By 1898 the 
meat imports of Denmark had fallen somewhat, but they increased again to a record peak 
in 1906 after which there was a setback and the imports steady for the remainder of the 
period. The main suppliers from 1898 onwards were (not in order of significance) 
Sweden, Russia, and the United States. Icelandic mutton sagged from 28-30% of the 
total in 1894-98 to 15-18% in 1902-06 but went up to 33% in 1910 and 43% in 
1913.65
64 See the printed Icelandic trade returns for geographical distribution of the mutton exports. 
On the domestic consumption, see Jon Sigurdsson, Sigurdur i Yztafelli, pp 65 and 124, and 
Steindor Steindorsson, Hladir i Hdrgardal, p 62. Both are speaking of consumption in the 
northern part of the country and my inference from their writings is that the consumption of 
mutton fell from a daily basis to once or twice a week.
65 Danish trade returns, see bibliography at the end of the thesis. By meat to Denmark is 
referred to all meat and prepared meat except pork and bacon, game and poultry.
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In spite of the importance of Denmark as a market for Icelandic mutton, it 
should be noted that from the early 1890s onwards Norway became a notable market 
also, taking one sixth to one third of the total mutton exports by value from Iceland.66 By 
far the largest supplier of meat to Norway in the early 1870s was Denmark, then came 
Sweden and Russia, both of which were shortly replaced the United Kingdom. In the late 
1880s, imports of meat to Norway started growing very fast and it was in this surge that 
Iceland markedly started meat exports to Norway also; then the United States also 
became a large supplier for Norway. Around 1900 the aggregate meat imports of 
Norway slowed down, halted at a higher level than initially and were fairly stable until 
the end of the period. This did not affect the imports of Iceland mutton that rose from the 
early 1890s into the early 1900s. In the late 1900s the quantities from Iceland fell 
slightly but went up again. All the while, the share of Icelandic mutton of all meat 
imported to Norway was small. It was only in the very end, in 1913, that the Icelandic 
produce was unusually large, amounting to ca 20% of the meat imports. By then, the two 
main suppliers were Denmark and Sweden and had been so since ca 1900.67
When the prices of Icelandic mutton exports are compared to meat imports of 
neighbouring countries (Denmark, Norway, and the UK), a similar pattern to that in the 
wool trade above emerges. Icelandic mutton had clearly the lowest price initially and was 
far below the average import prices of meat to Denmark even although these imports 
consisted largely of Icelandic produce. Possibly, this was related to the bad name 
Icelandic mutton generally had because of poor quality. However, over time the price 
gap was slowly narrowing, and by 1913 all four price levels were within a close range 
(Fig. IV. 15). Whereas this pattern is a repetition of the trends in the movements of wool
66 Table A.EXP/ALL-7.
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prices, there are certain oddities in the price movements of meat. The first is the 
conspicuous fall in the price of imported meat to Denmark between 1874 and 1878. 
Given that the imports in both years consisted largely of Icelandic mutton the 
explanation is either a drop in the demand for some reason or there was an impending 
rise in the supply of competitive meat from the other suppliers (Sweden and Germany) or 
supplies from new countries. Which one is more likely, is impossible to say without more 
information. Perhaps there was a drop in Danish demand for Icelandic mutton because of 
unusually bad quality. The second oddity in price trends is the permanent rise in prices 
of meat to Denmark in 1890 onwards, because the drop in prices in 1886 was a lasting 
one in the imports of meat to the UK and Norway. There were considerable changes in 
suppliers of meat to Denmark at the time, but they were too in the case of Norway, 
although the majority of meat imported to Denmark and Norway onwards was 
predominantly salted.68 Also, both Denmark and Norway received more meat than 
before from the US and the UK.69 The explanations may be that changes happened in the 
type of meat imported or its quality, or that live sheep exports from Iceland to Britain 
pushed up prices of mutton, but we lack adequate information to ascertain this.70 What 
is clear is that the price levels were moving closer to each other in the late 1880s, no
67 Norwegian trade returns, see bibliography at the end of the thesis. By meat to Norway is 
referred to all meat that was not smoked or prepared in any way. Pork and bacon is also 
excluded. From 1898 onwards reindeer meat, game, and poultry is also excluded.
68 The difference between ‘fresk’ (fresh, chilled, or frozen) and ‘ikke fersk’ is not stated in the 
Danish trade returns until 1898 onwards but even that late, the share of ‘fersk’ meat was 
negligible. In the Norwegian trade returns, there is only a distintion made between smoked 
meat and all other meat (saving game) but the portions are presumably similar to that of 
Denmark.
69 Referring to meat imports of Britain, it is confined here to unenumerated salted and fresh 
meat, excluding preserved meat by other means than salting (such as drying), also excluding 
bacon and hams, beet and pork. There is no distinction between salted an fresh meat in the 
British trade returns until the late 1900s, and then fresh meat is more expensive than salted 
meat. It is certain that this was also the case before that time, when freight with ships with 
cooling and freezing facilities were dearer than in the late 1900s.
C h a p t e r  I V  - 1 3 4
doubt because of the shifts in the suppliers of meat in all three instances, and especially 
because of the new imports of meat from America and other continents.
Because of varying quantities of live sheep exported over time, the share of 
exported live sheep as of the total livestock is not accurately represented in a single 
figure. However, if we divide the total export quantities during 1880 to 1896 with these 
17 years the average export quantities were ca 37,500 sheep per annum.71 Ewes with 
lambs and shearlings were not suitable for export although they were sometimes sold 
too.72 The remaining livestock, i.e., wethers, rams more than one year old, and other 
ewes, fluctuated between ca 90,000 to 140,000 in number according to official figures.73 
If we adjust for, say 30% underreporting, an exportable livestock ranged between ca 
130,000 and 200,000 sheep.74 Taking the middle way (ca 165,000 sheep), the average 
live sheep exports thus equalled to over 20% of all exportable sheep, although it should 
be underscored that these calculations are very uncertain.
Exports of live sheep from Iceland were almost exclusively confined to 
Britain.75 Due to an ever extending network of railways in Britain and rising crops of 
turnips as a result of increasing use of fertilisers, many farmers in Britain around and 
after the mid 19th century found themselves in a situation where they could start 
fattening animals to provide meat to serve urban dwellers. Thereby, they turned excess 
turnip crops into muck and money. Until then, relatively remote farmers had been used to
70 Sveinbjom Blondal, Saudasalan til Bret lands, p 36, discusses price trends in live sheep and 
mutton in Iceland.
71 Sveinbjom Bldndal, Saudasalan til Bretlands, p 13.
72 D. Thomsen, ‘Sala a islenzkri voru,’ p 241.
73 GuSmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, pp 280-82, cf. p 909 (Fig. 
22).
74 Estimated on the basis of Gudmundur J6nsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, 
p 252.
75 Table A.EXP/ALL-3.
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rearing store stock sheep to be droven to local markets or transported to other areas 
closer to the cities for fattening. Trade in, for example, live sheep increased in Britain 
because of this and they began to be imported also no later than by the mid 19th 
century.76 Hence, imports of live sheep were well grounded in Britain before Icelandic 
sheep entered this trade. In 1870 exports of live sheep from Iceland were just about 
starting and they did not become a notable item in the export trade until around 1880 (cf. 
Fig. IV.8). It was started at the initiative of Icelanders but it did not get a firm foot until 
British travelling merchants that had been buying horses in Iceland for many years began 
to buy live sheep. With continued encouragement and efforts of Icelanders, the British 
attracted their countrymen into this trade, and Icelandic parties became agents for the 
British.77 This trade expanded rapidly into the early 1890s but fluctuated considerably 
from year to year (Fig. IV. 16).78
Britain imported ever increasing numbers of live sheep from the beginning of our 
period until ca 1882 after which they fell rapidly and almost constantly. By the end of 
the period they had practically ceased. Hence, unfortunate as it may seem, live sheep 
exports from Iceland only took off when Britain’s live sheep imports in general started 
falling. In the 1880s the live sheep from Iceland were only drops in the flood of live 
sheep to Britain at the time, with Germany and Holland besides Denmark79 supplying 
most of it. Around 1890, live sheep imports of Britain shrank and Iceland’s share 
became large, in 1890 it was 23% of all live sheep to Britain although that is not typical 
because the live sheep quantities from Iceland reached an all-time peak in that year. But
76 C.S. Orwin and E.H Whetham, History o f British Agriculture, pp 26-7, 97-100. For import 
quantities of live sheep, see British trade returns.
77 Sveinbjom Blondal, Saudasalan til Bretlands, pp 22-4.
78 SveinbjOm Blondal, Saudasalan til Bretlands, p 16.
79 Although Iceland’s imports to the United Kingdom are included with those from Denmark 
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then live sheep imports from the United States rocketed and the quantities from Iceland 
started declining also.80
Not only was the contracting live sheep trade in Britain adverse for exporters in 
Iceland, but also the movements of live sheep prices there. From 1878 until 1898 there 
was a huge price fall in imported live sheep to the UK, which may or may not generally 
have affected prices of live sheep in Iceland, because there was a large difference 
between prices of imported live sheep to Britain and export prices in Iceland (Fig. 
IV. 17). It does not appear to have affected it very much because the export prices in 
Iceland were in the long-term steady while the import prices in Britain fell.81 The reason 
may be that freight rates fell enough to hold the prices up in Iceland, in spite of the fall in 
market prices. However, in the mid 1890s, freight rates for live animals were still 
considerably higher than for ordinary merchandise such as mutton.82 This probably 
explains for a substantial difference as late as in 1913 in prices of live sheep and price 
levels of wool and meat, the last two being reasonably close to each other. Apart from 
that, there is small wonder why imports of live sheep to Denmark were so few: the route 
was longer, that is, more expensive and with greater reduction in the number of sheep, 
and import prices of live sheep there practically the same as export prices in Iceland. For 
that reason alone, Denmark was excluded from this trade.
The export trade in mutton and live sheep from Iceland falls roughly into three 
shorter periods. As long as exports of live sheep were negligible, they did not affect
80 British trade returns, see bibliography at the end of the thesis. For the numbers of live sheep 
exported from Iceland, see approximate figures in Sveinbjom Blondal, Saudasalan til 
Bretlands, pp 13, 16. More accurate figures for my test years are in A.EXP/UK-14.
81 Sveinbjom Blondal, Saudasalan til Bretlands, p 34, claims that prices of live sheep in 
Iceland moved in tandem with prices in the ‘British market’ (‘... breska markaSinum’). Even if 
SveinbjQm was referring to import prices to Britain, this claim is not correct as my graph on 
prices of live sheep shows.
82 D. Thomsen, ‘Sala a islenzkri voru,’ p 243.
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much the supply of mutton available for export. In any case, the mutton exports soared 
in 1870-82 (Fig. IV. 14), and this can partly be explained by pointing out that the 
number of sheep almost certainly grew at the same time (Fig. IV. 18). This years formed 
the first sub-period. When the Icelandic live sheep exports gained momentum in the 
1880s, they reduced the supply of mutton for export. The exports of both now had to be 
understood in relationship to each other, and the beginning of the 1880s start the second 
sub-period. One may wonder why prices of live sheep fluctuated far more than prices of 
mutton (Fig. IV. 16 and IV. 14). The reasons for that are mainly two. In contrast with the 
usual barter exchange in other trades, the British paid with money, which was important 
in a money scarce economy, and British merchandise, which could be acquired with the 
cash, was cheaper and/or better than could be acquired elsewhere. The importance of 
both of these things will be explained in Chapter VII, but one can assert that live sheep 
exports were clearly advantageous for farmers and, therefore, they were more keen on 
selling their sheep alive instead of it slaughtering them and selling the products 
individually.
The contraction in mutton exports was evident as the live sheep exports grew 
(Fig. IV. 19) although fluctuations in the sheep number affected it also. The drop in the 
number of sheep is, for example, very clear in the export quantities in the year 1886. 
Although it does not show in my graphs, prices of live sheep substantially fell in 1886- 
88 compared to previous years and the exports of live sheep contracted.83 The price fall 
does not appear to have shaken the belief of Icelandic farmers in the profitability of this 
business, judging by the shares of mutton versus live sheep in 1886 compared to 1882 
(Fig. IV. 14 and IV. 16), because live sheep quantities were larger in 1886 while the 
mutton exports were smaller. However, a second price fall in 1891-93 probably aroused
83 Sveinbjom Blondal, Saudasalan til Bretlands, pp 16, 18,29, 32, 59.
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concerns because the altered portions afterwards in the exports of mutton versus live 
sheep can hardly be explained otherwise. Whereas the quantity of live sheep was only 
slightly less in 1894 than in 1890, the mutton quantity was by far larger (Fig. IV. 16 and
IV. 14). This seems to show that farmers were not so sure any longer of the safe profits 
or the infallibility of the live sheep market.
The second price fall was in a sense the beginning of the end in the Icelandic live 
sheep trade for the price remained low in the immediate years after 1894 and the export 
quantities contracted.84 However, substantial exports would probably have continued if 
external circumstances had not squeezed Icelandic sheep out of the British market. Since 
this business started voices had been raised now and then that Icelanders had to be aware 
that the imports to Britain might be checked on grounds of danger of animal diseases. In 
1892 the British government put a ban on importation of live sheep from several 
countries. Iceland was among them but in her case the ban was lifted shortly due to 
pressure from the Danish government and those who had vested interests in this trade. 
There was no post of official veterinarian in Iceland at the time, but in spite of the 
British concern no action at this was taken by Danish or Icelandic authorities to establish 
one. Later, in 1896, the British parliament passed a law prohibiting altogether imports of 
live sheep for fattening purposes. If  they were imported they had to be put in a 
quarantine and slaughtered subsequently. The law met opposition among liberal 
members of parliament, from the Danish government, Icelanders, and those with vested 
interests in the trade, but without results.85 That was the end of the second sub-period in 
the exports of mutton and live sheep.
84 SveinbjOm BlOndal, Saudasalan til Bretlands, pp 16,18. Table A.EXP/ALL-10.
85 SveinbjOm BlOndal, Saudasalan til Bretlands, p 53-4.
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The law of 1896 initiate the third period. Although considerable exports of live 
sheep continued for a few years, the law effectively removed the basis for these sales. 
This was because there was no profit for the British to slaughter immediately sheep, 
which sometimes came in a slack condition after a long journey from Iceland aboard 
ship. They had to be fed to gain weight and resume former condition.86 Icelandic 
exporters, however, were eager in continuing this trade because of the money incomes it 
generated, and tiny live sheep exports continued to Britain until around 1905. In the very 
end of our period, new live sheep markets were found elsewhere in Europe but the 
quantities exported were negligible.87 Whereas the live sheep trade fell after 1896, the 
mutton trade continued. The last sub-period is, therefore, dominated by exports of 
mutton alone, and mutton exports soon soared, both because of a rising number of sheep 
(Fig. IV. 18) and because the prices also started to rise; the growth in the mutton exports 
was particularly rapid in the very end of our period, 1910-13.
IV.3.1.3. Live Horses
Horses were indispensable for Icelanders because they were practically the only means 
of land transport and travelling, as well as their use for other purposes. Their importance 
in terms of transportation and travelling owes to the fact that until the very end of the 
19th century, no roads or bridges existed in Iceland. Hence, no large goods or items were 
transported any distances without horses, apart from things people carried on their
86 Table A.EXP/ALL-3. Sveinbjom Blondal, Saudasalan til Bretlands, p 46-7.
87 Table A.EXP/ALL-3.
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backs. Also, travelling, both for short and long distances, was usually not possible 
without horses, especially when crossing rivers. Horses were also much used by farmers 
throughout the year, for example carrying hay in summer and fetching sheep in autumn 
into heathlands or moorlands and valleys.88
Available records about the size of the horse livestock population are probably 
subject to a similar underreporting as the numbers of sheep. Even so, their numbers 
evidently underwent huge swings as well. A great increase in horse numbers in the 1870s 
was followed by an equal reduction in the 1880s, but in 1913 the horse population it was 
considerably larger than in 1870 (Fig. IV. 18). Taking the figures at face value, i.e., not 
adjusting for any underreporting, the ratio of horses per capita remained, however, the 
same — at roughly half a horse per inhabitant in 1870 and 1913.89 By comparison with 
live sheep, the export quantities of live horses were much lower, ranging between 5 and 
10% of the total horse livestock in the 1880s onwards.90
The activity of exporting live horses was certainly far less significant in 
Iceland’s foreign trade than the trade in live sheep. Horses ranged from being 1 to 3% in 
the aggregate export values throughout the period while sheep rose from less than 1% to 
a peak of 23%, before declining to less than 1%.91 The reason why these horse sales are 
worth special comment is a certain similarity to the live sheep trade, namely the hard 
cash which Icelanders received for the horses (see Chapter VIII). The predominant
88 See Th. Krabbe, Island og dets tekniske Udvikling, on various aspects of Iceland’s 
infrastructure (roads, bridges, communication). Of contemporary sources, on may cite 
Forvaldur Thoroddsen, Lysing Islands (2nd ed.), pp 86, 94-5. The importance of horses is well 
captured in a selection of an excerpts from various sources, Finnbogi Gu3mundsson and 
Johannes Halldorsson, comp., Ferdir um Island a fyrri tid. See also Jonas Jonasson, Islenzkir 
pjodhcettir (3rd ed.), pp 148-51.
89 Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, pp 280, 282, see p 909 
(Fig. 21).
90 Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, pp 281-3.
91 Table A.EXP/ALL-7.
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country of import was Britain where the horses were almost exclusively used in 
coalmines. The Icelandic horse breed was well suited for that purpose because it was 
relatively small and strongly built.92 After 1900, Denmark became equally as important 
as a market and there the horses were used on farms and as carriage horses in towns.93
Exports of live horses had been under way since the mid century but they did not 
gain momentum until around 1880,94 and price movements did not have anything to do 
with it because the export prices of Icelandic live horses probably went down at the time 
(Fig. IV.20). It is noteworthy that this rise in horse exports coincides with mounting 
exports of live sheep. One wonders if the buyers of both goods were the same but 
because of lack of research we know little about this branch except that merchants in the 
live sheep trade exported sometimes horses.95 What is almost certain is that if live sheep 
merchants were themselves not active in the live horse exports, they attracted other 
British merchants into it; Icelanders were not involved in it.96 After the initial spurt 
around 1880 the quantities of horses exported were fairly stable, yet slightly growing in 
the long run, throughout the period and the price was on the rise. This is very different 
from the sheep trade with its fluctuating quantities and prices. The live horse exports 
were relatively uneventful and without many shifts after the spurt around 1880, and, 
therefore, our period only falls into two, the 1870s when the exports appear to have been
92 Table A.EXP/ALL-3. D. Thomsen, ‘Sala A fslenzkri voru,’ pp 238-9. Forvaldur 
Thoroddsen, Lysing Islands (2nd ed.), p 86.
93 Table A.EXP/ALL-3. Forvaldur Thoroddsen, Lysing Islands (3rd ed.), p 105. Gunnar 
Bjamason, ‘Hesturinn okkar,’ p i l l .
94 Forkell Johannesson, ‘Brot ur verzlunarsogu,’ part 1, pp 236-7. Halldor Bjamason, ‘Iceland 
in the British Parliamentary Papers,’ Tables 1 and 2.
95 Sveinbjom Blondal, Saudasalan til Bretlands, p 31.
96 This is indirectly confirmed from a contemporary source in the early 1870s (J6n SigurSsson 
to Eirfkur Magnusson, 26 April 1872, Jon Sigurdsson, Bref Jons Sigurdssonar: Nytt safn, pp 
151-2).
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irregular, and the 1880s onwards when the exports rose markedly, whatever the reason 
for that was.
Judging by our sample years, Icelandic live horses occasionally represented a 
substantial portion of total imports of live horses to Britain, ranging from only a few 
percents to 20, 30, or even 40% until the 1880s. From ca 1890 onwards the portion 
fluctuated roughly around one tenth of Britain’s total imports of live horses. France 
supplied most of the horses in the early 1870s, then Germany for a long time, but the 
United States and subsequently Russia overtook this import trade from the mid 1890s 
onwards.97 Readily available information about the purchase prices of Icelandic live 
horses are scarce and the prices plotted on Fig. IV.21 are probably minimum prices; 
until 1894 there are the prices Danish merchant houses paid for live horses in Iceland. 
However, it is unlikely that the prices British horse merchants paid were much higher, 
although the way the British bought the horses, i.e. with money, gave Icelanders far 
better terms of trade than by selling to the Danish merchant houses. Also, from 1898 
onwards, when the prices are based on the actual values paid for Icelandic live horses to 
Britain, the level is in good accordance with the previous level. Finally, British trade 
returns show that Icelandic horses were very cheap in relation to horses from other 
countries.98 Hence, even if die true prices were somewhat higher than those indicated in 
Fig. IV.21, they were much lower than the average prices for live horses in Denmark or 
Britain. This was partly because Icelandic horses formed a very special niche in the 
British horse market, namely for mining horses, that had far lower prices than live horses
97 Table A.EXP/UK-14. British trade returns, see bibliography at the end of the thesis.
98 Horses from Iceland are included with horses from Denmark proper but they were 
practically all from Iceland, see table A.EXP/ALL-7 and British trade returns (see bibliography 
at the end of the thesis). All this is in accordance to a latter-day source saying that Icelandic 
horses were sold at the lowest price class, being a kind of ‘oddments’ in European horsemarket 
(Gunnar Bjamason, ‘Hesturinn okkar,’ p 112).
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intended for other purposes in Britain." But owners of horses in Iceland may also have 
been poor salesmen, sometimes dumping the prices.100
IV.3.2. Fisheries and Fisheries’ Products
In the period 1870-1913, the fisheries’ sector in Iceland can be divided into two parts, 
one representing the use of marine resources by Icelanders and the other constituting 
foreign enterprise. The reason for this dualism is as follows. Whereas the Icelanders’ 
fisheries were wholly integrated into the Iceland economy, the second was characterised 
by an outside exploitation of Iceland’s resources. It was managed by foreigners, operated 
partly by a foreign work force and had more restricted influences on the Iceland 
economy. Therefore, these two sub-sectors are best discussed separately.
In 19th century, fishing by Icelanders in Icelandic waters revolved largely 
around cod fishing. Fishermen caught fish for domestic consumption as well for export, 
but the commercial fishery was presumably the basis of Icelandic fisheries and of living 
at the seaside, although it is difficult to ascertain the proportions of fishing for export 
and fishing for domestic consumption and no one has attempted to quantify the shares. 
Cod was the predominant fish species in the regular, i.e., demersal, fisheries but its 
catches were usually mixed with other species to a varying extent. Haddock (ysa), tusk 
(keila), ling (langa) and saithe (ufsi) were all common species in the catches of Icelandic
99 An example of this, indeed for the Icelandic horse, is a qualitative source. In 1893 Icelandic 
horses sold in Newcastle to mines fetched £4.15s while Icelandic horses for sport and carriages 
were sold in London at £14—£16 (D. Thomsen, ‘Sala a islenzkri voru,’ pp 238-9).
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fishermen at the time and exported.101 Besides this, fishing of lumpsucker (hrognkelsi) 
and other species was also practised, almost wholly for internal consumption.
In 1870, practically all fish that was to be exported, whether cod or other 
species, was salted and then dried; only a tiny amount was dried to make regular 
stockfish (the Plattfisch type).102 So large was this production that throughout the 
period 1870-1913 saltfish was the export staple, not only within the fisheries’ products 
but also in the aggregate export values of Iceland (Fig. IV.22 and IV.8). Some of the 
remainder of the catch was eaten by the fishermen and their families, and fish was the 
staple item in people’s diet at the seaside. The rest was dried ashore to use in domestic 
barter trade between people at the seaside and farmers in the countryside. Pickling was 
not unknown but since salt was usually scarce it was not much practised for internal 
consumption purposes.
The fishing of demersal species formed the customary fisheries of Icelanders, 
primarily practised for the sake of food acquisition. Most other kinds of fishing, besides 
hunting of sea mammals, had the main objective of supplying oils and fats, skins, etc.; 
this was used both domestically and exported. One of these activities was shark fishing, 
for shark was in demand because of its high volume of fat, varying by species, that was 
turned into oil. The cod also provided oil from its liver and, as an additional product, roe 
which was salted and used as bait in the Mediterranean.103 There were no other 
important fisheries except the fishing of salmon, which was mainly done in rivers nearby 
the sea. The salmon was salted for export and carried a very high price. The main 
hunting of sea mammals in Iceland was that of seals, whose skin and high fat volume
100 This gets a support from a contemporary source (J6n Sigurdsson to Eirikur Magnusson, 26 
April 1872, Jon Sigurdsson, Bref Jons Sigurdssonar: Nytt safn, pp 151-2).
101 See Icelandic trade returns from 1886 onwards.
102 For information about export quantities of stockfish, see the Icelandic trade returns.
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made attractive merchandise. Walrus was also hunted because of its skins, fat and teeth, 
but to a lesser extent than seal.
Besides saltfish, a major item in our period was herring, and here is where the 
second sub-sector of the fisheries’ sector in Iceland comes in. Herring fishery was 
initiated by Norwegians and was primarily controlled and carried out by them until the 
1890s. Thereafter, although beginning to share the fishery with Icelandic fishermen, they 
continued to dominate the herring trade. All along, however, they employed an Icelandic 
work force to some extent. In spite of relatively extensive use of the sea by Icelanders 
through the centuries they had never realised the importance of or made use of herring. It 
is a very unstable fish species because of its relatively irregular migrations but had often 
been in abundance in Icelandic waters. Norwegians had a long record of herring fisheries 
and by the end of our period had taught Icelanders to appreciate this ‘silver of the sea’.
Whaling was another activity within the Icelandic fisheries sector which the 
Norwegians started. It was completely in their hands during the period to 1913 although 
they partly employed Icelandic work people. In contrast to the herring fisheries, whaling 
contributed very little to ordinary foodstuffs’ exports because the only tradable good of 
that kind, meat meal, was used for animal fodder. Other products of whaling were 
mainly bones, bone meal, and guano (all used as fertilisers), baleens (for manufactures), 
and whale oil (for lighting and industrial uses).104 By value all these products excluding 
whale oil accounted for only a very small portion of the export values, never exceeding 
5% 105 The quantity of whale oil is difficult to ascertain because it is not always
103 D. Thomsen, ‘Sala a islenzkri voru,’ pp 231, 232-3.
104 Trausti Einarsson, Hvalveidar vid Island, pp 22-3, 64, 65, 82. See also British trade 
returns under ‘Manures’. It should be pointed out that it is often difficult to distinguish 
between meal from whale meat and meal from whale bones in my sources. Therefore, figures 
for both commodities must be taken with reservation.
105 Table A.EXP/ALL-7.
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separated from other kinds of oils or from fats in the sources for my datasets. However, 
given that all oils and fats from Iceland amounted usually to 10-15% of total export 
values (cf. Fig. IV.8), whale oil presumably only accounted for a few percentages.
The fisheries’ sector, like agriculture, was characterised by stability in terms of 
exports. No product from the domestic fisheries’ sub-sector came close to rivalling the 
hegemony of the saltfish. Only from the external — or part-Norwegian — sub-sector 
came a product, herring, that ranked high in the aggregate exports by value in any year. 
But its mode of production stood half-way outside the Iceland economy and its 
influences on that economy were restricted.
IV.3.2.1. Saltfish
In order to understand the basis of saltfish production and the changes that came about 
through international trade, it is necessary to describe briefly some of the main features 
in the organisation and the state of technology in the fishery at the beginning of our 
period. Around 1870, fishing in Iceland was conducted largely in the same manner as it 
had been for past centuries. The fishing equipment consisted predominantly of small, 
open rowing boats from which the fishermen used a hook and a bait to catch the fish. 
There were two ways of using this, either as a handline or a longline (viz. lying in the 
sea), and which was more important is impossible to say because their use varied by 
regions in Iceland. Nets were only used in certain regions, and were not common.106
106 Johann Bardarson, Araskip (2nd ed.), pp 42-3. GuSmundur Danielsson, ‘Ut og inn um 
brimgardinn,’ pp 94, 104, 111.
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At this time, decked vessels had been introduced in the Iceland fishery but they 
still employed only about 7% of the total number of seamen in the country.107 
Furthermore, many of these vessels were engaged in shark fishing, either wholly or 
partly. Even if decked vessels could catch and presumably carry more demersal fish to 
land per seaman, they were fitted out for a shorter period of the year than the open boats. 
Much as the decked vessels have been praised in Iceland’s fishery history, they were 
insignificant in the demersal fisheries around 1870.
The fishery was conducted from fishing stations where natural circumstances 
were favourable for landing catches and where fishing banks were nearby. Seaman were 
both local and from the interior countryside. The main fishing season in Iceland was 
during the later winter, at a low point in the agricultural cycle, and, hence, many farmers 
and their labourers flocked to the seaside. There, they joined men who lived nearby to 
form crews which were supervised by those who owned the boats and were usually also 
foremen on them. Because most of the men were far away from their homes, they lived in 
huts throughout the fishing season. They cured the fish according to its prospective 
disposal (salting and drying, or only drying) and its ownership. The farmers who sent 
their labourers off to the sea owned the fish their workers caught. Labourers contracted 
themselves for year at a time, and they only got their agreed year wages. The farmer then 
used their labour as he saw fit. The catches of agricultural labourers, i.e., the shares of 
the inland farmers, were salted and dried, and subsequently used as a payment to local 
merchants for imports. Fish that farmers wanted to use for their household, if any, was 
dried during the fishery season and the labourers carried it back home when the season
107 This figure is estimated on the basis of number of decked vessels and a few instances about 
crew sizes in these ships (Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, p 
310; Gils Gudmundsson, Geir Zoega, pp 128, 133; Vilhjalmur S. Vilhjalmsson, Sjogarpurinn 
og bondinn Sigurdur i Gordunum, p 111). Therefore, it must be regarded as a highly 
hypothectical proxy but reliable enough to give a rough indication of the ratio of decked vessels 
seamen versus boat seamen.
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was over. Because they were not present when the curing of the saltfish took place, 
during the early summer, that was taken care of by the foreman. He cured the fish along 
with his share of the catches and used for this the help of the members of his household 
or others. Those of the crew who owned their catches or who lived near the fishing 
stations took entire care of the curing and used the product either domestically or as 
payment to their merchant. This description captures the main features of the 
organisation of the fishery in the southern and western parts of the country, but there 
were regional differences to this pattern across Iceland, stemming from economic and 
social relation between those who owned the boats, huts and the land by the sea, and 
those who supplied the fishermen if they were not independent for their crewing. 
Nevertheless, the saltfish that was exported around 1870 came predominantly from the 
southern and western parts of the country, and this illustration is based on that fact.
In terms of consumers, by far the largest market country over time for Icelandic 
saltfish was Spain.108 Although a considerable part of the saltfish exported from Iceland 
went first to other countries, most of it ultimately ended in Spain. It was not until the late 
1880s that a new consumer market emerged for Icelandic saltfish, namely Italy which 
increased its saltfish imports from Iceland rapidly.109 Thus, Spaniards and Italians were 
the main consumers of Icelandic saltfish although small quantities went to other 
countries in our period, both directly and as re-exports.110 According to Shannon Ryan, 
Spain’s aggregate saltfish imports in 1875-85 increased from ca 38,000 to ca 53,000 
tonnes.111 If we assume that practically all of Iceland’s saltfish exports, directly and
108 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur i sogu pjodar I, p 40.
109 Table A.EXP/ALL-3.
110 The minor consumer markets were Ireland, Portugal, and Greece. See D. Thomsen, ‘Sala a 
islenzkri voru,’ pp 173,202,203, and O. Vollan, Den norske klippfiskhandels historie, pp 291, 
356, 358 (table).
111 S. Ryan, Fish Out o f Water, p 134 (Table 4.T).
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indirectly, went to Spain at that time, then Iceland’s share of the Spanish market 
fluctuated around 11-13%, being ca 4,800 tonnes in 1875 and 5,700 tonnes in 1885.112 
Other countries exporting saltfish to Spain were Norway, France, Newfoundland, and 
Scotland besides Faroe Islands.113 Because I have no knowledge of Spain’s aggregate 
saltfish imports towards the end our period it is difficult to estimate the share of Iceland 
then. Besides, unknown quantities of Icelandic saltfish passing to Spain through other 
countries blur the outcome. However, Icelandic saltfish was primarily sold to the 
Northern part of Spain, especially in Bilbao and Barcelona, and around the turn of the 
century it replaced the Norwegian saltfish in Barcelona, one of the best markets, and 
Iceland asserted itself as the largest saltfish supplier there.114 The reasons for that are 
discussed in a section on Norway below.
Although Icelandic saltfish only entered Italy in the late 1880s, and competed 
there with Norwegian, French and North American saltfish, it shortly gained a firm 
foothold. Quantities of saltfish passing directly from Iceland to Italy were, however, 
relatively stable until the late 1900s when they increased rapidly.115 Possibly, this was 
only a sign of larger quantities going directly to Italy instead of indirectly. One of the 
main market district there for Icelandic saltfish was in Genoa and the Piedmont 
region.116 According to consular reports in 1894, Iceland’s share was around one tenth 
of all saltfish imports for the port of Genoa in that year, but the quantities of Icelandic 
saltfish tripled the year after.117 The quantity in 1894 amounted to ca one half of
112 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur I sogu pjodar I, p 251.
113 S. Ryan, Fish Out o f Water, pp 97, 147.
114 S. Ryan, Fish Out o f Water, pp 96-7, 137. O. Vollan, Den norske klippfiskhandels historie,
pp 275-7, 333, 335-6, 341-8.
115 Table A.EXP/ALL-3.
116 D. Thomsen, ‘Sala a islenzkri v6ru,’ p 217. S. Ryan, Fish Out o f Water, p 188.
117 S. Ryan, Fish Out o f Water, p 188 (text and table).
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Icelandic saltfish going directly to Italy.118 Presumably, the other main port for Icelandic 
saltfish was Leghorn for it imported a kind of saltfish similar to the one Genoa imported 
from Iceland, namely Labrador Style, which is described in the section on Spain and 
Italy below.119
In general, exports of saltfish by quantity rose at a rather steady rate throughout 
the period 1870-1913 (Fig. IV.23). Benefiting from recent research on the Icelandic 
saltfish industry and exports of saltfish, annual figures are available in our period to 
confirm this, although testifying to considerable short term fluctuations in the saltfish 
exports. The largest relative downswing was in the mid 1880s, and the sample year of 
1886 shows it well. The downturn is a measure of the natural hardships that the people 
of Iceland experienced in the mid 1880s, as well as concurrent tariff problems and fierce 
competition in the Spanish saltfish market. While the personal hardships affected the 
saltfish industry mainly by reducing export quantities, the second, or external, shock was 
reflected in prices. The saltfish price appears to have been fairly stable until 1878, when 
it soared up to become ca 29% higher by 1882, presumably because of almost doubling 
of prices of imported salt compared to 1878.120 Then, the Spanish tariff for Icelandic 
saltfish was stepped up and the situation was aggregated by generally falling saltfish 
prices in Spain because of increased competition, primarily from France. Thus, sales 
potential for the Icelandic saltfish deteriorated significantly.121 The outcome was that by 
1886 the average saltfish export price was down by ca 36% compared to 1882. Although
118 Table A.EXP/ALL-3.
119 S. Ryan, Fish Out o f Water, pp 183-5
120 Table A.EXP/ALL-9. For prices of imported salt, see section on chemicals (salt) in Chapter
V.
121 For a full discussion of these events, see a section on Spain and Italy below.
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the price was ‘only’ about 19% lower in 1886 than the ‘normal’ level of 1870-78,122 
this was a substantial blow for producers in Iceland and aroused national concern.123
The fall in the price of Icelandic saltfish in the 1880s had various consequences. 
Historians have thus far primarily attributed to it the huge saltfish exports from Iceland 
to Britain in the late 1880s.124 That is true and the relationship between the two is 
described in a section on Spain and Italy below. Another direct consequence, however, 
and a very important one was the fresh fish trade in Iceland (blautfiskverslun) which I 
maintain was started by the price fall (this view is supported in Chapter VII). The 
innovation came about when a trade in uncured or fresh fish (blautfiskur) started to 
spread in the late 1880s. Merchants began to buy fresh fish from fishermen in various 
places in the southern and western part of the country, to use for curing at their own 
expense and responsibility. This trading was immediately hotly debated because it meant 
a transfer from fishermen to merchants of the value added that was derived from curing. 
Opponents of this trade accused merchants of exercising their power over fishermen to 
squeeze the fish out of them by denying to sell the fishermen salt or charging the fish 
fresh as an instant payment for their debts with their merchant — thus depriving 
fishermen of their means to increase their income. It appears that merchants did not reply 
to this criticism very much but fishermen certainly lost some income.125
Apart from the fresh fish trade, the fall of the saltfish price definitely was the 
cause for the introduction of the Italian market for Icelandic saltfish for the timing of it 
coincides with the difficulties in Spain and that cannot be a mere incident.126 Also, the
122 Table A.EXP/ALL-10.
123 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur i sogupjodar I, pp 61-2.
124 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur i sogu pjodar I, p 84.
125 See fuller account of the fresh fish trade in Chapter VII.
126 See a section on Spain and Italy later in this chapter.
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introduction of the Icelandic saltfish in Italy is presumably linked to Pike Ward’s 
initiation of a Labrador cure in Iceland. On both of these aspects, see a section on Spain 
and Italy below.
After the downswing in the 1880s, short term fluctuations tended to be 
proportionally less severe over time.127 Therefore, it is impossible to distinguish any 
particular sub-periods in the saltfish exports although two of my sample years after the 
1880s also showed a contraction from previous sample years. These years, 1898 and 
1906, do not represent any great secular downwards turns at these points of time. 
Although nearby years also had similar contractions in export quantities of saltfish, the 
reasons were mainly fluctuations in fishing but not in prices for they remained relatively 
stable in the 1890s and 1900s albeit moving from a certain plateau up to a higher one at 
the turn of the century (cf. Fig. IV.23).128 The graph suggests an acceleration in the 
exports of saltfish in the 1900s onwards but the general trend, based on annual figures, 
does not back this well up.129
Prices of the Icelandic products relative to selected market prices abroad is an 
aspect that was studied in cases of other export commodities. It was found that prices of 
wool, mutton, and live sheep from Iceland showed a distinct pattern, viz. a relatively 
large gap between the Icelandic product and prices abroad in the beginning of our period 
and then the gap decreased over time. It is remarkable that prices of Icelandic saltfish are 
not subject to such a pattern (Fig. IV.24). Although the Icelandic saltfish clearly had the 
lowest prices, there was no large gap between them and saltfish prices abroad in the
127 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur I sogu pjodar I, p 36 (Fig.
11.1).
128 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Hallddr Bjamason, Saltfiskur i sogu pjodar I, p 36 (Fig. 
II. 1). Halldor Bjamason, ‘Iceland’s Success in the International Saltfish Markets,’ p 98.
129 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur I sogu pjodar I, p 36 (Fig.
11.1).
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beginning of the period. This fact suggests that there was already by 1870 much more 
competition for saltfish than wool, mutton, or live sheep, for example, in the foreign 
trade of Iceland. Why that was so is not obvious and this is outside my study to examine.
IV.3.2.2. Hermetically Sealed Fish Products and Fish on Ice
The hegemony of saltfish production remained unaltered throughout our period. No other 
edible fish product from the domestic sub-sector, i.e., caught and cured by Icelandic 
nationals, challenged its importance. There were, however, some attempts to break new 
ground in fish processing. The very first, tinning of salmon, was indeed already under 
way in 1870 (started in 1858). It was symbolic for this novel product in terms of the 
Iceland economy that it was initiated by a foreigner, James Ritchie who also operated a 
tinning factory in Peterhead in Scotland. Ritchie’s enterprise was unique, and we have no 
explanation for what brought him to the country.130 Exports of tinned salmon in 1870 
amounted to 26 tonnes (1% of the total export value).131 Even if this was still a minor 
item of trade, it might have expanded over time with favourable conditions, but it must 
be admitted that these were lacking in Iceland at the time. The tinning was halted in 
1876, when experiments with exports of salmon on ice were started by two Englishmen 
in the same district. They offered higher prices than Ritchie could afford, making the 
tinning unprofitable for him, and he left Iceland with his equipment.132
130 Sigurdur Fjeldsted, ‘Laxveidi,’ pp 245-6,249.
131 Tables A.EXP/UK-14, A.EXP/UK-15, A.EXP/ALL-5.
132 Sigurdur Fjeldsted, ‘Laxveidi,’ p 249.
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During the following decades trade returns record tiny exports of unspecified 
hermetically sealed food and prepared food from Iceland.133 I have no knowledge about 
what kind of food this was, whether it was of internal origin or possibly re-exports or 
ships’ provisions. Anyway, Ritchie did not have a successor until long after he left the 
country because it was only in 1906 that a production of hermetically sealed fish product 
was tried again. Then, an Icelander made an experiment with pickled salmon for export 
but it was unsuccessful.134 Another Icelander, which was more fortunate, set up a 
tinning factory to sell its products abroad; it started production in 1907.135 Although the 
output was small and tiny relative to total export values (less than 1%),136 it might have 
served as an archetype for others, and conditions for such business in Iceland were 
apparently more favourable than before. However, that did not happen and it remained 
the only fish tinning factory in the country down to 1913.137
According to trade returns, exports of fresh fish, i.e., on ice or frozen, were very 
sporadic until after 1900. Some fresh fish, definitely on ice, was exported in the mid 
1870s, presumably salmon by the Englishmen mentioned above.138 There are also 
accounts of exports of herring on ice by Norwegians in the 1890s, and the trade returns 
confirm such exports then.139 It was not until around 1900 that permanent exports of
133 Tables A. EXP/UK-14 and A.EXP/DEN-2 (more accurate information are to be found in the 
Danish trade returns on imports).
134 Sigurdur Fjeldsted, ‘Laxveidi,’ pp 250-51.
135 Hogni Torfason, Saga lagmetisidnadarins, pp 14-19. Amor Sigurjonsson, Fiskimalanefhd, 
pp 104-5.
136 Danish trade returns (imports). Table A.EXP/ALL-5. — It should be noted that Amor 
Sigurj6nsson, Fiskimalanefhd, p 105, erranously puts the average export value of the factory 
per annum at 200 thous. kr. instead of 20 thous.kr. This is evident by checking his sources (the 
Icelandic trade returns) and it is more in line with the information in my dataset.
137 Hogni Torfason, Saga lagmetisidnadarins, p 15.
138 Table A.EXP/ALL-3. Sigurdur Fjeldsted, ‘Laxveidi,’ pp 249-50.
139 Matthias bordarson, Sildarsaga Islands (2nd ed.), pp 120,256. Table A.EXP/ALL-3.
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fish on ice started, and they grew rapidly down to 1913.140 A relatively small part of it 
was halibut to Denmark, but I do not know for whose account it was exported thereto.141 
Besides small amounts to Britain,142 the overwhelming part of the iced fish, until the late 
1900s, went to Norway.143 Primarily, this was cod and haddock which Norwegian 
tinning factories, mostly in Stavanger, contracted German steam trawlers to fish in 
Icelandic waters and bring to Norway.144
This description illustrates well the foreign character of the exports of iced fish. 
The activities around this were hallway or wholly outside the Iceland economy and as 
long as this remained so, the economy benefited very little from these exports. 
Furthermore, fishing by other nationalities, although they were all often fishing just off 
the shore, is excluded here because they were not in any contact with the foreign trade of 
Iceland or the Iceland economy.145 After Icelanders began using steam trawlers in their 
fishing, this changed very much. The first time an Icelandic trawler started ‘fishing on 
ice’ was in 1907 and for ca five months of the year thereafter the trawlers were usually 
devoted to this type of fishing and sailed with the catches to Britain.146 The first steam 
trawler wholly owned by Icelanders came to Iceland in 1905 but before, around 1900, 
rather unsuccessful attempts had been made with steam trawlers by companies almost 
solely owned by foreigners.147 As the Icelandic trawlers increased in number so did their
140 Table A.EXP/ALL-3.
141 Danish trade returns (imports).
142 Sigurdur Fjeldsted, ‘Laxveidi,’ p 251.
143 Table A.EXP/ALL-3.
144 K. Shetelig Hovland, Norske Islandsfiskere, pp 31, 35-6.
145 Jon b. bor, Breskir togarar, p 172. Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, 
Hagskinna, p 354.
146 Heimir borleifsson, Saga islenzkrar togarautgerdar, p 114-15.
147 Heimir borleifsson, Saga islenzkrar togarautgerdar, pp 31-46. Here, an experiment with a 
sailing trawler in 1901-02 by an Icelander is excluded (Heimir borleifsson, Saga islenzkrar 
togarautgerdar, p 47-52).
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catches, and by 1913 the export quantities of fish on ice amounted to 7,000 tonnes or 6 - 
7% of the total export value.148 Basically, the success of this branch of trade has two 
causes. First, because of the seasonal migrations of the demersal species, which the 
traditional fishing was based on, they were in small quantities in the customary fishing 
banks during the autumn and early winter. Hence, this was usually a very low time in 
the fishing but various other species could be caught, for example haddock, halibut, and 
plaice. Second, everybody knew that this fish was in demand in Britain because British 
trawlers, which had begun fishing off Iceland around 1890, were very keen on flatfish 
although they did also fish a lot of cod and haddock besides other species. Also, the 
British ‘fished on ice’.149 Therefore, to avoid letting the trawlers lay idle during this low 
time, Icelandic owners began ‘fishing on ice’ during these very months and sailed with 
the catches to Britain.
O f course, sailing with the fish on ice abroad meant a minimum processing of 
the fish but this was an established disposal of the fish, provided secure incomes, and 
domestic outlets were not large enough. One possible domestic outlet was the tinning 
industry but it was only just starting in Iceland as we have seen and it needed time to 
establish itself both domestically and in foreign markets, among other things. Another 
domestic outlet was to cater for fish consumption in Reykjavik and neighbourhood 
because there had been insufficient supply of fish in the early 1900s according to 
temporary sources. But the trawlers had indeed landed fish for consumption in the town 
ever since the first steam trawler came in 1905 and they continued to do so after they 
started sailing to Britain with fish on ice.150 It is difficult to say whether the demand was
148 Tables A.EXP/ALL-3, A.EXP/ALL-5 and A.EXP/ALL-7.
149 Jon b. For, Breskir togarar, pp 20-21,24-5, 168 (Table II), 169.
150 Heimir borleifsson, Saga islenzkrar togarautgerdar, pp 64, 67, 113.
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in fact satisfied but even if it was not, the owners probably had to find a large enough 
additional outlet, which the British market did provide.
IV.3.2.3. Herring
Remarkable as it may seem, herring was not used by Icelanders until the late 19th 
century.151 Herring was a fish that did not need much processing, and probably all 
herring that was caught in Scandinavia around 1870 was salted in barrels although 
already in the 1870s a trade with herring on ice was also started.152 Also, although 
herring is a very unstable species because of its migratory behaviour it has definitively 
often been in abundance in Icelandic waters through the centuries, as it was in 19th 
century and this century.153
The prehistory of herring exports from Iceland dates to the mid 19th century 
when Norwegian merchants became aware of herring migrations in the sea off Iceland. 
After initial, although irregular, experiments by Norwegian herring merchants and 
fishery ship-owners in the late 1850s and into the 1870s, a large scale herring fishery 
began in the late 1870s (Fig. IV.25). The timing of this was no coincidence for in the 
1870s the customary spring herring fishery off the Norwegian coast failed completely. 
This was a blow because the spring herring was an export commodity and then the 
Norwegians started focusing more on Icelandic waters where they already had attempted
151 Matthias bordarson, Sildarsaga Islands (2nd ed.), pp 67, 79-82.
152 F. Hodne, Norges ekonomiske his torie, pp 118-19, 124—5.
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a herring fishery.154 Due to fluctuating marine conditions and the general migratory 
habits of the herring, the results of the Iceland fishery varied very much. In spite of this, 
Norwegian herring ships continued coming to Iceland on regular basis until round about 
1890.155 In the 1890s, the interest of Norwegians in the herring fishery off Iceland 
diminished. This was partly due to the introduction of the drift net method of fishing, for 
until then Norwegians had predominantly used barrier seine, i.e., pulled the seine around 
the herring and then towards land. The drift net was a less costly and more efficient way 
of catching herring because it could be applied in the open sea and, thus, nearby banks 
became the first choice of fishermen. Also, the herring seems to have changed its 
migration patterns because catches off Iceland became poor compared to earlier years. 
Some Norwegians though continued their Iceland herring fishery, especially those who 
had settled down in Iceland. The latter had usually started trading with general 
merchandise and integrated the herring fishery into it.156
In spite of the significant herring fishery started by Norwegians, Icelanders 
were slow in following their example. According to an estimate by Hreinn Ragnarsson 
and Einar Hreinsson, herring catches of Icelanders only slowly increased in the late 
1860s and the 1870s.157 Icelanders did not know how to prepare herring to make it 
suitable for consumption, so this dampened their interest.158 Some actually used it as a 
fodder for animals.159 In 1880 or 1881, Icelanders made the first reported attempt to fish
154 O. Vollan, Omlegginga avfisket, pp 20-21, 30-32. O. Vollan, Den norske klippfiskhandels 
historie, pp 261-3.
155 Matthias bordarson, Sildarsaga Islands (2nd ed.), pp 79-117.
156 Matthias bordarson, Sildarsaga Islands (2nd ed.), pp 117-20, 160-63.
157 See Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, p 319.
158 Matthias bordarson, Sildarsaga Islands (2nd ed.), pp 79-80. Odyr foeda, p iii.
159 Matthias bordarson, Sildarsaga islands (2nd ed.), p 103.
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herring for exportation, and their exports of herring presumably started to grow.160 
Around that time, Icelandic fishermen in the northern and eastern parts of the country, 
where the Norwegians were predominantly based, also started using the herring as bait in 
the cod fishery, for it was gradually dawning upon them that this increased cod 
catches.161 Because of lack of research and adequate information, the situation in the 
1880s and 1890s is obscure. By the early 1890s though, fishermen and owners of fishery 
vessels generally had realised the crucial importance of the herring as a bait.162 
Therefore, it is logical to assume that the catches and use of herring for that purpose had 
increased by then. To assist this, ice houses were introduced, commencing in 1894. 
There, food (predominantly herring) was frozen with the aid of ice and salt. Although 
these ice-houses were simple and were based on a simple technology, they were a great 
improvement over existing methods and increased rapidly in number.163 Thus, the use of 
herring as a bait for cod fishing rose significantly. It is plausible to assume that over 
time the herring exports of Icelanders also increased and that their share of the herring 
exports rose, especially in the 1890s when the activities of Norwegians ebbed in Iceland. 
Hence, by around 1900 Icelanders had begun to take part in the herring trade for real. 
Information about the share of Icelanders in total herring exports is limited but the 
Icelandic trade returns suggest that it was no more than ca 27% in 1905, when the 
Norwegians were back.164
The turn of the century marks a new epoch in the herring trade. Norwegian 
herring merchants and ship-owners came back in numbers and began to use drift nets in
160 Matthias bordarson, Sildarsaga Islands (2nd ed.), pp 99, 102-3. Gudmundur Jonsson and
Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, p 319.
161 Matthias bordarson, Sildarsaga Islands (2nd ed.), pp 82, 143-6.
162 Matthias bordarson, Sildarsaga Islands (2nd ed.), pp 146-53.
163 Matthias bordarson, Sildarsaga Islands (2nd ed.), p 153-8.
164 Icel., Min. of Icel., Landshagsskyrslur fyrir Island 1906: Verzhmarskyrslur 1905, p ii.
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the fishery.165 Icelanders were now much more keen about the herring and concurrently 
started fishing in drift nets.166 This change in the fishing technology is probably one of 
the main explanations for the larger export of herring after 1898, as compared to earlier 
decades (cf. Fig. IV.25). The open sea was now the location of the fishery, and it was no 
longer restricted to the coastal shelf. Another new invention, purse seine or ring net, was 
also tried in the herring fishing off Iceland, but the major part of the fish landings were 
caught in drift nets, at least until the mid 1900s.167 The share of Icelanders in herring 
exports rose only marginally. Figures for 1913 are lacking but in 1912 and 1914 their 
share was only round about one third.168 Even so, it must be acknowledged that in 
absolute terms the herring fishery of Icelanders accelerated greatly after 1902 compared 
to previous decades, and this fishery stimulated the concurrent mechanisation of open 
and decked boats besides being one of the pillars for operation of trawlers that Icelanders 
were buying in the 1900s.169
Although the herring fishing was mainly operated by Norwegian companies, and 
profits and losses of the activity moved out of the Iceland economy, it had a special 
advantage for the Iceland economy apart from many indirect beneficial impacts. This 
special advantage partly explains why the only limits or restrictions to the herring 
fishing, apart from those set by legislation, were ones set by the Norwegian companies 
themselves. Even though the Norwegian companies supplied most of the outfit for the 
fishing (ships, boats, fishing gear, capital, fishermen, etc.) from Norway, they had to rely 
to certain extent on Icelandic work force in salting the herring in barrels before
165 Matthias bordarson, Sildarsaga Islands (2nd ed.), pp 190-92,200-201 (tables).
166 Matthias bordarson, Sildarsaga Islands (2nd ed.), pp 175-89, 192, 194-202.
167 Matthias bdrdarson, Sildarsaga islands (2nd ed.), pp 163, 181, 193-4, 196, 271.
168 Matthias bordarson, Sildarsaga Islands (2nd ed.), p 201. Cf. the Icelandic trade returns.
169 Matthias bordarson, Sildarsaga Islands (2nd ed.), p 183-4, 196-8. Heimir borleifsson, 
Saga islenzkrar togarautgerdar, pp 106-110.
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exportation. It is noteworthy that it seems that the Norwegians usually had no difficulties 
in securing themselves Icelandic labour to salt the herring. This may be explained by a 
variety of circumstances — for example, by under-employment in the economy. But a 
very important reason was that the Norwegian companies always paid their Icelandic 
work force in money rather than merchandise, unlike the Danish merchant houses when 
they hired people for work. Because of this the Norwegian herring fishing was of 
importance to the economy, although the Icelandic herring fishing generated more 
linkages into the Iceland economy. Furthermore, this work was mainly done by women, 
which presumably entailed special consumption implications, different from those if 
acquired by men. Apart from that, the sums of money acquired by these women no doubt 
were unprecedented for Icelandic women until then. This special aspect of the herring 
fishing will be commented on in Chapter VIII.
IV.3.2.4. Whale Products (excluding Oil)
Whaling in Icelandic waters was practised to some extent for centuries, both by 
Icelanders and foreigners. By the early 19th century, however, whaling by Icelanders and 
foreigners around Iceland had largely ceased,170 although the demand for whale products 
(oil and baleens) had not fallen in foreign markets.171 Whaling was revolutionised when, 
in the late 1870s, the Norwegian Svend Foyn invented a new method in whaling using a 
combination of an explosive harpoon, air pumping system, and a steamship.
170 Trausti Einarsson, Hvalveidar vid Island, pp 22-31, 35-41.
171 Trausti Einarsson, Hvalveidar vid Island, pp 22-3, 63-4, 66. — On markets for animal oils 
in general, see S. Ryan, The Ice Hunters, Chapter 1.
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Subsequently, he acquired a patent for this invention for ten years, ending in 1882. With 
and without Foyn’s concession to use his method, several whaling companies had been 
established in Norway by 1882 but when his patent ran out, many new were formed.172 
As it happens, the first Norwegian company to set up a whaling station in Iceland did so 
in 1883. There can be no doubt that the timing of this coincided with the expiring of 
Foyn’s patent. Iceland was the first country in a series of countries outside Norway 
where Foyn’s effective method was used.173 The Norwegian company that set up a 
whaling station in Iceland in 1883 had a connection to one of the Norwegian herring 
companies that were operating in Iceland at the time. Subsequent companies were not 
related to the herring companies, however, and they came from different cities in 
Norway. The whaling fishery in Iceland is usually described as a Norwegian enterprise 
but companies from other countries were involved too. They came from Copenhagen, 
Hamburg, and Leith; most often one company from each city. The one from Leith was 
Chr. Salvesen and Co. and it was different from the others that it bought shares in some 
of the other companies and integrated the whaling fishery in Iceland into its international 
activities.174 However, the Norwegian companies dominated the trade and, with this 
qualification, the whaling fishery off Iceland can rightfully be called Norwegian.
Unfortunately, we have no reliable figures about exports of whale oil from 
Iceland. The sources used for the dataset usually do not indicate from which animal the 
oil came, so whale oil is mixed with cod liver oil, shark oil, seal oil, and animal fats. 
Furthermore, the Icelandic trade returns are especially unreliable in this matter.175
172 Trausti Einarsson, Hvalveidar vid Island, pp 44—6. H. Bogen, Linjer i den norske 
hvalfangts historie, pp 40,43-4,46.
173 Trausti Einarsson, Hvalveidar vid Island, pp 46, 51-3.
174 Trausti Einarsson, Hvalveidar vid Island, pp 50-57.
175 The particular unreliability of the Icelandic trade returns in the case of whale oil applies 
indeed to all products exported by Norwegians in Iceland. This is because of those who were
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However, there are constructed series for the quantity of whale oil that was produced, 
and this can serve as approximation for exports. Production (and exports) rose almost 
constantly from the year 1883 until shortly after 1900, when it began to fall off.176 But 
this is only half the story because new whale products were initiated.
The main objective of whaling through the centuries was to supply oil for 
lighting and industrial uses, and baleens for various manufactures.177 In the 1880s, the 
price of whale oil presumably fell markedly, as other kinds of oils and fats did,178 mainly 
because of greater use of mineral oil for lighting and lubrication.179 After 1900, 
however, demand for whale oil rose again when a method was discovered to use it in the 
manufacture of soaps, margarine, and explosives.180 On the other hand, the price of 
baleens had by the late 1900s fallen dramatically compared to earlier decades and they 
were not worth selling any more.181 The reaction of the whaling companies operating in 
Iceland to the reduced price varied. Some did nothing, but others chose at some point to 
increase productivity by utilising other parts of the whale as well, namely the meat and 
the bones. They were crushed to make meal, which could be used both as a fodder for 
animals and as a manure or fertiliser.182 This change in the whaling industry in Iceland is
due to return statements about their export, the ones from Norwegians in Iceland were always 
more or less lacking.
176 Trausti Einarsson, Hvalveidar vid Island, p 65 (Table D).
177 Trausti Einarsson, Hvalveidar vid Island, pp 22-3.
178 Prices of London market whale oil and Newfoundland animal oils moved in tandem at least 
during 1854-76 and 1888 to 1913, and it is plausible to conclude that it did so also inbetween 
the two periods of time. See S. Ryan, The Ice Hunters, pp 439,440-41, and Trausti Einarsson, 
Hvalveidar vid island, pp 64 (Table C).
179 S. Ryan, The Ice Hunters, pp 83^4.
180 Trausti Einarsson, Hvalveidar vid Island, p 66.
181 Trausti Einarsson, Hvalveidar vid Island, p 66.
182 Trausti Einarsson, Hvalveidar vid Island, pp 64—5, 82. There were three kinds of meal. 
One was bone meal, another was meat meal, and the third was guano which was made from 
one third of bone meal and two thirds of the worst meat meal. The first was used for animal 
fodder but the two other sorts as manure or fertilizers.
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very clear in the export figures for meat meal (guano) and bone meal, both as fodder 
meal and fertiliser. The export quantities of meal for fodder and of bones and meal as 
fertiliser rose in the 1890s, appear to have reached a peak around 1906 and then fell off 
(Fig. IV.26 and IV.27).183 The late peak in these export trades, compared to the whale 
oil, reflects how late the companies reacted in this matter.
It should be noted that growing exports of whale meal was not solely a financial 
issue for the companies. Criticism from Icelanders was mounting because the companies 
often let the bodies of the animals rot almost anywhere, sometimes at the shore beside the 
whaling stations. This waste and pollution antagonised people, and some blamed these 
rotting bodies for occasional deaths of sheep (farmers sometimes let sheep graze by the 
shore). This hostility was linked to another current in public opinion and debate. The 
whalers were from the start accused of spoiling the demersal fisheries by destroying their 
nets or driving off the fish; conversely other said the whaling helped in driving the 
herring towards land where it could be caught.184 More important, while whaling created 
some employment many felt it contributed only marginally to the economy and that 
Icelanders were completely left out. Gradually, new laws were passed and other were 
amended to set stricter limits to the whaling activities. Taxes on the whaling companies 
were also increased. Some Icelanders wanted to ban whaling altogether as was done for 
the northernmost regions in North Norway in 1904. This position won public opinion, 
and law was passed in 1913 that banned all whaling off Iceland for ten years.185 This 
ended the operation of all whaling companies, but they seem to have been slowing down 
their fishery anyway before the law was passed. For example, catches in 1912-13 were 
only round about one fifth of what they had been in 1906-11, and these were in turn less
183 Table A.EXP/ALL-3.
184 Trausti Einarsson, Hvalveidar vid Island, pp 116-28.
185 Trausti Einarsson, Hvalveidar vid Island, pp 60, 115, 128-35.
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than in the peak years 1901-05.186 One source says that the catches were becoming 
poorer.187 The whaling fishery was certainly decelerating, whether from natural causes 
only for business reasons too. The whalers were probably being pressed harder in 
Iceland towards the end of our period than before, but on the other hand the whaling 
activities were increasingly being directed to the southerly regions in the world at the 
time.188
Above we remarked that the Norwegian herring fishery had a particular 
important feature for the Iceland economy because of money in the form of wages it 
generated. This applied also to the whaling in a similar manner. Presumably the 
Norwegian whalers employed smaller numbers of Icelanders in this branch than the 
Norwegians doing the herring fishing. In spite of that, the whalers employed substantial 
numbers of Icelanders (men only) over time, and they paid them in hard cash. Apart 
from many indirect beneficial impacts from the whaling enterprises on the Iceland 
economy, these money payments presumably were of special importance in a money 
scarce economy like Iceland was (see Chapter VIII).
186 Trausti Einarsson, Hvalveidar vid Island, p 65 (Table D).
187 Magnus Gislason, A hvalveidastodvum, p 77.
188 Trausti Einarsson, Hvalveidar vid Island, pp 46, 59.
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IV.4. Destinations of Iceland’s Exports 
IV.4.1. General Trends
The main trends in Iceland’s exports by countries over time can be summed up in the 
term diversification, but there are two ways of looking at it. One aspect is the range of 
countries and their relative shares of Iceland’s total exports. In 1870, the main country 
receiving Iceland’s exports was Denmark, which had monopolised the foreign trade of 
the country for centuries. Denmark took more than 40% of Iceland’s exports by value 
(Fig. IV.28). Then, its share fell generally — down to ca 30% — at which level it seems 
to have stabilised from 1890 to 1913. In terms of absolute values (Fig. IV.29), exports 
to Denmark increased, so the fall in share was due to even faster growing aggregate 
export values.
With the relative demise of Denmark as a market country, other countries 
entered the scene or increased their share. Norway, although Iceland’s neighbouring 
country, was a relative newcomer in the foreign trade of the country in 1870. Some small 
trade though had been going on from the mid or early 19th century, but exports to 
Norway did not start to rise markedly until the late 1860s.189 This is reflected in the 
small portion of Norway in 1870 — only 2% by value.190 Albeit rising thereafter, it did 
so only gradually until the 1890s when it started to grow significantly (Fig. IV.28). It
189 Norw., Dept for Int. Aff., Tabeller vedkommende Norges Handel og Skibsfart 1867, p 142; 
1870, part 2, p vi.
190 Table A.EXP/ALL-5.
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reached is peak in 1906, when Norway took 33% of the total exports by value. 
Thereafter, Norway’s share declined — to 14% in the end of the period.191
Incidentally, as we will become clear below, most of the shifts concerning the 
other markets countries were related to the saltfish branch. In 1870, Spain had some 
20% share in Iceland’s exports by value, and the remaining portion, about 35%, went to 
the United Kingdom and other, unspecified countries, which a form the category ‘UK 
and others.’ The shares of these countries and, in fact, of Norway and Denmark too, 
remained relatively stable until the mid 1880s. Due to termination of commercial 
treaties, the Spanish market was closed and the ‘UK and other countries’ temporarily 
took over Spain’s share. Around 1890, Spain had started to buy saltfish again and Italy, 
which was a new market, became a market country for Icelandic saltfish as well. In the 
1890s onwards, Spain and Italy, besides unspecified countries, increased their share in 
Iceland’s exports while that of the UK fell very much. The outcome of all these changes 
was that instead of three relatively large market countries in 1870 where one had as 
much as 40%, Iceland had five main markets in 1913, besides the category Other 
countries. Then, all of them purchased sizeable portions of the exports values, and the 
share of none of them exceeded 30% by value.
The other way of examining this diversification in Iceland’s exports by countries 
is to concentrate on the staple items one by one and see if and to what extent there were 
changes in the buyers’ group over time. From this point of view, we can discern an 
interesting pattern. Initially, there was a substantial specialisation where each staple 
usually had one principal market country. In the case of saltfish, Spain was the main 
market (Fig. IV.23), while unspecified countries in the category ‘UK and other 
countries’ took the herring (Fig. IV.25). Also, Denmark was the principal market for
191 Table A.EXP/ALL-5.
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mutton (Fig. IV. 14), and fish oil and tallow (Fig. IV.7), besides wool (although the UK 
was quite significant there; Fig. IV. 12). However, over time a clear diversification took 
place where each staple was marketed to a significant extent to more than one market 
country. The timing of this change varied, because the circumstances were specific to 
each staple, but the turning point was between the mid 1880s and around 1900.
Looking across Iceland’s staple exports, this diversification becomes clear. After 
1886, Spain lost her dominant position in Iceland’s saltfish exports, and ever increasing 
diversification in terms of market countries set in. By 1913, Denmark was the largest 
buyer but three other countries nearly as large. From 1900 onwards, the market 
countries for wool diversified, and although Denmark still was the largest buyer in 1913, 
the UK and Other countries had become considerable markets for wool too. In the case 
of fish oil and tallow, three countries were equally large buyers in 1913 instead of only 
one in 1870. Mutton export were much affected by live sheep sales in the 1880s, and 
Denmark became practically the only market for a short while, but from the early 1890s 
Norway became a noteworthy buyer too. Herring exports did not take off until after 
1900, but the diversification was explicit there because the herring had three substantial 
markets in 1913 instead of only one around 1900 (Fig. IV.25).
IV.4.2. Denmark
From 1870 until the 1890s, the staple goods exported to Denmark were, in terms of 
quantity, saltfish, and, to a lesser extent, animal oils and fats (Fig. IV.30). Wool and 
mutton were minor items of the trade. Around 1900, this relative composition changed
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considerably when exports of herring suddenly increased. Saltfish remained the staple 
export commodity but herring was second while other commodities, new (live horses) 
and previous, were relatively insignificant. The reason for the start of herring exports to 
Denmark is not clear in Matthias bordarson’s work, the one and only major study of the 
herring industry in Iceland in our period. There are two or three plausible causes; maybe 
it was a combination of them. The herring that was caught with either drift nets or seine 
nets (also named ring nets) in the open sea was usually larger than the herring that had 
been caught with the barrier seine closer to land. Because of this the German market was 
lost for Icelandic herring after 1900. Also, the Icelandic herring was considerably 
cheaper than Dutch herring, which was consumed in Denmark among other countries. 
Lastly, new business patronage with Danish firms after 1900 may have been a 
complementary cause.192
IV.4.3. Norway
Even though our information about the export trade with Norway until 1886 (and in the 
year 1898) is partly based on estimates and educated guesses, there is no doubt that the 
major exports to Norway from 1870 to 1902 were saltfish and, not surprisingly, herring 
(Fig. IV. 31). However, the exact quantities of saltfish and herring involved are more 
difficult to ascertain before 1898.193 For reasons that are not fully clear, the 1890s and 
early 1900s were a time of rapid changes in the export trade with Norway. In 1894—
192 Matthias bordarson, Sildarsaga Islands (2nd ed.), pp 256-7,265-7, 326-7.
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1902 the value of saltfish was suddenly many times larger than before. Thereafter, 
herring dominated the exports and the saltfish exports contracted.
The reasons for the unusually large exports of saltfish in the 1890s and the early 
1900s were basically three. Icelandic saltfish had since the 1870s been imported to 
Norway (Fig. IV.31), because it was often of better quality194 and it was always cheaper 
than Norwegian saltfish (Fig. IV.24). Also, Norway had better communication with 
Spain and by the early 1890s Norwegians had started buying Icelandic fish to sell at 
those times in Spain when there was no Icelandic fish available.195 In 1893, Norway 
made a commercial treaty with Spain where the Spanish tariff for saltfish from Norway 
was reduced, certificates for origin of the saltfish were not demanded in Spain, and 
scheduled steamship routes between the countries started. As it happens, the tariff for 
saltfish from Norway was raised by one third and this made Icelandic saltfish in the 
Spanish market cheaper than Norwegian saltfish.196 Because of this and since origin 
certificates were not needed, the Icelandic saltfish suddenly became much more attractive 
for Norwegian merchants than before. This and the improved communication with 
Spanish harbours clearly resulted in more exports of Icelandic saltfish to Norway and 
then to Spain. In a sense, increased purchases of Icelandic saltfish by the Norwegians 
eventually contributed to their loss of the best part of the Spanish market, namely 
Barcelona and the Catalonia region for in this way the Norwegian merchants introduced 
Icelandic saltfish to their consumers in the markets, and Icelandic saltfish was usually 
better cured than Norwegian saltfish. Also, Icelandic saltfish was of a type that was 
more to the taste of the consumers in Barcelona and the Catalonia region, and in both
194 O. Vollan, Den norske klippfiskhandels historie, pp 264, 274, 275, 276, 333.
195 D. Thomsen, ‘Sala a islenzkri voru,’ pp 181-2.
196 O. Vollan, Den norske klippfiskhandels historie, pp 311-13, 314, 315, 317, 336.
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places quality, not price, was the main issue.197 Hence, around 1900 the Icelandic 
saltfish was much more in demand than before in these places.
Around 1900 or shortly after, circumstances within the saltfish industry in 
Iceland changed for the worse for Norwegian merchants. Competition for saltfish 
increased within Iceland. Also, communication with Spain had improved very much 
since the mid 1890s, with cargoes of Icelandic saltfish being transported there more often 
and regularly over the season. Furthermore, Icelandic saltfish was sold in consignment, 
not in advance as the Norwegian saltfish, and its buyers in Spain were fewer than buyers 
of Norwegian saltfish. For a considerable time, the Norwegians had sold both to 
wholesalers and retailers in Spain, thereby upsetting the first. Icelandic saltfish had, 
conversely, long been sold to the wholesalers and continued to be so, although Icelandic 
exporters made attempts to bypass them.198 All this made sales of previous quantities of 
saltfish from Iceland to Norway impossible and they decreased sharply between 1902 
and 1906 (Fig. IV.31), suggesting that the main change happened then.
While the exports of saltfish from Iceland to Norway diminished after 1902, the 
herring exports soared and the year 1906 had by far the largest quantities of our sample 
years (Fig. IV.31). The main reason for the increased herring exports was the revived 
herring fishing with drift nets and, later, seine nets by Norwegians in Icelandic waters.199 
But many of the fishing vessels after 1900 were steam ships, which increased the catches 
also.200 Even though the export figures for Norway exaggerate the shift in herring
197 O. Vollan, Den norske hlippfishhandels historie, pp 277, 335-6, 342, 344—5, 348. D. 
Thomsen, ‘Sala a islenzkri voru,’ pp 184, 195.
198 O. Vollan, Den norske klippfiskhandels historie, pp 266, 333, 342 (the latter table), 345-6, 
348. D. Thomsen, ‘Sala a islenzkri voru,’ pp 181, 184—5, 186, 193, 193-4.
199 Matthias bordarson, Sildarsaga Islands (2nd ed.), p 271. K. Shetelig Hovland, Norske 
Islandsfiskere, p 100.
2°o Matthias bordarson, Sildarsaga Islands (2nd ed.), p 197. See also K. Shetelig Hovland, 
Norske Islandsfiskere, pp 44—79, 84-90.
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catches in the period before and after ca 1900 (cf. Fig. IV.25), the significance of the 
new techniques is well implied in the graph.
IV.4.4. Spain and Italy
Spain was a significant market country for Iceland from at least the late 18th century. 
This was not because Spain bought many commodities from Iceland. It only bought one 
item — and that was saltfish. Nearly all saltfish from Iceland in the 1870s and early 
1880s was sold for final consumption in Spain, both directly and as re-exports through 
other countries.201 Given this and the large proportion of saltfish within Iceland’s 
exports, Spain was a very important country in foreign trade. According to our 
calculations, direct exports of saltfish to Spain (either shipped directly or transhipped 
without clearing customs in intermediate ports) appears to have been 16 to 20% of total 
export values in 1870-82 (Fig. IV.28).202
Throughout the 19th century in Spain, tariffs fluctuated considerably and 
usually were subject to bilateral treaties between respective exporting countries and 
Spain. In fact, tariff affairs were marked by a struggle between protectionist and liberal 
forces in the politics of Spain.203 In 1868 and 1869, when there was a liberal government 
in power in Spain, step were taken towards more liberal imports and customs treatment,
201 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur i sogu pjodar I, various 
places, e.g., pp 22-3, 26, 32-3,40.
202 Table A.EXP/ALL-5.
203 S. Ryan, Fish Out o f Water, ch. 4. O. Vollan, Den norske klippfiskhandels historie, pp 
270-73. Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur i sogu pjodar I, p 
56.
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namely with lifting a special due (surtaxe) on merchandise brought in other ships than 
Spanish and abolishing a due (differential tariff) on indirect exports, i.e., re-exports. 
Denmark and other countries shortly signed shipping and commercial treaties with 
Spain, which offered most-favoured nation treatment, etc. Even though the Danish- 
Spanish treaty from 1872 strictly speaking did not apply to Iceland, it did so in practice 
and it does not seem to have affected Iceland’s exports to Spain adversely.204 Anyway, 
there were no apparent complaints by contemporaries and, moreover, exports of saltfish 
from Iceland to Spain clearly increased from 1870 to 1882 (Fig. IV.32).
By the late 1870s, protectionist forces had come to power in the Spanish 
government and the policy was to raise tariffs, which new tariff legislation in 1877 made 
explicit.205 Later, in 1881, all current Spanish treaties with other countries were 
terminated and in 1882 new and higher tariffs came into force unless individual countries 
made new treaties with Spain.206 Therefore, to reduce tariffs bilateral treaties were 
necessary and many countries managed to come to terms with the Spanish government. 
Most important for Iceland because of its saltfish trade, France and Norway did so in 
1878 and 1882 respectively 207 After the Danish-Spanish treaty of 1872 was terminated
204 Fr. le Sage de Fontenay, ‘De aeldre Traktatforhandlinger,’ pp 58-9. — In a letter to the 
governor general of Iceland (landshofdingi) the Home Ministry of Denmark 
(Indenrigsministeriet) interpreted the treaty as applying to Iceland also, although colonies and 
dependencies were explicitly excluded in the treaty (Icel., Gov. Gen., Stjomartidindi 1879, 
sect. B, pp 161-2).
205 S. Ryan, Fish Out o f Water, pp 132-4. — There seems to be a confusion in S. Ryan, Fish 
Out o f Water, about the salfish tariff in Spain before and after the new tariff legislation in 
1877. After the reforms in 1868-69 it was 17.50 pesetas per 100 kg (Icel., Gov. Gen., 
Stjomartidindi 1879 B, p 161). With the protectionist legislation in 1877, it probably became 
23.50 pesetas per 100 kg except for those countries that had a bilateral treaty, in that case it 
was 18.70 pesetas per 100 kg (cf. S. Ryan, Fish Out o f Water, p 134). (This was certainly so in 
1882 onwards, cf. O. Vollan, Den norske klippjiskhandels historie, p 272, and D. Thomsen, 
‘Sala h islenzkri voru,’ p 183.) This information runs counter to Ryan’s claim that the saltfish 
tariff was 17.50 pesetas per 100 kg after 1877 (cf. p 133) because his sources estimate this tariff 
to be about 8s sterling per cwt which Ryan says was the ordinary tariff before 1877 (cf. p 132).
206 Fr. le Sage de Fontenay, ‘De aeldre Traktatforhandlinger,’ pp 59-60.
207 S. Ryan, Fish Out o f Water, pp 134—5, 144. O. Vollan, Den norske klippfiskhandels 
historie, pp 271-2.
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in 1881, attempts were made to negotiate a new one but the Spaniards wanted in return a 
reduction in Danish tariffs for Spanish goods. The Danish government and Danish 
parliament disagreed on this point, partly due to a constitutional power struggle between 
them, and the negotiations ended in a stalemate.208
After 1882, with no Danish-Spanish treaty valid, Iceland’s competitive position 
was weakened.209 Then, when France enjoyed a colossal expansion in its saltfish exports 
to Spain in the 1880s and into the 1890s, the situation was aggravated. France seriously 
squeezed Norway’s share of the saltfish market, although both nations had the same 
tariffs for their fish. This was because the French government operated an extensive 
bounty system for fishing and saltfish export.210 Iceland, being still worse off than 
Norway because of a higher tariff, thus had a very hard time in the Spanish market with 
its saltfish from 1882 onwards as the fall in the export quantities thereto in 1886 
confirms (Fig. IV.32). Probably, the competition from France was more deleterious than 
the higher tariff.
The price of saltfish in Copenhagen, predominantly of Icelandic origin, 
automatically reflected this situation. During 1874-82 the price of saltfish was 0.30- 
0.40 kr. per kg, in 1884 0.28 kr, in 1885 0.25 kr., and in 1886 0.15 kr per kg.211 It is 
obvious that the year 1886 was catastrophic in terms of the saltfish price. The general 
causes for this downswing were both the higher tariff for Icelandic saltfish and,
208 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur i sogu pjodar I, p 61.
209 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Hallddr Bjamason, Saltfiskur i sogu pjodar I, pp 59- 
60.
210 O. Vollan, Den norske klippfiskhandels historie, pp 268-70, 275-6, 277, 334-5. S. Ryan, 
Fish Out o f Water, pp 135-6, 138-42.
211 Danish trade returns (imports). See Denm., Bur. of Stat.: Statistisk Tabelvcerk, 3rd series, 
vol. 33, p 92; Vare-lndferselen og Udferselen 1880, p 118; Kongerigets Vare-Indforsel og 
Udforsel 1884, p 184, and 1885, p 186. — The years 1870 to 1873 are not included because 
imports and exports were not valued in the Danish trade returns until 1874 onwards; the values 
for 1870 I use in my Denmark dataset are reconstructed (see introductory text in Appendix A to 
the thesis).
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presumably more importantly, the competition from France. But the Copenhagen price 
slumped so heavily in 1886 also because of unusually adverse conditions in North of 
Spain where Icelandic saltfish was mainly sold. In 1885 it was plagued with cholera and 
had a poor cereal harvest affecting both people’s purchasing power and consumption 
level.212 But the slump was probably mainly a market reaction to news of a British 
agreement with Spain, as we shall see.
The Danish government was not the only one struggling with the Spanish 
government to reach more favourable tariff treatment for their imports to Spain. British 
products and manufactures, which included Newfoundland saltfish, were hard hit by 
discriminatory treatment of their goods and the British government tried for several years 
to negotiate with the Spanish government. In early 1886, a new commercial treaty was 
signed between the British and Spanish governments where they gave each other most- 
favoured nation treatment in terms of tariffs for the goods of both.213 This was of 
importance because a few years earlier Spain had made a treaty with the United States 
where certificates of origin for goods from ports in the exporting country were not 
necessary.214 Therefore, Icelandic saltfish, as any other non-British commodity, could be 
exported from Britain to Spain.
We do not know how large saltfish exports to Spain were between our sample 
years of 1882 and 1886, because of their relatively long (four years’) intervals, but my 
calculation implies that direct exports from Iceland to Spain in the year 1886 were 
practically wiped out (see Table A. 5 in Appendix A). Instead, the saltfish destined for 
Spain went to Britain. The quantities usually going directly from Iceland to Spain in
212 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur I sogu pjodar I, pp 64, 
65. S. Ryan, Fish Out o f Water, p 137. O. Vollan, Den norske klippfiskhandels historie, pp 
276-7.
213 S. Ryan, Fish Out o f Water, pp 134—5.
214 S. Ryan, Fish Out o f Water, p 135. O. Vollan, Den norske klippfiskhandels historie, p 272.
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1870-82 were now added to Britain’s customary quantities, while the quantities to 
Norway and Denmark in 1886 were similar to those in previous sample years.215 Hence, 
as if by stroke of fortune, Britain’s commercial treaty with Spain in April 1886 provided 
an important outlet for Iceland’s exports of saltfish to Spain for the very next years to 
come. This was because things were at standstill in negotiations between the Danish and 
Spanish governments and it was not until 1893, after the Danish political stalemate had 
been solved, that the two countries signed a new commercial treaty, similar to the one 
between Britain and Spain.216
Saltfish exports from Iceland to Spain were no doubt relatively small while they 
were being discriminated against by Spain’s tariff system and its commercial 
conventions with other saltfish producing nations.217 Our calculation for 1890 supports 
this218 and also the existence of substantial saltfish exports to Italy (Fig. IV.32), a new 
market country discussed later in this section. The new commercial treaty between Spain 
and the Danish Kingdom, signed in 1893, became valid in 1894 and consequently, 
saltfish exports to Spain increased once again, probably slightly at the expense of Italy 
(Fig. IV.32) and certainly at the expense of exports to Britain. Exports to Spain and Italy 
were higher in 1898 and still more so in 1902, when the situation was in a sense back to 
normal because the share of both countries was close to the 20% of export values that 
Spain had before 1886. Until the end of the period, direct exports of saltfish to the two
215 Table A.EXP/ALL-3.
216 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur I sogu pjodar I, p 63.
217 D. Thomsen, ‘Sala a islenzkri voru,’ p 182. — O. Vollan in his Den norske 
klippfiskhandels historie, p 278, says that Icelandic saltfish only amounted to 6% of Spains’s 
imports of saltfish in 1887 as against 22% in 1882. It is probably indicative of the portions 
although they cannot be verified because Vollan does not refer to his source here.
218 My estimate is in line with O. Vollan, Den norske klippfiskhandels historie, p 278 (table), 
although his figure includes saltfish imports from the Faroe Islands, Shetland, and Scotland as 
well.
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countries remained rather stable in terms of aggregate export values, round about 20%, 
although in absolute terms exports were growing.
The reinforced commercial relations of Iceland with Britain in the late 1880s 
onwards proved helpful for the marketing of Icelandic saltfish in one particular way. 
According to a contemporary British consular report from Italy, Icelandic saltfish 
appeared as a new product in the Italian market in 1887.219 It cannot be a coincidence 
that this happened immediately after the difficult year of 1886. Furthermore, this is 
probably a consequence of the British relations because the British definitely had more 
commercial communication with Italy than Denmark did. For instance, Genoa and 
Leghorn, the principal ports for Icelandic saltfish, were large importers of British 
produce, especially coal. This fact may have a connection with Iceland’s trade with 
Britain. In any case, this evolution was fortunate for Icelandic saltfish industry because 
it was risky to depend on one saltfish market only, as the happenings in Spain had 
revealed. An Italian market not only spread the risk for saltfish producers, but it also 
helped them diversifying their product because the Italian market preferred a small size 
codfish, something for which there was not much an export market before that time. 
Consequently, the entry into Italy probably helped to start a new cure in Iceland, the 
Labrador Style curing.
In 1893, an export of a new type of saltfish was started on the initiative of an 
Englishman, Pike Ward. Until then, only the large and medium size codfish had been 
reserved for export and it was fully dried after salting. What Ward wanted was a small 
cod, split in slightly different way than was customary, and only dried up to three 
quarters. This cure was an imitation of one that was traditional in Labrador, Canada, 
and the Icelandic type soon got the name Labrador Style in the markets (usually called
219 UK, FO, Italy: Report for the Year 1888 on the Trade o f Genoa by M. Yeats Brown, p 7.
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‘Labri’ or ‘Labradorfiskur’ in Iceland).220 It was cheaper than other salted codfish and 
was especially favoured in Italy. This trade grew slowly but from around 1910 onwards 
it soared, so that it amounted to about 27% of all saltfish exports by quantity in 19 1 3 221 
Spain, indeed, also was importer of Labrador Style saltfish by 1910, but it is unclear to 
me when it started buying it.222 At that time, the taste of consumers in Italy, especially, 
and in Spain was moving towards softer cures and, furthermore, exports of ‘ordinary’ 
saltfish only dried up to about 7/8 of the fish’s water content were started from Iceland 
to Spain in 1912.223
IV.4.5. The United Kingdom and Other (Unspecified) Countries
What was not exported to Denmark, Norway, Spain, and Italy went mainly to the United 
Kingdom. Although it is difficult in the present state of research to prove this decisively 
for the years down to the sample year 1898, contemporary qualitative sources in the 
1870s and 1880s never mention other countries trading with Iceland other than those
220 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur I sogu pjodar I, pp 200- 
201. Denm., Min, for For. Affairs, ‘FiskimarkaOurinn i Genua 1911. Skyrsla ... eftir [J.] 
Ar[f]wedson konsul,’ p 55.
221 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur i sogu pjodar I, pp 256- 
7,262,268. For prices of Labrador Style as against other kinds of Icelandic saltfish, see printed 
Icelandic trade returns (cf. bibliography).
222 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur I sogu pjodar I, pp 255, 
261.
223 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur I sogu pjodar I, pp 201- 
02. Halldor Bjamason, ‘Iceland’s Success in the International Saltfish Markets,’ pp 99-102.
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above (although there were occasional shipments to other countries).224 The small share 
of other (unspecified) countries in Iceland’s exports in 1898, when they are separated 
from the UK in our sources for the first time, also hints at this. At only 6% of total 
exports by value, they do not appear to have been particularly significant in Icelandic 
trade before 1898 225 However, because we cannot separate the UK from all the other 
countries in this group receiving exports from Iceland before 1898, we must consider all 
of them as a residual category that we will term as ‘UK and others’. A further word of 
caution must be offered about this group. Its share of Iceland’s trade for 1870-94 is 
partly estimated, and includes a declining rate of underreporting (see introductory text in 
Appendix). The estimated rate of underreporting was as high as 17% in 1870, from 
which it declined at an even rate down to 10% in 1898. While allowing for some margin 
of error, especially for the 1870s and 1880s, my calculations should be reasonably 
accurate for the proportions in trade between the main destinations of the exports but 
probably less so in the terms of individual goods in the export trade.
This group of countries — the United Kingdom and other countries — received 
a large part of Iceland’s exports (Fig. IV.28). In 1870 this amounted to 30-35% by 
value and it stayed generally on that level until 1886-94 when it rose to more than 50% 
(ca 50-54%). Subsequently, however, the share of the UK and the unspecified countries 
fell rapidly although in absolute terms the export values remained fairly constant (Fig. 
IV.29). In 1902-13, the share of the UK ranged from 14 to 26% and this was notably 
lower than in the pre-1886 era, when it was between 31 and 41% by value.226 These
224 UK, FO, ‘Denmark: Iceland: Report by Consul Crowe on the Trade and Fisheries of 
Iceland for the Years 1870-71,’ p 647. UK, FO, ‘Denmark: Iceland: Report by Consul Paterson 
on the Trade, Navigation, Industries, &c. of Iceland for the Year 1882,’ p 2141.
225 Table A.EXP/ALL-5. This percentage is, moreover, probably too high because in this group 
were subsumed all unidentified exports from Iceland 1898-1913 (see introductory text in 
Appendix A).
226 Table A.EXP/ALL-5.
C h a p t e r  I V  - 1 8 0
figures imply a certain decline in the export trade with Britain, something which is 
interesting because trade with that country was very much favoured by Icelanders and 
Britain was important, both for exports and imports. That turns the focus to the 
commodity composition of the trade.
In the 1870s, the single largest commodity exported to the ‘UK and others’ was 
saltfish and it dominated the exports thereto (Fig. IV.33). Then, from 1882 until 1894, 
exports of two items increased greatly, namely live sheep and saltfish, and we have 
discussed their causes in this chapter. Herring exports increased too but they were 
almost certainly exports to the unspecified countries in the group.227 Hence, Britain was 
not new as a saltfish market in 1886, when the extraordinary circumstances in the 
saltfish trade pertaining to Iceland and Spain made Britain still more important. In fact, 
the swift and absolute turn around in the export route from Spain to Britain would 
hardly have been possible if there had not had been well-established commercial relations 
with Britain.
Exports of live sheep and saltfish to Britain dwindled after 1894 as we have 
already discussed in the chapter. In the circumstances, some contraction in the overall 
export quantities was inevitable. Britain itself closed down the live sheep trade, and the 
saltfish was bound to revert to some extent to former pattern, i.e., with more direct 
exports of saltfish to Spain. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Britain generally kept its 
share in the saltfish trade compared to the pre-1886 period.228 The greater exports of 
animal oils and fats from 1894 onwards, however, did little to increase Britain’s share in 
the total exports by value because their prices had fallen by then compared to the pre- 
1880s 229 Presumably, this applied mainly whale oil, for which Britain and Norway were
227 D. Thomsen, ‘Sala a islenzkri voru,’ pp 236-7.
228 Table A.EXP/ALL-7.
229 Table A.EXP/ALL-9.
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the main markets. Also, after the processing of whale meat and whale bones into meal 
started, it was mostly exported to Britain and Norway.230 But prices of meal were 
relatively low so this product did not either enlarge markedly Britain’s share in the 
export values.231 Our dataset for Britain reflects these meal exports to some extent at 
least, but it should not be taken as representative of the quantities or the years because 
information about these goods and others are not as reliable as the datasets for the other 
countries.
Before concluding our discussion about exports to Britain there is one issue that 
is worth commenting. Why Britain continued to receive saltfish after 1900, as before, 
seems at first glance an odd question but this becomes an interesting one when one 
notices that the prices it obtained in Britain were lower than in Denmark at the time (Fig. 
IV.24). Moreover, why was there in Britain a larger gap between the import and export 
prices of saltfish or, more precisely, ‘cured fish,’ than in Denmark or Norway? I have no 
answers to the first question and can only speculate about the second. One would think 
that producers would sell where they received the highest price, other things even. This 
suggests that there was some advantage selling to Britain, an advantage that was not 
present when selling to Denmark in spite of higher nominal prices, and this can possibly 
be lower prices on imports or better imports. A complementary explanation is that this 
was partly caused by business relations of the exporters, both to produers in Iceland and 
buyers abroad.
The unspecified group of ‘Other countries’ certainly had a relatively little share 
in Iceland’s exports even in 1913 (Fig. IV.28), but exports thereto show two shifts that 
require explanation. The export quantities were rising fast from 1898 onwards but the
230 Trausti Einarsson, Hvalveidar vid Island, pp 63, 64-5. Tables A.EXP/ALL-2 and 
A.EXP/ALL-3.
231 Table A.EXP/ALL-9.
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year 1906 was very much out of trend, because the exports were negligible (Fig. IV.34) 
and this was caused by the practical disappearance of saltfish from past exports 
thereto.232 Investigation of the trade datas implies that the main reason for this is that 
total exports of saltfish (fish catches) dropped in 1906 compared to the last sample year, 
1902 (Fig. IV.23). This suggests that exports of saltfish to this category of countries 
were a residual and that the other countries were in a better position to buy saltfish.
The other shift in exports to ‘Other countries’ is that the overall exports soared 
after 1906 and were on a much higher level in 1910-13 than before (Fig. IV.34). This 
was mainly caused by greater exports of fish products, more precisely exports of 
herring.233 The reason for this is obscure to me but it is possible that this rise in herring 
exports to ‘Other countries’ was partly at the expense of Norway’s taking of herring 
from Iceland. Note that although exports of herring fluctuated in 1906-13, they were 
much greater in these years than before (Fig. IV.25). Norway dominated in these exports 
in 1906 but it appears that was subsequently checked by ‘Other countries’ rising share in 
these exports. But it is also possible that the larger share of this category is a statistical 
error. The trade returns show that the herring went to Sweden in 1910 and 1913 but it is 
possible that exports to Sweden were in fact grouped with exports to Norway in the 
returns before this time (Sweden is not specified individually until 1909).234 Hence, 
‘Other countries’ or, more precisely, Sweden may have become a signficant buyer before 
1910, and almost certainly some of Norway’s imports of herring from Iceland were re-
232 Table A.EXP/OTH-2.
233 Table A.EXP/OTH-2.
234 See Icelandic trade returns for the relevant years. Note also that imports from Sweden were 
not distinguished from imports from Norway and all imports from these countries assigned to 
Norway (Icel., Min. of Icel., Landshagsskyrslur fyrir Island 1905: Verzlimarskyrslur 1904, p 
9).
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Chapter V 
Imports of Iceland, 1870-1913
V.1. Outlines of Iceland’s Imports
V.1.1. Quantities, Values, and Growth Rates: Levels, Shifts, 
and their Causes
Iceland experienced the same growth in imports (Fig. V .l) that took place in the export 
trade of the country and, for that matter, in world trade during the research period. By 
value, the increase in Iceland’s imports was more than fourfold from the first year, 1870, 
to the last, 1913. In absolute figures, the imports were worth 3.3 million Danish kroner 
in the initial year and around about 13.9 million kroner in the last year, thus rising 4.3 
times over (Table V .l). From 1870 to 1913 total import values grew by 3.4% per 
annum, and comparing the average of 1870-74 and 1910-13, the annual growth was 
only slightly less, 2.7% per annum.
Looking at the physical side, the quantity of imports increased by more than 
eleven fold —  from more than 16,000 tonnes in 1870 to over 185,000 tonnes in 1913 
(Table V .l). Even though the quantity figures represent only the aggregate weight of 
numerous and diverse goods, they are a witness in their own way to the trade vitality and 
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carrying on the import trade. It is very obvious that the scale of import quantities in the 
three decades of the 1870s to the 1890s was on a different level from that of the 1900s 
and 1910s (Fig. V.2). This in turn illustrates the increased vitality revolving around 
imports and the greatly increased need of, for example, harbours, transport equipment, 
warehouse storage, work people, etc. which occurred from about 1898 onwards
Table V .l. Imports of Iceland, 1870 to 1913: Values, Quantities, and Growth Rates 
From 1870 to 1913
1870 1913 Times over Growth per annum
Absolute figures:
Quantity (Tonnes) 16 219 185 325 11.4 5.8%
Value (Thous. kr.) 3 254 13 545 4.3 3.4%
Per capita:
Quantity (Tonnes) 0.2 2.1 8.9 5.2%
Value (kr.) 46 160 3.4 2.9%
From 1870-74 to 1910-13
1870-74 1910-13 Times over Growth per annum
Absolute figures:
Quantity (Tonnes) 16 954 165 826 9.8 5.4%
Value (Thous. kr.) 3 678 11 801 3.2 2.7%
Per capita:
Quantity (Tonnes) 0.2 1.9 7.9 4.9%
Value (kr.) 52 125 2.6 2.3%
Sources: Tables A.IMP/ALL-1 and A.IMP/ALL-5.
To put the growth in the imports into a more meaningful context we need to look 
at the size of the population of the country. As already noted in Chapter IV, the 
population grew very slowly until the 1890s, after which the rate increased greatly. 
However, the annual growth in import values per capita from 1870 to 1913 was only 
marginally reduced (from 3.4% to 2.9%) as Table V.l shows. Looking at how many 
times import values per capita had risen by 1913 compared to 1870, the outcome is 
similar (3.4 times over instead of 4.3 as noted above). Hence, even though the population 
growth after 1898 was substantial (Fig. V .l) it was insignificant for the overall import 
growth. This is not simply a case of more people consuming more imports, but of an
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economy performing so well that it is capable of sustaining higher levels of imports per 
head. The growth in the imports, whether measured by quantity or value (cf. Fig. V.l 
and V.2), occurred mainly after 1898. The period 1870 to 1913, therefore, clearly falls 
into two around 1900, just as in the case of Iceland’s exports (Chapter IV).
Dramatic as this growth was it was not without interruptions. The four year 
intervals that are used to measure trade are of course much too long to identify trade 
cycles precisely, but because of their periodicity, they cannot help reflecting major or 
sustained downswings, as well as upswings. The period began well for the Iceland 
economy in that for ca twelve years, 1870-82, imports by quantity grew, and by 1882, 
the value of imports was 56% higher than in 1870.1 On top of this, Icelanders benefited 
after 1874 from falling prices on many commodities.2 Although average value per tonne 
is a crude measure, it has some meaning in that there were no significant changes in the 
structure of imports in 1882 compared to 1878 (see Fig. V.2). The average price per 
tonne was ca 8% lower in 1882 than 1878.3 The rising imports by value clearly point to 
a certain prosperity or rising purchasing power, and overall the years 1870-82 appear to 
be a consecutive era of increasing standards of living. This was in spite of several cold 
years and instances of occasional catastrophes, such as an eruption in 1874 that 
destroyed farm land in the eastern part of the country and drove many people off.4
The 1880s on the other hand have often been called the hardship decade in 
Icelandic historiography — because all sorts of calamities struck the population. 
Measles, increased mortality, very cold years that spoiled the haymaking, and 
consequent falling livestock numbers, reduced the living standards of people
1 Tables A.IMP/ALL-1 and A.IMP/ALL-5.
2 Table A.IMP/ALL-10.
3 Tables A.IMP/ALL-1 and A.IMP/ALL-5.
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considerably.5 Emigration to America reached new peaks,6 and this was topped off by a 
grave situation in the fisheries’ sector, which was discussed in Chapter IV. All this 
should have effected imports — and indeed by quantity, they fell by 15% in 1886 
compared to 1882. The fall in the value of imports, however, was much larger (38%) 
because there was a trough in many European price levels around 1886. Consequently, 
average value of imports per tonne in 1886 was 38% lower than in 18827 while the 
imports structure was generally similar in both years (Fig. V.2). Therefore, as it 
happens, contracting prices in Europe eased the situation in Iceland at this critical point 
of time, and the standard of living was not as adversely affected as import values 
suggest. I f  we may take imports as one legitimate measure of this hardship decade (the 
1880s), then the fall in the quantities rather than values better reflects the worsening 
living conditions.
To what extent the fall in prices of saltfish, the main export staple, from 1882 to 
1886 explain the reduction in Iceland’s import capacity? As noted in Chapter IV, prices 
of saltfish were 36% lower-in 1886 compared to 1882. Thus, we can compute how much 
more imports saltfish could have bought if its price in 1886 had been the same as in 
1882. Total imports by value in 1886 were about 1,929 thousand kroner less than in 
1882, but a 36% higher price for saltfish would only have provided ca 567 thousand 
kroner.8 Hence, higher priced saltfish would only have covered about 30% of the 
reduction in import value. But we must note that the reduction in quantities was much 
less or 15%, and we can use average value o f total imports per tonne as a crude measure
4 Gubmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, p 899. Bragi GuQmundsson 
and Gunnar Karlsson, Uppruni nutimans, 2nd ed., pp 51-2, 57-8.
5 Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, pp 899, 902,909.
6 Junius H. Kristinsson, Vesturfaraskra 1870-1914, p xviii (Fig. 6).
7 Tables A.IMP/ALL-1 and A.IMP/ALL-5.
8 Tables A.IMP/ALL-5 and A.EXP/ALL-7.
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of how much was missing to reach the 1882-level in import quantities. Then it emerges 
that the value lost because of the fall in prices of saltfish exceeded the amount that was 
lacking to reach the 1882-level in imports.9 This shows that although lower saltfish 
prices had very much impacts on Iceland’s purchasing power in 1886 we must remember 
that prices of many other exports also fell (Chapter IV), and we must allow for lesser 
production for exportation simply on grounds of the hardships of these years.
Imports rose again after the recession in the mid 1880s, but import values in 
1890 and 1894 show that they had merely resumed to the 1874-78 level (Fig. V.l). 
Although imports by value continued to increase thereafter, they were still smaller in 
1898 than in the record year 1882. On the other hand, imports by quantity were on the 
rise (Fig. V.2) and already in 1890, they practically equalled those of 1882. Hence, on 
the whole Icelanders had more import quantities in 1886-98 for less money than in any 
of the years during 1870-78 (cf. Fig. V.l and V.2). Anyway, these years have gone 
down in Icelandic history books as relatively good ones. Weather was milder than in 
either the 1880s or in the 1900s, livestock rapidly growing, emigration less than in the 
1880s, and there was a rise in the rate of natural increase of population.10
Around 1900, imports to Iceland evidently entered a new phase. The distinct, yet 
relatively slow, upward trend in imports by quantity from 1886 onwards gave way to a 
trend which soared upwards after 1898 and remained unabated until 1913 (Fig. V.2). 
Imports by value show this growth also but in a more uneven way (Fig. V .l) for several 
reasons. Price fluctuations presumably caused some of this, and changes in composition
9 With an average value of 131 kroner per imported tonne in 1886, the reduction in quantities 
compared to 1882 (4,104.8 tonnes) equalled to about 538,000 kroner (Tables A.IMP/ALL-5 
and A.EXP/ALL-7). The fall in the value of saltfish (567,000 kroner) clearly well exceeded 
this.
10 Junius H. Kristinsson, Vestwfaraskra 1870-1914, p xviii. Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus 
S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, pp 899, 902,909.
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of imports possibly too. Also, the portion of ‘Miscellaneous Transactions & 
Commodities, not elsewhere specified’ in SITC group 9 (most of it in fact unidentified 
imports) is especially large in 1906-13 as the value graph shows; for logical reasons this 
does not show in the quantity graph. Hence, the growth in the imports was in fact 
slightly more than the quantity graph indicates.
Given the relatively even growth in import quantities after 1898 and similar 
overall distribution of imports across SITC groups, price movements are particularly 
evident. Between 1898 and 1902, prices seem to have risen only modestly, but then very 
fast between 1902 and 1906. By 1910, there had occurred a clear drop in prices, but 
they were up again in 1913. Focusing on extreme levels, prices seem to have been very 
high in 1906 while they were unusually low in 1910. This interpretation gets support 
from the fact that the year of 1906 was a peak year in the international economy in terms 
of prices.11 Then, a short recession set in. In 1910, many European economies 
contracted compared to 1906, and price levels had fallen to a lower level.12 In Denmark 
— a very important country in the import trade of Iceland — the years 1907-08 saw 
banks and saving funds going bankrupt because of a recession in the construction 
sector.13 The consequence of this was also felt in businesses in Iceland.14 This 
recession between 1906 and 1910 was far from being as severe for imports as the one in 
the mid 1880s according to the import values, which diminished ‘only’ by 3% per annum 
1906-10 compared to 11% per annum in 1882-86.15 In short, with the evidence 
presented here, it is safe to conclude that the years from about 1900 until 1913 were
11 James Foreman-Peck, A History o f the World Economy, 2nd ed., p 156 (Fig.). Note that 
Germany and India have erroneously been crossed in the legend to the graph.
12 James Foreman-Peck, A History o f the World Economy, 2nd ed., p 156 (Fig.). Note that 
Germany and India have erroneously been crossed in the legend to the graph.
13 T. P. Andersen, Produktion ogsamfund: Danmarks ogNordens historie, p 201.
14 Hannes Jonsson, Hid guddomlega sjonarspil, pp 74, 80.
C h a p t e r  V  -1 9 0
marked by a huge and an unprecedented expansion in Iceland’s imports, while the 
previous three decades were characterised by a relatively slow but even growth in 
imports. Although there was a clear fall in imports in the mid 1880s —  15% by quantity 
compared to 1882 — it was relatively short-lived.
V.1.2. The Commodity Structure in General
Imports into Iceland in the period were by every measure relatively simple, and consisted 
overwhelmingly of basic goods (Fig. V.3). By far the largest group by the SITC system 
in 1870 was foodstuffs, amounting to nearly half of the imports by quantity (47%). The 
second largest group was mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials with 19% of the 
imports, and the third largest group chemicals (mainly salt) with 18%. Thereafter came 
crude materials (inedible) with 10%, and beverages and tobacco with only 4% of the 
imports’ quantities.16 Looking at the groups by value (Fig. V.4), foodstuffs were even 
more significant and occupied 63% of the imports’ value in 1870. The second largest 
group was beverages and tobacco with 14%, and next came all kinds of manufactures 
with 10%.17 These two last groups ranked much higher in the imports by value than by 
quantity, something that reflects their relatively high value in comparison with, for 
example, many foodstuffs. Conversely, mineral fuels (mainly coal) have a negligible 
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salt were particularly cheap in international markets.18 Also, it underlines that 
manufactures were very expensive in relation to weight.
Over time the composition of imports by quantity changed considerably. 
However, this was not so much a result of growth of the small groups (SITC 6-8) but 
rather of changes in the relative size of the larger commodity groups (Fig. V.3 and V.4). 
The most spectacular shifts were in foodstuffs, which by quantity fell below 10% of the 
total in 1913 (being 47% in 1870), and in mineral fuels that increased to ca 50% of total 
import quantities (from 19% before). Also, beverages and tobacco shrank from 4% 
below 1%.19 Other groups remained fairly constant proportionally. By value the shift 
over time looked somewhat different (cf. Fig. V.4). Foodstuffs’ imports were certainly 
down by 1913 but ‘only’ by half (from 63 to ca 30%), and, hence, they were still the 
single largest commodity group. The beverages and tobacco group had diminished 
considerably (from 14 to 2%) while imports of manufactures had almost tripled in value 
(from ca 10 to 30%).20 Coal and other mineral fuels now accounted for 19% of the 
imports’ value instead of 3% in 1870; after all, the quantities had grown 35 times over.21 
It is noteworthy that in spite of the rapid growth of manufactures, imports were still 
predominantly of basic commodities.
When studying these changes of the commodity groups in the imports’ structure, 
it is necessary not to forget that the quantities of just about every group increased over 
time (cf. Fig. V.2). For example, even though the relative share of foodstuffs fell so 
rapidly their quantities doubled. It is also important to keep the population size in mind. 
As already remarked, it grew quite fast from 1890 onwards and was 24% larger in 1913
18 Tables A.IMP/ALL-9 and A.IMP/ALL-10.
19 Table A.IMP/ALL-1.
20 Table A.IMP/ALL-5.
21 Tables A.IMP/ALL-3 and A.IMP/ALL-5.
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than in 1890, but the foodstuffs’ quantities grew by 79% at the same time.22 Therefore, 
the consumption of the shrinking as well as the stationary commodity groups, both in 
terms of relative shares in imports’ quantities, could be increasing per capita all the 
same.
The account above shows that the consumption pattern as represented in imports 
into Iceland changed significantly over time, both as regards the relative shares of 
primary products versus manufactures and also within primary products. Focusing on 
changes within primary products first, the major change in terms of quantity was the 
rising consumption of the group ‘Mineral fuels, Lubricants and Related Materials’ (Fig. 
V.2 and V.3), which consisted primarily of coal and, to much less extent, mineral oils.23 
This overshadowed all other quantitative consumption changes — as we can see, for 
example, in the fact that imports of foodstuffs per capita were far larger in 1913 than in 
1870 although relatively the quantities of foodstuffs consumed in 1913 were less (cf. 
Fig. V.3). The same goes for the commodity group ‘Crude Materials’ (predominantly 
wood) and further still for ‘Chemicals’ (almost exclusively salt).24 By value, however, 
Iceland’s consumption in imported primary products did not change as radically (Fig. 
V.4) for mineral fuels were relatively cheap 25 But expenditure on mineral fuels rose 
nevertheless relative to all expenditure on primary products.
Substantial as was the change of consumption within primary products, the rise 
in imports of all kinds of manufactures relative to imports of primary products was more 
remarkable. Admittedly, missing imports, unidentified imports (the SITC group 
‘Miscellaneous Transactions & Commodities, not elsewhere specified’), and lack of
22 Table A.IMP/ALL-1.
23 Table A.IMP/ALL-3.
24 Tables A.IMP/ALL-1 and A.IMP/ALL-3.
25 Tables A.IMP/ALL-5 and A.IMP/ALL-9.
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either quantity or value data for manufactures skews comparisons of import levels of 
manufactures over time. However, the trend is nonetheless clear from the available data 
because imports of all kinds of manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment, 
and manufactured articles (SITC groups 6-8) — whether measured by quantity or value 
— rose fast in 1870 to 1913 (Fig. V.3 and V.4). Measuring this growth in per capita 
terms, imports of manufactures probably rose some four times over by value and 
perhaps 21 times over by quantity. The growth of imports of manufactures was also 
significant when we measure their share relative to imports of primary products. While 
the relative portion of manufactures to primary products by quantity roughly doubled 
over time (from 2.5 to 4.7%), by value it tripled over time (from 10.4 to 29.9%).26 
Although we must remember that the figures for imports of manufactures in the datasets 
are far from definitive, they all support the view that the domestic consumption of 
manufactures was transformed during the period.
26 Tables A.IMP/ALL-1 and A.IMP/ALL-5. — All these imports are underreported in the 
current datasets (see introductory text in Appendix A) but mostly those in SITC groups 7 and 
8 .
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V.2. Imports of Iceland and their Context in the 
Economy
V.2.1. Primary Commodities
V.2.1.1. Foodstuffs (Cereals, Sugar, Potatoes, Coffee, etc.)
Clearly, there were substantial changes in Iceland’s consumption as witnessed by 
imports, however we measure them. When considering the exact commodities in each 
commodity group, so as to detect changes in consumption, whether by domestic or by 
producing sectors of the economy, it is natural to start with the basic wants of human 
beings, i.e., food and edible liquids (SITC groups 0 and 1). Here we see that cereals 
constituted by far the largest part of imported foodstuffs (Fig. V.5). To put cereal 
imports into perspective we should note that cereals were wholly imported, because com 
growing had become extinct in Iceland in the 16th century. In spite of some attempts in 
later centuries, regular com growing was not started again until the 1900s — and then
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on a very small scale.27 Around 1870, cereals were not a very important item in people’s 
diet but this changed as time passed, so that around 1910 they were a significantly larger 
part of the diet. The graph for cereal imports shows that their consumption per capita 
increased only slowly and with some fluctuations until about 1900. Following a 
temporary drop in cereal imports in 1898, they rose fast until they halted around 1906 at 
which level the consumption remained stable until 1913. By then, cereals’ consumption 
per capita had accelerated by ca 40% since 1870. But this was not the only change in 
cereal imports, for there was also a transition from unmilled cereals to milled ones (Fig. 
V.6), which were dearer.28 This started in the 1880s, and the trend was at work right 
through until 1913, when the relative share of unmilled cereals was small in comparison 
with that of milled cereals.
Let us look at possible explanations for these changes in cereals’ consumption, 
both in demand and in supply. World supply of cereals in the period increased in most 
cases and prices consequently fell although they rose again from the late 1890s 
onwards.29 Looking at average prices of cereals imported to Iceland, milled and 
unmilled, they followed this pattern too (Fig. V.7). Around 1870, the difference in prices 
between milled and unmilled was considerable, but it decreased and in the 1880s there 
was hardly any. Evidently, this was conducive to a rising consumption of milled cereals 
instead of unmilled, because it simply was economical. In the 1890s onwards, when 
prices of milled cereals were rising again, their imports, nevertheless, continued to 
increase relatively to unmilled cereals. That particular trend is clearly a sign of rising 
incomes at the time.
27 Steindor Steindorsson, ‘Akuryrkja a Islandi,’ pp 39, 43. Sigurdur Sigurdsson, 
Bunadarhagir, pp 260-66. See also Steindor Steindorsson, ‘Akuryrkjutilraunir a 17. og 18. 
6ld’.
28 Table A.IMP/ALL-10.
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Considering the demand side or, more precisely, who used cereals, it must be 
pointed out that bakeries were run in Iceland. Nevertheless, they were only two in the 
early 1870 and probably between ten and fifteen in number around 1913.30 Even though 
the quantity of their output may have increased more rapidly than their number implies, 
their consumption of cereals was probably marginal compared to consumption of homes 
or households. This is because people used cereals mainly for making porridge-like food 
— although bread baking in homes also grew, no doubt partly spurred on by larger 
imports of milled cereals.31 Besides, the products of the bakeries were mainly, albeit not 
wholly, consumed in villages and by seamen on decked vessels (ship biscuit).32 So, this 
rules more or less out the possible influences of bakeries on cereal imports and suggests 
that the demand for cereals came mainly from homes in the domestic sector.
There were several other important items of foodstuffs, albeit not as voluminous 
as cereals (Fig. V.8). The largest of these was sugar and various sugar preparations, 
imports of which increased greatly. In contrast with cereals, there were rapidly growing 
imports of sugar from as early as 1882 onwards, and with no fall in the consumption in 
1898, as in the case of cereals. Prices of sugar and sugar preparations were constantly 
going down in the 1880s (Fig. V.9), and this no doubt spurred imports. But in line with 
cereal imports, sugar imports did not diminish after the prices began to rise, which 
happened in the late 1900s. That also implies generally higher incomes after 1900 
compared to earlier decades.
Another significant item among plant foodstuffs was vegetables, which consisted 
mainly of potatoes (Fig. V.8). Whereas sugar could not be grown in Iceland, for obvious
30 [GuSbrandur Jonsson], Aldarminning braudgerdaridnar a tslandi, pp 89,146-86.
31 Jonas Jonasson, tslenzkir pjddhcettir (3rd ed.), pp 52-4, cf. pp 34-6. Gudmundur 
Forsteinsson, ‘Braudgerd,’ pp 120-25. Steindor Steindorsson, Hladir i Horgardal, pp 56, 57- 
9, 61, 63.
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environmental reasons, potatoes could and they were indeed grown in increasing 
quantities in our period.33 This was, however, a recent development, commencing around 
1870. Potato cultivation was first experimented with in late 18th century in Iceland, and 
in the early 19th century it had spread to some parts of the country, but it does not seem 
to have been very thrifty and some people were only starting growing potatoes in the mid 
19th century.34 The first reasonably reliable sources about potato crops, records of 
agricultural yield, date from the 1890s when the annual consumption was about 20 kg 
per capita.35 This was probably about double the figure of 1870.36 Clearly, to 
supplement domestic harvest, potatoes were also imported and their quantities increased 
over time (Fig. V.8). It is interesting to note that there was a sharp rise in potato imports 
by quantity about 1880, but the price of potatoes seem to have contributed little to this, 
because although there was a reduction in their prices, it was relatively small (Fig. 
V.10). Apart from that, the quantities of imports of potatoes were obviously stimulated 
by their import prices, which were generally falling until the late 1900s. Moreover, 
imports would have been even greater had merchants not held them in check, in case 
their imported potatoes were not sold before domestic crops were marketed. This was the 
case in Reykjavik until the 1900s and possibly elsewhere too. This situation no doubt 
encouraged more cultivation, so that potatoes grown in the neighbourhood of Reykjavik
32 [Gudbrandur Jdnsson], Aldarminning braudgerdaridnar a Islandi, pp 84-5. J6nas Jonasson, 
tslenzkir pjodhcettir (3rd ed.), p 36 fh.
33 Gudmundur Jdnsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, p 267.
34 Bunadarfelag Islands, vol. II by Sigurdur Sigurdsson, pp 241-2. See also descriptions of 
counties and parishes (syslu- og soknalysingar) in Iceland around the middle of the 19th 
century, made at the initiation of the Icelandic Literature Society {Hid islenska 
bokmenntafelag). Some of them have been edited and published.
35 These records in fact start in the late 1880s but the quantities of potatoes are suspiciously 
low. See Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, p 267, for potato 
yields. The annual average yield in the 1890s is estimated by me to be about 1,450 tonnes.
36 Around 1870, the acreage of vegetable plots, according to Gudmundur Jonsson’s and 
Magnus S. Magnusson’s calculations, was about half the size of them in the 1890s, when they
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were sold to Reykjavik.37 Domestic cultivation of potatoes fluctuated from one year to 
another, but there was an upward trend in output in the 1890s and the 1900s.38 Hence, 
although imports of potatoes in our sample years happened to represent a rising portion 
of the potato supply in Iceland (according to records of domestic growing and our 
import figures) that is not an entirely truthful portrayal of the general situation.39 
Towards the end of our period, in 1910 and 1913 imports of potatoes by quantity had 
fallen, and this was due to a sharp rise in their prices. Moreover, 1910 saw a good 
domestic harvest.
V.2.1.2. Beverages and Tobacco
Amidst a growing consumption of most foodstuffs and edible liquids, imports of 
alcoholic drinks showed np clear trend, neither upwards nor downwards, and they were 
very irregular over time (Fig. V .l 1). It was only around 1910 that a clear trend emerged, 
namely when imports of wine and ale almost vanished. The irregularity of these imports 
is rather surprising, because there was no domestic production of alcoholic spirits to 
compete with imports, and prices of imported wines and ale were falling from the late 
1880s onwards (Fig. V .l2). Smuggling is not a plausible cause of the fluctuations 
because my data is based on foreign trade returns, not Icelandic. Hence, for these widely 
fluctuating imports I have no explanation. On the other hand, the cause for their
were roughly about 200 hectares on average per annum. See Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus 
S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, pp 264 (Table 4.6), 266.
37 Forunn Valdimarsdottir, Sveitin vid Sundin, p 265.
38 Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, p 267.
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eventual decline is clear, and it was of coercive nature. The temperance movement 
gained foothold in Iceland in the early 1880s and agitated against consumption of 
alcoholic drinks. After 1900, it won public opinion on its side and managed to influence 
the Icelandic parliament to pass a law in 1909 banning imports of all wines and spirits; 
this came into force in 1912.40 These are the explanations for the declining relative share 
of beverages (and tobacco) in imports after 1906. It should, however, be noted that the 
bare quantity figures are a crude measure of the actual consumption of alcohol, because 
there were many types of such drinks, ranging from light beer to mixed spirits, although 
unmixed distilled drinks (gin-like) were most favoured.41
Tobacco was not outlawed like wines and spirits but its import quantities were 
remarkably stable during the whole period (Fig. V .ll). Presumably, this is because, in 
contrast to beverages and most other goods, prices of tobacco went up in the long-term, 
although its prices stayed markedly steady in the 1880s and 1890s (Fig. V .l2). Thus, it 
is difficult to identify any definite trend during the period in people’s spending on 
tobacco per capita or their quantity consumption per capita.
39 The relative share of imported potatoes rose from about 10% in 1894 to 30% in 1906. See 
Table A.IMP/ALL-3 and Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, p 
267.
40 See Storstuka Islands, I.O.G.T. Tuttugu ogfimm ara minningarrit godtemplara a Islandi. 
Einar Laxness, Islandssaga a-k (2nd ed.), p 44. Hannes Jonsson, Hid guddomlega sjonarspil, 
p 94.
41 Danish trade returns (exports).
C h a p t e r  V  -2 0 0
V.2.1.3. Crude Materials (Wood)
Imports of crude materials and raw materials consisted almost entirely of wood and, to a 
much lesser extent, cork, since Iceland had no natural supplies of these commodities.42 
However, because of its geographical location and currents in the sea, some places 
around the coast were endowed with drift timber, which was both used by its owners and 
sold to others. This was a major asset for those who owned such coast land 43 There 
were often complaints about shortage of wood, and merchants were criticised for being 
unwilling to import enough wood. Norwegian merchants, who began sailing to Iceland 
with timber around the mid 19th century onwards, eased the situation slightly, but 
probably not markedly before the 1870s (Fig. V .l3). It is very difficult to estimate the 
quantity of drift timber in relation to imported wood, and in spite of the considerable 
amount of wood acquired in that way, there was presumably always an ample demand 
for imported wood — as indeed its imports over time suggest.
Wood was among those goods whose imports rose sharply over time (Fig. V .l3) 
and although falling prices probably spurred that trend very much in 1870-82 (Fig. 
V .l4), it is noticeable that vigorous imports continued from 1890 onwards, when prices 
were stationary. The general rise in wood imports over time confirms a constant and 
heavy demand for this commodity, irrespective of prices, and it certainly was a very 
flexible material for construction of houses and furniture. Wood imports seem to have 
accelerated in the mid 1900s and the reasons are, in the end, the larger demand of 
individuals and the producing sector. But a certain change in the processing or utilisation 
of imported wood may also have affected it. Because of the relatively tiny secondary 
sector in the Iceland economy from the 1870s to about 1900, most crude materials such
42 Tables A.IMP/ALL-2 and A.IMP/ALL-3.
43 Gunnar M. Magnuss, Byrdingur, pp 15-16.
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as wood were bought directly and consumed primarily by the common people. 
Manufacturing industries (secondary sector activities) were few and either in the form of 
travelling or stationary artisans (some of them with apprentices). Hence, wood was until 
approximately 1900 bought mainly by individuals who hired a carpenter or a joiner to 
process it and build from it or repair with it whatever it was meant for.44 Only shortly 
after 1900 were the first proper timber-using workshops formed in Iceland, usually 
specialising in shipbuilding, carpentry and joinery, or furniture-making 45 Their activity 
probably gave wood imports the extra spurt that seems to have taken place in the mid 
1900s onwards.
In relation to the demand for wood, it is interesting to quote figures for the 
different types of residential buildings in Iceland in 1910. Then just over half of all 
houses were made of turf, the traditional building material in Iceland, 44% were made of 
timber, and only 4% of concrete and stone.46 We lack accessible information or figures 
from earlier times for comparison, but it is safe to conclude that the nearly all the timber 
houses had been built in the past 40 years or so. Furthermore, the majority of the timber 
houses (63%) were located in the urban areas,47 which had generally been growing 
substantially in our period. Given the relative expansion in those areas, compared to the 
countryside, the almost unabated demand for wood is more understandable.
44 See, for example, Gunnar M. Magnuss, Byrdingur, pp 21-38. Also biographies of 
carpenters, such as Kristmundur Bjamason, Porsteirm a Skipaloni I—II; Tryggvi Gunnarsson, 
vol. I by borkell Johannesson; Gunnar M. Magnuss, Dagar Magnusar a Grund; and Finnur O. 
Thorlacius, Smidur i forum  londum.
45 Gunnar M. Magnuss, Byrdingur, pp 35—8. Th. Krabbe, Islands og dets tekniske Udvikling, 
pp 327-8. Brynleifur Tobiasson, Hver er madurinn, vol. I, p 344.
46 Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, p 373.
47 Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, p 373.
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V.2.1.4. Mineral Fuels (Coal, Petroleum Products)
As already remarked, there was a colossal growth over time in imports of mineral fuels, 
which were almost entirely of coal. Such minerals were imported right from the start of 
the period, in 1870, and they competed with domestic fuel materials. In the countryside, 
dried sheep dung (,saudatad) was used almost exclusively for cooking and heating 
although dried peat (mor) was also used if  manure was scarce because it was a better 
fuel. Other materials, such as small wood, fish bones and wastes from fisheries, were 
also used where they were available. Until the end of the period, these were the most 
common fuels outside the villages, and uses of coal were small. On the other hand, in the 
hamlets, imported coal competed with domestic fuels already in the 1870s, and as time 
passed, coal became increasingly common in the hamlets and in Reykjavik, especially 
among the better to do. For instance, in these places ovens and radiators consuming coal 
(or peat) became more common over time.48 There too, use of coal as an input in 
production was also increasing. Coal was consumed in blacksmithies, in the Norwegian 
whaling stations, and by the steams trawlers after their appearance in 1905.49
Imports of coal, both by quantity and value, appear to have fallen by 40 to 50% 
in the 1870s, something which is slightly surprising given the concurrent general 
upwards trend in imports to Iceland.50 This remains something of a puzzle, especially
48 borunn Valdimarsdottir, Sveitin vid Simdin, pp 212-16. Gudmundur borsteinsson, 
‘Saudatad,’ pp 72-3. Gudmundur borsteinsson, ‘Motekja,’ pp 74-7. Gudmundur borsteinsson, 
‘Hristekja,’ pp 78-81. Gudmundur borsteinsson, ‘Skogarhogg,’ pp 82, 84. Steindor 
Steindorsson, Hladir i Horgardal, pp 86-8. Gudmundur Eggerz, Minningabok, pp 23,37.
49 On blacksmithies, see Gunnar M. Magnuss, Jdmslda, and Sumarlidi R  Isleifsson, Eldur I 
afli. On the Norwegian whaling stations, see Trausti Einarsson, Hvalveidar vid Island (pp 46 
and 82 on mechanisation). On steam trawlers, see Heimir borleifsson, Saga islenzkrar 
togarautgerdar.
50 Tables A.IMP/ALL-3 and A.IMP/ALL-7.
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because coal prices were going down at the same time (Fig. V.16). Apart from that 
ambiguous trend, imports of coal resembled imports of wood because there was a 
continuous growth in coal imports from 1886 onwards and a colossal one from about 
1900 onwards (Fig. V.15).51 A practically constant decline in coal prices no doubt 
fuelled coal imports (Fig. V.16), but they would not have taken place unless that was 
significant demand for coal anyway. And the huge growth indicates that the driving force 
behind the imports was not primarily ever lower prices, for they were indeed decelerating 
only slowly in the 1890s and 1900s. The prime force was a rapidly rising demand for 
coal, the heat efficiency of which was much higher than of domestic fuels, approximately 
two or three times larger.52 Therefore, coals were absolutely necessary for many 
industries, for instance, in the whaling industry by Norwegians and in the outfitting of 
fishing trawlers.53 For home consumption, coal was perhaps not an absolute necessity, 
both in terms of heat requirements and the type of radiators used, but the greater heat 
efficiency of coal was of course an advantage over alternative, domestic fuels.54
Coal was useful for everyone, but presumably one of its most significant uses in 
terms of the producing sectors in the Iceland economy was in the outfit of steam 
trawlers, which made their entrance in the fishing industry in 1905 onwards. Their outfit 
was a wholly Icelandic enterprise and, thus, their economic linkages were bound to be 
stronger than those of, for instance, the whaling industry, which was on the margins of 
the Iceland economy. Although the novelty of the trawler needed time and practice to
51 Unlike most other imports, there was not a fall in coal imports in 1886 compared to 1882. 
The reason is no doubt whaling, which was started in Iceland in 1883 and was operated on the 
border of the economy (see Chapter IV on exports).
52 The Economist Desk Companion, 2nd ed., p 76 (table on ‘Energy contents’).
53 For coal quantities used by trawlers, their number and size, see Heimir Forleifsson, Saga 
islenzkrar togarautgerdar, pp 94—6,122, 123, 141.
54 A qualitative source on private consumption of coal in Reykjavik around 1910 is Forunn 
Valdimarsdottir, Sveitin vid Simdin, p 216.
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prove its usefulness and efficiency, trawlers shortly increased in number and by 1913, 
they were eighteen in Iceland besides three other steam vessels.55 By then, their relative 
share of demersal catches by Icelanders was about one quarter, but they took also part in 
the herring fishing where they had approximately 60% in 1913.56 Finally, the trawlers 
initiated a new branch in the fishing, namely the production of fish on ice (cf. Chapter 
IV). All in all, catches of Icelandic trawlers was a large part o f Iceland’s total fishing by 
1913, whereas it had been zero eight years earlier.
Consumption of petroleum products was very small in Iceland for decades (Fig. 
V.17) and mainly confined to the use of kerosene in small oil lamps, which gradually 
spread out in Iceland after 1870.57 The price of petroleum fell significantly over time, 
and this no doubt spurred their use (Fig. V.18), but the spread of kerosene lamps 
probably owed more to the relatively comfortable and improved means of lighting it 
offered at homes, in workshops and elsewhere. Also, in a social history perspective, it 
has been argued that the kerosene lamp in Iceland and other countries provided a way to 
increase people’s own conimand over their reading material and for writing.58 However, 
after small boat engines were put in open fishing boats (rowing boats), the demand for 
petroleum products also grew further still as their import figures indicate.59 Engines in 
fishing vessels were first experimented with in 1902-0360 and ten years later nearly 400
open fishing boats had such engines, using either kerosene or benzene. That was a
sizeable part of the small open vessels’ fleet, because rowing boats (without engines)
55 Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, p 311.
56 Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, pp 326, 331, 355. Cf. 
Heimir borleifsson, Saga islenzkrar togarautgerdar, p 107 (table).
57 Gisli Agust Gunnlaugsson, ‘Ljos, lestur og felagslegt taumhald,’ pp 58-9.
58 Gisli Agust Gunnlaugsson, ‘Ljos, lestur og felagslegt taumhald,’ pp 58-9.
59 Table A.IMP/ALL-3.
60 Ami Gislason, Gullkistan, [1st ed.], pp 292-305. Jon b. For, Ranargull, pp 115-17. Oflafur] 
T. Sveinsson and Bjami borkelsson, Leidarvisir am hirdingu og medferd a motorum, pp 54-7.
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numbered close to one thousand in 1913, so there were four open boats with engines for 
every ten rowing boats. Also, in 1912-13 there was a sharp increase in the number of 
large motor vessels for fishing.61 This mechanisation was important for Iceland’s 
fishing, for both domestic use and export, for in 1913 more than 60% of demersal 
catches by Icelanders were fished by motor vessels, mainly small ones.62
It is safe to contend that coal and petroleum played a substantial role in the 
economic history of Iceland from the 1900s onwards. The motor engines and the steam 
trawlers have been hailed in Icelandic historiography as one of the most important steps 
towards dynamising the fisheries’ sector and, ultimately, developing the economy. 
Furthermore, this technical improvement in fishing has sometimes been described as 
Iceland’s industrialisation.63 Although these claims are made with the benefit of 
hindsight, mechanisation in the fishing fleet definitely had a decisive impact in the fishing 
sector of that time. The rising relative shares of motor boats and steam trawlers in the 
demersal catches confirm this, and then there are the indirect influences on incomes and 
general standards of living.- The alternative to machines in fishing was the manpower that 
had been used until then, and the choice was not difficult for fisherman and owners of 
fishing vessels — even although mechanisation demanded capital, which had usually 
been scarce in the Iceland economy. It seems plausible at this stage to suggest that these 
changes in the technology of fishing were linked to the pattern that we have been 
observing above, namely higher income levels and, possibly, higher standards of living 
too.
61 Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, p 311. 6[lafur] T. 
Sveinsson and Bjami borkelsson, Leidarvisir ion hirdingu og medferd a motorum, p 13.
62 Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, p 326.
63 Jon b. bor, ‘Velvasding 1 islenskum atvinnuvegum,’ p 38, 40, 42. Sigfus Jonsson, 
Sjavarutvegur Islendinga, pp 21, 31, 32, 102, 263ff. Magnus S. Magnusson, ‘Efiiahags^roun a 
Islandi,’ pp 153, 157-8. Gudmundur Jonsson, ‘Formali’ to Idnbylting a Islandi, p 6.
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V.2.1.5. Chemicals (Salt)
Imports of chemicals comprised predominantly salt and, to a very small extent, vinegar. 
Salt was a commodity that was mostly used as a preservative. Although it was used for 
salting mutton in barrels for home consumption, by far the major part of salt 
consumption was for salting products for exports, i.e., cod, herring, mutton, and hides. 
Hence, there was a clear relation between imported salt quantities and these products as 
Fig. V.19 shows; hides are omitted because their export quantities were so small 
relatively.
Clearly, salt imports fall into two distinct periods —  before and after 1900 — 
just like some of the other import commodities discussed above. Imports of salt were 
constantly rising from 1870 until 1898 (excluding a drop in 1886), but it was a steady 
and slow rise, and it was generally in line with the quantities of saltfish exported. The 
imports of salt relative to exports of saltfish particularly, show a certain ratio between 
the two commodities, because salt imports appear to be roughly 70-80% of saltfish 
exports. Mutton exports were stable and huge herring exports in 1882 do not seem to 
have affected salt imports very much. Shortly after 1898, imports of salt rose 
substantially — as their import quantities in 1902 to 1913 witness —  and the link 
between these and saltfish exports was no longer so clear, because salt imports exceeded 
saltfish exports to ever greater extent from 1902 onwards. Incidentally, although 
exportation of herring required salt and it increased imports of salt somewhat, herring 
exports seem to have been quite insignificant as an influencing factor for the imports of 
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for the termination of previous ratio between salt imports and saltfish exports probably 
is that requirements for salt rose in the saltfish production. For example, saltfish sorters 
agitated against used salt (ursalt) and producers probably were not as frugal in using 
salt as before. Also, salt for producing mutton for exportation may also have increased, 
especially because complaints had been made that Icelandic mutton was often lacking 
enough salt towards the end of the 19th century.
There cannot be any doubt that salt imports from 1902 onwards were not 
contingent on production purposes to the same extent as before, its importation 
increasingly was running independently of exports of those commodities for which salt 
was used. This in turn indicates that private consumption of salt was increasing, but 
prices of salt definitely were not spurring its imports, because in 1902 onwards they 
were generally higher than in ca 1886-94 (Fig. V.20). The rising import quantities, in 
spite of slightly adversely running prices, are a clear sign of rising incomes and salt 
imports, therefore, fall into this pattern we have observed above.
V.2.1.6. Conclusion
In the survey above we have covered round about 96-98% of Iceland’s imports by 
quantity (cf. Fig. V.3) and ca 60-85% by value (cf. Fig. V.4)64 —  excluding all kinds of 
manufactures, which will be discussed later in the chapter. The basic nature of Iceland’s 
imports stands out more clearly than before, and another feature is evident by now, 
namely the lack of domestic substitutes in most cases. Only in the cases of potatoes and,
64 Tables A.IMP/ALL-1 and A.DVflVALL-5.
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presumably, wood (drift timber) did imports compete with identical domestic 
commodities. In addition, coal competed with various kinds of domestic substitutes, 
although by heat efficiency none of them matched it. Hence, Iceland was dependent on 
external sources for the remaining staple imports cereals and salt, besides all the less 
significant commodities, such as sugar and sugar preparations; coffee, tea, cocoa, and 
chocolate; alcoholic beverages and tobacco; and petroleum products. Overall then, 
Iceland was very dependent on imports of primary commodities to substitute for a lack 
of internal resources, and a lack of entrepreneurship and skill in exploiting available 
domestic production possibilities. This import dependency made exports all the more 
important in the economy — because the capacity to import hinged crucially on the 
foreign exchange earnings generated by exporting.
Primary commodities among Iceland’s imports were basically of two types. One 
was non-durable goods used in individual consumption. These were particularly 
foodstuffs, and beverages and tobacco. Remarkably, there were wide differences in the 
consumption of these consumer goods. While imports of cereals did not markedly grow 
until the turn of the century onwards, imports of other foodstuffs (sugar, coffee, etc.) 
rose substantially already in the early 1880s onwards. By contrast, imports of a similar 
type of merchandise, beverages (practically all alcoholic) and tobacco, were subject to 
irregular fluctuations with neither upwards nor downwards trend detectable. This pattern 
is at odds with imports of various foodstuffs that may be called luxuries by the standard 
of the time in Iceland, and I have no explanation for it. The other type of primary 
commodities among Iceland’s imports was intermediate commodities used by industries. 
Some of these were non-durable (for instance coals, petroleum products, and salt) while 
other were durable (especially wood). From the point of living standards, both types are 
essentially of importance, but from a macroeconomic point of view, the second is mainly
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of significance. Intermediate commodities were indeed both consumed by individuals and 
producing sectors, but their aggregate consumption is the focal point, and the trend was 
even more clear than in the case of consumer commodities, because overall there was a 
continuous growth in imports of intermediate commodities from 1870 onwards and a 
especially huge one from around 1900 onwards. Only the natural and economic 
hardships in the mid 1880s caused a drop in these imports (cf. the year of 1886), but that 
was common to the consumer commodities’ imports too. Hence, there was more 
homogeneity in imports of intermediate commodities than in imports of consumer goods.
The conclusion to draw from different rates of growth of imports by 
commodities is not simple, even when they are aggregated into consumer goods and 
intermediate goods. Within consumer commodities, purchases of ‘luxuries’ increased but 
not of staple foods like cereals, even when prices of both were declining simultaneously. 
That is understandable per se but why did imports of be verages and tobacco not increase 
also? Imports o f ‘luxury’ foods were publicly lamented by pillars of society no less than 
imports of alcoholic beverages. Did they manage to influence people to this extent? As 
for the intermediate commodities, the trend is more uniform, but then both homes and 
manufacturing sectors used these commodities, and the relative shares of each is 
impossible for me to estimate. Compared to imports of consumer goods among primary 
commodities, the expansion in imports of intermediate goods is far more impressive. 
Also, durable intermediate commodities contributed to the capital stock in Iceland, and 
non-durable ones were partly used for production purposes, thereby increasing Iceland’s 
producing capacity.
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V.2.2. Manufactures 
V.2.2.1. Manufactures in General
Evidently, the groups containing manufactured goods, machinery and transport 
equipment, and manufactured articles (SITC group 6-8) are of special interest in terms 
of the semi-dynamic gains from trade discussed earlier in the thesis. But they also convey 
interesting trends in empirical terms. First, they were not at all negligible within 
Iceland’s imports —  as their 20-30% share by value after 1900 shows. Second, apart 
from mineral fuels (mainly coal) and chemicals (mainly salt) no commodity groups grew 
by quantity or value as fast as they did. Finally, these groups consisted of goods for 
consumption both by individuals and the producing sectors, and their investigation 
should, presumably, enable us to probe further into the questions of changes in 
purchasing power of the population and expansion in the economy after 1900.
To facilitate the understanding of the types of goods in these SITC groups, a few 
words about them in terms of Iceland’s imports are needed. Group 6, ‘Manufactured 
goods,’ included a variety of goods, they were leather and leather manufactures; silk and 
woollen manufactures; wood and cork manufactures; paper, paperboard and articles 
thereof; ropes, mats, lines, and nets; fabrics from cotton, linen or hemp; cement and lime; 
manufactures from rock; glass and glass manufactures; pottery manufactures; 
unprocessed iron and steel, and manufactures of metals. Because of their diverse nature, 
they had a mixed consumption. Some of them were final goods that were purchased by 
homes and individuals, and some were semi-processed goods that needed further 
processing or to be used as intermediary commodities with other materials or for 
machines. SITC group 7, relatively a very small one in imports of Iceland, consisted of
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machinery and transport equipment, that is capital goods, such as boats and ships. SITC 
group 8, ‘Manufactured articles,’ comprised a host of final goods intended often for 
personal use and, thus, bought mainly by Icelandic homes rather than the producing 
sectors. These included radiators and stoves, lamps and furniture, beds and mattresses, 
clothes and footwear, watches and clocks, ammunition, printed matter, articles for 
entertainment and decoration, and musical instruments.
Across the imports of the different kinds of manufactures listed above, the same 
general pattern that emerged in imports of primary commodities is also evident. More 
specifically, the pattern resembled largely the import pattern of those primary 
commodities that had the largest growth. By quantity, there was an overall long-term rise 
in imports of manufactured goods, i.e., goods in SITC group 6, from 1870 onwards, 
although there clearly was an unprecedented spurt around 1900 onwards (Fig. V.2 and 
V.21). By value, however, these particular imports were rather steady until about 1900, 
after which they soared (Fig. V.l and V.22). Imports of machinery and transport 
equipment (SITC group 7) were small and irregular, so they do not tell us anything 
definite about Iceland’s consumption of them. But similar to manufactured goods, 
imports of manufactured articles (SITC group 8), which were mostly goods for personal 
use (see above), grew almost unabated, being at least forty times larger by value in 1913 
than in 1870. As of all imports, the relative shares of manufactured goods (SITC group 
6) and manufactured articles (SITC group 8) rose from 10 to ca 25% and from 1 to ca 
10% respectively between 1870 and 1913.65
Although imports of manufactured goods (SITC group 6) by value increased 
very much in absolute figures from about 1900 onwards (Fig. V.22) as compared to 
previous decades, it needs to be stressed that these imports formed no break with past
65 Table A.IMP/ALL-5.
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decades. This is because the share of manufactured goods as of total imports did not 
radically change after 1900, compared to earlier decades. Rather, the upwards trend 
before 1900 simply continued after 1900 although at a slightly faster rate. Hence, there 
was a gradual rise in the imports of manufactured goods from ca 10% of total imports 
by value in 1870 to about one quarter in 1902-06. This trend also applies to imports of 
manufactured articles (SITC group 8), for there was an even rise over time in their share 
relative to total imports.66
V.2.2.2. Manufactured Goods (SITC Group 6)
The largest part of the goods in this import group (50-60% by value) consisted of 
manufactures of plant materials (Fig. V.22), and that ratio remained stable throughout 
the period 1870-1913. Within this sub-group, manufactures of plant materials, the two 
most important types of goods were (a) fabrics or textiles, along with made-up articles 
(clothes, etc.) from cotton, linen, or hemp, and (b) wood and cork manufactures (Fig. 
V.23), presumably mainly furniture, etc. Among manufactures of plant materials, the 
share of textiles and clothing, fell from ca 60 to 30% by value over time, while that of 
wood and cork manufactures remained largely the same. A third category —  ropes, 
mats, lines, and nets from linen, hemp, or cotton —accounted for ca 15-20% by value of 
all manufactures of plant materials until after 1902, when its share rose to one-third. 
This rise was at the expense of fabrics and textiles. The fourth and the last category was 
paper and paperboard, and manufactures thereof; imports of this type were relatively
66 Table A.IMP/ALL-5.
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insignificant throughout the period 1876-1913, although rising substantially in absolute 
figures.67
The relative shares of the four different types of manufactures of plant materials 
indicate a larger than average rise in demand for fishing gear, and does not come as a 
surprise given the expansion in the fisheries’ sector (see Chapter IV and section on 
mineral fuels above). Imported fabrics and textiles did not keep pace with the ‘average’ 
increase in imports by value or other manufactured goods from plant materials, namely 
wood and cork manufactures and of paper, etc. Even so, in spite of their relative fall 
within manufactures of plant materials, the import values o f fabrics and textiles per 
capita were rising fast after 1900 compared to previous decades. They were nearly three 
times larger in 1913 than in 1890-94 while the population grew by ca 20%.68 These 
figures are also indicative of the import quantities of fabrics because their prices 
remained relatively stable over time.69 Because of this observation, we see that the 
‘average’ rise in imports by value of wood and cork manufactures and of paper, etc. was 
in fact tremendously fast: Wood manufactures were used in construction, and their 
imports suggest an expansion there. Paper, etc. had numerous uses, for example in 
printing books and papers, and publishing of both increased substantially from about 
1900 onwards.70
The second subgroup within manufactured goods, manufactures based on 
mineral materials, formed a sizeable portion of imported manufactured goods — round 
about one quarter by value — although fluctuating over time. By far the most important 
type was metallic manufactures (Fig. V.24), which included, for instance, tools and
67 Tables A.IMP/ALL-6 and A.IMP/ALL-7.
68 Tables A.IMP/ALL-5 and A.IMP/ALL-7.
69 Tables A.IMP/ALL-3 and A.IMP/ALL-10.
70 Olafur F. Hjartar, Tslenzk bokautgafa 1887-1966,’ table in a folded sheet.
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implements of iron. Around 1900, however, imports of a new type of good began to rise 
rapidly in terms of value, viz. unprocessed iron (and steel). Shortly after, imports of 
cement and lime by value also increased significantly. Clearly, Iceland entered a new 
epoch with regard to consumption of iron and steel around 1900, and larger imports of 
construction materials (cement and lime) were another witness to expansion in the 
construction industry, besides imports of wood manufactures.
The third and last subgroup within manufactured goods, manufactures based on 
animal materials (mostly leather manufactures), was small in comparison to the others 
but imports of these by value were increasing, especially in the mid 1900s (Fig. V.22).71 
By quantity, the imports seem to have round about doubled by 1913 compared to the 
period of the 1870s through to the 1890s. Much of these imports were shoe leather, 
which in turn suggests that shoe making and repairing entered a new phase in the 
1900s.72
To get a fuller picture of manufactures imports and take out the price factor, it 
is useful to take a look at the quantities imported. By quantity, the two subgroups within 
manufactured goods understandably change places. Mineral materials were far more 
prominent and plant materials less so (Fig. V.21), something which is logical given the 
heavier mass (relative density) of minerals. Also, within the mineral materials, rock 
manufactures (millstones, etc.) along with unprocessed iron (and steel) and cement and 
lime characterised the imports of mineral manufactures, but not metallic manufactures, 
which were relatively expensive (Fig. V.25).73 As for plant materials’ imports, wood and 
cork manufactures with their relative heavy mass dominated while the lighter fabrics and
71 Tables A.IMP/ALL-6 and A.IMP/ALL-7.
72 Table A.IMP/ALL-3. Danish and Norwegian trade returns (exports).
73 Information about the imports of these goods is not complete because imports from Denmark 
in 1910 and 1913 have not been fully accounted for (cf. first footnote).
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made-up textile articles, that had ranked so high by value, dwindled very much in 
significance (Fig. V.26).
It is quite clear that these manufactured goods, whether of mineral, plant, or 
animal materials, were consumed or used both in homes (by individuals) and in the 
producing sectors of the economy. There is not much point at this stage in trying to 
distinguish between the two end users, so as to conclude something about patterns of 
consumption in the economy. Such an approach would be convoluted, and, anyway, 
sources to do so are not readily available. Besides, the levels of aggregate imports are no 
less important for our study than their specific channels of consumption. But the 
perspective taken in our discussion about imports of manufactured goods above missed 
certain aspects of the relationship between the Iceland economy and these particular 
imports. We focused on increases in relative shares and tried to explain them with 
reference to upswings in economic activity in various fields in the economy. As it 
happens, increases in these particular imports sometimes affected former production and 
consumption patterns in the Iceland economy. To be sure, this was by no logic because 
some imports of manufactured goods were pure additions to former consumption 
patterns and did not affect production patterns either. Thus, when imports of these goods 
in ca 1900 to 1913 as compared to their imports in 1870-82 are studied in more detail, 
they suggest that in the 1900s two or three profound changes had taken or were taking 
place in the economy. First, instead of continuing to buy certain kinds of these goods in 
the form of raw or crude materials as before, Icelanders started buying them in semi- 
processed or even fully processed forms. Second, they chose foreign substitutes, in place 
of domestic goods that they formerly used. Hence, these changes in the type or kind of 
demand were affecting established production and consumption patterns in the economy 
and, thus, warrant special attention. So let us elaborate these points fiirther.
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To avoid oversimplification, Icelanders always imported various manufactured 
goods, both semi-processed and fully processed, through the centuries. The level of these 
imports went up and down of course, even if such goods until the 19th century were 
mainly bought by the wealthy (i.e., high officials, large landowners, etc.) and institutions 
like the monasteries and the bishopries. Furthermore, since the first half of 19th century 
common people more frequently acquired the means or yielded to their desires to spend a 
part of their small means to buy goods that had been rare or not customary in Iceland. 
For example, coffee imports are believed to have started only after 1760 and regular 
coffee drinking did not become common until after 1850 or later (except in villages and 
elsewhere by the seaside). Not all luxury items arrived so late to Iceland — tobacco 
imports started from as early as the 17th century.74 To take more basic imports as 
examples, iron pots to cook in were indispensable, metallic blades were needed to cut the 
grass and turf, small millstones were needed to thresh the com and whetstones also, 
blacksmiths and silversmiths needed metals for innumerable things, etc. Also, most 
grown-ups carried small foldable knives that were used when eating and, indeed, for 
many other things. Finally, new items such as the lamps, which came in use from the 
1870s onwards, demanded glass bowls, kerosene, and wicks.75 It, therefore, follows that 
importing of manufactured goods was already under way, and their quantities were 
rising by the mid 19th century. Nevertheless, it must be appreciated that these imports 
were usually additions or extras in people’s survival and living, and not imports that 
were substituting domestically made goods (either from imported materials or domestic). 
True, there is not always a clear dividing line between a good that is replacing another 
and a good that is an addition. For example, coffee drinking certainly reduced the
74 Jonas Jonasson, Islenzkir pjodhcettir (3rd ed.), p 54. For consumption levels of people 
generally, see the last named source and a dispute by two 19th century Icelanders about 
consumption in that century, reprinted in Gils Gudmundsson, ed., Pjodlifsmyndir, pp 7-175.
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consumption of mysa that is a slightly sour liquid and a residual in butter making, but 
only a part of the coffee drinking was such substitution, a large part of it was a pure 
addition to previous consumption of drinks.76
The purpose of illustrating this point is to show that there were of course 
consumption changes before our period. Nevertheless, what is special in our period is 
that by ca 1900 common people had started or were starting to buy from merchants 
goods that until then had wholly been made domestically or processed at home with 
imported raw (crude) materials. To take a few examples, ordinary made-up fabric 
articles (clothes, etc.) had not been imported, or imported in negligible quantity, because 
all day-to-day clothes had been made from Icelandic wool.77 Imports of fabrics and 
textiles from cotton, linen, and hemp increased at least three or four times over by 
quantity from the 1870s to 1913, and so did imports of woollens.78 Although a part of 
these import quantities were used for other purposes than clothing, there can hardly be 
any doubt that these imports were at the expense of traditional production of woollens 
for domestic use. Around 1870, ropes were made in Iceland by processing imported 
hemp amounting to ca 20 tonnes annually, but in 1913 imports of hemp were practically 
zero while imports of various fishing gear (largely of hemp), ropes included, was five 
times greater.79 Around 1870 glasses in windows were rare because windows in houses 
were usually few and dried animal foetus-sacks were the customary material. By 1913, 
the import quantities were five times greater.80 Also, pottery (dishes, etc.) was not
75 Jonas Jonasson, islenzkir pjodhcettir.
76 See, for example, Vilhjalmur S. Vilhjalmsson, Sjogarpurinn og bondirm Sigurdur i 
Gordunum, p 97, and Asmundur Helgason, ‘Vertid og vertidarsidir,’ p 196.
77 Jonas Jonasson, islenzkir pjodhcettir.
78 Table A.IMP/ALL-3.
79 Vilhjalmur S. Vilhjalmsson, Sjogarpurinn og bondirm Sigurdur i Gordunum, pp 33-5. Table
A.IMP/ALL-3 (‘Textile Fibres’ in SITC group 2).
80 Jonas Jonasson, islenzkir pjodhcettir. Table A.IMP/ALL-3.
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needed, because people used the traditional Icelandic askur, a box-like piece made of 
wood with a lid on it. There was neither need for metallic manufactures like cutlery, 
because a spoon made of animal horns was the handiest instrument to eat the food with 
from askur. Only among the higher classes did people use pottery and cutlery.81 In 1913, 
imports of pottery manufactures by quantity were at least three times larger, and imports 
of manufactures of metals presumably had tripled.82 These examples give a glimpse of 
the contrast between 19th century Iceland, especially in the countryside where the 
majority of people lived, the ordinary life of common people until the 1880s or even 
1890s, and the new modes of consumption in the 1900s and the early 1910s.
The changes in production and consumption patterns exemplified above all 
revolved around the same thing, namely the reduction of labour input. Why and how it 
occurred is not clear to me, but possibly this was the outcome of a process where more 
than one factor was operating. Initially, this change may be been caused by two or three 
things. Emigration to North America naturally caused a reduction in the labour force, 
especially among the young generation who were very active economically. Also, new 
export industries, such as herring fishing and whaling, attracted labour from previous 
occupations (or at least reduced their time from previous activities), and growing 
branches like saltfish exporting required more labour drawn from previous activities. 
These new and expansionary branches may also have brought about rising purchasing 
power, but in any case these branches caused a reduction in the time that was allocated 
to domestic production. Hence, to maintain the same living standard, this reduction in 
time was compensated for by imports of substitutes for domestic commodities, imports 
of fully processed goods to replace semi-processed goods, and imports of semi-processed
81 Jonas Jonasson, Islenzkir pjodhcettir.
82 Table A.IMP/ALL-3.
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goods instead of raw materials. Also, if there was a rise in people’s purchasing power, it 
enabled them to afford more expensive imports. Later on, imports of manufactures and 
intermediate goods began to grow faster than before, and these were, for instance, 
wooden manufactures, glass manufactures, and cement and lime. The growth in material 
for the construction industry show that it was booming, like various other activities in 
the economy, and for this expansion new and larger amounts of labour were necessary. 
This labour was possibly not only drawn from population increase but from previous 
activities as well, and, therefore, required more imports of substitution goods, ect. 
Hence, the process behind the overall change in production and consumption patterns 
may have been of a domino or a spiral type. Leaving the exact causes and their interplay 
aside, what is important to realise is that this change is a portrayal of economy that was 
reallocating its labour force from traditional patterns of production and consumption to 
new modes of production (including exports) and consumption (including imports).
Analysing the general character of imports through time to identify possible 
changes in production and-consumption in the economy, as we have been trying, cannot 
of itself reveal the extent of such changes, or their rate and their timing. Moreover, such 
a detailed analysis cannot be undertaken within the present study — partly because the 
data does not always exist. Nevertheless, the inability of this research to give a full 
account of the processes sketched here does not undermine the central argument that a 
substitution of domestic production with foreign imports was taking place. The import 
commodities highlighted here serve as a proxy for economic and social change, and give 
a fair indication of the nature of the changes that were happening as a consequence of 
Iceland’s importation of foreign goods.
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V.2.2.3. Machinery and Transport Equipment (SITC Group 7) — 
Manufactured Articles (SITC Group 8)
The commodity groups ‘Machinery and transport equipment’ (SITC group no 7) and 
‘Manufactured articles’ (SITC group no 8) are slightly problematic, because goods that 
fell into these groups were underreported to some extent —  even though ‘Manufactured 
goods’ (in SITC group no 6) presumably did not completely escape this either. The 
reasons for under-reporting are, first, that goods in SITC groups 7 and 8 often were 
imported in very small quantities and, hence, information about their imports to Iceland 
in my sources are not always as detailed as for goods that were more significant by 
quantity or value. Second, classification of these goods was not as easy, constant, or 
systematic in my sources as of more simple goods. Thus, some of them are grouped with 
goods in other SITC groups, mainly in group no 6. Third, they were not always 
registered by physical attribute (usually weight) as well as value, but by value only. 
Hence, imports by value cover these goods better, but then price changes blur relative 
movements in this trade over time. Fourth, imports of these goods presumably more 
often went through personal hands, escaped ordinary customs control for some reason 
(e.g., parcel post), were outside ordinary channels of commerce (e.g., engines, boats and 
ships), or excluded in definitions of merchandise in terms of trade returns (e.g., ships) ; 
therefore, they do now show up in my sources.
This is not to say that available information about these imports is negligible or 
distorted to the point of being unsuitable for any conclusions about them. The quality of 
the information differs by countries and by points of time, and parts of them are quite 
trustworthy. Information on imports of these goods from Denmark is fairly extensive, 
and on those from Norway from at least 1902, possibly already from 1890. Imports from
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the United Kingdom are generally speaking not so accurate or complete, and most goods 
in SITC groups 7 and 8 are usually not detailed at all. That applies to the whole period 
of research. In spite of these shortcomings, it is possibly to draw some general 
conclusions from the available information, more especially about imports of 
manufactured articles. By contrast, because imports of machinery and transport 
equipment were small and very irregular,83 it is impossible to detect any definite trends 
at all in these imports, which consisted mainly of boats and sailing vessels, and of 
machines and appliances.
Manufactured articles (SITC group 8) were mainly intended for personal 
consumption, not as inputs for production, as the following list of some of the main 
goods indicates: articles for entertainment and decoration, along with art works and 
musical instruments; printed matter; clothes and footwear.84 Although my data on these 
imports is not complete, it should suffice to give a general impression of these imports. 
In line with imports of other manufactures, imports of ‘manufactured articles’ as a group 
got new momentum from about 1900 onwards. This was especially true of quantities, 
while there was more continuity in values.85 However, when we look at imports of these 
goods before 1900 it is clear that they had been growing substantially since 1870. Even 
though the graph only shows imports from Denmark, it is representative of their total 
imports because Denmark was practically the only origin of these imports until 1898 
(Fig. V.27). This early growth is rather remarkable because it was larger in the 1870s 
through to the 1890s than in the case of manufactured goods, i.e., goods in SITC group 
6. Given this early and substantial growth, the types of goods in question deserve 
comment. The main types were clothes and footwear, printed matter, and a mixed bag of
83 Tables A.IMP/DEN-3 and A.IMP/NOR-5.
84 Tables A.IMP/DEN-3 and A.IMP/NOR-5.
85 Tables A.IMP/ALL-1 and A.IMP/ALL-5.
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articles for entertainment and decoration, along with art works and musical instruments 
(Fig. V.27). The relative shares of each of these three major commodity groups grew 
roughly at the same rate for the years this graph represents total imports of these goods 
truthfully, in 1870 to 1894. While imports of articles for entertainment and decoration, 
etc. were largely dependent on fluctuations in people’s incomes, clothes and footwear 
were more essential goods and it is noteworthy their imports were growing considerably 
in the 1870s through to the 1890s. Imports of manufactured articles, i.e., goods in SITC 
group 8, certainly suggest that incomes of people were growing in the three decades of 
the 1870s to the 1890s, and not only after about 1900.
Almost none of the goods in this commodity group were produced in Iceland, 
and they were not in any real way substituting goods produced in Iceland. The main 
exceptions to this were printed matter and, albeit to a much lesser degree, footwear. 
Printing presses had been run in the country for centuries but it seems that book 
publishing was not the main business, for the presses were usually small and were 
dependent on printing papers and weeklies, besides smaller items (receipt forms, etc.). 
Often, editor and owner of a printing press was the same person.86 All major book 
printing had to be done abroad and was almost exclusively confined to Denmark. 
Although some of the printed matter that was imported was Danish books and papers, a 
substantial part of it presumably was Icelandic books and journals, especially towards 
1900 onwards. In theory, printed matter was an item that was in competition with 
Icelandic presses. In reality, however, such book printing was probably too large to be 
made smoothly in Icelandic presses, and yet too irregular for any press owner to invest in 
machines and employ printers to manage larger works. As for footwear, there were
86 Klemens Jonsson, Fjogur himdmd ara saga prentlistarinnar a tslandi. Vilhjalmur b. 
Gislason, Blod og bladamenn.
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several shoemakers in Iceland, and their number increased over time, but it would appear 
that they were mainly occupied with repairing. Thus, imported footwear was not really 
competing with any domestic production.
V.2.2.4. Conclusion
Imports of manufactures were overall characterised by the same pattern as imports of 
primary commodities in the sense that there was a huge expansion around 1900 onwards. 
Also, there was a substantial growth in imports of many manufactures in the 1870s 
through to the 1890s. Furthermore, there was not any marked break around 1900 in 
terms of the type of manufactures imported but rather a continuity. Hence, the demand 
for manufactures was mainly changing in terms of scale than in terms of kind or type. 
However, there were certain changes relating to imports occurring in the economy.
When imported manufactures in general are studied in terms of the Icelandic 
economy, it becomes clear that around 1870 Iceland had domestic alternatives to a 
number of imported manufactures (although they were not identical substitutes). Also, 
Iceland imported some raw materials that were processed and turned into manufactures. 
Both of these things changed over time because local alternatives to imports declined in 
importance, and imports of semi or fully processed manufactures increased at the 
expense of imports of corresponding raw materials. More important, it also emerged that 
changes in production and consumption patterns in Iceland were very much linked to the 
growth in imports of manufactures. In short, there was a shift from production of
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manufactures in Iceland, whether using domestic or imported raw materials, towards 
imports of manufactures that replaced them.
Why these changes in production and consumption happened is still obscure. 
Two causes are likely, and possibly both were at work concurrently. One possibility is 
that terms of trade rose or living expenses fell while the division of labour in Iceland 
remained unchanged. For example, perhaps fishermen decreased their processing of 
hemp because their purchasing power grew, and they could better afford to buy imported 
fishing lines and ropes instead. The other possibility is that even if terms of trade were 
not rising and living expenses not falling, the employment of the labour force was 
changing. In that case, fishermen may have concentrated more on fishing or sold their 
labour to others, with their result that they had to use their wages to buy imported fishing 
lines and ropes because they did not have the time to make these products themselves. 
Speculation about these possibilities is premature because it rests partly on the outcome 
of terms of trade analysis, and we will resume to this discussion in Chapter VI on 
balances of trade.
V.3. Origin of Iceland’s Imports 
V.3.1. General Trends
Similarly to exports, it is useful to look at the main trends in Iceland’s imports by 
countries from two perspectives. The first perspective is that of relative shares of the
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countries providing Iceland with imports, and the outcome can rightfully be described as 
diversification. As might be expected, Denmark still had the lion’s share in Iceland’s 
imports in 1870, about 80% by value (Fig. V.28). Over time, Denmark’s share of 
Iceland’s imports fell dramatically, so that in 1913 it only had ca 30% of the import 
values. This fall was caused by the rise in Iceland’s total imports rose over time, because 
imports from Denmark broadly remained on the same level in absolute terms (Fig. V.29). 
The decline for Denmark started already in the 1870s, but its pace was markedly faster 
after about 1890. Norway was a newcomer in the import trade of Iceland in 1870, and it 
only had a share of 4% by value at the time.87 Imports from Norway were relatively 
stable by value into the 1890s, and this means that they rose in absolute terms (Fig. 
V.28). In the late 1890s, they boomed temporarily and then contracted in the 1900s 
onwards, falling down to 10% in 1913, although Norway’s share remained constant in 
absolute terms.88 In terms of Iceland’s aggregate imports, however, the share of Norway 
was most of the time not very large.
The group ‘UK and other countries’ only provided about 10% of Iceland’s 
imports by value in 1870, but over time its share expanded significantly, not only 
absolutely but also relatively (Fig. V.29 and V.28). In 1913, the share of the United 
Kingdom was round about 40% while that of ‘other countries’ was little over 20%.89 
Thus, there was a rapid growth in imports from this group of countries. Generally 
speaking, the preponderance of Denmark as a supplier of Iceland’s imports in 1870, and 
its eventual demise as a market country in relative terms, caused still more 
diversification in the import trade than in the export trade. Instead of having one country 
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the category ‘Other countries,’ which provided Iceland’s imports in 1913, and none of 
them had a larger share than 40% by value.
The second perspective to perceive the main trends in Iceland’s imports is to 
look at which countries supplied important categories in imports. It is useful to do this 
both by quantity and value, because in terms of quantities the bulky, unprocessed, and 
usually inexpensive part of the imports are in focus but in terms of values fully 
processed products and valuables are prominent. This provides conveniently contrasting 
perspectives at Iceland’s imports. In the case of Iceland, the bulky commodities were 
timber, salt, coal, and foodstuffs. From this point of view, we see that during the 1870s 
through to 1890s there was a certain commodity specialisation among Iceland’s 
importing countries. Food was imported from Denmark, timber was supplied by 
Norway, and the United Kingdom (and other countries until 1894) provided coal and 
salt. Then, around the turn of the century a kind of diversification took place in the salt 
imports. Salt exports from Norway now exceeded timber imports, and from the category 
‘Other countries’ Iceland received primarily salt as well. By contrast, coal now overtook 
salt in imports from the United Kingdom (and other). The reasons for the change in salt 
imports in terms of the exporting countries are difficult to ascertain without further 
information. At this stage, we only know from our study that salt imports by quantity 
increased sharply when this diversification happened. In relation to this, we may also ask
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why a similar development did not take place in imports of timber and coal to Iceland, 
because their quantities rose rapidly too after about 1900.90
Moving on to imports by value we in turn are focusing on the relatively 
expensive merchandise in import. Here, a parallel diversification in a particular line of 
merchandise, namely manufactures, was also detected, and it happened largely after the 
turn of the century too. In the decades from the 1870 to ca 1900, there was a certain 
commodity specialisation among the countries exporting to Iceland. Within imports from 
Denmark, foodstuffs ranked high, as did manufactures and, to a lesser extent, wines and 
tobacco. The singularity of imports from Norway meant that the staple item, wood, was 
the most valuable item too. From the United Kingdom (and other countries until 1894) 
foodstuffs, besides wines and tobacco, had the largest values. After ca 1900, on the other 
hand, imports by value from Norway, the United Kingdom, and the category ‘other 
countries’ significantly changed character. In the case of Norway, manufactures replaced 
wood, which came second, and salt was third. In imports from the UK, manufactures 
took prime place and pushed coal and foodstuffs down. Similarly, manufactures 
dominated imports from ‘other countries’.91 In other words, in the case of relatively 
expensive imports, a certain specialisation among countries existed before ca 1900, and 
incidentally, these imports consisted mainly of basic (primary) commodities, just as in 
the case of inexpensive imports at the same time. After the turn of the century, this 
pattern was replaced by another where there was less specialisation among countries, 
and manufactures were the principal imports from all the countries excluding Denmark.
90 Precise figures are in tables A.IMP/ALL-5 and A.IMP/ALL-7. Graphical presentation of the 
shifts discussed is in the figures located in the main text below.
91 Precise figures are perhaps most conveniently found in the relevant country tables in 
Appendix A but tables A.IMP/ALL-5 and A.IMP/ALL-7 are also useful. Graphical 
presentation of the shifts discussed is in the figures located in the main text below.
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Overall, these instances of diversification in imports suggests that competition increased 
in Iceland’s import trade.
The changes described above applied to all countries and country groups 
exporting to Iceland —  except Denmark. Incidentally, Denmark was the principal source 
of manufactures for Iceland all the way until the mid 1900s, so there was a tradition for 
Denmark to supply Iceland with manufactures. Even so, in contrast to other countries, 
there was no relative rise of manufactures in Denmark’s exports to Iceland after ca 
1900, and this begs for explanation. On closer examination, it is evident that Denmark 
was not well disposed to supply Iceland with most of its imports. In spite of growing 
industries in Denmark, it was not a significant producer of manufactures in comparison 
with the core economies of Europe, including Britain. Also, although a very large part of 
Iceland’s imports from Denmark were re-exports, Denmark was no commercial centre 
but rather an outpost that was not conveniently located geopgraphically for Iceland. 
Therefore, it was not surprising that Iceland’s sources of manufactures and relatively 
expensive imports were being shifted from Denmark to Britain and other countries. 
Clearly, Iceland was increasingly dropping a mediator that was unncessary in its import 
trade, but the timing of this shift and how it happened requires an explanation, and it will 
be forwarded later in the thesis.
V.3.2. Denmark
Iceland’s import trade with Denmark had a couple of distinct features. One of them was 
the dominance of foodstuffs, something that is not surprising in the case of a
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predominantly agricultural country (Fig. V.30). Furthermore, in terms of individual food 
imports it is no exaggeration to say that cereals were the staple item (Fig. V.31). Imports 
by quantity from all other commodity groups were small, in spite of increasing imports 
of manufactured goods and mineral fuels. By value, however, all kinds of manufacture 
imports or goods in SITC group 6 and 8 were much more prominent than their quantity 
figures would allow, although foodstuffs still remained by far the largest group (Fig. 
V.32). Beverages and tobacco were also less insignificant than the quantity implied. This 
reflects of course a higher value to weight than for the foodstuffs, which is logical since 
they were far more processed. Another striking feature in imports from Denmark was the 
relative stability. Even though the quantities increased after 1900, the commodity 
composition remained largely the same over time. In this respect, imports from Denmark 
differ very much from the overall structure or composition in Iceland’s imports 
illustrated earlier in the chapter.
V.3.3. Norway
Imports of Iceland from Norway consisted mainly of crude materials (timber) and, later 
on, chemicals (salt) (Fig. V.33 and V.34). The former was of course an export staple for 
Norway and the second was a re-exported commodity.92 Measured by value the picture 
is a little different because both wood and salt were cheap in comparison with other 
commodities. Hence, relatively expensive merchandise such as manufactured goods (in 
SITC group 6) increasingly characterised imports by value from Norway (Fig. V.35).
92 Norwegian trade returns (exports).
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Imports of manufactures from Norway are interesting not only because imports of 
manufactures generally were so pertinent to important economic changes in Iceland. 
What is even more interesting is how rapidly they expanded in the imports from Norway. 
Although these imports started growing markedly around 1890 —  the data for imports 
from Norway are relatively poor until 1890, so it is impossible to say anything definite 
about the imports before that time —  they grew relatively slowly in the 1890s. Then, a 
great spurt occurred around 1900 and imports of manufactures remained a substantial 
item in aggregate imports by value from Norway. Of these Norwegian imports the main 
goods were manufactures of wood and cork —  not surprisingly from this land of forests 
— besides ropes, lines, nets, etc., and some manufactures of iron and steel (Fig. V.36).
V.3.4. The United Kingdom and Other (Unspecified) Countries
As happens, my sources do not enable me to distinguish between ‘Other countries’ and 
the UK until 1898, but the UK was by far the largest supplier before then. Qualitative 
sources — including contemporary accounts — do not mention countries exporting to 
Iceland other than the United Kingdom, Denmark and Norway in the second half of the 
nineteenth century.93 Also, when we can separate ‘other countries’ from the UK —  in 
1898 — their imports to Iceland were negligible, at 3% by quantity and 4% by value.94 
Therefore, imports from this group came for all intents and purposes from the United 
Kingdom, although that country forms part of a single ‘residual’ group for purposes of 
analysis in the period 1870-94.
93 See, for example, Matth. Thordarson, Dansk-Islandsk Samhandel.
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The principal imports by quantity from this combined category were mineral 
fuels, i.e., coal and petroleum products, and salt (Fig. V.37 and V.38). In fact, the UK 
(and other countries) supplied practically all the coal for Iceland, and small as their salt 
imports may seem, salt for Iceland came mainly from this country group, until Norway 
surpassed it around the turning of the century.95 But just as in the case of Norway, the 
overall structure of imports from the UK (and other countries) looks rather differently 
when measured by value. Until the early 1890s all kinds of foodstuffs and, to a lesser 
degree, beverages and tobacco, dominated import by value therefrom (Fig. V.39). Only 
in the late 1890s did mineral fuels become a substantial item in their exports to Iceland.
However, a relative rise in values of imports of manufactured goods (SITC 
group 6) from the UK in the mid 1890s was far greater than the relative rise in value of 
minerals fuels (Fig. V.37 and V.39). Imports of manufactured goods by value from the 
UK (and other countries) were negligible in 1894, but four years later they had risen to 
about 25% of all imports by value from there, and continued to be relatively large. O f 
these, textiles seem to have figured largely, as well as unprocessed iron and steel (Fig. 
V.40). True, imports of manufactures from the UK (and other countries) are 
underreported until and including 1898 in our dataset. Hence, they may have been more 
significant in the early 1890s, or even around 1890, than our data allow. It must also be 
recognised that, impressive as imports of manufactured goods from the UK are after 
1898, they continue to be underreported in our datasets. (This is because my source only 
gives information about the principal goods imported and the group of miscellaneous and 
unidentified imports (SITC 9) is relatively large.) By and large, however, uncertainties in 
the British data do not refute the timing of the trend in imports o f manufactures from the
94 Tables A.IMP/ALL-1 and A.IMP/ALL-5.
95 Tables A.IMP/ALL-2 and A.IMP/ALL-3.
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UK (and other countries). The idea of there being a ‘turning point’ in these imports from 
the UK in the 1890s is not challenged.
Turning to the category ‘other countries’ (that is, other than Denmark, Norway, 
and the UK), imports from there increased considerably during 1898-1913 and probably 
were slightly greater than my datasets allow for.96 Relatively speaking, however, they 
were small within Iceland’s imports. These imports consisted in quantity terms almost 
entirely of salt (Fig. V.41), but by value they were more diverse. Initially, foodstuffs 
were a fair part of the imports, but by 1902 manufactures of all kinds accounted for 
round about half of the imports or more (Fig. V.42). Since food and salt were still 
dominant in 1898, it appears that the rapid upward shift, which occurred in imports from 
the United Kingdom in the mid 1890s, did not take place in imports from other countries 
until a little later, from around 1900 — just as in the case of Norway. These goods were 
a mixture of manufactures to be used as inputs for processing in Iceland and as goods 
for personal consumption.97
96 I refer to the introductory text in Appendix A for a full explanation, but in brief, the 
explanation is the following. The source for ‘other countries’ probably misses some of the 
quantities, but, on the other hand, the values are overrated because they show the retail value of 
the imports, not the cif value as in the case of other countries.
97 Tables A.IMP/OTH-2 and A.IMP/OTH-3.
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Chapter VI 
Iceland’s Balance and Terms of Trade, 
1870-1913
VI.1. The Overall Balance of Trade 
Vl.1.1. Total Exports and Imports
In all the sample years from 1870 to 1913, Iceland had a surplus on its balance of trade 
account (Fig. VI.1). This suggests that Iceland usually or perhaps always had a trade 
surplus during the research period. Furthermore, the surplus grew over time from about
600,000 kroner in 1870 to more than 6,000,000 kroner in 1913, that is, by ten times 
over. Measuring the trade surplus on a per capita basis, the same growth pattern
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emerges although the overall growth was less. Hence, the surplus per capita grew eight 
times over.1
The growth in the trade surplus was paramount, although showing some 
fluctuation around the long-term trend. The only year with an extraordinary large 
surplus over the previous year was 1882. This was caused by unusually large exports of 
herring owing to Norwegian enterprise. However, in three years, the trade surplus 
contracted from the previous year’s figure. The first of the contraction years, 1886, was 
one of generally slack economic conditions in Iceland, when values of exports and 
imports were lower than they had been since 1874.2 However, the year of 1898 was 
particularly out of line with the general trend in the growth of the trade surplus. Exports 
by value were low compared to earlier sample years, and this was caused by a reduction 
in exports quantities rather than a fall in prices.3 Perhaps most important, the 
advantageous live sheep business had practically come to an end. In spite of this 
situation, imports were unaffected and moved upwards as before, causing a very small 
trade surplus in 1898. Finally, in 1906 the trade surplus fell slightly, because imports 
were 70% larger by value compared to 1902 and exports by value were ‘merely’ 37% 
larger.4 What is noteworthy about these contractions in the trade surplus from the late 
1890s onwards is that imports seem to run to some degree independently of exports. If 
exports fall, imports fall but less so; if exports are on the same level as before, there is a 
notable increase in imports; and if exports rise, imports rocket. True, this shows a 
certain connection between the relative sizes of exports and imports, but it refutes any
1 Table A.BAL/ALL-1.
2 Table A.BAL/ALL-1.
3 The drop in exports by quantity was 4% per annum from 1894 to 1898, and 5% per annum by 
value. See Tables A.EXP/ALL-1 and A.EXP/ALL-5.
4 Table A.BAL/ALL-1.
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idea about levels of imports always being closely dependent on exports throughout the 
research period.
Measured as a proportion of export values, the trade surplus increased quite fast 
from 1870 to 1894, rising from 15% to over 40% of export values (Fig. VI.2). (Here, we 
ignore the year 1882 when the percentage exceeded the trend and 1886 when the it 
clearly fell below it; both were abnormal years.) After 1894, the trend went downwards, 
ending in ca 30% in 1913. This downwards trend is quite apparent, even if  we ignore the 
years 1898 and 1906, when the percentages dropped very much and were clearly out of 
line. Evidently, then, the late 1890s were a time when there began a shift in the size of 
the trade surplus relative to exports — that is, when Iceland started to spend ever larger 
share of its exports value on imports.
VI.1.2. Internally-Owned Exports and Imports
Where the exports and imports of a country are entirely owned by the local population, 
the use of domestic and imported imports in production, and the incomes generated by 
exports, affect the economy to a full extent because these activities are fully integrated 
into the economy. On the other hand, where part of export production is owned by 
foreign companies, the benefits of the exporting activities for the population or the 
economy tend to be more restricted. Much of the incomes generated, for example, may 
be moved out of the country, rather than being reinvested there. As for imports, the part 
owned by foreigners, i.e., purchased for use by external capital in production for export 
within the state boundaries of a country, is not consumed by the economy proper. This
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phenomenon is well known in economic history, for foreign-owned mining and oil- 
drilling, to take an example, have often tended to form enclaves in the respective 
economy, enclaves with a limited contact with the domestic economy. In these instances, 
indicators for total exports and imports cannot be an accurate measure of the real impact 
of a country’s foreign trade on the domestic economy.
In the case of Iceland, some exports were owned by foreigners, primarily 
Norwegians, and this issue was discussed in Chapter IV on exports. These exports 
comprised all kinds of whaling products (whale oil, baleens, and meal) and herring, 
besides a few other insignificant exports. Some imports were also owned and used 
predominantly by foreigners. These types of imports are more difficult to define but 
include salt, barrels, staves, and coal. The quantity of imports and exports owned by 
foreigners operating in a relatively ‘enclavistic’ way within Iceland is most uncertain and 
difficult to estimate. However, a tentative attempt has been made (see Table 
B.BAL/ALL-2). For this purpose, all whaling products were subtracted from Iceland’s 
exports. Because of the preponderance of Norwegians in foreign enterprise in Iceland, all 
herring that went to Norway was also subtracted from Iceland’s export figures while 
herring going to other countries was considered to be owned by Icelanders. Similarly, all 
salt, barrels, staves, and coal from Norway were subtracted from Iceland’s import 
figures. This method inevitably produces crude results, but if they are accepted as a 
plausible approximation of the actual proportion of externally-owned merchandise, it 
must be admitted that the share of foreigners in Iceland’s foreign trade was substantial. 
According to this exercise, the exclusion of externally-owned exports and imports 
considerably affected Iceland’s trade surplus in that it reduced it, sometimes 
substantially (Fig. VI.3). More precisely, the share of externally-owned surplus as of 
total trade surplus usually ranged from ca 30 to 50% between 1882 and 1913.
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Furthermore, in spite of heavy fluctuations there was a long-term increase in the share of 
the surplus owned by foreigners (Fig. VI.4).5 Therefore, as the figures stand a 
substantial part of Iceland’s trade surplus was in the hands of foreign enterprises, and 
this shows that it is important to distinguish between internally and externally-owned 
merchandise when assessing the impact of Iceland’s foreign trade on its economy.
As Fig. VI.3 indicates, the exclusion of externally-owned exports and imports, 
as they were estimated here, in general did not alter in any significant way the general 
pattern discussed in previous section. Instead, the growth rates were affected, because in 
absolute terms, the surplus from internally-owned merchandise was 6.5 times larger in 
1913 than in 1870 (instead of ten times larger), and on a per capita basis the growth was 
fivefold (instead of eightfold).6 Also, the relative size of the trade surplus was more 
stable initially, fluctuating from 15 to ca 20% of export values from 1870 to 1886 (Fig. 
VL2). Then, the percentage rose to 30 and 35% respectively in 1890 and 1894, after 
which it gradually fell to 20% in 1913 (again ignoring the abnormal years 1898 and 
1906 when the percentages were especially low).
Looking at internally-owned merchandise from the point of view of the 
contraction years, the outcome of the exercise is also noteworthy. As already noted, the 
unusually large trade surplus in 1882 was mainly due to foreign activities, and, 
therefore, the size of the surplus in this year is in line with the trade surplus in the years 
before and after 1882. Conversely, the very small trade surplus in 1898 becomes even 
smaller and is almost zero. This shows that the slump was largely an internal 
phenomenon and affected the domestic economy far more than the activities of the 
foreigners in Iceland. The outcome for 1906, on the other hand, is slightly surprising
5 Here, we omit the year 1906, because the outcome then is highly doubtful, see earlier 
discussion in the chapter.
6 Table B.BAL/ALL-2.
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because there appears to have been a trade deficit in internally-owned merchandise 
although on a comparatively modest scale. However, on closer investigation, we may 
question the accuracy of this outcome. Herring is a key factor here because its export 
quantities to Norway at the time are subject to some uncertainty. According to a certain 
secondary source,7 which reproduces figures from Norwegian fishing statistics for 1903 
onwards, there is a discord between my series for herring exports to Norway (which are 
based on Norwegian trade returns) and these fishing statistics except for the year 1906. 
For that particular year, the fishing statistics record just about the same amount as the 
trade returns do (see Table A.EXP/NOR-3), which is in contrast to 1910 and 1913 when 
the herring catches off Iceland are substantially larger than the herring imports from 
Iceland to Norway. My reasoning is that if Norwegians in 1906 exported some of their 
herring caught off Iceland to other countries than Norway, as they evidently did in 1910 
and 1913, then an unknown quantity of the herring exports to Norway in 1906 was 
owned by Icelanders. But, as already explained, my method assumed that herring 
exported to Norway was solely the property of Norwegians. The explanation for this 
‘mismatch’ is obscure to me, and the Norwegian fishing statistics will need to be studied 
more closely to resolve or explain this. Hence, because o f lack of information we must 
let this deficit in 1906 stand as it does but, nonetheless, take due notice of the possibility 
that there was in fact a small surplus on internally-owned merchandise.
Before departing from the subject of trade balances in general, and the difference 
in balances between internally and externally-owned merchandise, I want to bring 
attention to one interesting aspect. From the point of view of the Norwegian enterprises 
in Iceland, the country was a resource base, which they exploited to their purposes. The 
main reason for venturing in Iceland was that they thought it would make good profit.
7 K. Shetelig Hovland, Norske Islandsfiskere, p 256.
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On the basis of our exercise, we can offer a very rough estimate of how lucrative the 
business of the Norwegian concerns may have been. Looking at the difference between 
externally-owned imports and exports, and calculating the balance as percentage of the 
exports, the result is that there was a surplus in all the years except one (in 1874), and, 
moreover, the surplus appears to have been usually around 90% of their exports.8 
Putting it differently, the foreign companies only had to spend in Iceland some 10% of 
their exports by value in order to produce these very same commodities. This is truly an 
impressive outcome compared to the one for internally-owned merchandise, i.e., owned 
by Icelanders, described above. This computation of the Norwegian trade surplus is not 
a measure of profitability — it leaves out many of their operating costs and some 
starting costs. Nevertheless, it suggests that the Norwegian herring and whaling fisheries 
in Iceland produced good returns for those engaged in it.
Even if our exercise in distinguishing between internally and externally-owned 
exports and imports is methodologically rather crude, nevertheless, it lays the foundation 
for a more reliable measure of the true impact of Iceland’s foreign trade on its economy 
while also hinting at a certain kind of leakage in the foreign trade, both its size and its 
channel. Further to that, our exercise shows that the size of externally-owned surplus 
(exports and imports) is large enough to warrant attention and advises caution when 
interpreting or using indicators for Iceland’s total foreign trade.
8 Table B.BAL/ALL-2.
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Vl.1.3. Missed Working Capital: Storage of Trade Surpluses
Persistent trade surplus in the research period, especially between 1870 and 1900, is 
interesting in the light of the understanding that merchants around 1870 were reluctant to 
pay their customers in cash, even if they were in credit in their accounts at the merchants 
(Chapter II). This raises the question if and for how long they continued this practice. 
The answer is important when discussion Iceland’s trade balance because the portion of 
the trade surplus that was not paid out in cash evidently did not benefit the economy in 
any way. These were ‘frozen’ assets with regard to the economy, even if this was done 
with the consent of the owners (customers). The reason for this arrangement is that it 
was very advantageous for the merchants concerned, because they could use this money 
as a working capital in their business activities, paying possibly with small if any 
interests on the money. Note also that their business activities were mainly confined to 
Denmark until some of the merchants started to put money in fishing in Iceland in the 
form of decked vessels.
A purposeful examination of this matter clearly requires sources and methods 
complementary to those employed in the present research. But it happens so that there is 
a certain way to see when Iceland’s trade surplus broadly started to become effective in 
that they were paid out to customers. This is possible by comparing the relative 
movements in gross barter terms of trade and unit price (net barter) terms of trade.9 A 
short explanation of this is in order before it is applied to Iceland’s foreign trade. Gross 
barter terms of trade measures the ratio of the volume of imports to the volume of 
exports, that is, variations in the quantities of imports and exports exchanged at constant
9 The employment of this method in the present research owes to R. Findley, ‘terms of trade,’ p 
624.
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prices. If gross barter terms of trade stay at the same level over time, it means that 
volume of exports relative to volume of imports remains the same. But if  gross barter 
terms of trade rise it means that imports increase relative to exports, and vice versa if 
gross barter terms of trade fall. Unit price terms of trade measures the relative movments 
of exports and import prices. If  unit price terms of trade rise over time, then prices of 
exports have risen relative to prices of imports and vice versa if unit price terms of trade 
fall. Thus, instances when relative movements of gross barter and unit prices move 
upwards at the same time mean that rising imports relative to exports are financed with 
relatively rising exports prices. Conversely, when relative movements of both terms of 
trade are downwards, relative contraction in imports in understandable when exports 
prices fall relatively to import prices. Consequently, those periods of time when relative 
movements of both terms of trade diverge are usually more interesting in the tom s of 
economic implications. Furthermore, in the context of the idea that trade surpluses were 
stored for a long time in Iceland’s foreign trade, instances of rising gross barter terms of 
trade and falling unit pricer terms of trade would support the idea that trade surpluses 
actually were stored.
Since enclave activities used money in their transactions, it is necessary to look 
at internally-owned exports and imports only and focus on instances of upwards 
movements of gross barter terms of trade. It emerges that gross barter terms of trade and 
unit price terms of trade moved in tandem from 1870 to 1886, and the divergent trends 
until 1890 only indicate that although net purchasing power of exports rose, Icelanders 
decreased their imports (Fig. VI. 5). All the while there were constant trade surpluses, 
and this is remarkable because had they been disbursed in cash, they probably would 
sooner or later have caused gross barter terms of trade to rise (caused imports to rise 
relative to exports), irrespective of the trend in unit price terms of trade. This is because 
if economy has a trade surplus, it usually is spent within the economy on internal
Figure 'v (.
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consumption, savings, or investments — unless it is exchanged for extra imports over 
exports later and this never seems to have been the case in Iceland. Possibly, some of the 
trade surpluses were spent internally but it is outside the scope of the present research to 
examine levels of consumption, savings, and investment in the economy to check these 
outlets. One thing, however, suggests that not much of the trade surplus was spent within 
the economy. If  a trade surplus is spent within economy, then it tends to push up export 
prices and Laspeyres price index for internally owned exports is almost identical to the 
movements in the unit price terms of trade index in Fig. VI.5.10 It does not imply that the 
trade surplus between 1870 and 1890 — amounting to millions of Icelandic kronur — 
were injected into the economy. Possibly, some o f the trade surpluses was spent abroad 
on consumption (for instance, travels), savings (mainly Danish state bonds), or 
investment (for instance, education). It is outside the scope of the research to probe into 
these aspects but it is safe to assume that they cannot account for the millions of kronur 
that accumulated as trade surpluses between 1870 and 1890. The only possibility left is 
a storage or expatriation of-the trade surpluses.
After 1890, however, new trends emerged in the relative movements of unit price 
terms of trade and gross barter terms of trade. Between 1890 and 1894 volume of 
imports rose slightly relative to exports (gross barter terms of trade moved upwards) 
while prices of exports relative to prices of imports (unit price terms of trade) fell 
markedly. In other words, in spite of clearly decreasing net purchasing power of exports, 
people seemed to afford to buy slightly more imports relative to exports. Although the 
contrast is not very stark it nevertheless indicates that circumstances had changed, and in 
principle there can be several possible sources for such a shift. One is that hoarded 
money is being lent or given to other people, another is that the state (or an authorised
10 Table C.BAL/ALL-3.
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bank) is printing money, third is that the economy is receiving net foreign credit (loans) 
or gift money (from state authorities or as private remittances), fourth is that the 
economy is having net transfers of factor rewards, fifth is that the economy is benefiting 
from a rise in unit price terms of trade, sixth is that the economy is using up concurrent 
or previous trade surplus, and the last is that people are entering into or increasing their 
short-term commercial debts with merchants. These possible explanation will be 
tentatively commented on below.
As for money printing and foreign credits or gift money, there is no ground for 
these possibilities. In the light of the general money shortage in Iceland, it is rather 
unlikely but conceivable that some money to buy more imports between 1890 and 1894 
came from Icelanders themselves (hoarded money), probably then in the form of loans. 
However, it is well possible that Icelanders entered into or increased their short-term 
commercial debts with merchants. What is certain is that Iceland was receiving factor 
rewards from enclave activities, and part of the live sheep and live horses that were 
exported were paid for in hard cash.
The new trends that emerged in both indices between 1890 and 1894 were taken 
to their extremes between 1894 and 1898. Gross barter terms of trade soared while unit 
price terms of trade fell sharply. In other words, volume of imports rose substantially 
relative to exports although net purchasing power of exports fell. As before, it is rather 
unlikely that hoarded money was a significant source of money to buy imports, there was 
no money printing at the time, and no major gifts of money from abroad are known. The 
suggestion that Iceland was benefiting from net foreign credit cannot be precluded as a 
minor part of the explanation, because there was a very small foreign loan made by the 
National Bank of Iceland in 1897-98. But we know nothing about its allocation and the
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sum is not large enough anyway to be a sufficient explanation.11 In 1898 there was no or 
very small trade surplus and apart from trade surpluses from the immediate years 
preceding 1898, the most plausible explanations for the rise in gross barter terms of 
trade probably are two, although we know nothing about their relative significance. One 
is net transfers of factor rewards, and the other is that merchants extended extra credit.
For the next four years, 1898-1902, gross barter terms of trade (imports relative 
to exports) continued to rise. Incidentally, net barter terms of trade (net purchasing 
power of exports) rose too and in fact faster than gross barter terms of trade. The rise in 
net barter terms of trade is in itself a sufficient explanation for the rise in gross barter 
terms of trade, so no further comments are needed. However, between 1902 and 1906 the 
pattern from 1894 to 1898 was repeated: gross barter terms of trade soared while unit 
price terms of trade fell equally as much. Apart from the use of trade surpluses from 
previous years — the trade balance was negative or very small in 1906 — other 
explanations must be listed first, net foreign credit, net factor rewards, or money printing 
come to consideration. By this time, when a number of savings funds had been 
established and savings were increasing, hoarded money cannot be a serious explanation 
for the imports. However, net inflow of foreign credit and money printing in 190612 may 
conceivably explain more than half of the rise in gross barter terms of trade, which 
amounted to 5.2 million kroner.13 The remaining part can only be explained with inflow 
of factor rewards in 1906, credits from merchatns, or with circumstances relating to 
previous years. Since externally owned exports were unusually large in 1906, inflow of
11 This loan amounted to about 300 thousand kroner (Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. 
Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, pp 668-9), but the rise in gross barter terms between 1894 and 
1898 meant that Iceland spent about 900 thousand kroner more on imports in 1898 than in 
1894 (Table B.BAL/ALL-2).
12 Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, pp 663, 669, 672.
13 Table B.BAL/ALL-2.
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factor payments probably was far greater than before. But the problem is that we still do 
not know anything about the amounts coming to Iceland that way. Hence, we cannot 
preclude that trade surplus from previous year(s) was used in 1906, but other causes 
relating to 1906 may go a long way in explaining the relative change in the gross barter 
terms of trade between 1902 and 1906.
From 1906 to 1910, gross barter terms of trade fell substantially and this fall in 
imports relative to exports can be fully explained with the concurrent fall in the net 
purchasing power of exports (fall in unit price terms of trade). But in addition, there was 
a substantial outflow of foreign credits.14 In the end of the research period, between 
1910 and 1913, gross barter terms of trade rose markedly and concurrent rise in unit 
price terms of trade explains it.
The central message of this examination on the relative movements of gross 
barter terms of trade and unit price terms of trade is that the trade balance cannot be 
taken at face value. This is because the outcome of the examination suggests that 
Icelanders did not get their surplus from foreign trade disbursed between 1870 and 1890. 
Moreover, there is almost a perfect match of the relative movements of the indices until 
1882 which means that all or practically all of the trade surpluses were stored. This 
entailed that the trade surpluses could neither be used for internal nor external 
consumption, savings, or investment, and the consequences for the economy are obvious. 
There possibly was a break in the storage of trade surpluses around 1890 but other 
explanations also come to consideration and have to be examined to see when trade 
surpluses generally started to be disbursed. Some of the other findings of the thesis imply 
that this possibly happened around 1900 or in the 1900s, but further comments about 
this will be saved for the conclusions (Chapter X).
14 GuSmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna, pp 669-70, 672.
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VI.2. Volume and Price Trends, Terms of Trade, and 
the Reallocation of Labour
The overall values and quantities of the trade flows, which were investigated in Chapters 
IV and V on exports and imports respectively, showed the actual values and quantities 
that were exchanged. But they suggest nothing about prices, and they inevitably are a 
crude indicator of the volume trade over time, that is, the actual quantities exchanged at 
fixed prices. Also, they say nothing about the economy’s terms of trade, which can be 
measured in more than one way. Hence, I will discuss the outcome of my computations 
of price and volume indices, and the results of terms of trade calculations, to offer a 
more accurate picture o f  trends in the trade flows, and comment on their main 
implications.
Vl.2.1. Volume of Trade, Importation for Enclave Activities, and 
Population Growth
The advantage of volume index over simple comparison of aggregate values and 
quantities is evident in the case of Iceland. According to Chapter IV, export values were
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5.5 times higher in 1913 than in 1870 and quantities were about seven times higher in 
1913 than in 1870 (Table IV. 1). Neither figure is indicative because the volume index 
shows that the rise in exports was in fact about fourfold (Fig. VI.6) or 3.3% per 
annum.15 Also, according to Chapter V quantities of imports rose more than eleven times 
over and import values more than quadrupled in the period (Table V.l). Incidentally, the 
value measure gave a relatively precise estimate because the volume index for imports 
shows that imports rose nearly four times over (Fig. VI.7). These computations are 
based on total exports and imports, but they are also representative of internally-owned 
exports and imports (Fig. VI.6 and VI.7).
Concerning externally-owned exports and imports, it emerged that the indices 
for them diverged somewhat from those for internally-owned exports and imports. The 
rise in the volume index for internally-owned exports was not quite as much as for total 
exports, because the first ‘only’ rose about three times over (Fig. VI.6). By contrast, the 
volumes indices for total imports and internally-owned imports was identical (Fig. VI.7). 
Note that this does not mean that foreign, i.e., Norwegian, enterprises were less active in 
the import trade than in the export trade. Rather, it implies that fluctuations in imports of 
Norwegian enterprises coincided remarkably well with fluctuations in total imports. 
However, beforehand one would expect some fluctuations of the externally-owned index 
around the total imports index, as the case was in exports. Hence, it is legitimate to ask 
if the index for externally owned imports is realistic. All things considered, there is some 
reason to doubt this perfect match of the import indices. Although several imports were 
assumed as being owned by Norwegian enterprises and subtracted from total imports, 
they did not include capital goods that the Norwegians brought to Iceland for the whaling 
industry. My work on the Norwegian trade returns did not indicate any imports of capital
15 Table C.BAL/ALL-3.
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goods, and this suggests that they are missing in the trade returns, or that they could not 
be identified there.16 In any case, there is a reason to believe that the perfect match of the 
import indices is not correct, and they must be understood in the light of that suggestion.
In spite of practically stationary population from 1870 to 1894 (70,000 to
73,000 people), volume of internally-owned exports per capita grew by about 80% 
between these two points of time, or at 1.4% per annum. Meanwhile, the volume of 
imports rose by almost 70% per capita.17 The trends of both trade flows was smoothly 
upwards in this sub-period, and, moreover, there was almost a perfect match between the 
movements of exports and imports (Fig. VI. 8). By contrast, from 1894 to 1913 the 
population grew from 73,000 to 87,000 people, and exports per capita rose considerably 
less (close to 40% or 0.7% per annum) than imports per capita (nearly 80%).18 
Therefore, it seems that the period from 1870 to 1913 cannot only be divided into two on 
the grounds of population growth — breaking about 1894 —  but also in terms of the 
movements of the volumes of internally-owned exports and imports.
Evidently, between-1870 and 1894 volume of exports per capita rose twice as 
fast as between 1894 and 1913. This slowdown of the growth of exports per capita after 
1894 is noteworthy, because rising imports at the same time indicate that there was no 
slowdown in the overall economic activity. Hence, the separate trends in export and 
imports suggest that economic resources were directed from export production towards 
greater production for the domestic market in the economy. This fits well with historians’ 
understanding of an economic boom in Iceland in the 1900s. Then, the economy no 
doubt diversified much faster than before and its structure probably was reinforced, for
16 For a description of my work on the Norwegian trade returns, which were in many ways 
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instance, in terms of infrastructure. Why this took place is not certain and what explains 
the timing of it is still less certain. The growth of the fishing sector and its economic 
impact presumably is a part of the explanation, but it does not explain very well the 
economy’s need for so much imports and their diversification in terms of products. 
Neither does it explain the timing of this change in a satisfactory way. A more plausible 
explanation for the separate trends in export and imports is that the supply of money 
seems to have increased substantially around 1900, as my comments in the discussion 
about Iceland’s gross barter terms of trade showed. Not only was printing of money 
greater than before, but also net inflow of foreign credit, and there was almost certainly a 
net inflow of factor payments. Possibly, trade surpluses started also to be paid out to 
some extent in cash. Some of the money was clearly spent on imports, but most of it no 
doubt was spent within the economy, rather than exported. Provided that this is correctly 
observed, this would explain why growing economic activities in the domestic sector 
meant a per capita decline in the export sector, because there was no marked under­
employment in the economy as the substitution of imports for internal production shows 
(Chapter V).
The trend in exports raises the questions whether there was a rise in productivity 
too. This is impossible to answer with our data but it seems plausible to suggest that 
although productivity certainly increased over time, this huge rise in export production 
was effectively impossible without greater inputs, that is, switch of labour and capital 
from production for domestic consumption to export production. But the relative 
contributions of inputs vs. productivity in rising output in the exports sector are 
unknown.
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Vl.2.2. Price Trends in Exports and Imports
As far as the prices are concerned, there was practically no difference between total 
exports and imports on one hand and for internally-owned exports and imports on the 
other.19 Consequently, discussion of price movements can be confined to these relating to 
total imports and exports. Movements of the exports and imports price indices as 
measured by Laspeyres’ method were very much in tandem until about 1900 (Fig. VI.9). 
Both were relatively stable from 1870 to 1882 after which both indices fell and remained 
at a distinctly lower plateau during 1886 to 1898. In 1902, the exports price index rose 
again, after which it kept rising and in 1913 it was higher than in any of previous sample 
years. By contrast, the imports index in 1902 dropped below the plateau of 1886-98 and 
subsequently only moved up to the reach former plateau level again. This discrepancy in 
the movements of export and import prices between 1902 and 1913 was very favourable 
for Iceland, and it is definitely one of the causes for the expansion in its foreign trade 
after 1900.
It is noteworthy that the great and widespread European price fall that began 
from the mid and the late 1870s onwards did not affect prices in Iceland’s foreign trade 
until after 1882. However, prices in European markets generally went up from the late 
1890s onwards, but import prices of Iceland did not do so to any significant extent. 
Clearly, these are examples of the variations in the international pattern of prices in the 
period, and Iceland apparently fared relatively well in this respect.
The indices also enable us to see more easily than before the main forces behind 
fluctuations in the trade surplus. For example, the downswing in 1886 compared to 1882
19 Table C.BAL/ALL-3.
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was caused by a fall in both prices and volume of trade (Fig. VL9 and VI.6-7 
respectively). Why the outcome for the year 1898 was even worse is also very clear. Not 
only did prices of exports go down and prices of imports move upwards (compared to 
1894), but the volume of exports went down too while the volume of imports went up. In 
short, our indicators for the foreign trade in 1898 had all moved adversely since 1894 
and the results certainly bear this out. Or again, we suggested that the rise in absolute 
trade surplus in 1890, or some time between 1886 and 1890, was more caused by a 
greater volume of exports than higher export prices, and our price and volume indices 
bear this out. Evidently, this was also the case in 1894 when the price indices actually 
fell while the volume indices, especially the export index, rose. The causes for the era of 
prosperity after 1900 also stand out more clearly than ever. Prices of exports rose but 
prices of imports remained practically the same as in the 1890s. Other things being 
equal, these favourable circumstances were bound to lead to prosperity, and the slump in 
1906 was simply a result of over-consumption, because the volume of imports far 
exceeded the volume of exports. Thus, the deficit in 1906 was not a sign of truly slack 
economic conditions as in 1898 or 1886.
Vl.2.3. Terms of Trade: Purchasing Power of Exports
This brings us to discussion about terms of trade, which can be measured in more than 
one way. Earlier, we discussed the movements in gross barter and unit price or net barter 
terms of trade, so I will only recapitulate the main trend in the latter. From the 1870s 
through to the 1890s, the unit price or net barter terms of trade remained practically
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constant. They neither improved nor deteriorated markedly, and this is true whether we 
look at total trade (Fig. VI. 10) or internally-owned merchandise only (Fig. VI.5). 
However, from 1902 onwards the unit price terms of trade greatly improved, primarily 
because of the rising export price index, and the unit price terms of trade from 1902 
onwards were substantially better than at any time before in our sample years. Other 
things being equal, this was conducive to prosperity because export production brought 
increasingly greater returns in units of imports.
However, the best measure of the purchasing power of exports is the income 
terms of trade, for it takes account of both prices and export quantities. This index is a 
measure of the variations in the incomes from exports, i.e., the fluctuations in quantity, 
given the prices of exports and imports at each point in time. Consequently, when 
multiplying the unit price terms of trade with the volume index for exports, we see that 
Iceland’s income terms of trade was actually improving almost constantly from 1870 
onwards and very much so after 1898, when it soared dramatically. Whether this is done 
for total exports and imports or for internally-owned exports and imports only, the result 
is the same (Fig. VI. 11). Consequently, although the unit price terms of trade was 
stationary from 1870 to 1898, the purchasing power of exports rose because export 
quantities increased — suggesting in turn that the Icelandic economy obtained some 
benefit from foreign trade. After 1898, unit price terms of trade started to improve, and 
it no doubt spurred exports whose volume index grew at a faster rate than before (cf. 
Fig. VI.6-7), leading in turn to income terms of trade rocketing. The years between 1898 
and 1913 were clearly a time when the Icelandic economy gained more from foreign 
trade than in any previous period in its history.
Figure _V_Lj/ 0
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Vl.2.4. Gains from the Labour Reallocation: Was the Trade-Off 
for Imports Advantageous?
Until now, we have commented on Iceland’s advantages from her foreign trade over 
time, and we have done this from different points of view. However, we have not 
considered whether the reallocation of labour that took place in the economy (Chapter V) 
brought improvements in standards of living. This is an intriguing issue although it may 
be cumbersome and difficult to quantify such change, and we do not know yet whether 
this shift caused any change in the level of living standards. The core question is this: 
Did it pay off to produce exports instead of importing raw materials and semi­
manufactured goods to process, or using domestic materials, and if so, how much was 
this advantage? A tentative attempt will be made to probe into this matter, if  only to 
underscore the importance to examine Iceland’s gains from trade from this perspective 
too. After all, the full implications of foreign trade for the economy have not been 
realised if the substitution of imports for export production is not discussed, because the 
rise in exports almost certainly was caused by foreign markets and foreign enterprise 
through trade. Furthermore, if this shift was markedly advantageous, then it would give 
foreign trade more weight and importance in the transitory process. Of course, the causal 
relations in the interplay between trade and the economic transformation would still be 
obscure, and I will examine this in Chapters VII and VIII.
First, internally-owned exports and imports per capita were calculated at three 
points of time, that is, in 1870, 1894, and 1913. Changes in the levels of these exports 
and imports in 1870-94 and 1894-1913 naturally reflected the change in export earnings 
and import expenditures respectively. The problem was to find out how much of the
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imports was a compensation for the switch of time from production for internal 
consumption towards production of exports, and how much o f the imports simply was an 
addition, resulting from a greater purchasing power because of the rise in exports 
quantities and possibly favourable terms of trade too. By subtracting expenditure on the 
first type of imports (‘connected’ imports) from exports earnings, it would emerge if and 
how great the advantage from this switch was. It would indicate the change in the 
standard of living as far as the export sector is concerned. Note that since the domestic 
sector is not included in this exercise, the outcome is not a measure of the overall 
standard of living, but only the part of living standard that pertains to external exchange.
In the case of Iceland and given the data at hand, any distinction between 
‘connected’ and ‘disconnected’ imports necessarily is a crude one, and a measurement of 
the standard of living so far back in time should not be taken for a conclusive one. 
However, a crude attempt was made to split imports into two categories according to the 
definition above. It entailed that imports were put in the ‘connected’ category if they 
belonged to any of the commodity groups (raw materials and semi-manufactured goods) 
that were processed in Iceland in 1870 or were a substitution for goods made from 
Icelandic materials in 1870. The residual, ‘unconnected’ imports, was the addition in 
consumption or the net gain from the labour reallocation.
The results from this exercise are produced in Table VI. 1 for examination. It 
shows that the relative share of ‘connected’ imports as of total imports fell over time 
from 40% to 30% between 1870 and 1913, although the economy’s expenditure on 
‘connected’ imports concurrently rose from 20 to 43 kroner per capita. Incidentally, the 
absolute increase in 1870-94 and 1894-1913 was the same, about 12 kroner per capita. 
When these amounts were subtracted from the economy’s exports earnings in the same 
sub-periods, it emerged that the net advantage in absolute terms was about 30 and 23
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kroner in 1870-94 and 1894—1913 respectively. Compared to the initial situation in each 
of these two sub-periods, the advantage amounted to about 60% and 25% improvement 
in export earnings. If  these figures are converted into annual compound growth rate, the 
improvement was 2% and 1% in 1870-94 and 1894-1913 respectively.
Table VI. 1. A Tentative Approximation of the Movements of Standards 
of Living in the Export Sector of Iceland, 1870 to 1913
Kronur/Kroner per capita (1870prices)
1870 1894 1913 1870-94 1894-1913
Exports (Internally Owned) 51 93 128 42 35
Imports (Internally. Owned) 49 84 149 35 65
Connected* in % 40% 37% 29%
Connected in kr. 20 31 43 12 12
Net advantage over period**
Absolute rise 30 23
Total percentage rise 59% 24%
Annual percentage rise 2% 1%
Sources: The New Datasets.
* Percentage of imports connected to the domestic sector in the economy, i.e., raw materials 
and semi-manufactured goods for processing, besides substitution goods. Since the data is 
based on terms of trade calculations, levels of included exports and imports vary between years. 
** Net advantage from the switch from processing for domestic consumption to export 
production, i.e., rise in exports over rise in connected imports.
Putting it differently, the outcome of this tentative exercise suggests that of the 
42 extra kroner per capita gained from increased exports in 1894 (over 1870), about 12 
kr. were a compensation for the switch towards more export production while about 30 
kr. were a real increase in the standard of living or 60% compared with the situation in 
1870. Measured by annual compound rate of growth, this meant 2% increase every year 
between 1870 and 1894. Similarly, of the 35 extra kroner per capita gained from 
increased exports in 1913 (over 1894), about 12 kr. were a compensation for the switch 
towards more export production while about 23 kr. were a real increase in the standard 
of living or 25% compared with the situation in 1894. Measured by annual compound
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rate of growth, this meant 1% increase every year between 1894 and 1913. The overall 
conclusion from this exercise is that even if  these levels actually were higher or lower, it 
suggests that the switch from production for internal consumption towards export 
production was very favourable for Iceland judging by the sub-periods 1870-94 and 
1894-1913.
This outcome of this exercise must be interpreted with care and it needs much 
qualification, one of which is that the distinction between ‘connected’ imports and ‘extra’ 
imports is nowhere clear-cut. For example, some of the coal imported certainly was a 
substitute for domestic fuels, but almost certainly by the far largest part of it was a 
downright addition to previous consumption and not replacing of any internal fuels. 
Conversely, some of the imports assumed to be ‘connected’ partly were an addition to 
previous consumption. But on the whole, I would suggest that the increase in the 
standard of living was not over-estimated, rather on the contrary. Also, the exercise does 
not say anything about costs of production of the exports, which may have changed. If 
costs fell, the advantages was more, but if they rose, the advantages was smaller. Hence, 
when investigating Iceland’s gains from trade, the next logical step from such an exercise 
as presented here would be to examine Iceland’s (single) factoral terms of trade, which 
takes productivity changes into account when measuring export performance. This, 
however, required far more data than was readily available and more time than was for 
allocation here.
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VI.3. Diversification in the Import Trade
Vl.3.1. Iceland’s Trade Surpluses and Deficits by Countries: A 
Shift in its Pattern
One aspect of Iceland’s foreign trade which is of interest is the net balance of trade with 
individual countries. Its value does not only lie in showing the patterns in Iceland’s trade 
surpluses and deficits over time, but rather in the way it reveals in effect an intriguing 
shift in the locus of Iceland’s foreign trade. Apart from that, examining this aspect 
moves us one step closer towards an understanding of the actual transactions of trade, 
i.e., the organisation and change over time. It should, however, be emphasised that trade 
balances with individual countries give us only an elementary understanding of the 
matter. We still do not know how the transportation (shipping) was organised, what 
trading houses or trading associations were doing business with which countries, and 
how trade surpluses and deficits between Iceland’s trading partners (countries) were 
balanced. Since the shipping issue and organisation of business operations abroad are 
beyond the scope of this research, we shall confine our discussion to Iceland’s net 
balance of trade by countries. We shall focus on total exports and imports more than 
internally-owned exports and imports, for here we are concerned with the directions of 
trade flows and balances between them, regardless of the ownership of the merchandise. 
Sometimes, however, we can clarify our description by looking at internally-owned 
merchandise only, and this will be done where appropriate.
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There was a clear pattern in Iceland’s trade balance by countries for a long time 
in our research period, starting in 1870 and lasting until the 1890s.20 In the trade with 
Britain and unspecified countries (the ‘UK and other’) there was always a surplus, and 
this applied also to Spain and Italy. By contrast, there was always a deficit in Iceland’s 
trade with Denmark. Initially, trade with Norway brought a deficit to Iceland, and its 
duration varies by our definition of the trade flows. Measuring total trade, there was a 
deficit in both 1870 and 1874, but measuring internally-owned merchandise only, a 
deficit was merely in 1870. Anyway, from 1870/1874 until 1890 Iceland always had a 
surplus in its trade with Norway, but both the deficits and the surpluses from 1870 to 
1890 were small in any comparison.21 The category ‘other countries’ constitutes an 
interesting case because Iceland’s total trade with these countries produced surpluses for 
Iceland in 1898 to 1902 — before 1898 ‘other countries’ were in the group the ‘UK and 
other’. However, in the three sample years from 1906 to 1913, there was a deficit in the 
first and last year and a surplus in the middle year (in 1910). On the other hand, if 
externally-owned exports and imports are excluded, there was always a trade surplus for 
Iceland in 1898-1902.
This general trade pattern meant that the trade surplus with Britain (by far the 
most important country within the group the ‘UK and other’), ‘other countries,’ and with 
Spain and Italy, was transferred in some form over to Denmark to cover the deficit there. 
In the case of Spain and Italy, it is highly probable that the surplus was transferred at 
least partly through Britain to Denmark as well as directly from the two Mediterranean 
countries to Denmark. The remaining net balance, which produced a surplus for Iceland, 
and the small surplus from Iceland’s trade with Norway was transferred to Iceland, at 
least nominally as our discussion on the storage of trade surpluses showed.
20 Table A.BAL/ALL-1.
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However, this trade pattern went through a radical change, of which the earliest 
signs can be found in 1894. Then, the former trade pattern between Iceland and Norway 
clearly was undergoing change, because this year suddenly produced a relatively large 
surplus for Iceland (over ten times larger than in 1890), which was followed by a 
substantial deficit in 1898. In 1902 the trade with Norway had entered a new era and 
until 1913 total trade was marked by higher surpluses for Iceland than ever in the trade 
between the two countries. Admittedly, by excluding externally-owned merchandise, the 
surpluses become smaller and there was a deficit in 1906. Nevertheless, in the long run 
the internally-owned surpluses from 1902 to 1913 clearly were larger than before 1894, 
and the deficit in 1906 is highly doubtful as we argued above. The second sign of the 
overall shift was that Iceland’s total trade surplus with Britain was far smaller in 1898 
and 1902 than before this time. Moreover, when excluding externally-owned 
merchandise, the year of 1902 showed a significant trade deficit in Iceland’s trade with 
Britain. By 1906 the surplus on Iceland’s total trade with Britain had shifted to a deficit. 
In the case of ‘other countries’ the timing of this change is problematic and varies 
depending on whether we include or exclude externally-owned merchandise. Since 
internally-owned merchandise was more important for the Iceland economy, it seems 
perhaps best to use them as a measure. Then, the change happened between 1902 and 
1906, when surplus shifted to deficit for Iceland. Of all the countries trading with 
Iceland, this overall shift emerged latest in Iceland’s trade with Denmark, and its first 
sign was that in 1906 the usual deficit was only a fraction compared to previous deficits. 
In 1910 it had turned to a surplus for Iceland. In contrast to all these countries, the trade 
balance with Spain and Italy continued to be favourable for Iceland until the end of the 
research period.
21 See Table B.BAL/ALL-2.
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Evidently, no later than in 1894 the circulation of trade flows started to re­
allocate, and this shift was fully completed in 1910. Consequently, the new surplus with 
Denmark, as well as the former surplus with Spain and Italy, was moved over to Britain 
and the category ‘other countries’ to cover Iceland’s deficit with them. Also, what was 
needed of the new surplus in Iceland’s trade with Norway was used to cover the deficit 
with Britain, and the rest was transferred to Iceland.
Vl.3.2. The Nature of the Shift
So far, we have not asked what was the essence o f this overall shift in Iceland’s pattern 
of trade balances by countries from the mid 1890s to the mid 1900s. Were mainly 
destinations of exports changing or was it the origin of imports? To facilitate an 
understanding of this shift, Table VI.2 was produced, and it shows in a schematic form 
when and where the change took place, year by year. With the help of this table, the 
trade flows in each instance were examined on the basis of material presented in 
Chapters IV and V, and the following emerged. Norway stood quite apart among the 
countries trading with Iceland in that the change in net trade balance meant rising 
exports from Iceland. In the case of Britain and the category ‘other countries,’ the 
change meant a relative rise in imports from these countries over exports thereto. Also, 
although the overall rise in imports of Iceland was spectacular after 1900, this relative 
growth in imports over exports from new sources understandably was partly at the 
expense of Denmark, which necessarily had to import a large part of what she re­
exported to Iceland.
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Table VI.2. Points of Timing in the Shift in Iceland’s Trade Pattern 
by Countries, 1894 to 1906
1870-90 1894 1898 1902 1906 1910-13
Norway Surplus Surplus up Deficit Surplus Surplus Surplus






‘Other Countries’ ? ? Surplus Surplus Deficit Deficit
Denmark Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit
down
Surplus
This information suggests that the essence of this shift in Iceland’s trade pattern 
was that the sources of imports diversified. For instance, they clearly shifted from being 
mainly catered for in Denmark and were moved to other countries that were better suited 
to provide Iceland’s imports in a more direct and less expensive way. After all, since the 
mid 19th century Britain had been a kind of European centre for marketing and 
transporting commodities and buying goods that came practically from all over the 
world. The cities of Britain had regular communication with market places in and 
outside Europe, and huge, world-wide, financial transactions were made there.22 Also, 
Germany, which had advanced manufacturing industries, was included in the category 
‘other countries,’ and rising salt imports from this category raises the question whether 
Spain was not starting to supply Iceland with this commodity (see Fig. V.41).
Although the diversification in the import trade partly consisted of more direct 
business connections with the producers of Iceland’s imports, this is not the only 
conceivable type of diversification that possibly took place in Iceland’s import trade. 
Assuming that composition of demand remains the same, import trade of a country can 
diversify when existing foreign producers enter new markets or when new foreign
22 S.B. Saul provides a lucid illustration of Britain’s central role in world trade in my research 
period in his Studies in British Overseas Trade, pp 43-5.
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producers simply enter the scene. If  composition of demand changes in economy, an 
additional source of diversification is the emergence of existing or new producers 
penetrating a market with their new products. It is plausible to assume that in the case of 
Iceland, where demand partly remained the same and partly became more multifarious 
after 1900, these three types of diversification were also at work in the import trade of 
Iceland. In any case, the possible sources of diversification are many, and in the light of 
this, the new trend in Iceland’s import trade is no wonder.
Given this trend towards diversification in the sources of Iceland’s imports and 
clear tendency towards trading more directly with the producers of Iceland’s imports, it 
is noteworthy that about half of Iceland’s imports from Denmark in 1910 and 1913 still
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were re-exports.23 Unfortunately, there is not information about this for previous years, 
but the relative share of re-exports probably was higher still. In any case, the saltfish 
finally went its customary route to Spain and Italy, and the transportation of the saltfish 
from Iceland to Denmark rather than Britain must have been a considerable cost 
increasing factor, because geographically Denmark was not on the shipping route from 
Iceland to the Mediterranean countries. This suggests that although Iceland made a 
progress in her import trade with the introduction of this shift in her trade pattern, there 
was some way to go until she had efficiently re-allocated her sources of imports.
Furthermore, given the diversification in Iceland’s import trade, it is noteworthy 
that the same change did not happen in Iceland’s export trade. The most conspicuous 
example of this is the saltfish sales where Denmark substantially increased its share in 
the saltfish exports from Iceland after 1902. Knowledge of the final markets for other 
commodities, such as wool and fish oil and tallow, prevents me from saying anything 
about whether or not the trend was similar there. But given the importance of saltfish 
among Iceland’s export staples, this rise in saltfish exports to Denmark is of major 
significance and suggests that most other exports were subject to similar trend. In any 
case, the reason why saltfish exports, and presumably the entire export trade, did not 
undergo the same change as the import trade probably is that existing business relations 
and those who had vested interests in maintaining status quo were too strong for 
potential newcomers in the saltfish branch to compete with them or attract business. On 
the other hand, established producers or merchants always had the possibility of entering 
new markets with Icelandic saltfish, for instance, Greece, Portugal, or the South 
American markets. Why this did not happen in our research period was probably caused 
by effective control through existing business relations and vested interests in the
23 See Denm., State Bur. of Stat., Dcmmarks Vareindfersel og -Udfersel 1910, pp 206-7, and
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middlemanship. This barrier was difficult for Icelanders to overcome because of lack of 
experience, knowledge, and capital, and no doubt also because of ignorance o f lucrative 
business potentials. Besides, saltfish for South America and Portugal, and possibly 
Greece too, required different drying and packaging. This probably is a part of the 
explanation too.
The dissimilar trends in Iceland’s export and import trade raise the question 
whether this shift in Iceland’s trade balances by countries simply was diversification in 
the import trade, or whether it also meant a kind of division between these two principal 
branches in Iceland’s foreign trade in that they started to be run by different different 
merchant houses. This is remarked because the trends can be interpreted as suggesting 
the emergence of very different business interests and objectives among owners of firms 
in the export trade on one hand and in the import trade on the other hand. O f course, it is 
possible that existing merchants and merchant houses in the Iceland trade simply 
diversified their purchases of imports while they continued their customary practices 
when selling exports. On the other hand, it is possible that the established merchant 
houses started to concentrate more in exports than imports, and that the diversification in 
the import trade is mainly due to the emergence of new competitors who used new 
sources in their purchases of imports. Unfortunately, it seems impossible to produce any 
hard and fast evidence to support either of the two suggestions. Similarly, neither the 
economic history literature nor the findings in the thesis so far suggest or imply any 
plausible explanation for this diversification in Iceland’s import trade. Nor do they offer 
any explication of the implications for Iceland’s foreign trade and the economy. Hence, 
we know nothing definite about the causes or the timing of this shift. However, Chapter 




My examination of some of the main trends in the overall trade flows in the present 
chapter shows that a substantial change happened in Iceland’s foreign trade in the 
research period. More important, however, the findings suggest that a considerable shift 
happened in the economy also. It seems to have started in the late 1890s, and while some 
of its impact was felt immediately, the shift was not fully over until the late 1900s, when 
a new era clearly had begun. The key element of this shift seems to be a kind of 
reorientation of economic resources and revenues. The fall in the rate of growth of the 
volume of exports per capita is perhaps the clearest indication of this, because it means 
that resources were directed from production of exports towards the domestic sector. But 
decreasing trade surpluses relative to value of exports also shows that the economy was 
using its surplus increasingly on imports rather just accumulating it over time. Further to 
this, judging by investigation of the movements in Iceland’s gross barter terms of trade it 
appears that before the shift Iceland’s trade surplus was stored away from the economy, 
but there are signs that it may have been increasingly paid out in hard cash after the shift 
began.
All of these trade indicators show a very important reorientation in the economy 
and a major shift in economic policy. Why this happened is, however, obscure as of yet. 
However, it is highly unlikely that the economy was in some way pushed into this new 
pattern, so one has to search for pull factors within the economy. Foreign markets
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possibly contributed to this shift in that price trends were very favourable after 1900 as 
Iceland’s net barter terms of trade show. Nevertheless, this improvement was of little use 
unless the economy benefited from trade surplus in some form. Rising imports certainly 
were one way to carry the benefits of trade into the economy, but given the suggestion 
that the trade surplus was not paid out in cash until possibly the late 1890s onwards, it 
raises the question if rising imports thereafter were a way to get the surplus transferred 
into the economy because merchants still largely refused to pay the surplus out in cash.
Be it as it may, these explanations are, nevertheless, far from satisfactory, and 
they do not explain the timing of this shift. Concerning the timing, the diversification in 
the imports trade immediately comes for consideration, but this diversification rather was 
a consequence than a cause of the reorientation in the economy. The most plausible 
explanation for this reorientation of economic resources and revenues is of monetary 
nature, in particular printing of money, and net inflow of foreign credit and of factor 
payments. These elements were found to influence the movements in Iceland’s gross 
barter terms of trade in the late 1890s onwards, and they offer a highly relevant and 
satisfactory explanation. However, it remaines to be established whether or not they were 
circulating in the economy in large enough quantities and that there was a definite shift in 
their levels before and after the shift that was idenfitied in the present chapter. My 
examination did not produce any systematic information about these issues, and some of 
them will be examined in Chapter VIII where the discussion will be continued.
Chapter VII 
The Impact of Foreign Trade on the Icelandic 
Economy 1: Main Effects of Trade Flows
VII.1. Methodological Remarks
In Chapters IV to VI, I surveyed exports and imports from a variety of perspectives. In 
this present chapter and the next, I will offer a basic examination of the impact of foreign 
trade on the Iceland economy. At the outset, I would like to restate that the main purpose 
of the thesis is to test the relevance of foreign trade for the economic transition of 
Iceland. In doing so, I chose to focus on the implications of trade for the economy, rather 
than trying to explain the economic transition with reference to trade. The outcome of the 
two approaches may not necessarily be entirely different, but the method of investigation 
is. In any case, by placing the viewpoint from within foreign trade, I am not necessarily 
explaining the economic transition as such. After all, this is only one of other possible 
viewpoints. To analyse the economic transition in its entirety and incorporate the 
findings and conclusions of the present research is a second stage. The first stage is to 
see what foreign trade can tell us about the transition. Since there has been no proper 
research on the foreign trade, this must be the first step and it is taken in this present 
thesis. Nevertheless, in the conclusions chapter I will discuss the key findings and offer a
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preliminary assessment of the relative significance of trade for the economic transition on 
the basis of existing knowledge about it.
In the examination of the impact of foreign trade, two main aspects will be 
discussed — first the material content or substance of trade (the trade flows), and second 
the informal and formal institutional framework of trade. The next chapter, however, will 
focus on the institutional impact of trade, that is links from institutions of foreign trade 
(tacit and written rules, and legislation) to changes in prices (competition) and to 
macroeconomic changes. This present chapter will deal with the material impact of 
trade, that is links from trade flows to changes in patterns of production, consumption, 
and exchange in the economy. Although I touch on living standards here, I shall do so 
indirectly only, because I do not employ any particular measure for them. Consequently, 
macroeconomic changes will be in focus.
VII.2. Potentially Strategic Trade Flows in Terms of 
the Economic Transformation of Iceland
In my examination of exports in Chapter IV, I suggested that saltfish exports and five 
sheep sales had possibly been of strategic importance for the economy. This was because 
live sheep exports were intrinsically linked to the supply of various other exports 
(mutton, wool, and woollens), besides food and materials for domestic production. Also, 
live sheep exports meant new business patronage, usually better terms of trade, and 
considerable inflow of money into a money-scarce economy. As for saltfish, a shift in the
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division of work in cod fishing and curing was considered potentially important. Of all 
the exports of Iceland, these two export trades were identified as requiring further 
investigation in relation to the economy, and this will be done below. Of the most 
important finding concerning imports in Chapter V was that they witnessed labour 
reallocation in the economy in the 1880s onwards. This was evident in the decline in 
imports of raw and crude materials for processing in Iceland, while semi and fully 
processed products were increasingly imported, some of which replaced Icelandic 
products made of domestic materials.
In the previous chapter, I claimed that there were almost certainly strong causal 
links between the rise in exports and shifts in the composition of imports. In this chapter, 
I hope to demonstrate that patterns of exchange in the economy were radically altered, 
and that marked shifts in production and consumption occurred too. Furthermore, I hope 
to show that these changes were caused primarily by changes in the export sector, and 
precisely these changes in turn activated the new patterns in imports. So, there was a 
causal sequence from exports to the economy and back to imports. The demonstration of 
these links entails an examination of changes in two of the export trades that we 
suggested might be influential, namely the live sheep trade and the saltfish trades.
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VII.3. The Live Sheep Trade and its Economic 
Implications
The economic implications of the live sheep sales are perhaps best explained by shortly 
describing the linkages of pre-existing purposes of raising sheep, namely to slaughter 
them and use the food and materials for export and domestically. For background 
information about my research method, which involves a synthesised employment of the 
general linkages approach and the economic determinants model, I refer to Chapter HI. I 
recommend Fig. IH.3 and LH.5 in that chapter for consultation, because they give a 
succinct diagrammatic presentation of the method.
The breeding of sheep did not produce any backwards linkages in the economy 
because there were no major domestic industries providing inputs for peasants. Given the 
level of technology and prevailing methods in farming at the time, there was no need for 
much producer goods or services in sheep breeding, and peasants reproduced their sheep 
with lambs that they bred themselves. Similarly, there were neither backwards linkages 
of the outwards type. Forwards linkage from sheep breeding did not exist, because the 
most of the slaughtering and all the processing of food and materials for domestic use 
was done at the homes of peasants and by themselves and their work people. Hence, no 
industries existed taking care of this activity. Consumption linkage did of course exist, 
because peasants needed a suitable type of land and location for the sheep breeding, 
labour in the form of hired work people or own family members, and they themselves 
comprised the entrepreneurial element. Requirements for money capital were not doubt 
small, but peasants needed other types of capital, mainly in the form of buildings or 
some kind of shelter, besides food (hay). When peasants sold the products individually to
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their merchant, they had to drive the sheep on foot to the port of trade where the 
merchant had his station, sometimes over long distances that took its toll on the animals. 
Then they had to slaughter the sheep and take back those items of the animal that the 
merchant did not want but the peasant could use. All this demanded, among other things, 
time, the services of several men and food for them, as well as horses. On top of this, 
there were no proper facilities for slaughtering, and the mutton could never be a good 
quality merchandise.1
Analysing the live sheep sales in a similar way, they understandably did not 
mean any change in backwards or forwards linkages, that is, they did not entail their 
formation. However, it emerges that exportation of live sheep required some change in 
consumption linkage. What was identical in previous practices of sheep raising and in 
the lives sheep sales in terms of this type of linkage was the use of the entrepreneurial 
element and utilisation of ‘land.’ But there was some difference in labour and capital 
utilisation. This is because selling the sheep alive was a much less troublesome and 
cheaper way of disposing of these assets of peasants. Instead of taking all the trouble just 
described, they could drive their sheep to an arranged place that the prospective buyers 
had advertised in time. There, they would take the dealers’ bids if it suited them, 
provided that they were not forced to sell because of some urgent need for income. The 
buyers usually took care of the sheep after the purchase, driving them to shore and 
putting aboard ship.2 Thereby, farmers saved themselves expenditure in terms of labour 
and capital (money, use of horses, etc.).
From the point of view of this research and with reference to the linkages 
approach, live sheep sales had certain interesting consequences, because the sales meant
1 Jon Sigurdsson, Sigurdur i Yztafelli, pp 116-17. Cf. Sveinbjom Blondal, Saudasalan til 
Bretlands, p 37.
2 Sveinbjom Blondal, Saudasalan til Bretlands, p 37.
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that if the sheep were exported live, peasants missed materials and food which they 
otherwise would have had from the animal. They could counter the situation by 
increasing the stock of sheep, and it did indeed grow in the long run (see Chapter IV). 
But there was a fall in the stock in the mid 1880s, and the live sheep exports were 
irregular so there was no perfect match between the stock and the exports. Therefore, it 
is logical to assume that there were times when the local supply of materials from sheep 
was small, or contracted. Their shortage presumably tended to push up imports for 
compensation. The loss of wool and, indirectly, woollens may have been substituted for 
by imports of textiles from cotton and linen, imported cereals may have come in place of 
mutton to some extent, and margarine probably was increasingly consumed instead of 
tallow. In fact, the trade data in the new datasets clearly bears this out in 1890 and 
1894, both of which had comparatively very large live sheep exports.
Furthermore, if there were occasional shortages of traditional exchange goods, 
then inland peasant people were likely to reduce their barter with coastal people to keep 
enough for themselves. However, since coastal people were still a relatively small 
fraction of the population in the 1880s and around 1890, any change in their 
consumption of imports does not come through in my trade data. One would need to 
examine household expenditures or imports of coastal people specifically to test this 
suggestion. In theory, inland peasants could have continued domestic barter if they had 
used the money they acquired from live sheep sales to pay for the fish from seaside 
people.' But this may not have been feasible for either inland peasants, because money 
was a scarce good, or coastal people if sheep products became more expensive in 
absolute terms or relative to imported substitution products. Note that this was the 
general trend of prices for each group of people. Whichever the case was, it inevitably 
pushed both parties into more imports than before. Furthermore, since greater imports
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required greater exports in return, the outcome no doubt tended to push up exports of 
fish products by coastal people and agricultural products by inland people. Incidentally, 
this trend in exports and imports, and declining traditional domestic barter, was 
catalysed by shifts in the fisheries’ sector, and they will be discussed below in relation to 
the saltfish trades.
Analysing the five sheep sales with the economic determinants model, it is safe 
to say that the sales brought two novelties in the institutional context of foreign trade 
and, thereby, the economy. One novelty was that the sheep were partly paid for in hard 
cash whereas regular merchants in the Iceland trade used to credit sheep owners’ 
accounts at their shops. For many a sheep owner this no doubt was the main attraction of 
the live sheep trade. For example, for people who wanted to emigrate, selling live sheep 
was perhaps the only way to acquire money to pay the fare to America. However, the 
general rule of money exchange for live sheep needs to be qualified, because sometimes 
live sheep were exchanged for goods. Most live sheep were exported through British 
merchants or merchants based in Britain. Their role in the five sheep trade had one of 
two forms. Initially, the British merchants who started this business bought sheep at their 
own risk and for their own account, and they continued to do this until the business was 
terminated effectively. Fairly quickly, Icelandic peasants began to take part in this 
business by various means, and they soon contracted British-based merchants as agents 
for them to sell the sheep abroad. The British merchants buying for their own account 
usually paid in money (seldom in goods), but the Icelandic peasants quickly began to use 
their agents to buy their imports from the revenues of the sheep sales in Britain. Danish 
merchant houses operating in Iceland sometimes participated in the live sheep business 
too, but they probably always paid with credits in the customer’s account, not money. 
Incidentally, Icelandic historians do not agree how important the money inflow was for 
the Iceland economy. Sveinbjom Blondal, who has examined the live sheep trade more
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extensively than any other historian, claims that it was not as important for increasing 
the supply of money in Iceland as some older historians maintained. However, this 
remains an unsettled issue and I will come back to this matter in the next chapter when I 
discuss inflows of money generally.
The acquisition of money was important for a money-scarce economy, but the 
barter exchange in the live sheep trade should not be underestimated, for in terms of the 
institutional framework of foreign trade it formed the other novelty of the live sheep 
trade. The reason is that goods from Britain proved to be 20-30% cheaper and often of 
better quality than goods sold by Danish merchant houses in Iceland. Therefore, whether 
the sales values of sheep were instantly converted to goods in Britain or ordered 
separately later, people made bargain purchases by taking their returns in British goods. 
This practice truly was a novelty of some importance because this way of getting 
imported goods meant an effective competition with regular merchants in the Iceland 
trade. The significance of this practice was that it supplied the Icelanders and the 
Icelandic trading associations engaged in this exchange both business and good-will that 
tended to undermine the hegemony of the Danish merchant houses, because they lost 
custom.
In conclusion, the analysis of the live sheep sales with the general linkages 
approach and the economic determinants model shows that the effects on the economy 
were noteworthy, and in fact somewhat greater than customarily believed judging by the 
literature. The change in the intensity of labour and capital utilisation was small in 
comparison with other implications of the five sheep sales, and it seems to have been 
broadly recognised. However, their impact on the pattern of consumption in imports and 
on traditional domestic barter have been identified in the literature. On balance,
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therefore, the live sheep sales had somewhat greater implications for the economy than 
realised hitherto.
VII.4. The Economic Impact of the Influential Fall in 
Prices of Saltfish in the 1880s
Vll.4.1. The Start of the Fresh Fish Trade
In Chapter IV, the rise of the fresh fish trade was commented upon in relation to saltfish 
exports. The innovation meant that merchants bought the fish fresh, and took over its 
salting and curing, instead of buying it already cured from fish owners. As will be 
argued below, the fresh fish trade was influential for the development of the economy. 
Therefore, it is of some relevance to ascertain why it started. In contrast to the five sheep 
trade, whose origin is clear, a convincing explanation of the start of fresh fish trade has 
been wanting in the literature. Recently, historians have tried to explain it and identified 
somewhat different causes. In the light of my findings based on the new trade data, these 
suggestions have missed the key cause, and this new explanation will be advanced here. 
So, before I analyse the implications of the fresh fish trade, I must shortly digress and 
discuss the origins of this innovation.
Until recently, historians have been curiously uninterested in the matter and Gisli 
Kristjansson in 1985 was probably the first to pay attention to this problem. He referred 
to the economic difficulties of Icelanders in the 1880s and, thus, concluded that the fresh
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fish trade had been caused by the need of merchants to ensure that they would get 
Icelandic products in return for imports that they had supplied in advance.3 Valdimar 
Unnar Valdimarsson and the present author, in a work on saltfish production, did not 
concede to Gisli’s explanation for the start of the fresh fish trade. Instead they pointed 
out that the fresh fish trade exemplified a growing specialisation in Icelandic economy. 
All the while a few Icelandic firms were getting larger and diversifying their activities.4 
Merchants had increasingly started to enter the business of fitting out fishing ships and 
to get involved in the saltfish production. Along with a general expansion in the foreign 
trade of Iceland, this had been conducive for a growing interest among merchants in 
curing fish that was independently caught by fishermen.5 Also, it had made economies 
of scale for merchants to cure not only their own fish but also to buy fresh fish from 
others.6 Finally, they claimed that a growing competition among merchants pushed them 
into fresh fish trade.7
3 Gisli Kristjansson, ‘Verslunarbylting 19. aldar,’ p 27. I quote: ‘I upphafi spruttu 
blautfiskkaupin af J>6rf verslana fyrir ad taka gjaldvoru baenda sem tryggingu fyrir utlanum 
f ) e g a r  hagur beirra Jjrengdist. Kaupfelagsmenn toldu bessi nyst&rlegu vidskipti dasmigerd fyrir 
verslunarolagid i heradinu og litu a Jaau sem neydarurraedi, sem leiddi af hardindunum.’ By 
‘hardindi’ he does not seem to be referring to domestic circumstances only or mainly, because 
a few lines earlier he says: ‘Blautfiskverslunin og Kaupfelagid lysa olikum vidbrogdum 
kaupmanna og baenda vid erfidleikum 1 versluninni a 9. dratugnum. Kaupfelagid atti ad baeta 
hag baenda med J>vi ad faera beim agodann af versluninni. Blautfiskvidskiptunum var hins 
vegar aetlad ad baeta hag kaupmanna med bvi ad faera beim fiskinn.’ There, Gisli seems to be 
referring just as well to market difficulties as to domestic circumstances. He may implicitly be 
referring to, for instance, the heavy fell in prices of fish oil in the early 1880s (see my trade 
data).
4 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur i sogu pjodar I, pp 77, 170. 
This statement may seem contradictory in terms but the correct understanding rests on the 
viewpoint taken. Companies that grew and took over more steps in the process did not preclude 
that they sub-contracted others for certain tasks that meant specialisation for them in turn.
5 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur i sogu pjodar I, pp 75, 185- 
6.
6 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur i sogu pjodar I, pp 75, 77.
7 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur I sogu pjodar I, p 77.
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Plausible as these observations are, they do not explain the timing of the fresh 
fish trade. Why did it start in the late 1880s, but not earlier or later? Gisli’s reference to 
the general hardships in the 1880s does not fully qualify as a proper explanation for the 
timing, because he speaks rather vaguely about the exact causes. The question of timing 
is all the more interesting because the beginning appears to be rather abrupt. The first 
evidence about this arrangement dates from 1887, and it is commented on as a brand 
new practice.8 Gisli says that the first evidence for the western part of Iceland dates from 
the winter 1886-87.9 This suggests that the cause was relatively sudden and that it 
emerged right in the mid 1880s. The only unusual or new development in the saltfish 
branch that can be identified at that time is a massive price fall. If  the selected market 
prices of saltfish that were graphed in Fig. IV.24 in Chapter IV are examined over time, 
something remarkable comes through, as will be explained.
Focusing first on the pre-1886 period, we see that import and export prices of 
saltfish in Denmark, of which 75-80% came from Iceland, were remarkably close to the 
fob prices in Iceland. Since freight and insurance, besides export duty, are included in 
the import prices, this suggests that the Iceland merchants made negligible profits or 
even outright losses on the saltfish business. Although merchants were keen on saltfish 
and Icelandic producers tried to push up their prices, it is not clear how producers 
managed to fetch such high prices from merchants. Also, how merchants coped with 
these high prices is an interesting question, and a part of the explanation probably is that 
Icelandic saltfish amost certainly was usually merely transshipped or temporary put in 
bonded warehouses before being shipped to the Mediterranean countries. The small 
difference in import and export prices of saltfish in Denmark supports this explanation.
8 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur I sogu pjodar I, pp 75-6.
9 Gisli Kristjansson, ‘Vershmarbylting 19. aldar,’ p 27.
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Hence, merchants could engage in the saltfish trade with relatively small margins. 
However, in case they lost on the saltfish business, they could take it out on either lower 
purchase prices of other exports or higher margins on imports (see a discussion about 
over-pricing in Chapter VIII). This pattern, however, changed in 1886 when the situation 
became very abnormal. Then, both Denmark’s import and export prices fell far below 
fob prices of saltfish in Iceland. Taking freight, insurance, and export duty into account, 
merchants made huge losses, at least 35% of the DMW price in Iceland, which is 
roughly fob price less export duty (see Appendix A). On top of this, Icelanders were 
going through hardships in the 1880s owing to epidemics and natural disasters, which 
almost certainly increased their debts with merchants.10 This meant that merchants’ net 
balance of exchange with Icelanders was negative, or unusually negative. Consequently, 
this aggravated the financial losses from the saltfish business.
Moving on to the post-1886 period, a new pattern emerges, because import and 
export prices of saltfish in Denmark usually were considerably higher than the fob prices 
in Iceland. Clearly, the pre-1886 situation was altered and there usually was a ‘natural’ 
price gap between fob prices of saltfish in Iceland and its import and export prices in 
Denmark. Indeed, export and import price levels of Denmark are out of line with other 
price series in 1894. But this no doubt is linked to the fact that Icelandic saltfish already 
in 1892 became subject to lower import duty than, for instance, Norwegian saltfish, and 
this seems to have benefited Danish saltfish exporters greatly. This leaves the question 
what happened around 1886 that produced the ‘natural’ price gap in the case of 
Icelandic saltfish, because the price fall in itself does not explain that. This will be 
commented on shortly below, but the main point for my argument is this : If  the start of 
the fresh fish trade was associated with the price fall of 1886, how exactly were the two
10 S. Thomsen, ‘Thomsensverslun,’ part 2, p 10 (graph).
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phenomena related? If the situation of merchants is considered, it is obvious that the 
fresh fish trade was a perfectly understandable reaction on their behalf to the price fall. 
They had every good reason to resort to it, because when they bought the fish fresh 
instead of cured, merchants in fact solved several problems at a time and gained an 
additional advantage.
• First, merchants produced a far larger price range for them to operate within because 
wet fish had a much lower price than cured fish. Thereby, they reduced their risk of 
net losses in case market prices went significantly down (as in 1886).
• Second, they escaped the situation of being put up to the wall by fish owners (mainly 
seaside peasants) in terms of price and quantity as had often happened before. 
Possibly, this may explain why export prices of Icelandic saltfish were so close to 
Danish import and export prices. Even though fish owners wanted to sell their fish, 
sources suggest that they may have had a better bargaining position than merchants.11 
In any case, with their own production merchants not only became more independent 
from Icelandic fish owners in getting fish to sell, they could now steer the curing and 
influence the point of time when the fish was fully dried, and they also got more 
control of the quality of the fish curing.
• Third, they were able to manage their credit extensions more effectively than before. 
They got fish in return much sooner in the calendar year, and possibly extended less 
credit because of lower value of the wet fish. Thus, they could reduce the period of 
credit advances and lower the maximum amount of such advances. Also, the 
merchants now avoided taking the risk of a bad drying season, depending on others 
for the curing and extending credit all the time. Previously, merchants extended
11 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur / sogu pjodar I,
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credits in hope of some future return (fish) that sometimes, e.g., on grounds of a bad 
weather, turned out to be of less value than the advances. Now, the issue of credit 
extensions did not mingle with affairs of the curing.
• Fourth, they avoided more easily cartels, which could be a double-edged sword. 
While they paid lip service to agreements for keeping the purchase price at a fixed 
point, to get fish and outsmart the others in the cartel, some broke it secretly by 
offering higher bids or accepting higher offers. If they were loyal to the cartel, those 
who broke the agreement would outsmart them. True, provided that the cartels held, 
there were advantages to be gained, and merchants formed cartels from time to time, 
but they seem not have been very successful always.12
• Finally, as a result of the fresh fish trade, they took over the curing which in turn 
demanded more capital in their business. On the other hand, they transferred the value 
added from the curing from their customers into their own hands. That was one the 
main asset of the fresh fish trade for merchants.
When these advantages are considered, is understandable why so many merchants 
became keen about this arrangement. Its abrupt beginning and the efficiency of 
merchants in introducing this novelty may come as a surprise, but merchants merely had 
to deny selling salt to fishermen to compel them to deliver the fish wet. Gisli Kristjansson 
describes how merchants in Vestfirdir seized the opportunity and put up facilities to 
improve their access to the fish in uncured state.13 And the eagerness of some merchants
12 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur I sogu pjodar I, pp 73—4.
13 Gisli Kristjansson, ‘Verslunarbylting 19. aldar,’ p
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in Reykjavik for fresh fish launched one of the first criticism of a socialist (an 
intellectual) in Iceland on merchants (capitalists).14
Vll.4.2. The Economic Implications of the Fresh Fish Trade
Having established the principal cause of the fresh fish trade, I now turn to its economic 
implications. The change with the advent of the fresh fish trade is perhaps best grasped 
by shortly describing the initial circumstances with reference to the economic 
determinants model, and I will do so before plunging into the implications of the change. 
The utilisation of the ‘land’ element for curing the saltfish was dispersed in that fish 
owners among fishermen were spread unevenly along the coast of Iceland, and so was 
the location of the curing process (see also Chapter IV). In the urban areas, however, the 
people who owned the fish usually deployed small plots, often nearby their houses, for 
drying the fish. Utilisation of the labour element was usually on a small scale because 
the fish owners with assistance of their family members took care of the curing 
themselves. In some of the urban areas, at least in Reykjavik, there also existed a 
putting-out system where the fish owner, usually a merchant or a fishing ship owner 
(often one and the same person), contracted people on the basis of piece work. In those 
cases, the fish was brought to the homes of the people who was hired, cured in these 
small plots by the family members, and when the fish was fully cured, it was returned 
back to the fish owner who remunerated the person in charge of the curing process. 
Consequently, this required a low level of technology (perhaps a wheelbarrow and/or a
14 See Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur i sogu pjodar I, pp 75-
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horse), and negligible investments in terms of money capital. From the point of view of 
the institutional element, this arrangement evidently harmonised well with the general 
low level of technology and capital in the economy, traditional social relations in rural 
and urban areas, and posed no threat whatsoever for the farming sector.
In terms of the general linkages approach, the introduction of the fresh fish trade 
understandably made small difference compared to previous arrangement in curing 
saltfish. This was because the fresh fish trade essentially meant a ‘mere’ involvement of 
a different agent in the curing process, that is, merchants instead of fishermen. Hence, 
backward linkages of the industry did not change (making of lines, ropes, and nets, etc.), 
and since saltfish was and remained an export commodity above all, the fresh fish trade 
brought no change in forward linkages, that is, did not initiate further processing of 
saltfish after drying. The main impact of the fresh fish trade in terms of the general 
linkages approach was in consumption linkages, and given the nature of this shift, the 
economic determinants model is far better suited to analyse the nature of the fresh fish 
trade and the novelty it presented.
From the point of view of the economic determinants model, the fresh fish trade 
constituted a substantial novelty in the economy. Starting with the ‘land’ element, there 
occurred a location concentration in the curing. Since merchants were located in the 
ports of entry (hamlets or small villages), they wanted to have the fish cured in their 
vicinity, usually in the ports of entry. Furthermore, as time passed and their activities in 
the curing process increased, spatial concentration within the ports grew. Merchants 
needed large and relatively good fields to dry the fish in the sun, and some space for their 
storage buildings, preferably close to the shore. This was a considerable change from the 
small plots described above.
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With regard to the labour element, there also happened as substantial change. As 
long as merchants merely cured fish from fishermen already living in or nearby the 
respective ports of entry, their population growth rate was not much affected. But the 
fact that urbanisation accelerated greatly around 1890 onwards suggests that merchants 
catalysed urbanisation in Iceland. When merchants involved themselves with fishing by 
decked sailing vessels, this trend was accelerated. But probably more important than 
involvement of merchants in fishing was the stimulus that their expansion into the curing 
process, that is, the introduction of the fresh fish trade, had on attracting people (not 
least women) to the respective ports of entry. True, people was partly pushed out of the 
countryside at the time because of low living standards (see the discussion about the 
ecological crisis in Chapter II), but the mass emigration to America fell in the early 
1890s, which is a witness to improving livelihood in the fishing sector. Hence, the 
introduction of merchants into the curing process meant a substantial location 
concentration (urbanisation) in the population distribution, as Valdimar Unnar and the 
present author have pointed out. Incidentally, Magnus S. Magnusson seems to focus 
predominantly on the role of decked sailing vessels in breaking the umbilical cord 
between the farming and the fishing sector, that is creating urban proletariat, but in our 
view, the fresh fish trade was far more important. Although we have no estimates of the 
number of people in the curing process and on board the vessels, sources suggest to us 
that the curing process occupied larger numbers.15
After the fresh fish trade began, merchants no doubt employed more men to 
work for them on permanent (annual) basis, but most of the people they wanted for 
saltfish curing were hired on the basis of piece work. Even so, this relatively unstable
15 As co-author and editor of Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson’s Saltfiskur I sogu pjodar, vol. 1- 
2, I read through all the primary sources and literature used in the work. My impression 
concerning the relative importance of the fresh fish trade and the decked sailing vessels in 
creating urban labour is based on that reading.
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employment offered many people considerable, if not stable, income. As merchants 
expanded their activity in the curing process, this gave ever more people a chance to seek 
a comparatively viable livelihood in the ports of entry. Effectively, merchants moved the 
single most important barrier to rapid urban growth (see the discussion about the labour 
bondage in Chapter II). After all, community authorities did not object to in-migration 
as long as people could sustain themselves, and the outright demand of merchants for 
work people plainly reduced the chance of people falling on poor relief or being sent to 
their home communities. Even if local authorities in the largest urban places were 
sometimes in trouble controlling such an inflow of people and establishing whether they 
could sustain themselves or not, there is no doubt that the demand of merchants for work 
people contributed to the growth of urban areas and decline of the farming sector. Note 
that although the merchants’ need for labour was seasonal, they needed people for the 
curing process in the spring and summer, which was the high season in the farming 
sector. Hence, people’s migration, temporary or not, to the coast meant a break away 
from the farming communities to interchangeable urban work and rural day labour (Icel. 
kaupamennska). In other words, the population element in arrival of the fresh fish trade 
was to create a significant pull factor in the coastal urban areas, thus removing the 
principal barrier to urban settlements and, thereby, pose a serious threat to the farming 
sector in terms of labour requirements.
Concerning the capital element, including the technology determinant, we can 
identify considerable changes there too. Saltfish production on a larger scale than before 
was bound to produce some economies of scale sooner or later, especially where 
merchants were suitably located, both locationally and spatially. This is the reason for 
the introduction of various technical improvements in terms of facilities in the saltfish 
curing. Besides having drying fields of various sorts adjusted or prepared, the largest
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merchant houses made facilities to assist the use of fresh water or sea for fish washing, 
had rail tracks laid on their premises for manually-driven fish carriages, built business 
offices and storage houses, and sometimes piers too. The first telegraphic wire in Iceland 
was put up by merchants to improve communication between their locations and a fish 
washing-machine was even experimented with, but it did not prove economical. All this 
investment in technological facilities in saltfish curing was unthinkable until big 
businesses (merchants) involved themselves into it. Furthermore, these investments 
required not only labour but skilled craftsmen, both for the building of these facilities 
and their maintenance. Evidently, the investments demanded money capital that was 
either taken from merchants’ own deposits or as loans, almost certainly in Denmark. But 
with the progress of banking in Iceland over time, capital requirements of merchants 
were increasingly satisfied in Iceland and rise of banking no doubt was partly spurred by 
these developments in the fishing sector.
The merchants’ step into saltfish curing and their business-related investments 
caused considerable alterations in the institutional setting in Iceland, the fourth element 
of the economic determinants model. This was because the social the hegemony of 
merchants grew further still. As the largest, if not the only, employers in their places, 
they possessed an extraordinary strong social and economic power after the fresh fish 
trade began. Their power was as much a consequence of being the largest employers as 
being in the position to control people’s consumption and living standards through truck 
system. The huge difference between them and the foreign enterprises in Iceland, 
especially herring businessmen who hired a lot of people, was that the foreigners paid in 
hard cash. By contrast, merchants in Iceland paid for all day work and piece work with 
goods in their stores, and it was no secrecy that imports were exchanged at a higher rate 
in return for labour than for goods (Icelandic products). As happens, the truck system
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probably existed before in Iceland, but the rise in the importance of this system, which 
has been described as the deployment of unscrupulous business methods, was 
concomitant with the start of the fresh fish trade.16
The rise in the importance of the truck system not only had implications for 
social division, because traditional exchange patterns in the Icelandic economy were 
substantially changed too. Already in the early 1890s, urban working people was 
complaining that the truck system prevented them from engaging in customary exchange 
with inland peasants. Instead, the people were compelled to buy Icelandic products as 
well as imports from their employers (merchants) whatever their price, and it usually 
was higher when exchanged for labour than for Icelandic products for export.17 
Evidently, because of their employment duties, people was unable to engage in making 
traditional products, for instance, stockfish. When fishermen hired themselves as 
labourers on decked vessels or other boats, they only owned their pre-contracted part of 
the catches. But this arrangement was partly in name only because employers of 
fishermen obliged them to put their fish into their shops, and credited their accounts, so 
they could not even allocate their lot of the catches as their pleased. Since no money 
could be had from merchants, the overall results were that urban people had neither 
products nor money to exchange for Icelandic products from inland peasants. 
Consequently, the traditional barter between coast and interior gradually ebbed out, 
much to the dismay of the people concerned. To compensate for the loss of traditional 
inland products coastal people started buying imported substitutes from merchants. 
Textiles (mainly cotton and linen), cereals, and margarine replaced the customary 
products. Similarly, processing of raw and crude materials like hemp decreased. Instead,
16 G.W. Hilton, The Truck System, pp 1-7.
17 Contemporary sources quoted in Jon GuSnason, ‘GreiSsla verkkaups i penmgum,’ pp 12,14.
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imported semi or fully processed goods were bought, and imported manufactures 
replaced domestic manufactures.
Incidentally, the only major change that has been associated with the fresh fish 
trade in the literature is the transfer of the value added from the curing — from coastal 
people and farmers to merchants. Significant as this redistribution of incomes or 
revenues was for those who lost them, this change had no major macroeconomic 
implications equivalent to those I have identified here. Consequently, the significance of 
the fresh fish trade in the economic transition of Iceland has been vastly underrated, and 
many of its consequences have been linked solely to the second outcome of the 1880s fall 
in prices of saltfish, namely merchants’ involvement in cod fishing with decked sailing 
vessels.
Vll.4.3. Entrance of Merchants’ Capital into Fishing
As discussed in Chapter I, Magnus S. Magnusson claims that the involvement of 
merchants in fishing was important for the development of the fisheries’ sector and, 
indeed, for the whole economy in the long run. This step he dates roughly about 1880. 
However, neither he nor any other historian has put a finger on the cause of this. Just as 
in the case of the fresh fish trade, we may ask why this did not happen sooner or later. 
Merchants’ capital investments in fishing have customarily been identified with 
merchants’ outfit of decked sailing vessels on cod fishing. Unfortunately, the data on the 
number of sailing vessels over time contain a serious lacuna in the 1890s, and ownership 
of sailing vessels has not been systematically examined in the literature. Consequently, it
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is not possible to be very specific about these matters. However, various sources suggest 
that the outfit of decked sailing vessels on cod fishing mainly took off in the late 1880s 
and the 1890s. This calls for an explanation why Magnus and other scholars have 
supported 1880 as the starting point of the decked sailing era. On the basis of the 
Sudurland region, which was most dedicated to cod fishing, it appears that the number of 
decked sailing vessels grew markedly around 1880. But the rise in their number in 1887 
onwards was proportionally larger, and figures from Reykjavik in the Sudurland region 
suggest that the biggest spurt came from the mid 1890s onwards.18 Additionally, 
qualitative information indicate that there was a marked increase in the instances of 
merchants owning decked sailing vessels in the late 1880s onwards.19
The rise in decked sailing vessels around 1880 is probably not a statistical error, 
but the later increases are clearly greater and in our view, their broadly concurrence with 
the start of the fresh fish trade is unlikely a coincidence. Merchants’ involvement in cod 
fishing almost certainly was as much a consequence of the fresh fish trade as the price 
fall of the saltfish. The fresh fish trade was merchants’ reaction to their heavy losses on 
saltfish in 1886, and their step into fishing was an extension of this move. Note, 
however, that investment in fishing was not necessarily a part of the fresh fish trade 
because merchants could well involve themselves in the curing process although they did 
not enter into fishing. But once they had stepped into curing, the next logical step was 
into fishing. It entailed more risk for their capital, but also (more) profits if the operation 
was successful. In fact, this meant that mainly Icelandic merchants entered in fishing 
(and curing), while Danish merchants tended to keep themselves to mercantile operations 
only for a considerable time. As it happens, any definite outline of merchants’
18 Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna. Icelandic Historical 
Statistics, pp 299, 308-10. Magnus S. Magnusson, Iceland in Transition, p 271 (Table D.3).
19 See Gils Gudmundsson, Skutudldin.
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involvement into saltfish curing and fishing is difficult to make because information is 
lacking, but this seems to the general trend.
Vll.4.4. The Economic Implications of Merchants’ Fishing Ship 
Operation
As in the case of the fresh fish trade, the implications of the advent of merchants in cod 
fishing is perhaps best understood by saying a few words at the outset about the initial 
situation, and the economic determinants model is suitable for this purpose. The very few 
peasants who owned decked sailing vessels and operated them for cod fishing before the 
mid 1880s were unevenly spread around the coast of Iceland, but they tended to be 
located in the southern and western part of the country. Good havens were important 
because the ships could not lie tied to land or piers, and this confined the operation of 
decked vessels to a limited number of places in Iceland. Most peasants owning vessels 
relied predominantly on fishing for their subsistence, rather than farming. Hence, they 
were usually distinguished from ordinary farmers, that is bondi (sing.) with the name 
utvegsbondi or a ‘coastal farmer.’ Since they needed to hire most of their labour outside 
their families, they tended to form stable exchange relations with inland farmers. Hence, 
they recruited their ships in the winter with bonded labour (men) from inland farmers, 
and reciprocally took care of the curing of their fish, sent their own bonded labour (men 
and women) to inland farmers during the summer, and sometimes went themselves to the 
interior to work for farmers. Outstanding balances in this exchange between inland and 
coastal peasants were paid up in Icelandic products.
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Peasants operating decked vessels almost certainly did not build terrestrial 
facilities of any kind, and this suggests that this business was subject to a kind of 
unstableness in terms of location and endurance over time. Hence, the operation of the 
ships was not supported with productivity increasing measures, no doubt partly because 
of costs. In fact, the ships themselves probably were a formidable investment for 
peasants, and the circumstances for ordinary peasants (whether coastal or not) to do so 
were far from favourable. Peasants had small access to loans and their chances of 
acquiring and using their own money were also small, because merchants predominantly 
credited them for their goods instead of paying in hard cash. Therefore, peasants usually 
had small money in their hand although they possibly had sizeable credits in their 
account at the merchant. This inevitably was a very serious hindrance to the operation of 
relatively capital intensive producer goods like decked sailing vessels certainly were. 
With reference to all these facts, there is small wonder why only very few well-to-do 
coastal peasants had operated decked sailing vessels for cod fishing before the mid 
1880s. With this background information, I now move onto the implications of the 
arrival of merchants in fishing.
Similarly to the fresh fish trade, the involvement of merchants into operation of 
fishing ships caused a limited change if measured by the general linkages approach. 
Backwards linkages remained the same in that they created negligible stimulus for 
formation of separate industries in the Icelandic economy. After all, the need for 
handlines and hooks, ropes, wood, etc. (backwards linkage) was mostly satisfied with 
imports. Forwards linkage, that is, curing of the fish, remained unaltered, and 
consumption linkage was little affected, because rewards to factors of production were 
essentially the same. However, measured with the economic determinants model, 
merchants entrance into fishing had considerable implications for the economy.
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Concerning the ‘land’ element, the utilisation of the relevant resource (the sea) 
did not radically change, but there was locational concentration in the operation of the 
decked fishing vessels. Merchants understandably tended to base the operation of their 
fishing ships from their own location, which was the ports of entry. Hence, as their share 
in fishing and, especially, in the operation of decked vessels increased, so did fishing 
start to be concentrated in fewer places than before, mostly the urban areas. The effects 
on the population element varied because labour intensity was the same but the 
distribution of the population was affected in a similar way as in the case of the fresh 
fish trade. Clearly, both stimulated concentration of the population in urban areas, that 
is, the ports of entry. Although crewmen sometimes were migratory workers, the growth 
of merchants’ fishing ship operation stimulated crewmen no doubt to settle down where 
the vessels were operated from, especially if they had a family. Their wives and possibly 
children too most likely did day or piece work for the merchant owning the vessel or 
some other merchant, if there was one. In any case, it seems plausible to assume that the 
growth of fishing outfit by-merchants and their involvement into the saltfish curing was 
conducive to families settling down in the ports of entry, especially if the members of the 
family were hired for work by merchants. In turn, better prospects of livelihoods because 
of merchants’ fishing operation added to the removal of the barrier to coastal 
settlements, namely local authorities’ resistance to much inflow of people to the coast. 
Thereby, merchants’ fishing operations affected the distribution of the population, as 
they did in the case of the fresh fish trade.
The impact of merchants’ operation of fishing sailing vessels on the use of the 
combined elements of capital and technology in the economy was considerable. 
Concerning technology, some of the more energetic merchants improved harbour 
facilities by having new or better piers built on their land, as we briefed above. These
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piers and other constructions on land, discussed in relation to the implications of the 
fresh fish trade, certainly were an improvement over existing facilities and premises. But 
the decked sailing vessels were a greater improvement in technology, pertinent 
managerial skills, and productivity because the alternative in the Icelandic fishing fleet 
was open rowing-boats. Concerning capital requirements, the terrestrial facilities 
required modest investments compared to the sailing vessels, which evidently were far 
more capital intensive than the open rowing-boat alternative. True, sailing vessels were 
extraordinary cheap in Britain in the 1890s and 1900s because they were an outdated 
technology and being replaced by steam trawlers.20 Even so, these vessels were a risky 
investment, as the history of shipwrecks in Icelandic waters witnesses, and overall they 
had to return good returns on the investment. Hence, only wealthy merchants, or well-to- 
do coastal peasants who had good knowledge of seamanship, endeavoured to buy sailing 
vessels.
It is obvious that when merchants assumed entrepreneurship in the operation of 
decked fishing vessels, the-institutional setting was also affected. As in the case of the 
fresh fish trade, merchants’ entrance in this branch of activity buttressed their powerful 
position in society through (a) use of truck system which (b) tended to reduce traditional 
inland-coastal barter trade and push up imports instead, while as employers they (c) 
effectively removed one of the most important hindrances to urbanisation.
Evidently, merchants engagement in fishing with decked sailing vessels meant a 
substantial change from previous utilisation of the four elements of the economic 
determinants model when coastal peasants were in the entrepreneurial role. In terms of 
the elements o f ‘land,’ population, and technology and capital, their arrival had dynamic 
effects in the economy, just as in the case of the fresh fish trade. The decisive factor in
20 R. Robinson, Trawling, p 112.
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making merchants so influential in the operation of fishing ships was that their relatively 
easy access to money capital, because all the other effects of their activities in this field 
were a result of their ability to purchase a sailing vessel. The vital difference between 
coastal peasants and merchants lay in their potentials of raising the necessary amount of 
money, either with loans or own money. Merchants not only had better access than 
peasants to money capital in Iceland and abroad, they also had some chance to produce 
capital with their margins. In other words, a rise in margins increased their revenues 
when the Icelandic products were exchanged for money in foreign markets. This 
produces the key difference between merchants and those peasants fitting out decked 
sailing vessels. In turn, merchants’ involvement in fishing was bound to be of at least 
considerable economic importance, because merchants were putting money back into 
productive use in the Iceland economy instead of retaining them abroad as they had done 
before.
It is clear that the economic impact of merchants’ operation of fishing ships has 
been recognised in the literature. But on balance, this impact has been overestimated in 
the literature, and the reason for this is that the implications of the fresh fish trade have 
been overlooked. According to my rudimentary examination, acceleration of urbanisation 
and rise in terrestrial investments was more an outcome of the fresh fish trade than 
merchants’ fishing operation. Similarly, social or institutional changes were no less an 
outcome of the fresh fish trade than merchants’ fishing outfit.
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5. Conclusions
The findings of the chapter have identified a new and important cause of the economic 
transition, altered and substantially clarified our understanding of the internal 
relationship of events in the transitory process, and cast a new light on the relationship of 
foreign trade and the economic transition of Iceland. As far as the central theme of the 
thesis is concerned, it is possible to assert that foreign trade clearly had much to do with 
the economic transition as it has been defined in the literature. In fact, on the basis of this 
definition and my findings here, foreign trade seems to have actually initiated the 
transitory process, which started for real in the 1890s although the first steps were taken 
in the 1880s.
Chapter VIII 
The Impact of Foreign Trade on the Icelandic 
Economy 2: Main Effects of Institutional 
Change
VIII.1. Methodological Remarks
This chapter continues the discussion of the impact of foreign trade on the Iceland 
economy. Now I focus on the institutional framework of trade. By ‘institutions’ I refer to 
established or conventional methods, ways and procedures, formal and informal, that 
were used or built for the task of exchanging exports for imports in the foreign trade. 
People usually settle themselves down to specific patterns that are not only voluntary 
decided but also moulded by external forces, such as legislation or norms. Using 
institutions as a collective term for the components of these patterns, I will focus on the 
most influential institutions that were used to conduct foreign trade activity in Iceland. It 
goes without saying that institutions need human agency to exercise their purpose or 
role, and a full-scale examination of the impact of foreign trade on the economy would 
require equally as much attention to be paid to this factor as to the trade flow. Owing to 
the nature of the topic, such examination of human agency would revolve around issues 
of competition in the Iceland trade. Circumstances did not allow an extensive
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examination, but I, nevertheless, believe that my main goal is achieved — to identify 
those actions that were so influential as to affect the institutional framework of trade.
My procedure in this chapter will be to (a) identify important changes in the 
institutional framework of foreign trade, (b) discuss their implications for the economy at 
large, and (c) relate and assess the impact of these changes for the economic transition. It 
should be remarked at the outset that the institutional impact of foreign trade on the 
economic transition of Iceland can only be broadly examined below. Assessment of the 
full economic implications of institutional change in foreign trade was not possible. 
Hence, a much fuller examination of the topic of this chapter would be desirable to test 
the findings of our broad findings and to fill out missing parts. Even so, my treatment 
hopefully provides a general idea of the relationship between institutional changes in 
foreign trade and the economic transition. As for central theme of the thesis, my 
examination should give a fair indication of the overall relevance of this particular aspect 
of foreign trade for the economic transition. The main objective with the chapter is to 
provide hard evidence to answer that question.
VIII.2. Main Shifts in the Institutional Framework of 
Foreign Trade
In Chapter II on the economy of Iceland, I sketched some of the main characteristics of 
the institutional framework of trade. This serves as my main account of the state of 
affairs around 1870, although it is supplemented below. Consequently, this present
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chapter will mainly be concerned with subsequent changes in the institutional framework 
of trade. It emerged in Chapter IV on exports that live sheep sales, which started for real 
around 1880, meant a significant novelty in the institutional framework of trade as will 
be explained in some detail in section VEH.2.1 below.
Although the history of the foreign trade of Iceland is an under-researched field, 
the historical literature suggests that in addition to the live sheep business, at least one 
more significant new practice was introduced in terms of the institutional framework of 
trade. This novelty was cash payment. One business firm in the foreign trade started this 
practice in 1895 and as time passed, some other merchants houses gradually followed in 
its steps. The significance and the effects of this practice have not been explored by any 
scholar, but we suspect that it was a potentially important change in the institutional 
framework of trade in our research period. This matter is examined, although relatively 
broadly only, in section VDI.2.2.
Apart from these two novelties, no other definite breaks with tradition were 
discovered in the institutional framework of trade. The two influential developments 
discussed in Chapter VII, the fresh fish trade and entrance of merchants into fishing 
outfit, do no qualify because they only meant an expansion of the roles merchants 
played, and not any change in how they as merchants conducted their general mercantile 
activities. The same goes for those foreign enterprises, mainly Norwegian, that were 
involved in particular branches in Iceland, like herring fishery and whaling. They do not 
qualify because they were usually not in general trading, and as for the minority who did, 
we have no evidence about or knowledge of that they operated differently from the 
Danish merchant houses. By contrast, the live sheep sales and the Edinborg firm were so 
important because they were engaged in general mercantile activities.
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Vlll.2.1. Live Sheep Era, ca 1880 to the Mid 1890s
As explained in Chapter n, there was little competition between merchants in Iceland 
around 1870. Nearly all of them belonged to Danish merchant houses or were dependent 
on Danish wholesalers. Moreover, even though merchants dealt in both exports and 
imports, not all of the early newcomers in the Iceland trade were serious competitors for 
them. This is because much of the initial competition the merchants had to face was 
confined to exports of ‘unusual’ or new commodities — such as live animals, herring, 
and whaling. Presumably, traditional merchants did not regard these trades (which meant 
production of the commodities too in the case of herring and whaling) as their proper 
domain. As long as the newcomers did not expand into traditional exports, the Danes 
retained their stronghold in the Iceland trade. This was because traditional exports were 
the primary means by which Icelanders bought imports, and as long as the established 
merchants had the lion’s share of exports in their hands, they did not need to fear loosing 
their position in the Iceland trade.
Therefore, until about 1880, Denmark-based merchants in the Iceland trade did 
not need to worry — even although exports of live horses had started and there was an 
emergence of herring fishing and whaling of Norwegians.1 However, they were rightly 
concerned about the live sheep exports that took off about 1880. The problem was not 
that newcomers were entering their traditional domain, but rather that live sheep exports 
reduced the supply of wool and woollens, mutton, and tallow. Given that people did not 
reduce their consumption of these commodities, this new export inevitably bore down on
1 True, herring fishing off Iceland started earlier, but not for real until the 1880s.
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the quantities of these particular commodities that were exported. There is little doubt 
that merchants reacted by raising the prices of these commodities to some extent.
But this was a minor issue compared with the real threat for many regular 
merchants. Live sheep were exported almost exclusively to Britain, and the income from 
sales was increasingly used by peasants to buy imports from there. This requires a brief 
pre-history of indigenous attempts to relate to the foreign merchant community. In 
various places in the thesis, I have commented on combines of peasants, purchasing 
societies, firms, and co-ops among Icelanders. The earliest of these date back to the 
1830s, and they all represent attempts by Icelanders to consolidate their bargaining 
position against merchants in order to improve their terms of trade. While the first of 
these attempts were informal combines to try to get merchants to offer better terms, the 
later ones were formal societies or firms that were in competition with merchants 
because they themselves ordered imports from abroad and sold their exports there. 
However, these societies and firms did not initially pose a very great threat for 
merchants. They were regionally based, had to fight many difficulties in rallying people’s 
participation, had to acquire knowledge of business conditions abroad through trial and 
error, and needed time to prove their worth. Hence, they tended to be short-lived. What 
finally put a foundation under the purchasing societies of peasants and the producers’ 
firms was the introduction of the live sheep trade.
In the beginning of the live sheep trade, around 1880, and to a large extent 
thereafter, the sheep were bought at the risk and for the account of foreign merchants, 
almost exclusively British. First they took care of all arrangements in Iceland 
themselves, but later on they contracted Icelandic agents (private persons, associations, 
firms) to deal with that. Soon the foreign merchants began to hold markets to buy sheep, 
and on the initiative of peasants in the northeast part of the country (from the county 
I>ingeyjarsysla) markets were started there in 1881. One of their leaders became an agent
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for a British sheep merchant. This was a success, and a year later, in 1882, the peasants 
formed an purchasing society of their own (Kaupfelag I>ingeyinga), and the society 
charged their British merchant with supplying them with merchandise in 1882 and 1883. 
These transactions were separate in the sense that the farmers received money for their 
sheep, although the one and same buyer supplied them with imported merchandise later. 
Things developed fast and in 1883 this purchasing society made experimental sales of 
live sheep in Britain on its own account. This went well and the society terminated the 
contract with the British firm. It exported all live sheep in 1884 onwards for its own 
account and used thereafter agents in Britain to sell the sheep and supply them with 
imported merchandise instead.2 With this change the ordering society became a 
producers’ co-operative society, the first in Iceland.
This history has been told because the start of Kaupfelag bingeyinga is of 
double importance. The first is that all later co-operative societies in Iceland were 
modelled on it, and it paved the way for them. The second is that the live sheep trade 
became their engine of growth, because the co-ops were all rural based and were formed 
by peasants. As we described in Chapter IV, live sheep exports were substantial, and 
even though regular Danish merchants engaged in this trade, offering only credit in 
return, the imports generated by the live sheep trade were significant, specially because 
they often were cheaper and better (Chapter VII). It is safe to conclude that the live 
sheep trade with its import generating effects, imposed on the merchants more pressure 
in terms of competition that they had had to face for a long time.
To highlight the deviation that the live sheep sales presented, compared to the 
customary institutional framework of trade, and to support the claim that they signified a 
distinct shift in the institutional framework of foreign trade, it is useful to look at them
2 Sveinbjom Blondal, Saudasalan til Bretlands, pp 25,28-9,30, 31,45.
CHAPTER VIII -301
from an abstract point of view. Using an insight from sociological debate about the 
interaction between structure and human agency, the unique characteristics of the live 
sheep trade can be summed up in the following way. First, live sheep sales were built on 
a form of business activity (collective enterprise) different from the prevalent Danish 
merchant houses operating in Iceland (private enterprise). Second, in terms of the human 
agency factor those who conducted or engaged in the live sheep business came from 
different social group (peasants) and some were foreigners of an ‘exogenous’ (British) 
nationality.
The activities of the Norwegian enterprises in Iceland also deserve brief 
consideration. Strictly speaking, their exports of herring and whale products formed a 
break with the existing institutional framework in foreign trade in two ways, and the 
certain affinities between the live sheep sales and the Norwegian enterprises are clear. 
First, they presented an innovation because the Norwegians engaged in production of 
exports unlike the Danish merchant houses, which largely refrained from doing so until 
the 1890s. Second, the Norwegians were an ‘exogenous’ group in terms of the 
composition of the mercantile community in Iceland. Apart from their nationality, they 
very often were industrialists (producers) rather than just merchants, and they almost 
certainly based their mercantile (and industrial) activities far more on cash payments 
than the Danish merchants did.
However, the enterprises of the Norwegians did not pose nearly as much threat 
to the hegemony of the Danish as the live sheep sales, because the Norwegians engaged 
in branches that the Danish had not entered into and the Danish presumably did not feel 
that the Norwegians were reducing the lot of Danish by starting the herring and whale 
industries and exporting the products themselves. Besides, the Norwegians inevitably 
were influential only in those places where they were located and their vicinity. They
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were based along the coast and yet in relatively few places only, and this confined their 
area of influence to a small number of coastal hamlets by the coast and selected inland 
regions as well. True, it seems likely that the Norwegians offered better terms of trade 
than the traditional Danish merchant houses in these places and parts of the country. 
Also, their very existence witnesses that they attracted some business from Danish 
merchants. Nevertheless, it seems safe to conclude that the activities of the Norwegians 
were a relatively limited threat to the established merchant houses in the Iceland trade.
Vlll.2.2. The Edinborg Firm and Spread of Cash Payments, the 
Mid 1890s Onwards
Important as the live sheep trade was, it effectively ended in 1896 and became less 
advantageous because prices fell. Nevertheless, from the 1890s onwards new 
developments took place that undermined the hegemony of the traditional institutional 
framework of trade. The co-ops in the 1880s and 1890s gradually began to sell other 
agricultural products than live sheep. Then, too, Norwegian merchants in Iceland began 
to generate a large export production from the 1880s onwards, by starting cod fishing 
and curing of saltfish. The start of the Labrador Style cure in Iceland in the early 1890s 
was not at the expense of traditional exports, because small cod had not been an export 
commodity until then.
More severe competition than ever for the Danish merchant houses in Iceland’s 
export trade started in 1895. Then, a general trading business called Verzlunin Edinborg 
(The Edinburgh Shop) was opened in Reykjavik. The firm was owned by Scottish
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merchants, George Copland and Norman Berrie, from Leith or Edinburgh, and also 
possibly its manager, Asgeir Sigurdsson. He was an Icelander who was brought up and 
educated in Edinburgh and Iceland, later had engaged into mercantile service for an 
Icelandic firm (Granufelag) and then for a business in Edinburgh. The operation of the 
Edinborg firm was different from the Danish merchant houses in Iceland at the time, 
because its policy was to make all transactions in money. In other words, to pay for all 
Icelandic products in money, demand payments in money for imports, and pay for all 
wage labour in money.3 Here, Edinborg was a pathbreaker, and it was to have a 
remarkable record in general trading in our period. Over time it also expanded its 
activities into the outfitting of fishing ships and the production of saltfish. The history of 
this trading company has not been examined, but the key to its success was the policy of 
cash payments and its quick turnover.
The advantages of offering cash to producers and sellers of Icelandic goods, 
instead of credit, does not need much elaborating, and it explains a lot of its success. We 
know nothing about the prices it paid. Strategically, Edinborg was not forced to offer 
higher prices — it could even offer lower prices, because for many customers cash 
instead of credit no doubt was worth a slightly lower price. But even if the firm offered 
similar or higher prices to attract customers immediately, it no doubt could make profits 
all the same, because of its policy of quick turnover.4 Furthermore, Edinborg broke new 
ground in the marketing of saltfish, to cut down costs. The Danish merchant houses had 
always sold their saltfish in Copenhagen to Danish commission agents (consignees) or
3 Fra Islands Nceringsliv, p 65.
4 Cf. its motto: ‘Lag alagning — fljot skil’ that may be tranlated as ‘Small margins — Quick 
return.’ The phrase ‘quick return’ probably means that Icelandic producers were not instantly 
cashed for their products, rather that they had to wait for their products to be sold abroad. But 
because of its quick turnover policy, the Edinborg firm could offer a payment in cash within a 
short time. Granted that this was so, it shows that the firm needed a small initial capital stock 
and its operation involved little risk.
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agents of importers in Spain. Edinborg, however, started direct collaboration with 
Spanish importers and shipped the fish to Spain. By doing this, Edinborg cut down 
intermediary costs, unnecessary cost in Copenhagen (unloading, loading, shrinkage, 
etc.), and transportation costs. Before this time, the Danish merchant houses sometimes 
had shipped the fish directly to Spain, but always through intermediaries in Copenhagen 
who took their share.
As for the import prices the firm offered, again we do not know much. However, 
they almost certainly were lower than those prevailing among its competitors, because 
the Edinborg firm prided itself of low margins. This was not merely a trick to attract new 
business in the beginning, but reflected its policy of a quick turnover. The logic was that 
smaller margins might pay if the goods could be sold quickly enough. Note that the 
Danish merchant houses turned their money over only once or twice a year, so they were 
not very hard to beat in this respect. With a slightly lower price on imports to attract 
customers and a slightly faster turnover than the Danish merchants to compensate for 
this, Edinborg probably managed to make the transactions worthwhile. Anyway, 
Edinborg’s success in the import and export trade rested on a balance between margins 
and turnover, and in this matter, its new policy paid off for it.
From the point of view of the common people, the cash payments for exports 
were probably the most attractive aspects of trading with Edinborg. But working for the 
firm was equally as beneficial, because another component of Edinborg’s cash policy 
was the payment of all wages in money. When the firm entered the scene, the truck 
system was the rule in Icelandic employment arrangements. Hence, Edinborg’s policy in 
this matter was not only a unique break with tradition but a very welcome one too. 
Naturally, there were limits to the number of people the firm could hire, both as 
permanent staff and on daily basis. But because of the firm’s cash policy, it could set a 
standard, choose the best people from prospective employees, and make demands in
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return. The staff generally showed more expertise than was customary, and exercised a 
more positive and polite attitude towards its customers. The firm was novel in 
advertising, and in a word, Edinborg was a hugely successful business.
To sum up the innovation that the introduction of the Edinborg firm represented, 
compared to the customary institutional framework of trade, and support the claim that it 
signified a distinct shift in the institutional framework of foreign trade, it is useful to look 
at the matter from the same abstract point of view as the live sheep sales. In terms of the 
‘structure and human agency’ dichotomy, the unique characteristics of the Edinborg firm 
can summed up in the following way. Cash payments for goods and labour, instead of 
the customary bookkeeping barter and truck system, was a break with traditional 
institutional framework of trade. The ‘alien’ ownership of the firm, i.e., neither Danish 
nor Icelandic (except perhaps for the Icelandic manager), was a break with the 
traditional human agency factor in foreign trade. Of course, the institutional deviation 
owed to the human agency deviation, because the owners had a more modem outlook 
and came from a very different society than the Danish merchants.
VIII.3. Impact of Institutional Shifts on Competition: 
Levels of Gross Margins
The two novelties discussed above formed in one way or another important breaks in the 
institutional framework of foreign trade. Their economic implications, which we now 
turn to, did however not rest on their originality, but rather on their weight or power to
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influence the economy in some way. It is evident that both the live sheep sales and the 
operation of the Edinborg firm, possibly along with other lesser-known Icelandic firms, 
posed a potential threat to the Danish merchant houses in Iceland. But we need to 
establish whether these novelties did have any marked effects on economic phenomena, 
and if so, how much they were. The effects of these novelties can be measured in more 
than one way, but to give some indication of their power I choose to consider only two 
aspects, the impact on gross margins on exports and imports (section 3) and the impact 
on money supply (section 4).
VIII.3.1. Gross Margins in Iceland’s Trade with Denmark
There are several complications, pertaining to the method of measurement and to the 
sources, in estimating the overall influences of the new competitors on margins on 
exports and imports. However, there is evidence to maintain that the Icelandic 
enterprises engaged in the live sheep trade did their business mainly in Britain, i.e., 
outside Denmark, while the Danish merchant houses did their mainly in Denmark. 
Therefore, margins on exports to and imports from Denmark should reflect in its way the 
impact of competition from newcomers. As explained in Appendix A to the thesis, it is 
possible to calculate gross margins on exports and imports in the Iceland trade, and 
consideration of this quantitative information throws some light on the response of the 
Danish merchants. By gross margins we mean the differences in the prices paid for 
Icelandic exports and the prices they were sold for in Denmark, and conversely the 
differences between the cost of imports in Denmark and what they were sold for in
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Iceland.5 A calculation of gross margins on exports and imports in the trade with 
Denmark produces both intriguing and unexpected results.
Focusing on the general trends first, they contrasted very much. The gross 
margins on exports clearly fell between 1870 and 1913, because they amounted to over 
50% of purchase prices initially and then fell almost invariably to about 20% in the end 
(Fig. VIH.1). Indeed, the general fall in freight rates exaggerates the fall in operating 
costs, but even if we try to exclude the fall in freight rates by arbitrarily putting the 1870 
gross margin level at, say, 40% there was a conspicuous fall all the same over time. By 
contrast, gross margins on imports showed a radically different pattern. They were on a 
lower level than the margins on exports in 1870, just over 30% of purchase prices, and 
they rose almost constantly until 1902 (reaching about 150% gross margins), after which 
there was a dramatic fall down to a level about 45%. Since exports to and imports from 
Denmark largely were in the hands of the same merchant houses, a calculation of 
aggregate gross margins is justifiable. Then, we see that they rose but in fact relatively 
modestly over time, except for the year 1902 when they soared. Thereafter, a fall in the 
margins was evident.
How do we interpret these trends in a meaningful way? Although fluctuations in 
the levels of transportation costs blur the trends, it seems safe to suggest that the 
research period can be divided into five sub-periods. The first period was from 1870 to 
1878, when competition in foreign trade seems to have been slight. Gross margins on
5 The examination of margins in feet meant that DMW values of exports (Delivered at 
Merchant’s Warehouse) were compared with their cif values, and fob values of imports were 
compared with their retail values. Consequently, both calculations include freight, insurance, 
and other costs, besides net margins (merchants’ profit). Optimally, it would be desirable to 
subtract at least the freight cost because it no doubt fell considerably over time and, thus, skews 
the outcome. Also, the value series involve average prices which do not necessarily reflect the 
exact purchase or selling prices of goods in the trade between Denmark and Iceland. But these 
imperfections should not obscure the trends, although the freight has to be taken into account, 
when interpreting the outcome.
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exports remained very stable, while those on imports rose fast, and consequently, the 
relative size of aggregate margins rose in these years. The difference between margins on 
exports and imports shows that purchase prices of exports were harder to manipulate 
than sales prices of imports. This was because sales prices of exports were quoted in the 
Icelandic press and were better publicised than the original purchase prices of imports. 
The latter presumably varied more, and it was impossible to know at what prices 
merchants bought the imports, so they could easily adjust margins on imports at their 
will. However, the very reason for the rise in margins on imports is not clear to me, 
because there was no change in the level of margins on exports. However, it is noticeable 
that constructed national income account indicate that gross domestic production per 
capita was growing, and possibly merchants used the opportunity to raise their margins 
on imports.6
The period from 1878 to 1890 seems to witness a considerable competition, 
because margins on exports went down at a relatively fast rate while marg ns on imports 
rose comparatively slowly. -The reasons for these trends are obvious, because the live 
sheep trade took off at this time and more vigorous trade with Britain followed, and 
competition increased with the involvement of new importers and exporters. 
Furthermore, the divergent trends in the gross margins on exports and imports shows 
that the established merchant houses offered higher prices for exports while the 
competition also forced them to keep the overall margins on imports at the same level. 
Overall, merchants’ margins on exports and imports remained stable (at about 50%), 
and this implies that they were equally well off as before.
The third sub-period lasted from 1890 to 1902, because the trends in the 
margins indicate new developments. Apart from 1894, margins on exports were falling
6 Gudmundur Jonsson, Hagvoxtw og idnvceding, pp 155 (table 15.1), 370.
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markedly, and when the trade data for 1894 is examined more closely, gross margins on 
all exports except saltfish were considerably less than before. Clearly, saltfish stands 
quite apart, and the reason for the jump in aggregage margins on exports in 1894 was 
exceptionally high sales prices of saltfish, which were discussed in Chapter VII. The 
very high margins on saltfish in 1894 require an explanation, and although information 
for adjacent years is wanting, the explanation probably is the new commercial treaty 
between Spain and the Danish kingdom where the tariff on Icelandic saltfish was 
significantly reduced (Chapter IV).
In contrast to exports and here is were the break with previous sub-period is, 
margins on imports generally rose sharply between 1890 and 1902 (reaching the level of 
150%), and this is something one would perhaps not expect given the competition with 
imports from Britain through the live sheep exports and new competitors after the 
practical termination of the live sheep sales. However, this can be explained in the 
following way. Merchants tried to be competitive in the export trade by raising their 
prices of Icelandic products (especially wool, mutton, and hides), and this necessarily 
meant lower margins on the exports for them. Once they managed to attract people’s 
custom in exports, they were at liberty to put whatever margins on the imports. 
According to one consular report, Icelandic customers were more fixed on nominal 
prices of exports than their real prices, that is, prices of exports relative to prices of 
imports.7 Note also that many customers of merchants were in debt to them and had 
small alternative but to do business with them, whatever the price was. Also, those 
merchants fitting out fishing ships (increasingly common in the 1890s) paid the wages of 
the fishermen in goods (the truck system) and obliged them to put their share of the
7 UK, FO, ‘Report on the Trade and Commerce of Iceland for the Year 1896’ by W.G. Spence 
Paterson, p 5.
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catches into their shop too. It is noteworthy that margins on exports were becoming very 
low, and possibly merchants had to compensate for this with higher margins on imports. 
The outcome of those divergent trends in the gross margins in the trade with Denmark 
was that the aggregate margins rose over the sub-period from about 50% to 95%. This 
suggests that merchants prospered between 1890 and 1902, and they possibly used these 
years of growing gross domestic production to raise their margins on imports above what 
they needed to compensate the concurrent fall in the margins on exports.8
In the fourth sub-period, between 1902 and 1910, gross margins on imports fell 
greatly (from 150% to 35%) while margins on exports rose hardly at all (from a little 
less than 20% to just over 20%). What evidently happened was that high margins on 
imports from Denmark could no longer be sustained, no doubt because of competition 
from merchants that traded with other countries. Margins on exports from Denmark, 
however, remained the practially same, because they were already by 1902 low, and 
normal profits in the export trade simply could not be generated below this level. By 
1910, however, competition-clearly had reached a balance but in new circumstances, and 
the years 1910-13 form the last sub-period.
My examination on gross margins was based on macro-level data (trade 
returns), but the few micro-level sources about margins that I am aware of (mainly based 
on accounting books) do not diverge very much from the levels described.9 In any case, 
the macro-level outcome does not suggest any upwards or downwards bias vis-a-vis the 
micro-level evidence. In turn, this imples that the trade data is just as fair an indicator of 
the actual margins as micro-data. Apart from that, reviewing the research period from 
1870 to 1913, it is clear that the years between 1902 and 1910 meant the introduction of
8 Gudmundur Jonsson, Hagvoxtur og idnvceding, pp 155 (table 15.1), 370.
9 Gudmundur Jonsson, Hagvoxtur og idnvceding, p i l l .
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new practices in foreign trade and a substantial shift in its institutional framework. Then, 
competition that had long prevailed to varying extent over time in the export trade finally 
entered the import trade. What caused this is no doubt the start of the monetisation of the 
economy, and this will become more clear when the monetisation will be discussed later 
in the present chapter.
Vlll.3.2. The Theory of Over-Pricing of Icelandic Exports
Overall, the data for Iceland’s trade with Denmark suggests that the gross margins on 
Icelandic products were not too low to enable merchants to sell them with profit in 
foreign markets. Furthermore, although gross margins on Iceland’s exports to Denmark 
fluctuated over time and also by commodities, there were at least some margins on most 
goods in trade, according to the new datasets for Denmark.10 Nevertheless, the 
prevailing view in Icelandic historiography is that Iceland’s exports usually were over­
priced. In other words, their purchase prices in Iceland plus costs of freight, insurance, 
etc., did not cover their sales prices.11 This theory of over-pricing of Icelandic exports 
was first forwarded by Gunnar Karlsson in his doctoral thesis in 1977, and the theory
10 This does not show in the tables that accompany the thesis, but this can be seen in the 
underlying base tables in my datasets, but these tables are too voluminous to reproduce.
11 In Icel.: ‘Verd a islenskum vorum til utflutnings hefur verid of hatt. 6kleift hefur verid ad 
selja J)aer erlendis a haerra verdi en f>aer gengu a her [in Iceland]. Kaupmenn hafa lagt a erlendu 
vorumar allan kostnad, alia alagningu sina og jafavel tap a solu islensku varanna ...’ (italics 
mine, HB). Gunnar Karlsson, Frelsisbaratta sudur-pingeyinga, p 262.
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and conclusions based on it have been accepted since by other historians or, at least, not 
been challenged.12
In support of this theory, Gunnar Karlsson referred to qualitative sources from 
1850 to 1890 complaining about Icelandic products being too highly priced to be sold 
with normal profit abroad (presumably mainly in Denmark). He suggested that this 
might partly be due to regional combines among peasants (Icel. verdkrofufelog), who 
often collectively put pressure on merchants, and refused to do business with them unless 
they agreed to the prices demanded for the exports. Gunnar did not doubt the existence 
of over-pricing, but he was not too sure of the explanation for it. In relation to this 
problem, it must be pointed out that sources suggest that over-pricing actually existed 
around 1830 and probably as early as the late 1810s. The most unambiguous evidence is 
the fact that the Danish silver mint was sold by merchants in Iceland at a considerably 
higher price that either nominal or real price — on the grounds that Icelandic products 
were over-priced. Therefore, the loss from buying the products and shipping them to 
Denmark and selling there-was taken out on the sales of minted cash. Note that the 
selling rate of the silver mint was unofficial and arbitrary and varied from one merchant 
to another and by regions in Iceland. On the other hand, when imports were sold in 
return for exports, the loss was taken out on higher margins on imports.13
Granted that there usually were margins on Iceland’s exports to Denmark in the 
research period, how then can this be complied with the claims of over-pricing in the 
sources Gunnar Karlsson referred to? Does the evidence simply contradict, or is there a
12 Gunnar Karlsson, Frelsisbaratta sudnr-pingeyinga, pp 261-3. Examples of support to 
Gunnar’s view are, for instance, Sveinbjom Blondal, Saudasalan til Bretlands, p 36, Sverrir 
Jakobsson, ‘Um verzlun og verzlunarsamtok: Inngangur,’ 221, and Bragi Gudmundsson and 
Gunnar Karlsson, Uppruni nutlmans, 2nd ed., p 75.
13 Jon Johannesson, ‘Formali’ to Brandsstadaannall, by Bj5m Bjamason, p 12. Bjom 
Bjamason, Brandsstadaannall, pp 75, 83, 101, 105, 107. [Baldvin Einarsson], ‘Annad bref til 
ansvars J)vi undangeingna um Penfngaverdid a Islandi.’
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way to interpret Gunnar’s sources so that they comply with my trade data? In relation to 
this, is should be observed that rumours is not the same as first hand knowledge 
(experience), and even if the individual sources witness over-pricing it may have 
occurred temporarily and varied by merchants and commodities. In other words, it may 
never have been the usual case. Furthermore, it is also possible that the evidence can be 
interpreted in a different way. I will shortly discuss Gunnar’s sources and in addition a 
similar evidence that I have come across. Gunnar’s first source dated from 1850, and it 
merely states that the margins on exports were low, so it does not imply any over­
pricing. The second source dated from 1876, where the manager of the Granufelag, 
which was a peasants’ purchasing society formed in 1870, complained about purchase 
prices of Icelandic products, saying that they were too high to sell profitably, when costs 
were included. This he claimed had been so for the past years. The complain can be 
explained in two ways. First, the new datasets show that prices of many important 
agricultural exports had fallen in 1878 compared to 1874 (but they were higher than in 
1870). So, there was a general price fall in markets from the early and mid 1870s 
onwards, and peasants may have been reluctant to accept lower prices than before, 
especially because regular merchants could take a fall in prices of Icelandic exports out 
on imports to Iceland. Second, the Granufelag competed with Danish merchant houses in 
the north of Iceland, and it had to offer as good or better prices than the Danes (other 
things equal). This could be difficult because the Danes could afford to push up export 
prices temporarily to beat the Granufelag. Together these two explanations probably go 
a long way in explaining the difficulties of the Granufelag manager in 1876.
Further complaints about the over-pricing of Icelandic products in 1879 and 
1885, when market prices had fallen considerably since 1876, may have similar 
explanations. Also, the 1879 evidence is probably more based on rumours than first hand
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knowledge. But note also that gross margins on exports fell after 1878, reaching a very 
low level in 1886 (just over 20% of purchase prices), and the small rise in the gross 
margins on imports did not compensate for this. In 1891, when Gunnar referred to his 
last source, gross margins on exports had increased so this claim is based on either 
outdated information or circumstances in trade peculiar to the north of Iceland. Clearly, 
these price trends and the special historical circumstances in foreign trade in northern 
Iceland explain why complains about over-pricing of Icelandic products were called 
forth. More important, however, my remarks show that the qualitative sources Gunnar 
Karlsson quotes can be interpreted differently, and they can be accommodated within the 
overall pattern of margins and prices in Iceland’s trade with Denmark.
Incidentally, there are noteworthy comments on over-pricing in one of the British 
consul’s reports from Iceland in the research period. In early 1897, the Foreign Office 
received a report stating:
‘15 to 20 years ago [i.e., ca 1877-1882] there was very little cash in circulation in 
the Island [sic]. ... the merchants, to attract customers, often gave more than the 
market value for Iceland produce, buying the native products, in fact, at a loss, 
which they made good by the high profit on the foreign goods.... This system still 
obtains to some extent, because for wool the Iceland merchant often pays Id. to 
2d. per lb. more than he can get for it in England, and the fisherman frequently 
receives rather more for his fish here than the exporter can get for it from Spain or 
Great Britain, but the merchant counts on covering his loss by the prices he 
charges for the foreign goods which he supplies in exchange.’14
Concerning the consul’s claim about the situation around 1880, it is important to note 
that it refers to a past situation, and it possibly is more based on rumours than first hand 
knowledge. The Consul, W.G. Spence Paterson, arrived to Iceland in 1877 and did not 
engage into trade until 1892 though he became British consul in 1882.15 Even so, this
14 UK, FO, ‘Report on the Trade and Commerce of Iceland for the Year 1896’ by W.G. Spence 
Paterson, p 5.
15 Gudni Jonsson, Minningarrit Flensborgarskolans, pp 47, 157.
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does not preclude that he had a solid source for his claim, and that there actually were 
instances of over-pricing at the time. Note that he lived in HafharfjorSur, a neighbouring 
hamlet to Reykjavik, and also in Reykjavik itself, which definitely had more mercantile 
competition than anywhere in Iceland. Hence, if there was any place in Iceland where 
over-pricing occurred, then it was most likely to happen in Reykjavik. Paterson’s 
statement about the contemporary situation cannot be refuted, since I have no evidence 
to do so. However, in the case of wool he probably is referred to Danish merchants and 
while the live sheep sales lasted, they presumably had to make higher bids than was 
profitable for them to do in order to get wool to export. In fact, this complies with 
existing research on the live sheep sales.16 In the case of saltfish, there almost certainly 
was more competition for saltfish than ever, because the Edinborg firm had arrived on 
the scene and was located in Reykjavik. But given its policy it is highly unlikely that the 
firm exceeding profitable sales price in its bids. Therefore, Paterson’s remark about the 
saltfish probably refers to Danish merchants, and they could afford to overbid because 
they could cover themselves on the imports prices. My conclusion, therefore, is that 
Consul Paterson’s comments can be explained in such a way that they comply with my 
understanding that over-pricing was rather an exception than the usual practice in 
Iceland’s foreign trade in the research period. Nevertheless, a further study of prices in 
the trade with Denmark, besides Britain, would be desirable to explore our argument 
further. Also, the quality of my macro-level trade data can be improved, and micro-level 
examination of accounting records would be desirable to shed a further light on this 
matter.
With reference to his over-pricing theory, Gunnar argues that there was an 
inflation in Icelandic products. The fact is that neither my observation about the early
16 Sveinbjom Blondal, Saudasalan til Bretlands, pp 34, 36.
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19th century over-pricing, nor the sources Gunnar refers to, imply anything about 
inflation in Iceland. They only relate to purchase prices of Icelandic products relative to 
their foreign market prices, and my price index for exports shows that there was in fact a 
secular fall in prices of exports between 1874 and 1898 (see Chapter VI). If only for this 
downwards trend in export prices, Gunnar’s argument that the alleged inflation of 
Icelandic products partly explains why merchants were reluctant to pay for exports in 
cash is disproved.17 But it is also another reason why his argument does not stand 
scrutiny. Danish merchants were in business to make money, but most of them did not 
see any other way to do this than in old mercantilist style by extracting money from 
Iceland instead of circulating them back into the economy for productive and profitable 
purposes by paying for exports in cash, if only to pursuit a policy that they suited to 
their own interests.
17 Gunnar Karlsson, Frelsisbaratta sndur-pingeyinga, p 262.
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VIII.4. Impact of Institutional Shifts on Levels of 
Money Supply: The Start of Monetisation of the 
Economy
Vlll.4.1. Shifts in Net Mercantile Money Inflow to Iceland
Our chief aim with the examination of the supply of money in Iceland is to find out 
whether the live sheep sales and the Edinborg firm did have much impact in this matter. 
To answer that question with confidence would require statistical data on gross inflow of 
money and its sources or channels into the economy. However, owing to scarcity of 
sources and literature the situation is that identifying major shifts in the gross inflow of 
money to Iceland is difficult enough, and estimating the approximate leyels over time is a 
formidable task. This has two consequences. One is that lack of information about 
aggregate levels of money inflow over time prevents an efficient use of quantitative data 
about individual sources or channels of money coming to Iceland. The other is that to 
say something with certainty about the topic, I will mainly describe the shifts on the 
basis of qualitative sources, with occasional references to quantitative data. Evidently, I 
cannot support my findings and conclusions statistically, but much can be inferred from 
my sources about the timing of the main shifts in money inflow and which developments 
were important in this respect. To see this matter in perspective, I will survey our whole 
period in terms of mercantile sources or channels of money flowing to Iceland. In doing 
so, I comment on those export activities that brought cash to Iceland and were discussed 
in Chapter IV on exports. Therefore, I do not confine myself to the principal sources or
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channels of money only but offer a more comprehensive, yet tentative, picture of the 
topic.
Vlll.4.1.1. Era of Money Scarcity, the Early 1850s to the mid 1890s
As I described in Chapter II, cash was almost absent in foreign trade, because of its 
relative scarcity in Iceland. Apart from the practical refusal of merchants to pay out in 
cash, this scarcity was partly due to small inflow of money from other sources. Possibly 
the largest inflow of money around 1870 was through salaries of officials in Iceland 
from the central administration in Copenhagen. Hence, only a small group of merchants’ 
customers, particularly salaried officials and some well-to-do peasants, had money 
besides commodities to sell. So, instead of denying to sell them imports in return for 
money, merchants of course accepted them.
Around 1870, there were very few other channels for cash apart from salaries. 
Tourism was a growing service industry, although tiny, when shipping with Iceland 
became more frequent in the 1860s onwards.18 Also, separate enterprises such as 
attempts to mine sulphur and tin salmon (Chapter IV), brought some money into the 
country. But possibly the largest and most stable channel of money was the exportation 
of live horses. This started in the early 1850s when British travelling merchants were 
granted special permission by Danish authorities to buy live horses in Iceland and ship to 
Britain. This business continued into our period and prevailed beyond it. However, the 
amount of money this business brought to Iceland is difficult to measure, because it
18 Heimir borleifsson, Postsaga islands 1776-1873, pp 500-501.
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seems that Danish merchants took part in this trade and they did not pay in cash. 
Another source of money transfers to Iceland was herring fishing by Norwegian 
businessmen. This started first in the late 1850s but was irregular until the late 1870s 
(Chapter IV). Icelandic work people were no doubt hired to salt the herring in barrels for 
exportation, but since even the export quantities involved are uncertain, it is very 
difficult to speculate about how much money the herring fishing generated into the 
country before 1880.
From about 1880 onwards, new channels of money transfers to Iceland were 
added. The first of these was the live sheep trade, and during its heyday it no doubt was 
more important as a source of cash incomes than any of the above mentioned activities. 
Although there are various problems associated with estimating the amount of money 
flowing into Iceland for live sheep, Sveinbjom Blondal in his study on this trade made an 
attempt to estimate this and his figures have not been superseded. Probably second and 
third in importance to the live sheep exports were activities of Norwegian enterprises. 
The herring fishing gained a temporary momentum in the 1880s, but there is much 
uncertainty about the amounts of money brought into Iceland by it. The whaling started 
in the early 1880s and produced several products (whale oil, meal, bone meal, and 
baleens) as time passed. The whalers hired unskilled Icelandic labour to work in the 
whaling stations. Again, the amounts of money time injected into the economy are 
uncertain, although partial and rough estimates have been made by Trausti Einarsson. 
Apart from that, it does not appear that any specific changes in the foreign trade or the 
economy can be assigned to this phase of money inflow.
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Vlll.4.1.2. Monetisation of the Economy Starts, the Mid 1890s Onwards
The mid 1890s witnessed changes in the influx of cash into the Iceland economy. First, 
the main source of money, the live sheep trade, came to a practical halt after 1896. There 
was no agricultural product to replace it, although exports of butter started shortly later 
as a reaction to the loss of the live sheep market in Britain. Second, the Edinborg firm 
started its operation in 1895. In comparison to these events, other changes in the decade 
were of smaller significance. Exports of herring fell during the 1890s, compared to either 
the 1880s or the 1900s onwards. However, exports of Labrador Style saltfish started, 
and whaling exports diversified in the decade. Norwegian merchants, living in Iceland, 
are an empty box in this picture but they presumably contributed to the monetisation of 
the Icelandic economy that now started for real.
The mid 1890s was a turning point in transfers of money into Iceland, mainly 
because of the activities of the Edinborg firm. Information about the sums of money put 
in circulation by the firm over time are not available, but I have figures about its exports, 
imports, and costs from a few years to base our reasoning on. Understandably, the firm 
started small in 1895 as the following table indicates, but it was a large business already 
in the 1900s. While all exports were paid for in cash, Edinborg appears to have been 
lenient in demanding cash payments for imports.19 This was quite natural in the 
beginning, but it, of course, was also designed to attract business. Because of this 
practice, we do not know how much of the imports to deduct from the exports values, 
but it is clear that net inflow of money through Edinborg’s trade exchange was no less
19 It is noteworthy that the firm clearly states that all exports in 1903 were paid for in cash, but 
it makes no mention of money in relation to the imports. See Handbok fyrir hvem mcmn, 2nd 
ed. (1904), back cover (inside). Also, a contemporary source from 1905 says that in Isafjordur, 
Edinborg is heavily engaged in loans to its customers. See Jon GuSnason, ‘Grei5sla verkkaups 
l peningum,’ p 56 (backnote 7). Whether these were loans to help customers temporarily or
CHAPTER V III-321
than 600,000 to 700,000 kr. in 1903 and one million kr. in 1905. Furthermore, since the 
largest part of the operating costs were probably wages, it is safe to conclude that the net 
inflow of money through Edinborg’s activities in Iceland was 700-800 thousand kr. in 
1903 and no less 1.2 million kr. in 1905 (see Table VIIL1). Compared to Sveinbjom 
Blondal’s estimates of money generated by the live sheep exports, these were huge sums. 
Only in four years out of 21 (1876-96) did cash incomes from live sheep exports exceed 
500,000 kr.20 So the Edinborg firm quickly surpassed the live sheep trade as the 
principal source of cash injections into the Iceland economy.
Table VIII.1. Inflow of Money Through the Trading Activities 
of the Edinborg Firm in 1895,1903, and 1905
Thousands of krdnur




1895 — 43 • • • • • • 9
1903 1,143 525 121 • • • 700-800
1905 1,750 750 . . . •M 197* 1,200 ?
Sources: Handbokfyrir hvem mann, 2nd ed. (1904), back cover (inside). Fra Islands 
Nceringsliv, p 65.
* In source the figure applies to 1903, but it presumably is an error and should be 1905.
To comprehend the relative significance of the figures in Table VIII. 1, we can take a 
look at the total value of exports and imports. Comparing 1903 and 1905 with the 
closest sample years, 1902 and 1906, it suggests that Edinborg had 10-12% share in 
total exports, while in total imports it was 6-8%.21 After only eight to ten years in 
business, this was a significant achievement. Edinborg started in Reykjavik and had by
long terms loans, meant to hold on the custom of people, is not clear (cf. Jon Gudnason, 
‘Greidsla verkkaups i peningum,’ p 46).
20 Sveinbjom Blondal, Saudasalan til Bretlands, p 39 (table).
21 Table A.BAL/ALL-1.
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1904 opened outlets in three other places in the southern and western parts of the country 
(Keflavik, Akranes, and Isafjordur).22 In 1914, it had outlets in Vestmannaeyjar, 
Hafharfjordur, and Isafjordur.23 Consequently, it had little if any trade with the northern 
and eastern parts of the country, and it’s share in those places where it operated was far 
larger than the figures for Iceland as a whole indicate.
True, total exports and imports had increased since 1895 and the population had 
grown. Also, Edinborg no doubt easily managed to attract the custom of many of those 
who had not standing debts at their merchant’s account. Even so, Edinborg’s success 
clearly was at the expense of the older, established merchant houses. They in turn were 
left with customers in standing debts, and although it was good for the respective 
merchants to retain customers to do business with, it was a mixed blessing because those 
customers in constant or seasonal debt were stuck unless they could pay up their debts. 
Perhaps the best measure for the success of the Edinborg firm and its competitiveness, is 
that according to one source the firm effectively forced other merchants in Reykjavik to 
start money payments 24 Given that, the firm’s indirect effects on the monetisation of the 
economy were huge.
As happens, reports of British conculs in Iceland confirm the inflow of cash into 
the economy from the late 1890s onwards. Their testimony is of unique significance and 
needs to be cited in full, since I attempt a quantitative interpretatation of the sources 
below. For the sake of convenience, the citations are summed up in Table VIII.2 below.
22 Handbok fyrir hvem mann, 2nd ed. (1904), advertisment on the inside of the back cover.
23 Fra Islands Nceringsliv, p 65.
24 Vilhjalmur S. Vilhjalmsson, Sjogarpurinn og bondinn Sigurdur I Gordunum, p 133.
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Table VIII.2. References to the Spread of Cash Payments for 
Exported Saltfish and Wool, 1898 to 1906
Apply References to saltfish Date
to______________________________________________________________ from
1898 or ‘Two or three years ago [i.e., starting in 1898 or 1899] merchants from late
1899 Scotland and Denmark began to buy salt fish for cash.... This cash trade for 1901
salt fish has been increasing very fast in the south of Iceland during the last
years and has never been greater than in 1901. It may be foretold that almost 
all the salt fish produced in the south of Iceland will be bought for cash some 
years hence.’ (1)
1903 ‘The old barter system is rapidly vanishing owing to the feet that British early
merchants are buying salt fish for cash on a large scale, a single merchant at 1904
Reykjavik having last year bought salt fish for 60,000/. by cash ... Other
British merchants are working in the same way in the west of Iceland. A few 
years hence all the salt fish in the south of this island will no doubt be bought 
for cash.’ (2)
1904 ‘The barter system is rapidly vanishing, owing partly to the fact that British early
and other merchants are buying salt fish for cash. A few years hence all the 1905
salt fish in south and west Iceland will be bought for cash.’ (3)
1905 ‘The greater part of the salt fish of all kinds is now bought for cash...’ (4) early
1906
1906 ‘The greater part of the salt fish ... are now being bought here for cash.’ (5) early
1907
Apply References to wool Date
to from
1903 & ‘During the last two years American ageents have bought wool in great early
1904 quantities for cash.’ (3) 1905
1905 ‘last year Americans,... bought [wool] in the island for cash.’ (4) early
1906
1906 ‘a good deal of the exported wool are now being bought here for cash.’ (5) early
1907
(1) UK, FO, ‘Report on the Trade and Commerce of Iceland for the Years 1898-1900,’ p 8.
(2) UK, FO, ‘Report on the Trade and Commerce of Iceland for the Years 1900-02,’ p 9.
(3) UK, FO, ‘Report on the Trade and Commerce of Iceland for the Years 1901-03,’ p 8.
(4) UK, FO, ‘Report on the Trade and Commerce of Iceland for the Years 1903-05,’ p 9.
(5) UK, FO, ‘Report on the Trade and Commerce of Iceland for the Years 1905-06,’ p 9.
Evidently, it is difficult to interpretate these statements into estimates of the 
quantities of saltfish and wool exported for cash. However, the significance of the matter 
justifies an attempt to do so, although it is bound to be tentative. The outcome of my 
interpretation is produced in Table VHI.3 below, and it implies that the sums of money
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involved were of greater importance for the economy than Table VIII. 1 suggested. The 
Edinborg firm exported numerous commodities apart from saltfish, and this fact 
indicates that the sums of money injected into the economy through exports of domestic 
production were higher still than Table VDI.3 suggests. In any case, although the 
Edinborg firm probably was the largest exporter in the saltfish branch that paid in cash, 
other parties paid in cash as well, and the inflow of hard cash was definitely larger than 
Table VIII. 1 indicates.25
Table V1II.3. Estimates of Inflow of Money Through Exports of Saltfish and 
Wool, 1898 to 1906
Values in thousands of Kronur
Year Saltfish Wool
Saltfish referred to in Estimates of fish Wool referred to in Estimates of wool
source bought for cash source bought
As of total Approxi­ In relative In absolute As of total Approxi­ In relative In absolute
saltfish mate terms terms saltfish mate terms terms
exports values exports values
1898 34% 908 5% 45
1899 26% 869 10% 87
1900 38% 1 477 20% 295
1901 34% 1 323 30% 397
1902 41% 2 465 40% 986
1903 81% 3 565 45% 1 604 100% 802 10% 80
1904 77% 3 765 50% 1 883 100% 948 20% 190
1905 100% 5 455 55% 3 000 100% 1 346 20% 269
1906 100% 5 892 60% 3 535 100% 1459 20% 292
Sources: Table VTII.2. Table A.EXP/ALL-7. Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, 
Saltfiskur i sogupjodar, vol. 1, pp 271,273-5. Icel., Gov.Gen.: ‘Verzlunarskyrslur 1898,’ pp 166-9; 
‘Verzlunarskyrslur 1899,’ pp 379-82; ‘Verzlunarskyrslur 1900,’ pp 309-13; ‘Verzlunarskyrslur 
1901,’ pp 334-7. Icel., Min. of Icel.: ‘Verzlunarskyrslur 1902,’ pp 343-6; ‘Verzlunarskyrslur 1903,’ 
pp 214—17,255; Landshagsskyrslur jyrir Island 1905: Verzlunarskyrslur 1904, pp 30-31, 76-94; 
Landshagsskyrslur fyrir Island 1906: Verzlunarskyrslur 1905, pp xxviii-xxix.
However, this is not all, because in the early 1900s herring fishing, which was 
largely an enclave activity, revived and became yet another important source of money
25 In fact, there seems to be a reference to the Edinborg firm in the 1904 consular report (see 
Table VHI.2). Also, the figure complies the firm’s own statement about its exports in 1903 (see 
Table Vm.l).
CHAPTER VIII -325
inflow to Iceland. Cash payment of wages was the customary practice in herring fishing, 
where Norwegian businessmen operated. With the revived interest of Norwegian 
enterprises in this fishing in Icelandic waters, salting of herring on land became a 
significant source of money for common people. When purse seine or ring nets replaced 
drift nets in the herring fishing in the mid 1900s onwards, catches increased greatly. The 
incomes of people often sky rocketed, not least because there often were long working 
hours in the herring trades. Indeed, because of the huge income generating opportunities, 
those places where herring was salted had a Klondyke character to them. Unfortunately, 
however, no scholar has attempted any quantification of the sums of money generated by 
the herring fishing in Iceland — either as wages or as the profits to those Icelandic 
businessmen engaged in the herring fishery. Therefore, the relative significance of this 
source of monetisation is unclear, but there cannot be any doubt that its impact was 
considerable.26
From 1907 onwards, still another new channel of money inflow to Iceland was 
opened. This happened when steam trawlers, which Icelandic companies had started to 
fitted out, began to sail to Britain and sell fish on ice.27 Although catches fluctuated, it is 
probably safe to assume that increasingly more fish was sold this way, and provided 
hard cash that was brought back to Iceland. From trade data one may speculate that this 
amounted to less than 100 thousand kr. annually. However, the revenues were larger in 
1912 and 1913, and it is estimated that it amounted to 1.4 million kr. in 1913, which was
26 Ole O. Tynes gives a first hand account of the impact of herring salting on ways of living 
and the supply of money among people in Siglufjordur, which was the principal place for 
herring salting in Iceland. See his ‘Skyggnzt um af sjonarholi.’ See also a secondary source by 
Ingolfiir Kristjansson, Siglujjordur, pp 157,165-6, 167-8.
27 Heimir Forleifsson, Saga islemkrar togarautgerdar, pp 114-15.
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a record year.28 In any case, it was not a particularly important source of money for the 
Iceland economy, compared to either Edinborg’s activities or the herring branch, until 
the very end of our period.
Vlll.4.2. Introduction of Banking
The important direct and indirect impact of the Edinborg firm on money supply and the 
monetisation of the Icelandic economy have been completely overlooked by scholars.29 
Furthermore, the sums of money from the herring fishing entering into the economy after 
1900 have been substantially ignored in Icelandic historiography, although they have 
been mentioned occasionally.30 Instead, historians traditionally have stressed the 
importance of the foundation of Islandsbanki (Bank of Iceland) which started operation 
in 1904. To be sure, this step was important, because the bank had a relatively large 
working capital, compared to the existing state-owned Landsbanki Islands (National 
Bank of Iceland). The latter is generally assumed to have increased its lending in the 
1890s, but it is believed to have been relatively conservative in its lending policy, and it 
opened its first outlets outside Reykjavik only in 1902 and 1904 (in Akureyri and
28 Table A.EXP/UK-15. Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskirma. 
Icelandic Historical Statistics, pp 513-14. See also Heimir fcorleifsson, Saga islenzkrar 
togarautgerdar, pp 124-5.
29 To my knowledge, only one historian has realised that Edinborg had some importance for 
progress in the foreign and domestic trade. This is Gu&jon Fridriksson in his broadcasting 
programmes.
30 Since Matthias hordarson’s Sildarsaga Islands in 1939 (2nd ed.), who was a amateur 
historian, no historian has placed any emphasis on the importance of the money generated by 
the herring fishing for money supply in Iceland. But there are sporadic references to some 
relevance of the herring fishing for the supply of money in Iceland, see, for instance, Jon 
Gudnason, ‘Grei&sla verkkaups i peningum,’ p
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Isafjordur respectively). Islandsbanki, however, instantly opened three outlets outside 
Reykjavik (in Isafjordur, Akureyri, and Seydisfjordur). All in all, Islandsbanki is 
considered far more important for the economic progress of Iceland, and its formation 
customarily has been hailed as one of the significant events in the economic history of 
Iceland. Furthermore, it is usually linked to the Home Rule in 1904, another major event 
in the traditional perception.
The Islandsbanki had its origin in a request made by two Danish businessmen to 
the Icelandic AlJ)ingi to grant them permission to put up a bank in Reykjavik. This was 
in 1899, and the reason for the request and the ongoing interest of foreign businessmen in 
the matter, has received little attention from Icelandic historians. In the light of our 
account of the increasing monetisation of the Iceland economy through foreign trade and 
rise of the fishing sector (Chapter VII), it seems plausible to suggest that the reasons for 
the initial approach were basically two. One is that already by 1899 there had taken 
place significant changes in the supply of money in Iceland as we have described above. 
The other is that the entrance of merchants into the fishing sector meant a rising need for 
investment capital. After all, it would be hardly feasible for foreign capitalists to put up 
a bank in Iceland as long as cash savings were small, and profitable investment 
opportunities in Iceland were limited. Concerning the first, the live sheep trade had 
injected some money into the economy, although a part of this was used to pay for 
imports, and some of the money was used to emigrate. This first phase of monetisation 
coexisted with the emergence of savings funds and a bank established in 1885 
(Landsbanki Islands). From 1895, however, Edinborg began to transfer huge net sums of 
money to Iceland. This increased the amounts of disposable incomes of people and was 
conducive to greater savings. These could be tapped by a new financial institution 
waiting to offer prospective customers equal or better terms than the competitor
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(Landsbanki Islands). Concerning the latter cause, the fresh fish trade and, later, 
merchants’ fishing ship outfit presumably increased their need for short and long-term 
capital which an Iceland based bank was better equipped to supply, rather than an 
external (Danish) bank which was bound to be unfamiliar with Icelandic circumstances 
and being far from location.
Altogether, it seem plausible to suggest that both the accelerated monetisation of 
the economy in the late 1890s and the economic impact of the growth of the fishing 
sector in the 1890s were the soil from which the proposal of a bank in 1899 sprouted. 
Both developments continued to expand into the 1900s, and with addition of a revived 
herring fishing the circumstances for a commercial bank became even more favourable. 
It is against this background that we must perceive the foundation of the Islandsbanki, 
and it has little to do with the Home Rule, which is another over-estimated event in terms 
of the economic progress of Iceland.
VIII.5. The Economic Implications of the Shift in 
Money Supply: Modernisation of the Economy 
Initiated
Above I have been working on first two of my aims — to identify important shifts in the 
institutional framework of trade and to discuss their economic implications. To assess 
the importance of these implications for the economic transition of Iceland, I optimally 
would like to examine two broad issues. One issue would be the impact of shifts in
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margins, i.e., prices that Icelanders customers were offered over time. In doing so, I 
would be focusing on their effects on and their importance for standards of living in 
Iceland. Unfortunately, I am unable to do such a survey because of a number of reasons, 
both practical and scholarly. The other issue would be the impact of inflow of cash on 
the Iceland economy over time. Vast and complicated as this issue is, I nevertheless will 
try to offer a rudimentary assessment of the importance of the monetisation for the 
economic transition. This happens to be a subject where this is some literature available 
on relevant issues and it will be supplemented with my observations and insights. 
Therefore, the remainder of the chapter will be devoted to this matter.
Since every economy is composed of both form (institutional framework) and 
content (economic activity), and we are interested in the overall impact of shifts in 
money supply on the economy, I face two questions when embarking on my assessment. 
How do I study the effects on the institutional framework of the economy, and how do I 
study the effects on economic activity? To study aspects of such widely different nature, 
one must approach them in-separate ways. For the institutional aspect of the economy, I 
use ordinary historical analysis to identify the links from shifts in the institutional 
framework of trade to institutional changes in the economy, including foreign trade. For 
economic activity, I basically use an economic analysis to identify the links from shifts in 
the institutional framework of trade to major changes in the level and type of economic 
activity. My economic analysis essentially is a standard or conventional macroeconomic 
analysis, but it perhaps is best explained with reference to the general linkages approach 
in Chapter n, where the method is conveniently laid out. Through the combined effort of 
the two approaches, where I deal both with the ‘content’ and ‘form’ aspects of the 
economy, I intend to provide a rough assessment of the impact of institutional shifts in 
foreign trade on the economic transition of Iceland.
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Vlll.5.1. Institutional Changes in Foreign Trade 
Vlll.5.1.1. Barter, Truck, and Price Polices
Given that I broadly am correct in my interpretation of the shifts or phases in mercantile 
inflows of money to Iceland, their impact should be able to detect in the economy. At 
least, one would expect that the seemingly great money transfers from the 1890s 
onwards should be identifiable. Also, the apparently abnormal situation in prices around 
1900 suggests that something much was happening among firms in the foreign trade 
branch. Incidentally, we can identify further changes around 1900 that relate to the use 
and supply of money. Since these changes seem to offer some explanation of later 
developments, both in the institutional framework of the foreign trade and in the 
economy at large, we will start with them.
Shortly before 1900, merchants in at least Reykjavik started a policy of dual 
prices for imports. This meant that merchants quoted a certain price if it was paid for in 
exports (Icel. voruverd) and a significantly lower price if it was paid for with cash (Icel. 
peningaverd). The origin of this practice is somewhat obscure and also the levels of 
these prices with respect to previous price levels. Also, we do not know for long this 
policy lasted, but there are certain clues about this matter. It appears that this dual price 
policy was the reaction of the established merchant houses in Reykjavik towards the 
competition from Edinborg. Note that traditionally there had only been one price, which 
was used when Icelanders came with their products to merchants. But the fact that the
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cash price (peningaverd) was significantly lower than the produce price (voruverd), and 
this took mainly place in Reykjavik, suggests that merchants were reacting to much 
lower prices that Edinborg offered. In other places in Iceland, merchants seem to have 
held on to the single price policy, and quite naturally so because Edinborg was a 
competitor for them in few places only (in Keflavfk, Akranes, and Isafjordur, besides 
Reykjavik, before 1904).
It also appears that prices of merchants in other places in Iceland than Reykjavik 
were approximately midway between the produce and cash price. Given the rocketing 
margins around 1900 in the trade with Denmark, this also suggests that merchants in 
Reykjavik were in fact taking at least a part of the fall in import prices out on margins 
on other imports. Even if that was true, how can this be reconciled? How could 
merchants raise margins on imports, if they were trying to beat their competitor who 
offered far lower prices on imports? In principle, this could be done three ways. One was 
to raise margins on those imports that the competitor did not sell, to compensate for the 
price fall of those imports both parties sold. The other way was to raise import prices to 
those customers who could not pay with cash and had to settle for the price decided by 
the merchant. This was possible, if the customer was in debt and had no choice but to 
take his imports at his merchant, even if he had added sky high margins on the imports. 
The third way was that if the merchant owned and fitted out a fishing vessel too, 
fishermen were by custom obliged to take their wages out in goods at the merchant’s 
shop. Irrespective of whether the merchant fitted out a ship or not, he compensated for 
the price fall on those imports that he sold to customers with cash. Possibly, merchants 
practised all three methods. In any case, the second and third method would explain the 
difference between produce and cash price. Note that the fall in import prices did not 
have to be levelled out on customers in Reykjavik, because the more powerful merchants
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usually had outlets in several ports of entry. Therefore, a heavy price fall on imports sold 
in Reykjavik could be taken out on imports sold in the respective merchant’s shops 
elsewhere in Iceland, where people usually did not have money. Of course, this is only a 
hypothesis which must be tested against appropriate sources, but there can hardly be any 
doubt that there was a connection between the abnormal rise in margins around 1900 and 
the dual price policy that seems to have started then.
Along with the spread of cash payments, which took place at least in Reykjavik 
and Edinborg presumably had an influential impact on, another change in monetary 
affairs occurred in the 1900s. This was a locational abandonment of the truck system, 
which mainly concerned merchants and fishing ship owners, the main urban employers at 
the time. Jon Gudnason, who has studied the truck system in our research period, claims 
this and lists the largest urban areas in Iceland, viz. HafiiarfjorQur, Reykjavik, 
Isafjordur, Akureyri, and Seydisfjordur. Granted this is a correct assessment, the 
question is what caused cash payments in these places to become the rule. Jon attributes 
this mainly to the start of motor boat fishing and trawling, besides better access to bank 
loans.31 On the basis of my discussion so far, it is hard to see how the motor boat fishing 
was important in this respect. Owners of motor boats were dependent on merchants 
(including foreign enterprises) for cash in return for their fish, because the owners 
usually were not exporting themselves. Trawler owners, however, paid their people in 
cash according to Jon, and that probably was a general practice. But their relative 
importance in terms of the overall economy was limited, so their influence may be 
somewhat doubted in this matter, at least outside those places where they were fitted out 
(Reykjavik and Hafharfjordur). Also, in my view it is debatable if the introduction of 
Islandsbanki in 1904 was influential. Even though it offered far better chances of loans,
31 Jon Gudnason, ‘Greidsla verkkaups i peningum,’ pp 39-40.
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there was a strong opposition among influential men in society to ban the prevailing 
truck system. Hence, it took nine years (1893-1901) and four bills in the AlJ)ingi to fight 
for a legislation concerning the prevailing truck system. And the initial requirement that 
all wage labour was to be paid in cash was changed into a permission only, and other 
conditions were eased. Thus, the purpose of the bill, which was passed into law in 1902, 
effectively was nullified.33 On the basis of my discussion above, it seems plausible to 
assume that the impact of the legislation on the abandonment of the truck system was 
comparatively small. However, another legislation probably was more effective and it 
was passed into law practically simultaneously (1901). It banned the use private tender 
in exchange for goods from mid year 1902.34 For some reason that is obscure at present 
several merchants in the 1890s (and possibly already in the 1880s) had started to issue 
private notes and coins to use in their shops. This private tender was handed over to 
those customers who were not in debt, but it is not clear whether this was to hold on to 
their custom or simply out of the merchants’ temporary money shortage. In any case, 
this private tender was used and it was only redeemable against goods in the respective 
merchant’s shop.35 The aggregate nominal value over time of this private tender, which 
was counted in kronur, is unknown so we do not know about their relative quantity 
compared to official, legal tender in circulation. It presumably was not great, but its 
abolition certainly aided to the spread of cash payments.
33 Jon Gudnason, ‘Greidsla verkkaups l peningum,’ pp 10-23, 54.
34 Icel., Gov. Gen., Stjomartidindi 1901, sect. A, p 198.
35 Jon Gudnason, ‘Greidsla verkkaups i peningum,’ p 33. Ludvik Kristjansson, ‘Petur J. 
Thorsteinsson,’ pp 62-4.
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Vlll.5.1.2. Division of Labour in the Import Trade
The introduction of cash payments for goods (at least exports) and wage labour from 
about 1900 onwards was a certain kind of institutional change in the economy, even if it 
was restricted to certain locations only. But we can also detect another change in the 
institutional framework of the import trade, namely in growing specialisation. 
Traditionally, merchants in the Iceland trade were simultaneously in the export and 
import trade, and they acted both as wholesalers and retailers. Neither commissionership 
nor agency did not exist. Until the end of our period, production of agricultural goods 
remained largely in the hands of peasants in the countryside, while fishing became a big 
business and partly merged with the export trade in the urban areas (Chapter VII). 
Furthermore, many merchants continued to export and import. However, there occurred 
an acceleration in the division of labour in the import trade after 1900. In the early 
1900s, the first wholesale business in Iceland was opened, and in the mid 1900s the first 
business in consignment (commissionership) and agency was started. By 1913, they 
numbered fifteen in total.36 Concurrently, retailers grew rapidly in number. The success 
of retailers on one hand and of wholesalers and commissioners and agents on the other 
hand were, of course, interrelated since none of them could effectively thrive without the 
other. But on top of this, specialised shops emerged too, limiting themselves to particular 
types of imported goods (textiles, shoes, hardware, etc.).37
To be sure, there were special shops before ca 1900, mainly in Reykjavik.38 But 
unless the goods were paid for in Icelandic products, their operation rested on the
36 Fra Islands Nceringsliv, pp 68-72. Gu9mundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, 
Hagskinna. Icelandic Historical Statistics, p 397.
37 Klemens Jonsson, Saga Reylgavlkur, vol. 2, pp 244-6. Vilhjalmur I>. Gislason, ‘Upphaf 
serverslunar i Reykjavik,’ p 196-8.
38 Vilhjalmur I>. Gislason, ‘Upphaf serverslunar i Reykjavik,’ pp 190-95.
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customary bookkeeping barter where the customer’s account was debited and the shop 
owner’s account credited with the same amount. Since their accounts could be at two 
different merchants, the merchants had to finish the transaction with actual transfers of 
values between themselves. Evidently, this was a cumbersome system compared to cash 
exchange on the spot. But more important, merchants largely barred off transfers of this 
type. Naturally, a merchant welcomed a credit on his customer’s accounts, but it 
inevitably meant the debiting of someone else’s account, even at his own firm, about 
which he perhaps was not so pleased with. The merchant always wanted to control 
debiting on the account of their customer, to be sure he could pay for all the goods taken 
out in his store. Transfers of this kind broke down the surveillance tool of merchants, so 
they were against such transfers. Not least because of this, the monetisation naturally 
acted as a catalyst for specialisation in the import trade.
It is customary in Icelandic historiography to attribute the advent of wholesalers 
in Iceland to the laying of telegraphic cable in 1906 (Chapter II) or even to the start of 
Islandsbanki in 1904.39 Although the greatly enhanced communication and access to 
capital no doubt facilitated their operation, as of all business activities in Iceland, the 
cable played a small part compared to the monetisation of the economy, and the role of 
the bank is only speculations. As for the cable, specialisation in wholesale or retail 
business would have been impossible if the firms would have had to receive all payments 
in Icelandic products. After all, if they would have done that, the business would not 
have been wholesale of retail sale but general trading as all other businesses in the 
Iceland’s foreign trade had been. Therefore, specialisation of whichever kind in the 
import trade rested primarily on the condition of widespread cash exchange in the 
economy. Clearly, this was happening in Reykjavik and other places from about 1900
39 Helgi Skuli Kjartansson, ‘Reykjavik sem verzlunarmi5stod,’ pp 177, 187 (note 8).
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onwards, and the time was prime as their growth shows. Admittedly, it can be claimed 
that monetisation only was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for specialisation in 
the import trade. Even if that was so, then this vital prerequisite has been overlooked 
until now. However, shipping (postal) communications were hardly a serious retarding 
factor for wholesalers in the mid 1900s. Until 1904, there were 20 trips a year, after 
which they became 30 annually.40 Of course, the telegraphic cable enabled faster orders 
from abroad and shorter delivery time, which was a clear advantage. But essentially the 
cable was an improvement in technology that consequently accelerated things rather than 
made them suddenly possible by removing barriers.
If the cable was far from being all-important as it is generally believed, what 
about the Islandsbanki? As happens, the role of the bank for the start of wholesale 
business in Iceland is only speculative, because this has never been examined. 
Furthermore, one of the founders of the first wholesale concern did not make any 
mention of the bank as being important for their initiative, only the telegraphic cable.41 
This evidence, documented-over thirty years later, does not prove the insignificance of 
the bank, but it does not lend a support to its alleged role for the import trade.
40 Gu9ni Jonsson, Eimskipafelag Islands, p 29.
41 Vilhjfalmur] S. Vilhjalmsson, ‘Gudspekinemi og bankastjori,’ p 182.
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Vlll.5.2. Impact on Economic Activity 
Vlll.5.2.1. Levels of Savings
To support the interpretation above of the different phases of money inflow to Iceland, I 
will offer a preliminary assessment of their significance for the economy, focusing now 
on the allocation of money incomes and macroeconomic changes that can be attributed to 
money transfers to Iceland. In principle, money income could be allocated by immediate 
consumption, direct investment, and savings. Because of lack of research, the present 
knowledge of these matters varies. We know relatively little about direct investments in 
our period, although I will offer a few remarks about them below. But we know more 
about savings from financial data, and we have various sources about consumption. So, 
in spite of incomplete and partial knowledge, I will try to outline the trends in each of 
these fields in our research period.
As one might expect, savings in Iceland did greatly increase in the third phase of 
mercantile money inflow, compared to earlier periods (Fig. VHI.2). The trend shows an 
even rate of growth of savings from 1875 to 1890, after which the savings evidently rose 
very fast for a few years (until 1895). After that, the growth of savings until 1900 was 
similar as before, cf. the practically identical slope of the inserted line on the figure. 
However, between 1900 and 1905, there was a complete shift in savings. Then, they 
more than doubled and after 1905, the growth of savings was much faster than before. 
Of course, savings are not an accurate measurement of the sums of money people put 
aside, because they can hoard them too. Evidently, hoarding presumably was 
considerable relative to savings for a part of our period, because financial institutions 
were only just being introduced in the 1870s onwards in Iceland. But even if we allow
CHAPTER VIII -339
for a greater degree of hoarding until about the 1890s than after that, it would not 
change the conclusion that savings rocketed in the 1900s onwards.
Vlll.5.2.2. Levels of Consumption: Services and Manufacturing Industries
Consumption of people was spread among domestic products and service, besides 
imports. It goes without saying that it is practically impossible to detect any special 
change in imports that is specifically associated with money rather than barter 
purchases. Importers supplied the same kind of imports to Iceland, whether they received 
cash or goods in return. But it is possible to detect any changes in consumption of 
domestic services and products? Given the traditional base of the economy, pure service 
industries were practically non-existent for a long time after 1870. But from about 1900 
onwards, urban services started to emerge (for instance, barber’s) or become larger (for 
instance, photographers and lawyers).42 Skilled workers like blacksmiths and carpenters 
were not very numerous in Iceland in the last decades of the 19th century. Carpenters 
travelled around but blacksmiths ran workshops only and processed items on order, 
besides repairing and fixing. Hence, they did not produce goods for unspecified sales 
later. However, in the 1900s onwards, it appears that some skilled workers (like 
blacksmiths) began to manufacture items for subsequent sales, and they ran a shop along 
with their workshop. Also, some cobblers and shoemakers started retail sale of imported 
shoes.43 Services and the activities of skilled workers often were on small scale, but a
42 Klemens Jonsson, Saga Reykjavikur, vol. 2, pp 248, 250-2.
4j Klemens Jonsson, Saga Reykjavikur, vol. 2, p 245.
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few trades that emerged were on a relatively large scale, at least for Iceland. Presumably 
among the largest of these were a dockyard (Slippfelagid) in 1902, timber store 
(Volundur) in 1904, and cabinet workshop (Jon Halldorsson & Co.) in 1905, all in 
Reykjavik.
Moving on to pure manufacturing (machine type) for the domestic market, it did 
not emerge until the 1890s onwards. But the growth of this type of manufacturing 
industry appears to have been slower than in the case of skilled workers, because very 
few firms that lasted for some time were formed until about 1910 onwards. These were, 
for instance, a brewery (Olgerdin Egill Skallagrimsson) in 1913, and a confectioner 
(Magnus Th.S. Blondahl) in 1912. However, it is interesting to note that Reykjavik and 
other urban places in the southern and western part of the country were not at the 
forefront here, as in the case of other industries. Some of the first experiments with 
manufacturing took place in the eastern part of the country. The reason for this is 
obscure, but possibly the activities of Norwegian herring and whaling businessmen, 
besides Norwegian merchants in Iceland, influenced this. In other words, perhaps the 
money the Norwegians generated in their surrounding regions caused the monetisation 
effects to take place a little earlier there than elsewhere in Iceland. In general, their 
activities were conducive to the distribution of mechanical knowledge among Icelanders 
in these regions, and it was no doubt of help when motor boats and all kinds of machines 
spread out later.
Even though our discussion about services and manufacturing industries in the 
domestic sector is highly tentative, it, nevertheless, shows that these particular industries 
and trades did not start to grow effectively until the 1900s onwards. Slow as it was in 
parts and sporadic, this growth was a witness to diversification and specialisation which 
was, as in the case of the import trade, practically impossible while the bookkeeping
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barter prevailed. True, the firms in the new industries could have accepted Icelandic 
products instead of their services or goods, but it was inconvenient, to say the least, for 
all concerned. But if that was so, then why did the new industries not emerge in the 
1890s or before? Besides, people’s chances to take their products to other places than to 
their merchants were somewhat restricted, because merchants wanted to have the 
products to export them and let people pay their imports for. So, whichever way we 
speculate about this, the emergence of the new industries and firms clearly supports the 
argument of a decisive break in money supply in Iceland around 1900 onwards.
Vlll.5.2.3. Levels of Investments
At present, there is no comprehensive information available about investment over time 
in Iceland in our research period. Therefore, a few general remarks about state 
expenditure, infrastructure, and private investment waves will have to suffice. After 
Iceland received financial autonomy in internal affairs in 1874, the Icelandic Al{)ingi 
kept to a conservative policy in the expenditure of the treasury. Not until the early 1890s 
onwards did AIJjingi shift to a relatively progressive economic policy, when it increased 
markedly and permanently its expenditure on infrastructure and projects or funds to 
stimulate advances in the economy. As happens, the fishing industry was largely 
bypassed in the allocation of the money, and most of it was spent on agricultural affairs. 
Also, the building of infrastructure that benefited trades and industries was not fast in 
our period. Bridges, roads, lighthouses, etc. were built but slowly. Therefore, it is safe to 
assume that this construction was hardly decisive for economic growth or development
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of the economy although it helped. For instance, Reykjavik did not have a pier where 
ships could lie until 1917.44
Understandably, private initiative in the building of infrastructure was limited 
and irregular over the period. Private investments no doubt were considerable in the 
private sector, but information about this is thin-spread and only some of the main 
investment waves are easily discernible. For instance, since the state supported land 
improvements in the countryside, and private and public sources cannot be separated by 
the type of improvements, they cannot be used as a measure for conceivable impact of 
fluctuations in money supply. Information about an important issue, housing in urban 
areas, is absent before 1910 so no comparison can be made there either. It really is only 
in the fishing branch that we have some indication of different levels of private 
investment. The first major investment wave in our period was in decked sailing vessels, 
because there was a great surge in their outfit from the 1890s into the 1900s, after a 
period of many decades where their number had been comparatively stable.45 With 
reference to our discussion about them in Chapter VII, it seems safe to conclude that 
their introduction was not much related to the increased money supply in the economy 
from the mid 1890s onwards. The buyers of the ships were either merchants or relatively 
well-do-to men, originally coming from the group of rowing boat owners and coastal 
peasants. Merchants had access to capital abroad, and the well-to-do boat owners used 
different ways. Probably some had acquired enough wealth over time to buy a vessel, 
while other bought in partnership, sometimes with loans as well.46 We should also note 
that the decked sailing vessels were very cheap in Britain in the 1890s. All in all, the
44 Jon Helgason, Arbcekur Reylgavikur, 2nd ed., p 318.
45 Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna. Icelandic Historical 
Statistics, p 310. Magnus S. Magnusson, Iceland in Transition, p 271.
46 Vilhjalmur S. Vilhjalmsson, Sjdgarpurinn og bondinn Sigurdur i Gordunum, pp 132-8.
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investments in decked vessels in the 1890s did not necessarily make heavy demands on 
internal supply of money, and that complies with our interpretation.
By contrast, the advent of boat engines and motor boats, besides trawling, no 
doubt was linked to the greater money supply in Iceland. The first engine was put in a 
boat in 1903 and in a few years these engines spread out remarkably fast. Soon, boats 
specially designed for using engines started to be built in Iceland, if they were not 
purchased abroad. The issue of self-financing versus public loans in the purchase of 
decked vessels and, especially, trawlers is an unsettled issue in Icelandic economic 
historiography. But there can hardly be any doubt that the comparatively inexpensive 
boat engines and boats, even if they grew larger over time, at least partly owed to far 
greater sums of money than before injected into the economy from the late 1890s 
onwards. Even so, there also was a pent-up demand for more efficient fishing gear on the 
behalf of fishermen and owners of rowing boats. As Gfsli Kristjansson and J6n Olafur 
Isberg have pointed out, when people increasingly moved to the coastal urban areas, 
coastal peasants had growing difficulties in manning their rowing boats. The motor 
boats solved this problem because they were more efficient in catching fish and required 
less arduous labour from the crew. Besides, whereas the outfit of decked vessels and 
trawlers was a large scale business and somewhat risky, and confined to relatively few 
places in Iceland, the motor boats provided a vent for small scale enterprise in many 
places around the country. Hence, its multiplier effects in the economy should not be 
deprecated, or its attendant ‘democratic’ distribution of revenues in the society, as in the 
case of herring salting.
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VIII.6. Conclusions
It is evident that institutional shifts in foreign trade were very influential in the Iceland 
economy. This is so, even if we could not assess the economic implications of shifts in 
prices that were caused by institutional changes in foreign trade. Indeed, our claim rests 
on the understanding that the effectual start of monetisation of the economy, through the 
institutional novelty of cash payments in foreign trade, was the principal cause of the 
changes sketched in this chapter. However, there can be no doubt that inflow of money 
to Iceland grew at an unprecedented rate from the mid 1890s onwards and these changes 
coincided with that shift. Besides, inspection of the logical and empirical relations 
between the two processes shows that the retreat of barter and decline of consequent 
money scarcity in Iceland opened up the way for precisely those changes that happened 
in the economy and we described. Since the concurrent timing of these changes is hardly 
an coincidence and these processes are necessarily connected, we cannot but conclude 
that this start of effective monetisation of the economy was the principal cause of these 
changes.
Given all this, foreign trade continued to exercise its impact on the economy and 
did not only initiate the economic transition as we showed in the last chapter, but also 
propelled it onwards to the end of our research period. In turn, our analysis in this 
chapter and the last has revealed that the economic transition was a far more complicated 
process and more wide-ranging that hitherto realised in the literature. Hence, we have a 
richer understanding of the origins, nature, and timing of this change that transformed 
not only the economy but the entire Icelandic society.
Chapter IX  
Iceland and the International Context: 
Comparative Discussion on Foreign Trade and 
Economic Development
IX.1. The Historical Evidence Among Peripheral 
Economies in the Late 19th and Early 20th Century
IX.1.1. The Real Gains from Trade
According to the theory of gains from trade, economies could reap economic growth or 
development, possibly both, from engaging in international trade. But what was the 
actual experience of contemporary transitory economies in the late 19th and early 20th 
century? Was there an economic growth or development, and can it be linked to foreign 
trade? Concerning economic growth, there is little knowledge about this aspect, partly 
because of scarcity of contemporary data or information. In any case, owing to little 
research on this, the main trends are obscure and the literature has relatively little 
definite to say about this. Perhaps the most extensive comparative examination on 
economic growth is that by V. Bulmer-Thomas in his book about the economic history of
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Latin America.1 There he employs an indirect method, based on the expenditure method 
in national income accounting, to produce interesting computations on the economic 
growth of Latin American economies.
In his exercise, Bulmer-Thomas first determines the size of two independent 
variables. He decides a certain target growth rate of domestic production at 1.5% per 
capita per annum in 1850-1912 (same as for the USA at the time), and further assumes 
that the value added in the non-export sector was 0.5-1% per annum. Granting this and 
by using the appropriate population growth rate, and making educated guesses about the 
relative sizes of the export and non-export sector, he is able to compute for each country 
the rate of growth of exports that was needed to achieve this target GDP growth rate. 
Using a matrix form to narrow down the number of likely target growth rates, he comes 
to the conclusion that for individual countries in Latin America, the value of their 
exports had to grow by 3.2% to 13% per annum. Furthermore, only two countries, 
Argentina and Chile, achieved large enough export growth rates to sustain 1.5% growth 
of domestic production per annum over the period from 1850 to 1912. Remarkably, the 
necessary export growth rate in Latin American countries fell insignificantly even if the 
desirable economic growth rate (1.5% per annum) was lowered or if other adjustments 
were made. For instance, using volume rather than value of exports would be more just 
because prices of exports fell and, thus, Latin American countries in fact could achieve 
the desired outcome with lower export growth rates. However, the price fall amounted to 
perhaps 0.5% per annum according to Bulmer-Thomas, and this lowering of the growth 
target growth rate of exports only marginally affected the overall outcome.2
1 V. Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History o f Latin America.
2 V. Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History o f Latin America, pp 50-53, 61-4, 66-7, 137 (fii 
49), 139. About Argentina and Chile, see also W.A. Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, pp 197- 
9, and L.G. Reynolds, Economic Growth in the Third World, pp 85—8, 108-10.
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The conclusion to draw from Bulmer-Thomas’ computations is that very few 
Latin American economies achieved even a modest economic growth, that is, 1.5% per 
per capita per annum or more. Furthermore, some economies possibly had negative 
growth and experienced a fall in domestic production, at least for shorter periods of time. 
Hence, their economic growth over the entire research period may have been none.
Concerning economic development and major changes in the economic structure, 
there is an abundant literature. However, it is not very systematic in that it differs by 
purposes, research or analytical methods, qualities, and extensiveness. Occasionally, it 
even produces conflicting conclusions. Therefore, it is difficult to discern and reproduce 
any definite findings and clear trends. Bulmer-Thomas has perhaps produced the most 
extensive survey on this in his study on the economic history of Latin America. He found 
that export demand could produce three patterns or models in Latin American 
economies, depending on the circumstances. One pattern was an additive model where 
‘the export sector was grafted onto the existing structure of production with very little 
change’ in the domestic sector. Another pattern was the destructive model where 
‘expansion of new exports was achieved by attracting resources from existing activities 
...’ in the economy but the structure of the domestic sector remained largely unaltered.3 
The third pattern was the transformative model in which the domestic sector was 
substantially affected by a pull of resources into the export sector. Markets operated 
more efficiently, factors received higher rewards, and technological changes were 
marked.4 Bulmer-Thomas admits that most countries showed a mixture of elements from 
the models, but he nevertheless finds this distinction helpful. These observations for 
Latin America show that the outcome in terms of economic development could be just 
about any, and this implies that development was very unevenly spread among peripheral
3 V. Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History o f Latin America, pp 83-4.
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economies in the world, both by scale and nature. For instance, some of the changes that 
had developmental potentials were in the form of foreign enclave activities, which tended 
to have limited links to the domestic sector in the economy.
As happens, scholars have focused more on explaining those instances where 
economic development happened, than on why its absence was so widespread as it was. 
Economic stasis seems to have been more frequent than change, and in their search for 
answers, scholars have until recently concentrated more on identifying the elements 
initiating economic development (and growth), than on its constraints.5 Leaving aside the 
question which of the two approaches is more fruitful and suitable, I will consider the 
problem in a way that cuts across these boundaries. The growth and development 
potentials among peripheral economies were influenced by a number of elements. 
Circumstances in product and factor markets, both in the industrialising and the primary 
producing countries changed over time and influenced the type and scale of demand, as 
well as the supply. But it was not only the commodity lottery, as Bulmer-Thomas 
phrases the coincidental demand for individual exports from the periphery, that had an 
impact on the demand for primary products. The level of the infrastructure in peripheral 
countries, their external relations, and geographical location was also influential. Since 
all these elements can be regarded as largely external and relating to foreign trade on one 
hand and mainly internal and relating to factor markets on the other hand, I will briefly 
discuss them each in turn.
4 V. Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History o f Latin America, p 84.
5 J.L. Anderson, Explaining Long-term Economic Changes, pp 66-7, 69.
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IX.1.2. Relevant External Elements: Foreign Trade and Related 
Preconditions
Until relatively recently it was a conventional perception among economic historians that 
the growth of industrialising countries in the late 19th and early 20th century generated a 
substantial demand for primary products (foodstuffs and raw materials) from traditional 
economies in the world Furthermore, it was believed that this export stimulus was large 
enough to pose a challenge or an option for them to generate economic growth which, 
under adequate circumstances, could be turned into a development over time.6 It was 
recognised that the experience of economies stretched over a wide range from success to 
failure, but failure was considered owing to either lack of ‘rational’ economic response 
or adverse, internal economic, social, and political elements rather than insufficient 
export demand.7 The internal scene and factor markets will be considered later in the 
chapter, but the significance of foreign trade for economic growth and development will 
first be discussed shortly. Recent findings suggest that the stimulus for exports was not 
as strong as customarily believed, neither in terms of aggregate demand nor product 
range. The reason for this revision is that historians’ conventional understanding of 19th 
century world trade was based more on inference and individual cases than an extensive 
study of third world trade statistics.8
The best way to measure the purchasing and income power of exports is by 
using income terms of trade, which multiply net barter terms of trade with the volume 
index of exports. However, information about the terms of trade for most peripheral
6 J. R  Hanson II, Trade in Transition, pp 4-5, 6.
7 B. Ingham, Tropical Exports and Economic Development, pp 1-8, 28-38, 88-96. W.A. 
Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, pp 169-70, 175, 181-224.
8 J. R  Hanson II, Trade in Transition, pp 6,10-12.
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economies in my research period is lacking, and volume of exports is usually employed 
instead.9 According to a comparative statistical study by J.R. Hanson II on a number of 
third world economies in the 19th century, their volume of exports was on the rise but 
the growth rate slowed down in the second half of the century from ca 4% to ca 3% per 
annum. Also, export diversification was limited in the last decades of the century. Why 
was the demand not stronger? Hanson notes that share of Europe in third world exports 
fell over time, especially that of Britain, and other Western European countries did not 
compensate for this although they were increasing their share in these exports. In turn, 
trade between third world countries increased. On the basis of this, Hanson argues 
against the common explanation that the slowing down of growth was a result a 
‘depression’ from the mid 1870s to ca mid 1890s. Rather, he maintains that on top of the 
decline in British demand, which had competitive causes owing to basic changes in the 
world economy, other markets were not so keen about third world products because of 
their rising domestic production, substitution with synthesisers, etc. In other words, the 
demand of the industrialising countries for primary products was on the whole slowing 
down because of growing production internally and new trends in their demand 
patterns.10
Bulmer-Thomas’ findings for Latin America support Hanson’s observation, 
because the rate of growth of Latin America’s export values slowed down to 2.7% per 
annum in 1870-90 compared to 4.5% per annum in 1850-70, but it rose again to 
previous level in 1890-1912. A somewhat similar trend seems discernible in the growth 
rate of volume of exports for a few selected Latin American countries.11 This does not
9 J. R  Hanson II, Trade in Transition, p 120. V. Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History o f 
Latin America, pp 79, 81.
10 J. R  Hanson II, Trade in Transition.
11 V. Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History o f Latin America, pp 65 (Table 3.4), 441 (Table 
A.2.3).
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contradict with Hanson’s findings, because he observed a very similar trend in the rate of 
growth of export volumes in the third world although his periodisation was different.12
Given the existing export stimulus, much depended on the utilisation of this 
potential that was offered. Unfortunately, according to Hanson there is very little 
information about import patterns among peripheral economies.13 In these circumstances, 
it is practically impossible to test empirically the theoretical proposition of the semi­
dynamic gains from trade where capital and service imports are clearly most important. 
In want of information about whether or to what extent import patterns changed, the 
utilisation of this potential provided with exports remains obscure. Apart from that, 
however, the relative size of the export sector in the economy is indicative of the 
significance of foreign trade in the economy. Assuming that net capital transfers and 
foreign investment in the form of capital goods imports were negligible, the relative size 
of the export sector would effectively set the upper limits for imports.
According to Hanson, Asia’s export sector possibly was 1-2% of her domestic 
product (GDP) in 1870, while it was probably 5-6% for the United States and other 
European countries than the UK, France, and Germany. For the UK and France, the 
shares were about 16% and presumably 20% respectively. For Germany, the proportion 
of exports to GDP was 16% in 1880. At the turn of the century, the size of the export 
sector in Asia had doubled, but for the other countries and regions it had not much 
grown and sometimes fallen. Assuming that the relative size of the export sector in 
Central America was broadly as large as in South America, Hanson’s and Bulmer- 
Thomas’ estimates coincide in the same upwards trend where the export sector broadly 
was somewhere between 10 and 14% in 1870, and rose to about 18% in 1900 and 25%
12 J. R  Hanson 13, Trade in Transition, pp 14,28 (Table 2.7).
13 J. R  Hanson II, Trade in Transition, p 134.
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in 1912.14 These figures indicate that even if capital goods and important services were a 
high portion of the imports of Asia and most European countries, they could hardly 
matter much for the economy because of the small portion of foreign trade in their 
economies. However, in the case of Latin America relatively large imports of capital 
goods and services could be of substantial importance, especially after 1900.
Useful as it was to expend export revenues on imports of capital goods and 
services of developmental significance, a balance on trade (a trade surplus) was 
important for any economy. After all, foreign trade was not only means to provide goods 
and services, but also money income and working capital for productive purposes in the 
economy. As long as foreign trade was a relatively small part of the economy, this 
income generating potential usually could not be very significant. In any case, a sizeable 
trade surplus inevitably reduced the importation of important products. Again, the 
comparatively large exports sectors in Latin American economies seem to have provided 
them a larger potential than other peripheral countries in the world had. However, there 
seems to be little information about the relative size of their trade surplus and its 
allocation. Hanson briefly investigated the allocation of trade surpluses in his study, and 
it emerged that a little less than half of the countries had cumulative surpluses, and a 
small majority had in fact cumulative trade deficits. Also, the trade surpluses ranged 
from almost zero to almost 40% of the sum of cumulative exports. Furthermore, only 
some of the surpluses were actually transferred to the respective economies but 
repatriated instead.15 All this evidence shows that in spite of the existence of foreign 
trade, a trade surplus and its actual transfer into the respective economy was by no 
means self-evident.
14 J. R  Hanson II, Trade in Transition, p 23 (Table 2.5). V. Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic 
History o f Latin America, p 439 (Table A.2.1).
15 J. R  Hanson II, Trade in Transition, pp 123-6.
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IX.1.3. Relevant Internal Elements: Factor Market Observations
The efficiency of the links between the export and the domestic sector rests on a number 
of issues, both economic and social. With reference to the economic determinants model 
used in the present research, these links are affected, for example, by the location of the 
resource bases for export and home industries, the locational distribution of the 
population in the economy, the level of infrastructure, the level of technology in home 
industries, human capital, and social institutions such as existing social stratification and 
power relations that social institutions form. Even mentality can affect the links, for 
instance, attitude towards work and innovation. Also, shifts in demand and supply affect, 
among other things, income distribution, which is important for the scale and type of 
demand in the domestic market.
This broad approach that the economic determinants model offers is useful, but 
internal causes affecting economic growth and development are customarily examined in 
the literature on a lower, yet identical, level of abstraction, that is, with reference to 
markets for factors of production.16 This is natural because growth and development rest 
on efficient and operative factor markets. Since export production always or at least 
predominantly rests on the utilisation of internal or endogenous factors, the efficiency of 
the links from the export sector to the domestic sector depends on the operation of
16 R. Cameron uses the economic determinants model in a certain way in his A Concise 
Economic History o f the World (3rd ed.). Most other authors of general economic histories, 
however, apply factor market approach, see books by W. Ashworth, J. Foreman-Peck, and A.G. 
Kenwood and A.L. Lougheed (see bibliography).
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effective factor markets. Therefore, examination of factor markets is in fact a suitable 
way to study the efficiency of these links. It identifies obstacles and bottlenecks that 
deter production and may override an favourable export stimulus.
On the basis of factor market observations, there has emerged a certain 
interpretation of the economic history of the world in my research period, and W.A. 
Lewis provides perhaps the best account of it in his book, Growth and Fluctuations, 
1870-1913 (1978).17 According to him, the Extra-European world can roughly be 
grouped into two. Apart from Japan, which provides a special case because it 
industrialised much earlier than other Asian economies, the two main parts are the 
tropical economies and the temperate settlements. Lewis analyses the economic 
performance of both the tropics and the temperate settlements largely on the basis of 
their factors of production, and he claims that the situations in their factor markets were 
widely different.
The tropical economies, among other things, had a high ratio of population to 
‘land’ and much inflow of people ready to work for low income. This tended to suppress 
wage levels and partly because of this, there was small incentive for labour saving 
methods or technology (imports of capital goods), and comparatively small capital was 
attracted to the tropics. The temperate settlements, on the other hand, had a low ratio of 
population to ‘land’ and much inflow of labour wanting to raise their already higher 
standards of living than prevailed in the tropics. This tended to push up wage levels and 
in turn, it stimulated mechanisation of work to save labour, which was relatively easy 
because of much inflow of capital, and created buoyant markets. Comparatively high 
living standards in turn were conducive to all kinds of imports (consumer goods, capital
17 Scholars that share this perception with Lewis include J. Foreman-Peck, and A.G. Kenwood 
and A.L. Lougheed, as their general economic histories show (see bibliography).
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goods, and services). Compared to other temperate settlements, United States was by far 
most successful as indicated by their early industrialisation. However, Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, Argentina and even Uruguay all experienced rapid economic changes, 
for example, fast rising exports, urbanisation, rise of manufacturing industries, high 
national income, etc., although varying by countries and over time.
The tropical countries had a very different story. Often being colonies, they 
underwent social and economic changes, and in spite of economic growth among some of 
them, it often was haphazard and structural changes negligible, denying them 
development in terms of improved living standards or structural change. Some of the 
tropical economies had fast growing exports, for example, because of mining that foreign 
companies started. But this economic activity usually was located in enclaves in the 
economy, lacking spillovers and integration with the traditional, domestic sector, which 
usually was much larger.18 Lewis does not deal with the periphery of Europe (including 
the northern parts) in his analysis, but it probably stood halfway between the two groups 
concerning their factor markets and with view to the timing of their industrialisation.19 
With regard to social structure, the European periphery is more difficult to locate and no 
attempt will be made to do so here.
18 W. A. Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations.
19 On Southeast Europe, see, for example, I.T. Berend and G. Ranki, Economic Development 
in East-Central Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries, and C. Trebilcock, The 
Industrialization o f the Continental Powers, pp 292-384.
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IX.1.4. Trade and Development: Two Strands of Explanatory 
Frameworks
The discussion of the experiences of economies towards the export stimulus of 
industrialising countries has been slightly sketchy and tentative. However, it shows that 
although the outcomes stretched over a wide range, certain regularities have observed in 
the literature, especially on the basis of the factor market approach. As to the relative 
importance of foreign trade, which is largely influenced by external circumstances, and 
factor markets, which are predominantly moulded by internal elements, a certain 
suggestion has been made. Evidently, trade was no panacea for economic growth or 
development, and Hanson claims in his study that third world export performance was 
more influenced by supply conditions than demand conditions. Also, Bulmer-Thomas 
found that there was not a lack of export demand and stressed the importance of 
hindrances in domestic linkages (in factor markets) in utilising the export stimulus. 
Granted that Hanson’s and Bulmer-Thomas’ notions stand up scrutiny, they imply that 
internal circumstances were more important than the trade stimulus.
Although the historiography has produced this suggestion and, in any case, 
moved towards a more balanced perception of both internal and external elements, there 
not a consensus in this field. The numerous examples of economies gaining little from 
trade for longer or shorter periods of time since the 19th century, and also before that 
time, have prompted broadly two different schools of explanations among scholars and 
politically oriented writers. One set is that dependence on primary exports is bound to 
produce meagre results in the long run. The lines of argument vary, and one is that 
dependence on a single or few commodities is risky because of fluctuating demand and 
alternative sources for these commodities in other countries. This is especially likely
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where the exports sector is large, because then fluctuations in international commodity 
markets are more consequential for the respective economy. Another argument is that 
because of relatively huge price fluctuations in primary products, export revenues are 
much affected and, thereby, chances of importing goods and services necessary for 
starting and sustaining economic development are reduced. A third argument is that 
static gains from trade will in fact work against primary product countries because the 
initial comparative advantages are self-perpetuating and will remain the same. Enclaves 
and examples of backwash effects are said to be cases in point. Fourth, there is the 
doctrine of unequal exchange which is based on the contention that the theory of 
comparative advantages is fundamentally incorrect. Finally, there is the terms of trade 
argument that supposes ever-declining terms of trade for primary producers because the 
industrialised countries are bound to gain the upper hand in their exchange with less 
developed countries.20
The other school of explanations focuses on internal circumstances and tries to 
identify the problems in carrying over the possible benefits of trade to other sectors in the 
economy.21 The internal circumstances are often examind on the basis of factor markets 
to observe structural hindrances in the employment of the factors of production. Even so, 
the links between the export sector and the domestic sector are conveniently examined 
within this approach because both sectors are dependent on the same factor markets. 
Furthermore, the economic impact or significance of foreign trade can also be examined 
in empirical way — devoid of the pessimism and determinism inherent in the school 
above — by scrutiny of the issues that semi-dynamic gains from trade highlight.
20 A.G. Kenwood and A.L. Lougheed, The Growth o f the International Economy, 3rd ed., p 
132. J.S. Hogendom, Economic Development, pp 337ff. T.J. Bfames], ‘staples theory,’ p 590.
21 A.G. Kenwood and A.L. Lougheed, The Growth o f the International Economy, 3rd ed., p 
132.
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In any case, the first set of explanations deals with the operation of the world 
economy and the general effects of international trade on individual economies in a 
somewhat deterministic and pessimistic way, while the second set takes the international 
context as given and tries to locate the impact of trade, for what it was, on the respective 
economy and explain how and why it influenced the economy, for good or worse, in this 
particular way. In my view, the insight that the first school offers is blocked by its 
pessimism and determinism, and this is mainly caused by scholarly onesidedness and 
political convictions of its exponents than the perspective as such. Therefore, if the 
international context would be investigated in a more analytical and critical way, one set 
of explanations would by no means preclude the other. Instead, they should be thought of 
as necessary complementary explanatory frameworks. However, scholars usually 
employ only either one of the two, and since the purpose of the thesis is more concerned 
with the latter set of questions and explanations, its theoretical and empirical base has 
been in focus in the discussion above.
Concerning my initial point of departure in this present chapter — the empirical 
relation between trade and economic development — the literature has little to say. 
Extensive comparative research seems to be lacking on the significance of static, 
dynamic, and semi-dynamic gains from trade as sources of economic development.22 
However, it is safe to conclude from my discussion that economic development depended 
on a host of other elements in the economy than shifts in relative prices of exports and 
imports, the level of utilisation of economic resources, or imports of consumer goods, 
capitals goods, and services. Lewis’ analysis suggests that levels and distribution of 
income, circumstances in factor markets, and international movements of capital and
22 Dynamic gains from trade have perhaps mainly been examined by H  Myint (see B. Ingham, 
Economics and Development, p 127 and J.S. Hogendom, Economic Development, p 334). 
However, concerning semi-dynamic gains from trade, J.R. Hanson II in Trade in Transition, 
remarks that there is no survey on the imports of third world countries (p 134).
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labour mattered no less. Furthermore, Lewis stresses the importance of social structures 
in understanding divergent paths when ‘economic’ variables are identical.23 The findings 
by Hanson and Bulmer-Thomas broadly support this also.
These observations are backed up in general by a series of studies by I. Adelman 
and C.T. Morris since the 1960s. Through statistical analyses of a host of social and 
economic variables, they have tried to identify correlation between seemingly strategic 
factors for economic growth and development. Since they have been searching for 
statistical correlation rather than location of causal relationships, they have not been able 
to provide general answers to the questions why development starts and what are the 
decisive factors in its process. Rather, they have managed to demonstrate that 
institutions are significantly more important than purely economic factors for growth and 
development. Furthermore, they have demonstrated that suitable institutional framework 
is only a prerequisite but not a sufficient condition, because favourable economic 
circumstances and stimulus is also needed.24 Hence, it is safe to conclude that relevant 
as trade is to economic development in theory, the empirical evidence suggests that the 
causal relationship is a whole complex of economic and social factors and elements, both 
internal to economies and in their external relations, that must be studied simultaneously.
23 W. A. Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, for instance, pp 31,165, 166-7, 176, 195-6.
24 See B. Ingham, Economics and Development, pp 36-7, 92-6.
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IX.2. The Icelandic Case
IX.2.1. Iceland’s Gains from Trade in Terms of Economic 
Growth and Development
As I remarked in Chapter I, it is clear that Iceland underwent economic development in 
the research period, mainly with the advent of mechanisation in the fishing sector shortly 
after 1900 although a progressive step was taken after 1887 with the rise of decked 
sailing vessels in the fishing fleet. This leaves us with the question of economic growth, 
which admittedly is outside the scope of the thesis. However, the matter is pertinent for 
the discussion about the gains from trade among other peripheral economies in the world, 
and it is in fact a relevant introduction to the central theme of the thesis, the economic 
development of Iceland and the role of foreign trade. According to newly constructed 
national income accounts, Iceland’s economic growth at constant prices was 1.7% per 
annum per capita between 1870 and 1913, which is slightly more than the benchmark 
that Bulmer-Thomas used for Latin America 1850-1912 and he based on the economic 
growth of the US.25 However, the economic growth of Iceland fluctuated over time and 
three sub-period can be discerned. The first era, from 1870 to 1881, was marked by 
considerable expansion, because the growth was 2.2% using the same measure. Then, 
years of contraction followed and economic growth was equally as negative as it had 
been positive before (-2.2% per annum). After 1887 and through 1913, economic growth
25 Gudmundur Jonsson, Hagvdxtur og idnvceding, p 370.
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was considerable again. Over this sub-period, it was 2.4% per annum, but it was slower 
initially (2% until 1899) and then rose markedly (2.7% until 1913).26
These approximations of Iceland’s gross domestic production over time are very 
important not only in terms of the estimates of the levels of economic growth but also 
because of the vast source material that has been exploited and basic computations that 
now have been forwarded for historical analysis. Nevertheless, the series are an 
approximation of the actual domestic production, and the quality of the results inevitably 
depends on one hand on the accuracy and extensiveness of the sources and on the other 
hand on various estimates that have been necessary for the construction of the national 
income accounts. With regard to gross domestic production in the import trade and 
quantities of exports, the present research has produced more reliable data on imports 
and exports than was exploited for the construction of the national income accounts. 
According to the new datasets used in the present research, exports are always under­
estimated (usually by 10-20% by value) and imports are under-estimated initially (by 
about 25% by value) but over time the level of the under-estimate declines and in 1913 
imports are in fact slightly over-estimated (by about 5% by value).27 Evidently, the 
quantities that are lacking in the trade data used for the construction of the national 
income accounts affect the new estimates of the levels of domestic production. However, 
a calculation of the difference this makes and a production of new estimates of the 
domestic production will not be attempted here for a variety of reasons. Rather, the 
purpose of this observation is to remark that if only for this reason, the new series about 
the economic growth of Iceland is by no means conclusive.
26 Gudmundur Jonsson, Hagvdxtur og idnvceding, pp 155 (tafia 15.1), 157.
27 See Fig. A.1 in Appendix A.
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IX.2.2. Foreign Trade and Related Preconditions in Iceland
It is safe to say that in international comparison, Iceland’s foreign trade supplied a 
considerable capacity for delivering imports and income in the form of a trade surplus. 
Between 1870 and 1913 the volume of total exports per capita grew at 2.8% per annum. 
Incidentally, however, in contrast to the findings of Hanson and Bulmer-Thomas for 
peripheral economies around the world, the growth rate for Iceland was much faster until 
the mid 1890s than after this point of time. But since Iceland’s net barter terms of trade 
export concurrently started to rise significantly, the purchasing power of exports in fact 
remained unaltered. This is indicated by Iceland’s income terms of trade, the most 
suitable measure for the purchasing power of exports, because it rose just as much as the 
volume of exports (by 2.9% per capita per annum) between 1870 and 1913.28 From the 
scanty information available about income terms of trade among peripheral economies, it 
appears that Iceland was uniquely well disposed in this respect.29
Clearly, a considerable developmental potential for the economy was provided 
by foreign trade, but how was it used? Rising imports in SITC groups 6-8 both in 
absolute and relative terms suggest that this potential was increasingly used from 1870 
onwards. A part of the imports was consumer goods, and the datasets (and the sources) 
are aggregated in such a way that distinction between manufactured consumer goods and 
capital goods is sometimes unclear. But the trade data implicitly indicates that the share 
of capital goods increased, and imports of the largest capital goods (ships) are lacking in
28 Table C.BAL/ALL-3.
29 V. Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History o f Latin America, p 81.
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my datasets, as I explain in Appendix 1, so they were in fact greater than the my trade 
data indicates. Consequently, there was a clear shift in capital imports from the early 
1900s onwards, when imports of important capital goods such as trawlers and boat 
engines commenced.. Given this, imports clearly were used to provide the Icelandic 
economy with capital goods, although this opportunity was perhaps relatively modestly 
used until after 1900.
Iceland’s rate of growth of volume of exports trade was on a similar level as 
among other peripheral economies, but what about the relative importance of foreign 
trade in the economy? According to the new national income accounts, the exports were 
24% in 1870 and 41% in 1913.30 Although this share fluctuated over time and the new 
trade data produced in the present research may alter this outcome, it indicates well the 
secular rise in the relative importance of the export sector in the economy. With 
reference to my discussion about the relative size of the exports sector among peripheral 
economies above, a share of this size was comparatively large in international 
comparison, but this is to be expected since Iceland was a very small country. This large 
exports sector meant that foreign trade necessarily influenced very much the Icelandic 
economy, and although it had a modest growth of volume of exports in international 
comparison, its income terms of trade imply that Iceland had unusually good opportunity 
to benefit from foreign trade. We know nothing about service imports (see the semi­
dynamic gains from trade argument), but its imports of capital goods clearly were of 
considerable significance for the economy. Compared to countries with relatively small 
exports sectors, they were much more important and this adds to their historical 
significance in terms of Iceland’s economic history.
30 Gu5mundur Jonsson, Hagvdxtur og idnvceding, p 384.
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Concerning the income generating potential of Iceland’s exports, Iceland was 
rather badly disposed as my discussion about the storage of the trade surplus indicates 
(Chapter VI). However, it is unlikely that Iceland was unique in this respect, and 
Hanson’s discussion about the trade surplus of peripheral countries and its allocation 
suggests that it usually was exported to a varying extent. Lack of information prevents 
me from forwarding any suggestion about the usefulness about Iceland’s almost 
perennial trade surplus, but it possibly was paid out in cash to some extent after 1900. 
Even so, it is safe to say that Iceland for most of the research period did not benefit much 
from its trade surplus, so the usefulness of exports was mainly confined to imports of 
products.
IX.2.3. Comments on Iceland’s Factor Markets
If we consider the circumstances over time in Iceland’s factor markets and their relative 
scarcities, it seems obvious that we must divide the research period into two. Until about 
1890, Iceland was scarce in terrestrial land and money capital relative to the supply of 
labour. The emigration from Iceland in fact outright proves the relative scarcity of land 
to labour, and almost constant complaints about money shortage indicate the same 
relative scarcity. From about 1890 onwards, however, the constraints from the supply of 
terrestrial land relative to the demand was solved by exploiting off-shore land, that is, the 
fishing ground off Iceland. Furthermore, the acute money shortage probably was largely 
eliminated by the flow of money from various new sources from the late 1890s onwards. 
It seems that effective money market was formed with the rise in the number of savings
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funds, and, especially, with the operation of two commercial banks and relenting of 
foreign capital. Overall, these changes imply that the initial conspicuous relative 
scarcities disappeared, and that much more effective factor markets were established.
It is clear that the initial situation in Iceland’s factor markets was unlike both 
that of the temperate settlements and tropical countries. The relatively scarcity of the 
temperate settlements was in labour (population) to land (and capital), and this attracted 
labour to them. The scarcity of the tropical countries, however, was mainly in capital to 
labour (and land), but they did not attract very much capital since the population to land 
relatives were so unfavourable, according to W.A. Lewis. It appears that Iceland was 
much more like other European peripheral regions, which tended to be scarce in land and 
capital to labour, and this caused emigration from these regions just as in Iceland. But 
whereas most of them were fenced off by other countries, Iceland could overcome its 
lack of land by exploiting an off-terrestrial resource, the sea. This step, however, was not 
taken with very productive outcome until about 1890, and with the rising net inflow of 
money later on, Iceland’s relative scarcities in factor markets became very similar to 
those in the temperate settlements. They had favourable man to ‘land’ ratio, that is, 
abundant natural resources for utilisation relative to its populations, and so did Iceland 
when its greatest natural resource, the fishing banks, started to be efficiently utilised. 
Furthermore, it seems that the similarities between Iceland and the temperate settlements 
in terms of the capital factor are greater than between Iceland and the tropical countries. 
The temperate settlements almost certainly had greater capital relative to its labour, but 
Iceland after 1900 and presumably the other European peripheries were in a similar 
situation as Iceland concerning capital.
Given this, it is safe to conclude that Iceland had the potential of overcoming its 
natural resource (‘land’) factor already in 1870, but social institutions, not least the
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institutional framework of foreign trade, prevented the economy from exploiting this 
potential. From the point of view of Iceland’s developmental potentials, this particular 
factor abundance, although masked initially, was a decisive advantage, because it was an 
immobile factor while the other two main factors of production, labour and capital were 
mobile, and their scarcities could be overcome once social constraints were removed. 
These constraints seem to have been present in the factor markets of ‘land’ and money, 
but essentially they were only in the money market. With reference to my general 
description of the Icelandic economy around 1870 (in Chapter II) and the findings of the 
thesis, it seems safe to suggest that the principal constraints to the economy were in the 
market for money capital. After all, it was only with the advent of the fresh fish trade 
and the employment of new technologies in the cod fishing that the existing stasis in the 
economy was broken. Hence, legal constraints in the market for labour (the labour 
bondage) were not among the most serious ones, as Icelandic scholars have often 
claimed. Whether we consent with Bjora S. Stefansson that the labour bondage in effect 
did not obstruct the growth of fishing and urban areas, or that it was a barrier to such 
development and people simply started to disobey the law in the last decades of 19th 
century, the outcome is the same. When the demand for urban labour grew and greater 
capital was put in the fishing in the late 1880s onwards, the labour bondage law, which 
was not legally abolished until 1894, was made irrelevant anyway, and this suggest that 
it never was a barrier to urbanisation and the growth in the fishing sector. In any case, it 
was practically irrelevant compared to the net drain of money from Iceland in upholding 
the economic stasis, as in fact my interpretation of Gudmundur Halfdanarson’s findings 
in Chapter I had implied.
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IX.2.4. Trade and Development in Iceland
Overall, foreign trade was very advantageous for Iceland in my research period, and in 
international comparison it probably was unusually beneficial for the economy. The 
export sector clearly was comparatively very large, net barter terms of trade seem to 
have moved more favourably than for many economies, and Iceland possibly had larger 
capital imports than other countries. My comments on Iceland’s factor markets indicates, 
however, that all of this was of little use as long as the institutional complex that 
comprised the economy and its external relations around 1870 persisted. According to 
my understanding, most detrimental of all for the development of economy’s industries 
was the net capital outflow, and this did not change until merchants started to invest in 
the fishing sector. It emerged in Chapter VH3 that this was an indirect consequence of a 
shift in market conditions (the fall in the prices of saltfish), and as such it qualifies as a 
result of foreign trade.
This observation may seem to run counter to Hanson’s and Bulmer-Thomas’ 
inference that for most peripheral economies internal elements mattered more than the 
trade stimulus. But it does not, because they were only speaking of the relative impact of 
these two sources of impact on the export performance of the respective economies, and 
I am speaking about another aspect, namely development. Note that it seems evident that 
Iceland’s export performance was mainly a function of internal circumstances than the 
trade stimulus. But in terms of the economic development of Iceland, it seems equally 
clear that the economic stasis was only broken with developments within the realm of 
foreign trade. As I tried to show in Chapters VII and VIII, a major change in the 
economy was initiated with the advent of the fresh fish trade and the start of
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unprecedented amounts of capital investments in the fishing sector. Later, the 
monetisation of the economy followed. These events were caused by changes in foreign 
markets and shifts in the institutional framework of foreign trade.
The usefulness of Bulmer-Thomas’ findings about the three possible types of 
export sectors in Latin American economies can be disputed, but it is relevant to 
consider them in relation to Iceland. In fact, it seems that the three models broadly 
describe the evolution of the Iceland economy. If  the initial situation around 1870 is 
considered as the benchmark, the first significant change, the live sheep trade, was 
integrated into the economy without any change in its structure, and this is an example of 
the additive model. With the start of the fresh fish trade and the rise of the operation of 
decked fishing vessels, economic sources were drawn to a considerable extent from 
previous occupation. It is debatable whether this change presented an example of the 
destructive model or the transformative model, but the latter definitely is a proper 
description of the economy after the monetisation had begun.
IX.3. Major Historical Patterns Relevant for Iceland
IX.3.1. Iceland: A Colony?
The principal conclusion from my discussion about the Icelandic economy in terms of its 
factor markets was that certain barriers in the capital market had been decisive for the 
initial economic stasis in my research period. This situation was an outcome of a power
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imbalance in Iceland’s external relations and pertained to its foreign trade. Merchants 
had assumed the position where Iceland’s trade surplus was stored and used as cheap 
working capital for merchants abroad. Furthermore, they refrained from paying exports 
in money and, moreover, sucked out money capital that came into Iceland by accepting 
money in return for imports. This conspicuous and highly detrimental power imbalance 
for the development of the economy deserves examination, but this matter can only be 
tentatively discussed here.
If  this power imbalance in the case of Iceland’s external relations is viewed in 
international perspective, imperialism and colonialism immediately come to 
consideration. Occasionally, Icelandic historians have remarked that Iceland was a 
colony in the early modem period, that is from the 17th to the 19th century.31 Also, 
Icelandic communists in the early 20th century frequently spoke of alleged colonial 
position of Iceland in past centuries.32 But the origin of this idea among communists is 
unclear to me, and how they supported this notion has not been examined to my 
knowledge. By contrast, other historians have either purposely or by custom and under 
the influence of Danish term ‘bilancT rejected the idea, and Iceland usually is called a 
dependency (Icel. hjalenda) in Icelandic historiography.33 Anyway, it is evident from 
these contrasting views that the question of Iceland as a colony is an interesting and 
unsettled issue in Icelandic historiography. With reference to the stasis of the economy 
until the late 1880s, we may ponder whether the colony perspective can aid us in 
understanding the economy. It is outside the scope of the thesis to explore this idea in 
any detail but it is relevant to our discussion about stasis, if  not stagnation, and
31 Bjom Sigfusson, comp., Neistar, p 188 footnote. Jon Olafur Isberg, Milestones in Icelandic 
History, p 35.
32 J.F. Horrabin, Lond og riki, p 157. Since the author did not include Iceland in his text, a
section on Iceland was added to the Icelandic edition by the publisher, cf. p 8.
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transition in the economy and their respective causes. Hence, I will briefly discuss the 
colony idea to deepen our understanding of the different phases from stasis to the 
realisation of development potentials.
First, a definition of the term colony is in order. For the sake of clarity, some 
scholars wish to distinguish between (a) expansion of capitalism, (b) imperialism, and 
(c) colonialism. The first is simply a spread of the capitalist method of production and 
voluntary (at least not coercive) adoption of it within societies. However, imperialism is 
confined to an informal kind of dominance over other regions while colonialism entails 
formal dominance.34 This definition requires two remarks. First, note that neither 
informal imperialism nor colonialism (formal imperialism) is necessarily linked to 
capitalism, cf. ancient times. Second, much as it is convenient to have a specific term for 
informal imperialism, it means that we are in want of a common term for both formal 
and informal imperialism. Not surprisingly, many scholars use colonialism and 
imperialism interchangeably but try to eschew the polemical flavour of the latter. In our 
discussion, colonialism and informal imperialism will be referred to as two components 
of imperialism proper. Concerning the content of the definition, the term ‘dominance’ 
implies that informal imperialism and colonialism are marked by unequal relations of 
power which usually cover economic, political, social, and cultural aspects. In economic 
sense, this relationship predominantly consists of one-way transfers of goods (and 
services), rather than proper exchange.35 The kernel of this relationship surely is what
33 GuQmundur Jonsson, ‘The State and the Icelandic Economy,’ p 2. GuQmundur 
Halfdanarson, ‘Islensk Jydd fe lagsb roun ,’ p 30.
34 A. Porter, European Imperialism, p 10, cf. pp 2-3,12.
35 K.E. Boulding, ‘Introduction’ to Economic Imperialism: A Book o f Readings, p xi-xii. A.H. 
Amsden, ‘imperialism,’ pp 728-9. G.E. Sfmith], ‘imperialism,’ pp 274-5. — A.H Amsden 
adamantly stresses the importance of power relations in definining imperialism, see her 
‘imperialism,’ pp 731-3. See also M. Wfatts], ‘colonialism,’ p 75; R.J. J[ohnston], ‘power,’ pp 
469-71.
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K.E. Boulding called ‘“a threat-submission” system’ which is legitimised and not 
necessarily legalised, when he spoke of imperialism proper.36 Defining imperialism in 
this way, it usually was practised directly and formally (i.e., as colonialism) by 
European powers from at least 1500 onwards, but it changed nature over time. It started 
with downright plunder and later moved to a mercantilist phase that centred on trade. It 
was followed in the 18th century by the penetration of industrial capital and production, 
which intensified in late 19th century in a scramble for colonies that was based more on 
ethnocentrism in various disguise rather than economical reasons.37
According to the terminology above, Iceland clearly was a colony because 
Denmark exercised an explicit formal dominance over Iceland from at least 1662 when 
Iceland was subsumed in the monarchy and ancient rights given up. Moreover, before 
that time, Denmark had de facto for a considerable time ruled Iceland.38 For a long time, 
the governance of Iceland in the early modem period was marked by the mercantilist 
phase of imperialism.39 This is because trade rather than investment for production was 
its hallmark, and the Icelandic economy was wholly untouched by penetration of ‘home’ 
(Danish) or foreign capital until the late 19th century. When Danish subjects were 
granted monopoly to the Iceland trade, in the 17th century, the locus of Iceland’s foreign 
trade shifted from being internally based and was moved to Copenhagen where it 
remained until 1900. The Danish king even contracted out his revenues from Iceland for 
a while to powerful men in Denmark. Both practices were in the spirit o f feudal times, 
although the mercantile system also was an step towards modem state operation. In a
36 K.E. Boulding, ‘Introduction’ to Economic Imperialism: A Book o f Readings, p x.
37 M. W[atts], ‘colonialism,’ pp 75-7. H. Magdoff, ‘Imperialism,’ 13-19. R. Cameron, A 
Concise Economic History o f the World, 3rd ed., pp 92—4, 99-106, 120-29. G.V. Scammell, 
The First Imperial Age.
38 Magnus Hauksson, ‘Einveldisskuldbindingin 1662,’ pp 76-8, 80.
39 A useful discussion of the different expressions of mercantilism (or ‘economic nationalism’) 
is in R. Cameron’s A Concise Economic History o f the World, 3rd ed., pp 130-62.
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word, the general management of Iceland, both in internal and external affairs, in as late 
as the 19th century witnesses an enduring mercantilist policy (Chapter II).
The position of Iceland as a colony becomes clearer still if we look at 
developments in the late 19th century. The projects that were initiated by foreign 
enterprises in Iceland, mostly in the field of herring fishing and whaling, signified 
Iceland’s first contact with the growing integration of the world economy and increasing 
penetration of foreign enterprises in traditional, peripheral societies. For our context 
here, they meant the first penetration of industrial capital in Iceland. When merchants 
started putting capital in fishing after 1886, it signified a major turn in the policy of 
Danish towards Iceland because these investments were the first ones of ‘home’ (Danish) 
capital in Iceland. In turn, it meant the entrance of merchant capital in the Iceland 
economy. But in spite of the significance of this step regarding sustainability, among 
other things, the impact on the Iceland economy was, nevertheless, somewhat restricted. 
This was because the three main factors of production were tied to merchants and the 
fourth factor, entrepreneurship, necessarily was embodied in themselves. Land was 
owned by merchants, they were the owners of capital (or supplied it in Denmark), and 
labour was tied to them through the truck system, which was all-pervasive in urban areas 
where merchants were about the only employers. The concentration of all the factors of 
production in one and the same group, on top of the impact of bookkeeping barter, gave 
them extraordinary powerful position to influence the Iceland economy. How they used 
this power depended on the respective persons, but the economic outcome was the same, 
namely a restricted economic development, expatriation of profits (capital), and 
excessive concentration of power which blocked other groups in society to challenge 
their hegemony.
If Iceland ever was a capitalist colony, then it was in this phase from 1886 to the 
early or mid 1900s. This phase was characterised by capitalist production and Danish
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monopolistic exploitation of Iceland at the same time so the term colony is truly apt for 
Iceland during this time. But since it was done with Danish merchant capital, this 
arrangement only meant an extension of the era of Danish imperialism in Iceland. 
Evidently, this phase was relatively not very long in its pure form, because after 1900 
the hegemony of merchants was challenged with the impact of monetisation and the 
penetration of industrial (and banking) capital from Denmark and other countries. In 
other words, this phase was the era of non-merchant capital in Iceland, breaking the 
stronghold of merchants in the economy. Unlike the foreign enterprises in late 19th 
century, the foreign investments in this era did not form enclaves or operated on the 
boarder of the economy because it entailed the use of domestic factors of production and 
co-ownership with Icelanders. With the waxing of monetisation and foreign capital in 
Iceland, the waning of Danish economic subjugation of Iceland set in.
As it happens, since the beginning of the 20th century, imperialism has often 
been associated with the rise of capitalism, and the prime example has usually been the 
late 19th century scramble for colonies. This has mainly been the stance of marxists, but 
other scholars, for instance, K.E. Boulding, D.K. Fieldhouse, and D.S. Landes, have 
increasingly disputed this and argued that imperialism and capitalist are two distinct 
phenomena.40 Evidently, our discussion above refutes marxist claims. Furthermore, J.A. 
Schumpeter has relevance for our argument because he maintained that imperialism was, 
in the words of K.E. Boulding and T. Mukeijee, ‘a product of pre-capitalist ideas. It was 
an alliance between a small group of highly selfish capitalists [sic] and the members of a 
small group of people who retained a feudal outlook.’41 Incidentally, this broadly
40 See extracts from their writings in K.E. Boulding and T. Mukerjee, eds, Economic 
Imperialism: A Book o f Readings.
41 K.E. Boulding and T. Mukerjee, eds, Economic Imperialism: A Book o f Readings, p 34. Cf. 
J.A. Schumpeter, ‘On Imperialism,’ pp 58-9.
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coincides with the Icelandic experience according to our interpretation above. In 
conclusion, the term colony is certainly apposite for Iceland in the early modern period 
and long into our research period. Furthermore, our tentative discussion has 
demonstrated that Iceland experienced different phases of imperialist policy at some time 
or another.
The fact that there are many resemblances between colonies in different parts of 
the world and Iceland further supports my notion that Iceland was a colony, at least 
economically. Understandably, the other de facto colonies of Denmark (the Faroes, 
Greenland, and Danish West Indies) received similar treatment as Iceland. But it is 
slightly remarkable that mercantilist policies of Spain and Portugal in their colonies in 
Latin America seem to have been similar to those used for Iceland.42 Furthermore, 
Iceland does not appear to have been the only colony in as late as 19th century to have 
been governed in mercantilist ways, because India is claimed to have been treated 
similarly until 1870.43 In fact, S. Amin maintains that some African colonies were ‘trade 
or trading post economies’ with indigenous ruling class and peasant production, and this 
also suggests resemblance with Iceland.44 In all the cases, the locus of the foreign trade 
of the countries in question almost certainly was external, in the formal empires, as in 
Iceland. To be sure, this no doubt also was the case where a peripheral country was a 
part o f informal empire in the 19th century.
42 V. Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History o f Latin America, pp 22-7.
43 R. Robinson and R. Gallagher, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade.’ Brought to my attention by 
A.H. Amsden, ‘imperialism,’ p 729.
44 S. Amin, Unequal Development. Cited in M. W[atts], ‘colonialism,’ p 76.
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IX.3.2. Dualism and Enclave Activities
When Iceland is examined from international perspective, the issue of enclave activities 
calls for attention. Incidentally, the enclaves that existed in Iceland have not been put in 
this international context, and, therefore, many question concerning them have not been 
answered. For instance, were they beneficial or detrimental for the development of the 
economy? Did they support or challenge the hegemony o f Danish merchants in Iceland? 
What was their significance in relation to Iceland’s money market? These questions will 
be touched on below and provisionally answers offered.
Sometimes, the dual economy model or the idea of dualism is used to describe a 
situation or a certain stage in the transition from a traditional to a modem society. 
Implicitly, transition means that basically two elements are operating in the society, one 
traditional and the other modem. What dualism adds to this understanding is that the two 
elements are only marginally integrated owing to some social, political, or economic 
hindrances. In fact, the idea can apply to almost every aspect in society, including 
economic activities, spatial location, technology, subsistence versus market production, 
financing, etc. Often, dualism is confined to economic activity and discussed in terms of 
a two sector model, and used to explain the transfer of labour from the agricultural 
sector to urban based industrial sector. The model is usually presented as a stylised, 
neoclassical model, and it is common in textbooks in development economics, but that is 
were its relevance starts and ends because it has been found problematic in real-life 
circumstances.45 However, the general idea of a dualism is a useful concept, albeit
45 R. L[ee], ‘dual economy,’ pp 140-43. D. Colman and F. Nixson, Economics o f Change, 3rd 
ed., pp 35-42. B. Ingham, Economics and Development, pp 109-20. M.P. Todaro, Economic 
Development, 6th ed., pp 75—80, 84—5.
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simple.46 Furthermore, its application to economic activity can be illuminating if it is not 
put into a neoclassical straitjacket.47 For instance, M. Santos, appears to have proffered 
a sensible and constructive analytical framework of a dual economy, which is basically 
composed of a lower circuit with traditional activities and a upper circuit where modem 
activities operate, although there are also relations between the two circuits.48 Without 
going into details, we can add that in dual economies, the modem element is confined to 
spatial enclave activities where new products or new technology is used, but without 
much impact on the overall economy which continues its traditional course. The reasons 
for lack of impact can be many, for instance, use of external factors. But even if factors 
are partly endogenous, linkages tend to be small and the modem economic activity has 
negligible multiplier effects. Not surprisingly, enclave activities have often received a 
bad press in the development literature and development debate.49 The reason for this is 
not only that enclaves almost by definition feed comparatively little back into the 
economy.50 The reproach is no less caused by great expectations that nation leaders and 
policy advisers tended to have for the new manufacturing activities as a path-breaker for 
modernisation, generating strong linkages and large multiplying effects. When the 
modem element failed to deliver all this, it was condemned.
46 Some critise dualism for expressing European ethnocentrism (R. L[ee], ‘dual economy,’ pp 
140-43), but that is a political reading of it, which does not alter the feet that the idea is 
sometimes useful.
47 A classic example is H. Myint, quoted by B. Ingham, Economics and Development, p 119, 
and B. Ingham, Tropical Exports.
48 M. Santos, The Shared Space. Cited in R. L[ee], ‘dual economy,’ pp 141-2.
49 J.S. Hogendom, Economic Development, pp 339-43. M. Gillis et al., Economics o f 
Development, 4th ed., p 475. M.P. Todaro, Economic Development, 6th ed., p 446-7. H.W. 
Singer and JA. Ansari, Rich and Poor Countries, 4th ed., p 293.
50 Even if we can subscribe to Hogendom’s view {Economic Development, p 342) that enlave 
activities were important in the economic development of Japan, the United States, Canada and 
Britain, they can hardly be regarded as enlaves as time passed and in contrast to ‘standard’ 
enlaves, they had relatively strong linkages and multiplying effects.
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Reflecting on dualism in the Icelandic economy, particularly Santos’ framework, 
it is safe to conclude that it is not a relevant idea or a meaningful one in Icelandic 
context. In spite of explicit enclaves in the form of foreign enterprises which were geared 
towards exports, at least two reasons can be identified why they did not produce dualism 
in Iceland. First, the enclaves almost certainly constituted a very small part of aggregate 
economic activity in Iceland, and they, furthermore, only partly used Icelandic factors 
and imported themselves their inputs and goods for consumption. This was bound to 
minimise their overall impact on the economy. Second, even though enclave activities 
were located on the coast, rather than inland, they were spread along the coast in many 
places. Furthermore, they were situated in those parts of the country where the staple 
urban industry, cod fishing and saltfish processing, only started to grow in the 1880s 
onwards and remained on a smaller scale than elsewhere.51 Hence, they in a way 
balanced the huge growth of the saltfish industry in the other parts of the country. In 
turn, they often generated a base for a rise of urban areas in their respective districts, and 
there they implicitly and explicitly were conducive for indigenous activities in fishing, 
including herring fishing. Note that although a disparity emerged between urban and 
rural areas, it was not caused by enclave activities but by the overall rise of urban based 
marine utilisation at the expense of agriculture in terms of work force.
On balance, the foreign-owned enclave activities in Iceland have gone down in 
Icelandic history with a good name. This is in contrast to many countries and begs an 
explanation. Above, we touched upon one reason, that is, stimulating effects on the 
economy in districts where saltfish industry was non-existent or on a small scale. Earlier 
in the thesis, we discussed another reason, namely money which the enterprises paid as 
factor rewards in Iceland. Two additional reasons will be advanced here. One is that the
51 See maps of saltfish production by places from 1873/75 to 1893/95 in Valdimar Unnar
CHAPTER IX -378
revenues generated by the enclave activities were like a bonus or lottery winning. They 
were uncontrollable like good catches or favourable weather for fanning, and 
appreciated as such. In other words, Icelanders had no expectations whatsoever over the 
foreign enterprises so they could not ‘fail’ in any respect. The other reason is less 
obvious but no doubt a part of the explanation. Here I am referring to various beneficial 
impact on Icelandic society broadly speaking. The foreign enterprises often improved 
infrastructure for their own advantage but this was useful for others too, at least in the 
long run. Even more important was the significance of new technology and new ideas 
they brought to Iceland, besides the example they set for energetic Icelanders.52 For 
instance, Icelanders were introduced to machines in the herring stations, and the first 
mechanical workshops in Iceland were usually formed by men having acquired their 
skills or basic knowledge there.53 Ironically, the foreign entrepreneurs even taught 
Icelanders to catch herring, which was of considerable economic significance after 1900. 
We can also list social and cultural influences on Icelandic society, and they should not 
be deprecated. Finally, there were fiscal linkages because the foreign enterprises 
increased revenues of the Icelandic treasury through their exports. To be sure, Iceland 
only was a base to make profits for the foreign enterprises, which often trespassed the 
law, and it was claimed that the morals of their work people were not particularly good 
at times. Nevertheless, the overall impact of foreign enclave activities on the economy 
itself were no doubt far more beneficial than detrimental. In any case, Icelanders had no
Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur i sogu pjodar, vol. 1, pp 174-5.
52 In the case of whaling, this point is discussed in Trausti Einarsson, Hvalveidar a Island! 
The relevance of new ideas in general for economic development is lucidly briefed in J.S. 
Hogendom, Economic Development, p 336.
53 Learning by doing and learning by using is always important in economic activity (cf., for 
instance, G.N. von Tunzelmann, Technology and Industrial Progress, pp 38, 73, 117-19), but 
it becomes even more important when formal education or vocational training is missing as in 
the case of Iceland at the time.
CHAPTER IX -379
expectations towards the foreign enterprises, and it seems safe to conclude that 
Icelanders felt on balance that their gains were larger than the disadvantages.
Chapter X  
Foreign Trade and the Icelandic Economy: 
Conclusions and Implications
X.1. Interpretation of the Findings
X.1.1. The Economic Transition: A Historiographical and 
Methodological Note
The contrasts in the current perception of the economic transformation and my 
interpretation of it are significant. Given the historical importance of the subject, the 
contrasts deserve some consideration, and there is a double reason to spend a few words 
on them here. First, a discussion of the sources of the current understanding among 
historians not only explains its emergence but also underscores more clearly the 
methodological difference between the present research and past historiography. Second, 
in consequence of this difference a few methodological caveats must, however, be made 
to avoid misunderstanding of my stance.
To a certain extent, the divergence between the two interpretations stems from 
the new findings in the present thesis. For instance, there has no specific explanation in 
the literature for the arrival of merchants into fishing in the late 1880s onwards, as I
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noted in Chapter I. Even if historians knew that merchants had advantages of the fresh 
fish trade and this indirectly led a number of them to start operating decked sailing 
vessels, that did not explain the timing of this sudden interest. Also, the rise in 
investment in fishing (decked sailing vessels, motor boats, and trawlers) has long been 
considered as being the primary explanation for the division of labour in the economy, 
urbanisation, and spread of market economy.1 In the light o f our findings, this is a 
misleading and most unsatisfactory understanding of the nature and the causes of the 
economic transition. O f course, these instances are just classic examples of the 
advancement of knowledge when new perspectives are applied or new information is 
discovered, because they inevitably alter previous perceptions among scholars. But the 
reasons for this advance in knowledge is telling in terms of the present research topic. 
Note that some of my individual observations are reproduced from the existing literature, 
and, furthermore, my original observations are mainly based on readily accessible 
printed primary sources and not on any obscure archival material as my Bibliography 
shows. The main reason for the divergence between the current view and my 
interpretation lies in the novelty of the research method, which reveals two kinds of 
oversight among Icelandic historians and they have little to do with the new findings 
forwarded here.
As happens, Icelandic historiography has laid much stress on the importance of 
technical advancements in the fishing industry. In retrospect, the emphasis on the fishing 
industry as the basis of Iceland’s industrialisation is natural, and this will in fact been 
supported more firmly later in the present chapter with reference to sustainability. But 
the overemphasis on technological progress and mechanisation in this process has 
blocked historians’ view, from whichever stand they have written. For instance, in
1 ‘Felagsleg verkaskipting, hrod J)ettbylisJ>r6un og utbreidsla markadshagkerfis heist i takt vi5
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Magnus’ view the importance of the period between 1880 and 1905 lies in the merchant 
capital that was put in the fishing (capitalist modes of production starting) and in the 
formation of wage labour (proletariat) when people gradually withdrew from farming to 
urban activities by the coast. In other words, the focus is on those who owned or 
supplied capital in fishing and how labour was integrated in capitalist modes of 
production. This view necessarily ignores the overall economic and social relations of 
labour, the mass of people, and misses the form and nature of the remuneration of 
labour. As my findings show, the start of retreat of the truck system and of the 
bookkeeping barter was of utmost importance for the people involved, and this is a vital 
link in understanding the overall context of the economic transition. To sum up, it is 
shifts in people’s economic and social relations in toto which provide the key to the 
modernising element in the Icelandic transformation, not changes in technology. The 
origins of this belief in the all-importance of mechanisation in the transformatory process 
are not evident, but it probably owes partly to the importance of machines in general for 
processes of industrialisation in the past. Possibly, this stance can also be traced to the 
common belief among influential mid 20th century contemporaries in enterprising 
initiatives and capital investments, rather than institutional frameworks, as the principal 
source of economic prosperity.
The other misconception that has blocked historians’ view concerns the 
nationalistic outlook, which still haunts Icelandic historiography. In the early 20th 
century, a particular, nationalistic interpretation o f history asserted itself among scholars 
and public alike. The history of Iceland was perceived as a series of eras that shifted 
with changes in the constitutional status of Iceland — running from an independent, free 
state in the early middle ages through a union with Norwegian and, later, Danish kings,
hradar bjddfelagsbreytingar, ekki slst i krafti sjavarutvegs sem leidandi atvinnuvegar.’ Magnus 
S. Magnusson, ‘Innreid nutimans,’ p 361.
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reaching is lowest ebb in a dependency or colonial status within the Danish kingdom, but 
rising again as Iceland step by step gained more political freedom and increased 
constitutional rights from the mid 19th century onwards, finally reaching its climax in an 
independent republic in 1944.2 Thus, historians and other scholars tended to favour a 
periodisation based on constitutional and political perceptions. After all, periodisation is 
meant to serve the purpose o f expressing historians’ perception of vital shifts in history 
— the social structure as Magnus S. Magnusson correctly notes.3 Partly because of the 
nationalistic tendencies in the historiography, much stress has been laid on endogenous 
rather than exogenous sources of motion in Iceland’s history, especially if they can be 
linked with the rise of Icelandic nationalism and indigenous initiative.
The nationalistic understanding of history has been waning for the past decades, 
but its periodisation tends to persist although it does not always coincide with historians’ 
interpretation of what was taking place elsewhere in Icelandic society. The reason for 
this persistence is that a few events, supposedly having economic implications, coincide 
with the political periodisation. In my research period the year of 1904 (and, more 
broadly, the mid 1900s), besides interchangeably 1871 and 1874, have become 
effectively canonised in historical writings. Apart from the Home Rule in 1904, which 
often is linked to the concurrent growth of the economy, the most important ones include 
the opening of the Islandsbanki in 1904, the arrival of the first steam trawler in 1905, 
and the laying of the telegraphic cable in 1906.4 As the historical analysis in the present 
research witnesses, none of these events seem to be among the most decisive ones for the 
economic development of Iceland — at least when they are compared with the impact of
2 Ingi Sigurdsson, Islenzk sagnfrcedi, ch. VIII. Gunnar Karlsson, Hvarstceda, pp 32-3. 
Gudmundur Halfdanarson, ‘Takmorkun giftinga,’ p 457.
3 Magnus S. Magnusson, ‘Innreid nutimans,’ p 359.
4 For example, in the view of Magnus S. Magnusson all these events excluding the cable 
constitute the reasons for his break around 1905. See his ‘Innreid nutimans,’ p 362.
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monetisation. The Home Rule was in fact a relatively small step forwards 
constitutionally or politically, and it appears that the system shift was of minor economic 
importance. The Islandsbanki almost certainly was not as important for the generation of 
capital as often assumed. Also, the first steam trawler in 1905 was so small it only could 
fish inshore, and the next trawler (which could fish in ocean banks) only came in 1907. 
Besides, several attempts had been made with sailing trawlers before 1905 so this year is 
not so significant in the history of fishing. Similarly, the cable presumably was not of 
such importance for business in Iceland as often alleged. To sum up, the fundamental 
shifts in the economic history of Iceland and in the economic transition were neither in 
the mid 1900s nor around 1880. Incidentally, this conclusion coincides with Gudmundur 
Jonsson’s findings that the 1890s form a break in the rate of Iceland’s economic growth 
and his interpretation that Iceland’s industrialisation, as he puts it, started in this 
decade.5 Although there is no inherent or necessary direct causal relationship between 
economic growth and economic development, these findings give support to the the claim 
that, to paraphrase S.B. Saul, the sooner the customary artificial, nationalistic shifts in 
Iceland’s history are banished from the literature, the better.6
In spite of my criticism and the fact that my understanding of the economic 
transition is radically different from the present one, it does not mean that I am rejecting 
historical materialism, or any other approach, as an analytical tool. I am only saying that 
in the case of historical materialism it is unsatisfactory as an overall explanatory 
framework for the economic transition of Iceland, and this is something that Magnus S. 
Magnusson might even concede to. To explain this further, I should add that in my view 
historical reality cannot be encompassed within a single one-dimensional or linear
5 Gudmundur Jonsson, Hagvoxtur og idnvceding, pp 170-72.
6 S.B. Saul, The Myth o f the Great Depression, p 55.
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account. Any account is based on a selection of approaches or research methods, limited 
range of sources, and certain way of presentation. It is a simplification of a multi­
dimensional process that, moreover, spans over time. Given this, one approach is equally 
valid in itself as the other, because each approach looks at the process from a certain 
angle, dealing with certain elements and teasing out certain facets, while leaving out 
other elements and facets. Therefore, employment and comparison of competing 
perspectives in the academic community is much more fertile and productive in 
analytical terms than choice of a single research method on which the researches 
bestowes all-importance.7
With reference to this basic historical methodology, I consider my particular 
viewpoint just one way of looking at the economic transformation of Iceland, and it 
misses, partly or altogether, issues and aspects that other viewpoints catch. For instance, 
it cannot analyse the formation of wage labour in the same way as historical materialism. 
On the other hand, historical materialism is open to the criticism of developmentalism 
which treats historical processes indigenously, i.e., as autonomous units and sometimes 
following the same sequence of stages.8 Note that this is not a dispute of one viewpoint 
being ‘correct’ and other being ‘wrong’ in some absolute sense. Rather, the point is that 
historical research is about explaining the past and choosing that or those viewpoints that 
explain the problem at hand in the most satisfactory way. In this context, it is useful to 
quote J.L. Anderson when he remarked: ‘A model is neither ‘right’ nor ‘wrong’, except 
in the rigour of its logic, the accuracy of its facts, and the realism of its assumptions. 
Assessment should focus on the extensiveness of the model and on its explanatory
7 A similar stance is taken by G.N. von Tunzelmann in his Technology and Industrial 
Progress, p 421, and by H.D. Evans in his Comparative Advantage and Growth, pp 311-12.
8 P.J. T[aylor], ‘developmentalism,’ pp 130-31. — Note that developmentalism does not 
preclude the use of the linkages approach, see J. Sender and S. Smith, The Development o f 
Capitalism in Africa.
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power.’9 To be sure, current understanding of the transformation among Icelandic 
historians has not been wrong or false, for historical interpretation is always correct 
from its point of view. Also, my understanding is not more logical or realistic in its 
assumptions. Rather, the difference lies in the extensiveness and explanatory power of 
the viewpoints for the problem at hand, namely the economic transition of Iceland.
For instance, current viewpoint cannot or does not explain the timing of (a) 
merchants’ engagement into fishing (with decked sailing vessels), and (b) the trawler 
outfit and the arrival of motor boats. Also, current viewpoint leaves out some of the 
aspects of the economic transition and cannot integrate them into its framework 
(bookkeeping barter and truck system), besides ignoring external influences on the 
economy. Although I have omitted many issues, especially concerning agriculture, my 
interpretation (viewpoint) does a better job in terms of extensiveness and explanatory 
power. Therefore, I am bound to conclude that my research method can produce a fuller 
and richer understanding of the nature and the origin of the economic transition than the 
prevalent line of inquiry.10 Furthermore, it appears that my overall interpretation 
qualifies as a ‘general theory of the causal relationship in that great economic 
transformation’ of Iceland, that GuSmundur Jonsson calls for in a recent survey of the 
existing Icelandic economic history literature.11 In any case, my interpretation offers a 
more convincing overall explanatory framework than hitherto forwarded. However, it 
has to be emphasised that my research method has no pretensions of explaining the 
economic transition in toto. Like any other method or a geneal theory, it can only explain 
so much and other aspects, such as social issues and the quality of life, have to be dealt
9 J.L. Anderson, Explaining Long-term Economic Changes, p 69, cf. pp 4—5.
10 Here, we define theory as a statement of a causal relationship between observed variables. 
Model, however, is built on an abstraction of reality or variables that the model purports are 
related so their causal relationship can be tested with theories or theories generated on the basis
of the outcome. Hence, theory and model may coincide, at least partly, as in our case.
CHAPTER X -387
with in different ways and at the same time in a interdisciplinary manner. Furthermore, 
while later research probably will change in some ways individual conclusions of the 
thesis, I believe that the overall interpretatation is more likely to stand further scrutiny.
X.1.2. Entrance of Merchants in the Fishing Sector: 
Termination of the Crisis in Utilisation of Economic Resources
In my view, the findings of the present research have comparatively wide-ranging 
implications for the historical analysis of Icelandic history, and this applies not only to 
the years between 1870 and 1914, but also for the times before and after this period. 
Only some of these implications can be outlined here and, furthermore, in a broad way. 
Concerning the research period itself, there are several aspects or perspectives that 
immediately command attention, and one is how the Icelandic economy escaped from its 
stagnation that prevailed in 1870. Evidently, the historical importance of this 
achievement is great, but it also reveals a more fundamental significance of the economic 
transformation than my previous discussion has managed to portray. The transformation 
was not merely a shift from traditional to modem ways of living, and it did not only 
generate a rise in standards of living and in the quality o f living, all of which are topics 
that I will shortly comment on later in the chapter. The transformation literally enabled 
the economy to escape from a man-made ecological crisis that had emerged around 
1870. As I perceive it, this escape happened in two separate stages, quite unrelated,
11 Gudmundur Jonsson, ‘Sagnaritun um hagsogu,’ p 180.
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although both had their origins in shifts in foreign trade. The first stage was a shift of 
economic resources from farming to fishing, and the second stage was a shift in the net 
inflow of money to Iceland.
With reference to the general crisis in the farming sector around 1870 (see 
Chapter II), it seems plausible to claim that Iceland experienced in fact an ecological 
crisis at the time. By this I mean that the present population could not sustain the same 
living standards (and quality of life) as before within the framework of former social 
practices and previous ways of utilising the land. Rising population put an ever 
increasing pressure on the ecosystem and this had to lead to deteriorating standards of 
living and quality of life. Such a situation had emerged around 1870, but Iceland 
temporarily escaped the full consequences of this crisis with mass emigration in the 
1870s onwards. However, this outlet was only a temporary solution to the problem, and 
the emigration only masked the problem. New ways were needed to sustain a population 
over the existing level, and a permanent solution was at hand, because Icelandic waters 
could support far greater- population if the economy was given the opportunity to 
implement more efficient ways to harvest them. In my judgement, the lack of capital was 
the main cause for this unfortunate situation because money shortage blocked 
investments in technological improvements. Therefore, the involvement of merchants in 
the fishing sector (the fresh fish trade and the merchants’ operation of decked vessels) 
provided the initial solution to Iceland’s ecological crisis. This is because the 
technological level in the fishing sector moved up one step with greater fishing effort on 
decked sailing vessels, and it is noteworthy that the social structure did not block 
transfers of people into this growing industry, as the growth of coastal urban areas in the 
late 19th century onwards witnesses. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that shortly after (in 
the mid 1890s onwards), the population began to rise again.
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Although the advent of the fresh fish trade and entrance of merchants into 
operation of fishing ships meant the start of an important reallocation of economic 
sources and a move towards a more sustainable economy, a second and perhaps more 
decisive step was taken in the 1900s with the advent o f steam trawlers and motor boats. 
Both presented advancements in technology, and precisely because of their different sizes 
and power, their impact in the fishing sector was all the more pervasive. This is because 
the motor boats were suitable for small scale fishing and entrepreneurs with relatively 
small means, but the trawlers suited large scale fishing and those with access to greater 
capital. Therefore, the motor boats very much replaced the open rowing boats and the 
trawlers competed with the decked sailing vessels. This step firmly shifted economic 
resources towards fishing, presented a decisive break with the farming sector, and put 
the fishing sector as the leading sector of the economy.
The discussion in Chapter II touched on a long-term deterioration — stretching 
over centuries —  not only in natural circumstances but also in human society (for 
instance, loss of practical -knowledge and fall in technological level). In the long run, 
Icelanders had supported themselves with rapacious instead of sustainable ways of 
living. What seems obvious, therefore, is that with greater fishing effort towards the end 
of the 19th century onwards, the pressure on terrestrial land was eased and the walk 
along rapacious ways of living reverted. Granted that this is a plausible conclusion, then 
merchants’ fishing outfit signified an important long-term achievement in terms of 
survival and livelihood prospects in Iceland.
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X.1.3. The Start of Monetisation: Modernisation of the Icelandic 
Economy Initiated
The second stage in the escape from stagnation lay in shift from perennial money 
shortage in Iceland, mainly caused by merchants, to an ample supply of money. The 
relevance of this shift for the escape from economic stagnation lay in the fact that 
merchants’ drain of money from Iceland caused an acute shortage of working capital in 
the economy. Note that this was found being one of the stagnant forces in 1870. 
However, it was concluded in Chapter V m  that there happened a significant long-term 
rise in the net inflow of money in the late 1890s onwards, and the sources were several. 
Rewards to Icelandic factors of production became far greater than before, mainly 
because of growing Norwegian enterprise in Iceland. The use of hard cash in general 
trading started, most significantly by and at the initiative of the Edinborg firm. The 
spread of cash payments in foreign trade meant that a growing part of Iceland’s trade 
surplus was not stored (or exported) anymore but injected into the economy. Also, 
relenting of foreign credit emerged as a significant new source in the capital market in 
Iceland with the arrival of the Islandsbanki in 1904.
All this meant that the economy’s demand for money could be satisfactorily met, 
and this had huge impact on the economy as Chapter VIII shows. The more fundamental 
significance of this shift, however, was that the economy escaped from the stagnant trap 
that the capital shortage caused. The money could now be put into productive uses in the 
economy, for instance, to expand its infrastructure, improve housing, start new 
industries, increase consumption, all of which is outlined in Chapter Vni. The 
importance of this shift in money supply in Iceland becomes more evident if one thinks 
back to the situation in the early and mid 1890s. Then, merchants certainly had started to
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allocate their resources into fishing, but the money shortage prevailed and they continued 
to export trade surpluses and profits abroad. In other words, in the absence of adequate 
money supply in Iceland, the economy would have moved more into fishing but it would 
have been unable to expand its infrastructure, improve housing, start new industries, 
etc., except to the extent that the relatively tightly concentrated merchant elite in 
Copenhagen would have given room for. Therefore, it was concluded in the discussion 
about the different phases of imperialism proper in Iceland in Chapter IX that investment 
of merchant capital in the fishing sector offered Icelandic society a very restricted 
development potential and certainly not modernisation in its full sense, thereby including 
not only structural changes in the economy but also higher living standards and better 
quality of life. Given the institutional framework of foreign trade, the early and mid 
1890s situation could only be improved with the introduction of new sources of capital, 
outside the control of merchants, or with new practices in foreign trade such as those the 
Edinborg firm started. With reference to these arguments, I am bound to conclude that 
the rise in net inflow of money to Iceland was equally as important as the shift of 
economic resources into the fishing sector in helping the Icelandic economy to escape 
from its economic stagnation.
X.1.4. The Social and Welfare Implications of the 
Transformation: A Sketch
So far, only economic aspects of the transformation of Icelandic society have been 
examined. Evidently, however, it had pervasive and profound implications for social
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relations of people, standards of living, quality of life, and Icelandic culture in many 
ways. Saving for cultural impact, these implications will be taken for consideration and 
tentatively sketched to underscore that the economic changes had substantial impact on 
social and welfare matters.
In Chapter HI, I defined economic development as more than a change in 
economic structure, because the real test of economic development is whether it allows 
greater living standards and a higher quality of life. Clearly, the effects of the 
bookkeeping barter were oppressive for people economically and socially, but they 
effected rather different groups in society. The bookkeeping barter came mainly down on 
those who had products to sell, especially peasants, and deprived them of potential 
capital (money). By contrast, the truck system prevented those who had nothing to sell 
but their labour to take full advantage of their income, so the system came down hard on 
propertyless people. But in both cases, people was denied much freedom, because they 
were forced to exchange their products or labour for goods at their merchant’s shop, 
whatever terms he offered. Therefore, the retreat of the bookkeeping barter and the truck 
system through spread of money payments meant a huge extension of people’s freedom. 
People could not only distribute their money between savings, investments, and 
consumption of domestic goods and services, and adapt this to their changing 
requirements when they wanted, but they were also free to buy their imports where they 
wanted. Hence, cash payments were no less an issue of living standards (and quality of 
life) than a macroeconomic progress.
The spread of money payments was of particular importance for urban people, 
who were not any longer forced to do their business with their employer. Also, it offered 
men and women opportunities to build homes and have families instead of stay single 
and serve peasants until their thirties or so. It offered large numbers of women greater
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opportunities than ever to earn money and allocate them according to their own 
preferences. Also, cash payments no doubt gave wage earning wives more independence 
in marriage, and allowed women to postpone marriage temporarily or stay single and yet 
live a better life than in the countryside. These facts in turn enhance our understanding of 
the pull effects of urban areas, especially those where money payments were most 
common. It also helps us to understand why people (not least women) endured there 
deplorable working conditions and amounts of work, by modem standards. People were 
given a choice of a new urban livelihood with its distinctive restrictions and oppression, 
and they voted with their feet.
The start of monetisation also gave entrepreneurs from all walks of life chances 
to try out their luck and the introduction of motor boats is a point in case. As it drew into 
the late 1900s, more money were being circulated in the economy, and many had gained 
experience and knowledge of the new situation, larger scale projects and firms were 
started by entrepreneurs. The arrival of entrepreneurs outside the group of merchants 
was important too in the sense that it helped to balance the hegemony of merchants in the 
urban areas. Before the monetisation started, merchants were by far the most powerful 
men in their places, because they usually were the only and certainly the largest 
employers, and they provided people with their subsistence goods and means of income 
(products). As a result of the spread of cash payments and entrance of newcomers in the 
business community, power relations were shifted in such a way that the dominance of 
the Danish merchants in urban affairs, small and large, was effectively eroded.
It is evident that in many respects, not only standards of living but also quality 
of life rose with the start of the monetisation and attendant changes. However, this also 
entailed economic and social costs. The traditional barter exchange between inland 
peasants and coastal people declined and practically disappeared, much to the dismay of
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many (but to the advantage of merchants). Peasants did not get labourers unless paying 
higher wages than before, and this was detrimental for the farming, it was said. Some 
felt that good, traditional ways of life were abandoned for urban trivialities and money 
making. Morals, it was claimed, were low among some in the urban places, such as 
disregard for law, drunkenness, dishonesty in business, etc. Also, the new industries, not 
least the herring fishing and the whaling, confronted Icelanders with a waste of resources 
and money, besides pollution, that offended them. Frugality and complete utilisation of 
materials, owing to poverty (and parsimony), among other things, almost certainly 
declined. All of this is difficult to estimate now, since we do not know how people 
themselves perceived the changes in terms of their own lives.
As Bjom S. Stefansson has pointed out in his writings about the labour bondage, 
there were some mutual duties between people who worked as domestic labourers and 
their master, the head of the household. For instance, the master had to supply food and 
clothes, if it was not a part of the wages, and if the work people fell ill the master had to 
take minimum care of their health, without deducting it from their wages in any way. 
However, people was under the management of their master, and they had to work as 
much as the master required, and the master was free to charge them with whatever 
works he wanted, wherever he saw fit. By contrast, when merchants hired people to work 
in the fish curing (largely women), it usually was piece work, even at the premises of the 
merchant. Hence, people had to supply clothes and food, and they had to work long 
hours with only a few and short breaks. Usually, they worked outside whatever the 
weather was. In case of illness, people was without income, and they or their family had 
to take care of themselves. During winter, work was only occasional and incomes tended 
to be irregular. However, outside working hours, people was free to allocate their own 
time without the interference of their employer.
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These remarks are intended to show that I do not take a Panglossian view to the 
economic transition, because the fact remains that it did not mean costless or 
unambiguous improvements for everybody in Iceland, whether they lived in the 
countryside or in the urban areas by the coast. Just as in the traditional society, interests 
conflicted also in the urban areas but along other lines. Therefore, a net assessment of 
the pros and cons is impossible. But even if we can quantify more easily changes in 
people’s standards of living than their quality of life, a treatment of the quality of life 
clearly is equally as important.
X.1.5. The Relevance of the Findings for Earlier and Later 
Periods of Time
In my judgement, the findings in the thesis have considerable implications for historical 
research outside the period under study. Starting with the period before 1870, the 
findings concerning sustainability, which was a very pressing matter in the economy 
around 1870, reiterate more forcefully the need for a proper study of this aspect in 
Icelandic history. When was vegetation eradicated with ensuing restrictions on livelihood 
in the country, and what were the most influential factors in that process? Is it linked to a 
seemingly general regression in technology, practical knowledge, and cultivation in 
Iceland over the centuries? What about the role of foreign trade in this process? This 
entails not only an examination of natural conditions over time, but also of social 
structure, foreign trade, and the causal relationship between internal and external factors. 
To be sure, the matter has been commented on before in the Icelandic economic history
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literature, but it has not been examined seriously with view to the long-term development 
of the economy.12
Furthermore, some of earlier conclusions relating to the era of ‘classical’ 
monopoly trade, 1602-1787, need readjusting. For instance, it has been claimed as a fact 
that merely an energetic and far more lively foreign trade was needed to break the 
vicious cycle of economic stagnation in Iceland, step out of the poverty caused by small 
returns in farming, and exploit the riches of the sea.13 In whichever way these words are 
understood, they are not correct because more energetic foreign trade was of limited use 
in terms of true development of the economy as my discussion about the phase of 
merchant capital in the colonial history of Iceland shows. Instead, my findings indicate 
that only a demolition of the age old bookkeeping barter, which upheld merchants’ 
monopoly of capital among other things, and a release of labour from the urban truck 
system was capable of truly advancing the Iceland economy and, in particular, raising 
living standards and quality of life. Furthermore, the economic drain caused by 
merchants’ exports of profits and the storage of trade surplus, insofar as there was a 
surplus, had to be reverted. In other words, expansion in scale was useless, because only 
through a radical reorganisation of the institutional structure of foreign trade could any 
positive change in terms of economic development take place.
Also, the stress on indigenous elements in upholding the vicious cycle of 
inequality, poverty, low technology, conservatism, risk aversion, etc. tends in my view to 
obscure and underestimate the primordial cause of it, namely the detrimental impact of 
the foreign trade monopoly system and, more generally, of the colonial policy of
12 Gisli Gunnarsson, Upp er bodid Isaland, pp 15-17,250-68.
13 ‘Su stadreynd er eigi a5 sidur ohogguS, a5 aSeins kraftmikil utanrikisverslun gat rofid 
vitahring efiiahagslegrar stobnunar a Islandi; adeins storefling utanrikisverslunar skapadi 
Islendingum moguleika a5 brjotast ut ur beirri fataskt, sem litill jardargrodi hafbi skapab peim.
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Denmark towards Iceland. This is not to deny that evaluation of the relative importance 
of internal versus external factors rests on the research questions that are asked, the 
research methods that are used, and the sources utilised. However, although my 
viewpoint is perhaps more externally located than in the most recent and authoritative 
work on the ‘classical’ monopoly trade era, my criticism seems to be valid and apply to 
this work.14 Note also that the linking of internal social forces to the alleged dismal state 
of affairs in Iceland in the early modem period was a new and intriguing idea in the 
1980s, and it was a long needed counterbalance against the nationalistic historiography 
which blamed the Danes for everything that went wrong. However, it seems necessary to 
go over the matter again to increase our understanding of the complex causal 
relationship between internal and external elements over time. In that re-examination, the 
colony idea discussed in Chapter IX is bound to come to investigation, which no doubt 
could be fertilised greatly with a comparative study of other colonies in the early modem 
period. In any case, historians studying Iceland’s history at this time cannot any longer 
shun Iceland’s colonial past, if they are to produce rigorous and up-to-date studies of the 
period.
Apart from the 17th and 18th centuries, the findings also have a bearing to 
historians’ understanding of Iceland’s economic history in the early 19th century. For 
example, the findings suggest more definite explanations than before for the economic 
stagnation of Iceland. Since fish owners and fishing boat owners in Iceland received 
practically no cash from merchants for their products, they consequently had no means
ha fyrst var mogulegt ad nyta hin miklu audaefi hafsins umhverfis landid l rikum maeli.’ Gisli 
Gunnarsson, Upp er bodid Isaland, pp 17.
14 This is Gisli Gunnarsson’s Upp er bodid Isaland, which borrows heavily from the ideas of 
Karl Polanyi although it also draws on marxist ideology, among other sources. Incidentally, 
there is no explicit exposition of research questions and no theoretical disposition either in the 
original thesis or the Icelandic translation (see his Monopoly Trade and Upp er bodid Isaland). 
Hence, its ideological and methodological positioning can be disputed.
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to build decked vessels in Iceland or buy them from abroad. True, drift timber of suitable 
quality and type could be and was used, but it was a commodity that was relatively 
scarce and it was costly anyway to build large ships. As for merchants, who could have 
entered the fishing sector earlier than they did, they were mostly of Danish birth and 
origin and considered Iceland only as a hinterland to trade with and make secure profits. 
Hence, they did not find it feasible to risk their money in hazardous ocean fishing on 
banks that very few Icelanders knew about anyway since they only could go a relatively 
short distance from land in their rowing boats. True, French fishermen flocked to 
Icelandic waters on decked vessels to fish, but that was too remote, for Danish 
entrepreneurship. If we omit decked vessels that were used in shark fishing, which was a 
lucrative business in its heydays, it seems that relatively few vessels were operated for 
cod fishing. Furthermore, those men that did so were nearly always a) merchants (not 
coastal peasants), b) of Icelandic nationality, c) living in Iceland, and d) in regions where 
cod landings were substantial.15 Naturally, very few eligible persons were left to meet all 
the conditions, and the outcome was a tiny and irregular outfit of vessels on cod fishing. 
In effect, the economic situation during most of the 19th century witnessed a kind of 
stalemate where status quo was the only logical outcome.
Concerning the following decades after our research period, especially until 
about 1940 when the occupation of Iceland radically altered economic conditions, there 
is much to say. For instance, most Icelandic capitalist (businessmen) and firms took over 
from the Danish merchants the truck system and the bookkeeping barter.16 But the long- 
drawn-out shift from the bookkeeping barter and truck systems to cash payments in the 
first half of 20th century appears not to be prominent in Icelandic labour history. Have
15 Gils Gudmundsson, Skutuoldin, 2nd ed., vol. 1-2.
16 Jon Gudnason, ‘Greidsla verkkaups i peningum.’
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historians not overlooked the relevance of these practices, not only in terms of the 
welfare of common people, but for the economy at large?17 It seems to me that their 
persistence forms a vital link, among others, in explaining the huge gap that existed 
between the Icelandic labour class and the upper classes, their conflicts in the economic 
and political sphere, the growth of the communist movement in Iceland, and other 
matters.
This oversight among Icelandic historians in their study of early 20th century 
also has an ideological or intellectual aspect, besides being a historiographical issue. 
Almost certainly this oversight can be linked to nationalist tendencies and the social and 
scholarly background of those historians that have reproduced Icelandic history. If so, 
this instance would reveal a certain discourse within Icelandic historiography and be a 
prime example of how ‘repressions and power relations ... underlie scientific claims to 
truth rather than reproduce them.’18 Given the rise of postmodernism in Icelandic 
scholarship, it is noteworthy, however, that the discussion about Icelandic nationalism 
has very much focused on the birth of national conscience in Iceland and how this idea 
was used to consolidate the Icelandic people into a single force against Danish rule and 
for an independent nation state. True, it has been pointed out how this idea implicitly 
ignored internal friction and tensions between social groups, and how nationalist history 
used to exalt the unity of Icelandic people in past centuries. But it has much less been 
considered how nationalism has influenced scholars’ interpretation of Iceland’s 20th 
century history and to what extent it has blurred the perception of lay and learned of 
their contemporary history. The oversight among historians concerning the importance of
17 The only exception is Jon Gudnason in his article on the truck system (‘Greidsla verkkaups i 
peningum’).
18 D. G[regory], ‘discourse,’ p 136. G. P[ratt], ‘poststructuralism (including deconstruction),’ p 
468 (quotation).
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the two oppressive systems discussed seems to be a point in case of the inevitable 
misconceptions. In any case, my findings suggest that there is a need for a critical 
analysis of 20th century Icelandic historiography, broadly based on the key concepts of 
poststructuralism or postmodern method. Such examination would also be an intriguing 
contribution to the ideological, intellectual, and cultural history of Iceland in the 20th 
century.
X.2. Methodological Remarks
It is fair to say that the research method employed in the thesis was partly an experiment, 
which was successful and yielded results far beyond what I expected initially. True, 
Hirschman’s linkages approach has been used by some scholars, although their 
application of the approach has varied. And the staples theory has been tested relatively 
widely in the economic history literature. But it appears that the two constructs have 
relatively seldom been tested in a synthesised way on historical evidence, although M.H. 
Watkins demonstrated this theoretical potential as early as 1963.
The successful application of the research method is partly due to the seamless 
compatibility of the general linkages approach and the economic determinants models 
that was derived from of the staples theory. But it owes more to the economic 
determinants models, simple as it is. Note that the linkage approach is an innovative way 
to study the interplay between production (supply) and consumption (demand). But it 
turned out that very few changes in the economy could be captured with the linkages
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approaches. This is no defect of the approach. Rather, the initial state of the economy, 
the nature of changes over time, and the analytical level used in the present research all 
meant that this was bound to be so. Being concerned not only with product flows but 
also with static institutional and organisational aspects of the economy, I needed a 
research method to analyse them. Since a host of shifts in the economy happened in the 
institutional complex and the economic determinants model was highly useful for the 
analysis of these shifts, it turned out that of my two basic research tools it was more 
useful.
In the light of my experience, it is my conviction that the two methodological 
constructs provide powerful tools in economic history analysis, when the focus is not 
only on the interaction between production and consumption but also on static 
organisational and institutional aspects. Also, the linkages approach offers a rather novel 
way to study external relations of an economy, for instance, leakages, although this was 
not done here. Furthermore, the economic determinants model neatly solves a certain 
methodological problem in the kind of economic history research where social 
institutions are analysed too. Instead of leaving the social context cut off from the 
economic context, the tool conveniently have a place for it within their formal 
frameworks. Through consumption linkages, social relations are linked to the overall 
linkages approach, and there the social context can be approached alternatively as 
entrepreneurial factor or as institutional factor, depending on how deep the researcher 
wants to go into its source. In other words, social context can be viewed on two levels, 
one economic and the other social, like the other components of the consumption 
linkages. This is a crude sociology and it is bound to be so, because this issue is only a 
small part of our synthesised research method and economic history is not properly 
equipped to analyse sociological issues. However, economic history has to be informed
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by social theory and possess awareness of social context so it can analyse and interpret 
response to economic variables not only from material perspective but also social 
perspective. I have tried not to neglect this aspect in my research.
The usefulness of the economic determinants model also was felt in my 
discussion about factor markets. As happens, factor market analysis has a propensity to 
gloss over the implications of purely social elements, such as power relations, for 
economic growth and development. Clearly, one of the reasons for this is that social 
elements can be very difficult to quantify. However, they cannot be dismissed without 
distorting historical analysis, and the economic determinants model is of some help in 
this respect as my application of it for Iceland showed (Chapters VII and VIII). Also, 
elements such as infrastructure does not fit very easily into the capital component of the 
factor market analysis, and the economic determinants model is useful as a 
supplementary tool to the factor market approach. Clearly, examination of factor 
markets does not produce perfect results, but it has yielded valuable insights into some of 
the main trends in the history of world economies, and its usefulness in comparative 
research is substantial.
The choice of sources and their exploitation formed a part of the overall research 
methodology, no less than the research tools. Similarly to application of the synthesised 
research tools, my utilisation of the sources does not appear to have many parallels, and 
this calls for a few evaluative comments. To be sure, trade statistics have and are widely 
used in economic history research, but it appears that they have seldom been used in the 
way I did. First, the choice of basic sources was rather unusual, because trade statistics 
of Iceland were only a complementary source, and the bulk of the material came from the 
statistics of the countries trading with Iceland. The task of harmonising many and 
different trade statistics from this time was fraught with difficulties. However, this
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clearly is manageable, and the datasets provided an opportunity for much more rigorous 
analysis than the Icelandic source alone would ever have offered. Second, the use of 
Icelandic trade statistics along with the foreign statistics provided a unique opportunity 
to compare price levels, which is impossible using only one set of trade statistics as is 
usually done. Overall, therefore, both these practices can be recommended if the state of 
source material is similar to that in the Iceland case.
X.3. Further Research
It seems that the present thesis has to a considerable extent recast the research agenda 
for the transformation of Icelandic society in the late 19th and early 20th century. This is 
because the overall context in my interpretation is relatively different from the present 
perception of historians. Although it has incorporated findings and insights from other 
scholars, the conclusions suggest a reorientation in the study of the nature and origins of 
this influential shift in the history of Iceland. Nevertheless, when the main findings and 
conclusions of the thesis are reviewed, it is obvious that there is much need for further 
research, and they might well alter some of my findings and conclusions. We need more 
information and knowledge not only about the economy but almost every aspect of 
Icelandic society in the research period to increase our understanding of its 
transformation. In the hope that a sketch of my proposed research agenda will prove 
helpful in encouraging further research among scholars, and to point out how important 
and interesting these topics are, a few words will be spent on this.
CHAPTER X -404
On the most basic level, in the field of trade data, a number of things await to be 
worked on. Although relatively large datasets were built up and they proved very helpful 
in my examination, they need to be improved (see introductory text in Appendix A). The 
trade series partly rest on estimates, sometimes they present minimum quantities and 
values, and they have lacunas and anomalies that all need to be addressed if the trade 
data is to be used in any detail, for instance, in small scale studies in Icelandic context. 
This applies especially to data for the trade with Britain and, less importantly, with 
Norway. However, as an indicator of the approximate quantities of the trade flows, their 
general composition, Iceland’s trading partners, price trends, etc., the trade data in the 
new datasets is a comparatively reliable source and free of the limitations of the 
Icelandic trade data. Concerning the implications of the trade data, however, it is of some 
importance to know to what extent the new datasets affect the newly constructed national 
income accounts, because exports and imports are underestimated in them (see Appendix 
A). For instance, given the apparantly pervasive and profound impact of the start of the 
monetisation, one might expect that economic growth accelerated faster from about 1900 
onwards than the accounts suggest.
Most of the important research questions raised in the thesis relate to Iceland’s 
foreign trade, which has been sadly neglected, and its links to the economy. Apart from 
reiterating the need for examination of a few topics already identified in the literature, the 
thesis has located a number of new complications and issues that have never been 
considered and need to be cleared up. Given the long-term historical importance of the 
two principal conclusions of the thesis, that is, the shift to sustainable ways of living and 
the start of the modernisation of Icelandic society, they clearly need much further 
research. First, the state of the economy in terms of sustainability around 1870 has to be 
examined properly. How serious was the situation by different measures? Is it reasonable
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to believe that this the first time Iceland experienced such ecological crisis? Was this 
crisis realised as such or merely as the latest example of hardships by the administration 
in Iceland and high authorities in Copenhagen? To what extent was the mass emigration 
from Iceland a reaction of this economic situation? Who owned the decked fishing 
vessels from the time they started to increase in number (the significance of merchants 
versus coastal peasants)? To what extent did the fresh fish trade and the operation of 
decked fishing vessels ease the crisis? What was the relative importance of the fresh fish 
trade versus merchants’ operation of fishing vessels in easing this situation?
Equally important questions can be asked about the significance of the money 
shortage. Is it possible to forward an estimate of the total money inflow to Iceland over 
time by its sources and its types (goods versus factor rewards)? Is it possible to 
approximate how much money was exported from Iceland over time as (a) factor 
rewards, including trade and business profits, and payments for imports of services, and 
(b) payments for ship provisions (mainly coal) abroad? How large a share of the trade 
surplus over time was paid out in hard cash and how much was stored or ‘frozen’ by 
merchants? Did the stored surplus carry interest? Does the net inflow of money to 
Iceland around 1870 support my conclusion that it caused a very serious barrier to the 
development of the Iceland economy at the time? What were the broad levels of net 
money inflow of Iceland over time? Does the outcome support my conclusion that there 
was a huge rise in the net inflow from the late 1890s onwards? What advantage did 
merchants gain with the issue of token money, how large was this coinage relative to 
valid official currencies in Iceland, and how does it relate to the monetisation of the 
economy?
My tentative conclusions concerning the different phases of imperialism in 
Iceland, which ended with the start of modernisation, also require a scrutiny. In terms of
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the research period, the era of merchant capital that started with the entrance of 
merchants into the fishing sector is perhaps most interesting. Although it was relatively 
short, it caused a significant reallocation of economic sources (mainly labour and 
capital), and it had considerable social and welfare implications. These issues require 
proper examination and there remains a number of questions that was not possible to 
answer in the present research. For instance, would closer examination suggest anything 
that would significantly challenge my claim that the entrance of merchants into the 
fishing sector offered the economy actually very limited developmental potentials? Also, 
several issues regarding this shift need clarification, such as the impact on production 
and consumption patterns in Iceland, patterns of traditional barter, the substitutive role 
of imports for domestic production, and urbanisation versus emigration. Furthermore, 
how and in what ways were people’s standards of living and quality of life affected with 
new urban employment, both in the countryside and by the coast?
My claim about the modernisation of Icelandic society throws up a host of 
intriguing questions about its timing, process, and implications, both in terms of 
individuals and classes as well as the overall economy. For instance, since that the start 
of effective monetisation, which initiated the modernisation process, probably is fluid, is 
it possible to link the beginning of modernisation with any particular point of time? What 
was the role of Islandsbanki in the monetisation? Given that cash payments eroded the 
hegemony of Danish merchants in Iceland’s economy and foreign trade, how exactly did 
this process take place step by step? Are the declining influences of merchants in some 
way linked to the diversification in Iceland’s import trade? How can the monetisation 
explain the shifts in the levels of margins in Iceland’s trade with Denmark in the 1890s 
and 1900s? To what extent did greater money supply and more frequent cash payments 
influence levels and patterns of consumption and investments? Compared to the era of
CHAPTER X -407
merchant capital, how were standards of living, quality of life, social relations, and 
power relations affected? Since the modernisation process introduced a number of new 
elements into Icelandic society, many questions relate to political and ideological 
conflicts, including the rise of the labour movement.
My theoretical and comparative discussion showed the relevance and usefulness 
of analysing the Iceland economy and its economic transformation from an international 
perspective. Hence, it would be interesting to carry out a survey of existing literature or, 
better still, a co-ordinated research to find similarities and dissimilarities, and their 
respective causes, among other societies and communities in and around the North 
Atlantic Ocean. Here I am referring to the Faroes Islands, Northern Norway, the 
Hebrides and Shetland (even other northerly parts of Scotland), Newfoundland, and 
Greenland. Almost certainly, a number of important similarities and parallels could be 
found in spite of contrasts and specific settings.19 On a broader basis, analogous 
comparison with other traditional societies and transitionary economies over the world in 
the 19th and 20th century -would no doubt produce useful findings and show that such 
comparative research is fruitful empirically and methodologically. The mercantilist era 
seems to be a point in case. Incidentally, the farther parts of the world have more often 
been cited in the thesis than peripheries in East and South Europe. This owes mainly to 
the fact that this is an under-researched field, especially from a comparative perspective. 
However, the history of the European periphery should provide an interesting material 
for comparison with Iceland, because Europe, after all, rests on a common heritage 
which is basically different from, for instance, Asian or African societies. It is only with
19 In fact, the present author has observed several such instances during this research although 
they have not come to discussion in the thesis.
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European expansion in the modem period that Africa and Asia became subject to 
European influences and, thereby, provide a historical record for comparative study.
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Meaning and Use of Symbols
0 Less than half of the unit used
Nil
Information wanting
. (in a cell) Information should not appear in this place given the respective context
. (in a figure) Decimal distinction
Totals may not equal sums of individual figures because of rounding 
See also Technical Note at the front of the thesis
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1. Icelandic Trade Returns and Records
1.1. A Short Description
As it happens, there is no comprehensive, statistical examination and analysis on the 
foreign trade of Iceland in our research period (see Chapter I).1 Therefore, much effort 
had to be put in systematic collecting and digesting of trade statistics, the analysis of 
which constitutes the backbone of the thesis. Regular trade returns for Iceland were 
published from the mid 19th century onwards and later aggregated in statistical 
handbooks, published by the statistical bureau of Iceland from time to time. Being useful 
as such, the level of aggregation, however, was so high until 1974 that it prevented all 
specific studies of the trade flows. Besides, the series only ran back to 1895.2 The 
historical trade statistics were more disaggregated in 1984, but the situation was not 
radically altered until 1997. Then, the data in the trade returns had been restructured and 
was published in a printed form, with exports checked and supplemented to a certain 
extent, and the material (especially exports) aggregated on a country-wide level by
1 Here, I am referring to studies such as the following for Britain: R. Davis, The Industrial 
Revolution and British Overseas Trade', S.B. Saul, Studies in British Overseas Trade', and W. 
Schlote, British Overseas Trade.
2 As far as the years 1870 to 1913 are concerned, see the following works from Icel., Statlce: 
Arbok 1 (1930-31), pp 46-7, 56; Tolfreedihandbok. Statistical Abstract o f Iceland [1967], pp 
178-80; Tolfrcedihandbdk. Statistical Abstract o f Iceland 1974, pp 120, 122, 128-9.
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various criteria.3 Simultaneously, the trade data for the research period under study here 
was published in greater detail, but on a national level, on a CD-ROM disc.4 Hereafter, 
these trade statistics for our research period will be referred to as the IceStat datasets 
after Statistics Iceland, the statistical bureau of Iceland, which published the historical 
statistics.
The publication of the trade data in 1997 was a giant leap in facilitating the use 
of Icelandic trade returns. However, the Icelandic returns are somewhat limited in scope 
in the late 19th century, and they have several drawbacks until the 1910s.5 While they 
offered elementary information about the distribution of Iceland’s trade with other 
countries until 1872, there was no information at all about this during 1873 to 1894. 
Also, the returns only had indirect information about values of merchandise until 1895 
onwards.6 Instead of direct information about the value of goods, there were collected 
separate information about their average prices. These were retail prices on imports and 
merchants’ purchase prices of exports, both as during the summer. By multiplying the 
export and import quantities with the average prices, a general idea of the values could 
be gained, and the trade returns included such calculations for the years 1880 to 1894. In 
1895 onwards, these calculations were replaced by information about the actual value of 
exports and imports. However, export values remained on what I term DMW basis
3 Icel., Statlce, Tolfrcedihandbdk. Statistical Abstract o f Iceland 1984, pp 122-4. Gudmundur 
Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna. Icelandic Historical Statistics, sect. 10.
4 Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna. Icelandic Historical 
Statistics, compact disc (CD-ROM), sect. 10, s.v. Ttarefiii’.
5 For a complete list of the trade returns and their location in printed form, see Valdimar 
Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur I sogu pjodar, vol. I, pp 291, 294, 295. 
The trade returns are shortly discussed in Halldor Bjamason, ‘Tofluvidauki,’ part 1, pp 235-7, 
and in Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna. Icelandic Historical 
Statistics, p 406.
6 Indeed, a few goods were enumerated by value only.
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(Delivered at Merchant’s Warehouse) and only moved on to fob basis in 1922.7 Also, 
imports were valued at retail prices until 1909, when they moved on to cif basis.8
More important than the lack of information about the distribution of trade by 
countries and the somewhat uncertain estimates of the actual values of goods in trade, 
the data about the quantities exchanged is of questionable reliability. This comes from 
the way the underlying records were made. To obtain information about the goods 
exchanged in the Iceland trade, the central administration in Copenhagen ordered in 1813 
and 1815 that merchants in Iceland annually gave the local sheriffs information about the 
quantity of exports and imports (hereafter called merchants’ records). The local sheriffs 
were responsible for this data collecting, and they seem to have been inefficient in doing 
this, because they were repeatedly pressed for these records by the administration in 
Copenhagen during the early decades. Some records still survive from the first half of 
the century, but it only was with more determined efforts and a new data collecting 
method in the early 1860s onwards that the central administration in Copenhagen 
managed to obtain this data from the sheriffs (and merchants) on a regular basis.9 To 
facilitate the collection of data and get it more uniformly registered, it was decided that 
instead of annual reports from sheriffs, a report should be filled out each time a cargo of 
a ship entering or leaving Iceland was being unloaded or loaded. These new blankets 
should be handed in from 1864 onwards.10 Unfortunately, the records tended to be filled 
out hastily and with carelessness by the respective staff of merchants. This made the
7 There is no standard term for exchange between seller and buying at this particular point, see 
ICC/CCI’s Incoterms. Hence, DMW is my own terminology. In Gudmundur Jonsson and 
Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna. Icelandic Historical Statistics, p 406, DMW prices are 
effectively equalled to fob prices, but it is important not to do so, see the discussion about value 
computations and merchant’s margins in the chapter.
8 Icel., Gov. Gen., Stjomartldindi 1895, sect. A, p 130. Icel., Min. of Icel., Stjornartidindi 
1909, sect. A, p 118; 1922, sect. A, p 12.
9 Halldor Bjamason, ‘Tofluvidauki,’ part 1, pp 232-3.
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records slightly less reliable than otherwise and, hence, more difficult to work on and 
aggregate for the printed trade returns.11 In 1895, the administration reverted to annual 
records, and this arrangement remained to the end of our research period. 
Simultaneously, the obligation to return reports about mercantile activities was extended 
to all those engaged in exportation or importation in Iceland.12
Besides late returns of reports, and omissions and inaccuracies in those that 
were obtained, these accounts sometimes were completely lacking from merchants and 
others that were engaged in the foreign trade.13 For example, Sveinbjom Blondal 
demonstrated with the use of contemporary papers that the trade returns (i.e., the 
merchants’ records) sometimes under-reported heavily the exports of live sheep in our 
research period. That is natural, because live sheep were mostly exported by British 
travelling merchants.14 Also, there is no doubt that some exports and imports by small 
exporters and importers, besides commission agents, never was reported. Partly, this 
causes a slight general under-reporting and partly a specific under-reporting when it 
comes down on imports of goods not sold by regular merchants, such as capital goods, 
whether for agriculture, fishing, or manufacturing industries. Imports of these increased 
significantly over time. Hence, imports of, for instance, agricultural implements and 
tools, and small boat engines, besides boats and ships, are vastly under-reported.15
10 Lovsamling for Island, vol. 18, p 640.
11 There are frequent complaints about this in the printed trade returns. See, for example,
12 Icel., Gov. Gen., Stjomartldindi 1897, sect. B, p 73. Only seasonal merchants and other 
travelling merchants were required to hand in reports after each journey instead of annually.
13 See, for instance, Halldor Bjamason, ‘Tofluvidauki,’ part 1, p 252.
14 Sveinbjom Blondal, Saudasalan til Bretlands, pp 13-14 and Appendix.
15 In the case of the smaller items, this is evident when the Icelandic trade returns are 
compared to the trade returns of the countries trading with Iceland, see the new datasets. See 
also remarks about this in Jon Sigurdsson, ‘Um verzlun og verzlunarsamtok,’ p 229, and Icel., 
Min. of Icel., Verslunarskyrslur 1908, p ii. As for the larger items, namely ships, this is self- 
evident because probably none of the sailing ships bought from Britain in the 1880s and the
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Furthermore, a comparison of a number of selected exports and imports with 
another Icelandic source, customs records, shows that the merchants’ records were 
subject to a constant and considerable, albeit variable, under-reporting from the 1880s 
into the 1910s.16 As it happens, in Iceland there was no customs control until 1872 and 
thereafter only partially so for decades. In 1872, a law came into force stipulating so 
that imported alcoholic drinks be subject to tariff. Later, in 1882, a new legislation 
demanded export duties be paid on a number of fisheries’ products. Over time, more 
exports and those imports that were called luxuries at the time became subject to levies, 
which were specific, not ad valorem. The sheriffs in the country were charged with 
carrying out the necessary control on exports and imports, and collecting levies on 
commission.17 A comparison of the quantities of the particular goods subject to levies as 
reported in customs records and merchants’ records over time shows that there was not 
only a constant under-reporting in the exports of commodities produced by Norwegian 
enterprises. This was to be expected because they tended to live in Norway and pay 
small attention to reporting to Icelandic authorities about their imports to and exports 
from Iceland. The under-reporting also was substantial, yet variable, in the case of 
saltfish, which was mainly exported by permanent merchants.18 All this suggested that 
under-reporting was not only slight or specific, but that all exports and imports were 
subject to a general under-reporting. Nevertheless, it presumably was proportionally 
larger in the case of travelling merchants, small exporters and importers, and
1890s are listed and neither are the steam trawlers in the 1900s onwards. Similarly, sales of 
ships from Iceland are missing.
16 A comparison was made between the customs records (Icel. utflutningsgjaldareikningar for 
exports and tollreikningar for imports) and the merchants’ records from the 1880s to the 
1900s. See the printed trade returns in these decades.
17 For a discussion about the introduction of the export duty on saltfish, see Halldor Bjamason, 
‘Tofluvidauki,’ part 1, pp 234-5. For a list of imports brought under tariff over time, see Icel., 
Gov. Gen., Stjomartldindi 1901, sect. A, p 178 (parag. 14).
18 On the saltfish, see Halldor Bjamason, ‘Tofluvidauki,’ part 1, p 239.
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commission agents, all of which probably returned seldom if any reports about their 
mercantile activities.
1.2. Attempt of Exploitation
In spite of all the deficiencies of the Icelandic trade returns, my original intention was to 
build my trade analysis on them. Incidentally, the publication of the historical trade 
statistics was being prepared then, and the national data had all been keyed into 
computer datasets with a spreadsheet programme. This data was available to me, and it
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seemed feasible because its exploitation would save very much time for me.19 Also, since 
my purpose with the research was to test the general relevance of the foreign trade for 
the economic transition of Iceland, the deficiencies seemed not to undermine seriously my 
study. However, to get some overview of the distribution of trade by countries before 
1895, and the merchants’ records were the most obvious choice. This is because the 
information about the countries trading with Iceland was always there in the records, 
although this information was dropped in the extraction of data for the printed trade 
returns. When I commenced this work, it was on the understanding that these sources 
would be available and manageable to supplement and extend the printed trade returns. 
At that point, my intention was to start the research in 1855.
However, an attempt to exploit these sources in the National Archives of Iceland 
(bjodskjalasafh Islands) from the late 1850s to the early 1890s proved practically 
fruitless and very frustrating. Research carried out in the Archives for over a month to 
locate the records, extract data, and put it in schematic computer form — I do not 
believe this has previously been attempted by any other student or scholar — established 
not only that these records are voluminous in quantity (after 1864), but also, and more 
important, that they have been so inconveniently sorted, catalogued, and stored by the 
National Archives that they cannot be used productively for any extended period of time 
by the individual scholar, on the national level at least. Besides, many of the 
administrative officials’ archives, where the pre-1864 records are stored, are in complete 
disorder, and even if there are piles of post-1864 records in one place, it is impossible to 
know what and how much is lacking.20 It would take a well funded and substantially 
staffed project to reorganise the documents, and to extract and aggregate the data, for
19 The datasets were made available to me by kind permission of Magnus S. Magnusson, one 
of the editors of the historical statistics.
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this potentially rich source of information on Icelandic trade to be rendered into a useful 
format.21
The negative outcome of the attempt to exploit the merchants’ records before 
1895 is most unfortunate. True, the under-reporting problem cannot be overcome with 
these records, but their main potential asset is that they should be useful to get a more 
accurate idea of the quantity of trade with certain countries over time. Of particular 
importance in this respect is the trade with Britain, which had to be estimated from 1870 
to 1894. This potential usefulness is significant, because accessible and aggregated 
British series on the trade with Iceland specifically seem to be scarce for the period from 
1870 to 1900. Also, information about a substantial part of the imports of foreign goods 
from Norway is lacking from 1870 to 1878, and the Icelandic merchants’ records 
possibly have some information about this. Finally, Iceland’s saltfish exports by 
countries are very interesting, and since they had to be estimated from 1870 to 1894 for 
all the countries except Denmark, an examination of the merchants’ records might prove 
useful until 1882, when Icelandic customs records for exports came into existence.
After the Icelandic merchants’ records proved unmanageable for any meaningful 
use, there was small point in working on the customs records, because they contained a 
relatively small number of goods, and they require a substantial time to be exploited. 
Nevertheless, these documents are well organised and they might prove useful in certain 
instances (see the discussion below). But in the circumstances, the only way forward was 
to consider using trade returns of the countries trading with Iceland.
20 After 1864, there is one sheet for each unloading or loading of ship, making it impossible to 
see how many sheet there should be for a particular year.
21 This view echoes Magnus S. Magnusson’s experience, who felt in 1985 that ‘the state of the 
National Archives (hjodskjalasafii) in the field of modem economic history was disastrous ...’ 
(Magnus S. Magnusson, Iceland in Transition, p 22).
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2. The Use of Foreign Trade Returns for Iceland
Using as a basic source the trade returns of countries trading with the one under study is 
possibly a slightly unusual procedure, but in the circumstances it was necessary. 
Incidentally, comparative examination of trade returns of the country of origin and the 
country of destination does usually show discrepancies in the quantities stated of 
individual commodities. On the other hand, when the aggregate trade between any pair of 
countries is compared, it usually is in a relatively good harmony and plausible 
explanations can be offered for remaining differences.22 Disagreements between trade 
statistics of countries have many perfectly logical causes. These can be shrinkage in 
goods during voyage or at loading and unloading, different methods of measuring the 
goods, ship losses, variations in documentation of transit goods, intentional or 
unintentional errors in records, and change in the country of destination or buyers after 
departure in the selling country. Apart from these causes, countries have had different 
definitions of what exchanges or transfers of goods belong to foreign trade. Some employ 
the special trade principle while others use the general trade principle. Essentially, the 
difference between the two principles is about how goods deposited in customs storage 
are reported. According to the special trade principle, goods are not imported until they 
have entered the domestic economic zone, whether directly from abroad or from customs 
storage. By contrast, according to the general trade principle, all goods are considered 
imported when they enter the customs zone, irrespective whether they are put in customs
22 G. Federico and A. Tena, ‘On the Accuracy of Foreign Trade Statistics (1909-1935).’
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storage or cleared for consumption in the country. Evidently, the way imports are defined 
affects both the amounts of goods reported as imported and exported.23
This listing shows that no trade returns necessarily possess the one and only 
truth, and they often measure trade at different points in the transportation from 
producer to consumer. Hence, there is no surprise if the new datasets do not always 
coincide with the best available Icelandic source, the customs records. Besides, caution 
must always be made when using past statistical sources. In the case of trade returns, 
one must (a) examine the compilation and the making of the available returns, (b) select 
the best source(s) if there is any choice, and (c) remedy, if possible, any major 
shortcomings in the source material.
It should be clear by now that the method of using foreign trade returns in the 
case of Iceland’s foreign trade is not necessarily inferior in theory. More important 
though, it certainly is not inferior in practice because of the substantial deficiencies of 
Icelandic returns. In general, the foreign trade returns used for this research were 
superior to the Icelandic returns, but in some cases the Icelandic source had more 
detailed or additional information, allowing me to produce better and more 
comprehensive statistics than by using only either one of the two types of sources. 
However, the potential of this merging was far from exhausted in the production of the 
new datasets. The first advantage of the foreign trade returns was that they were not only 
accessible in printed form, but they also were more extensive and reliable as well, 
because in contrast to Iceland, there was a proper and relatively effective customs 
control in the neighbouring countries, producing reliable statistics based on customs 
records.24 Hence, they eliminated the problem of under-reporting, which persisted in the
23 The Economist Desk Companion, 2nd ed., pp 67-8.
24 It is relatively clear from the Danish and Norwegian trade returns that they were based on 
customs records. There is no introduction or explanatory text in the British returns, stating this
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Icelandic trade returns to the end of our research period, and that is why the foreign 
returns eventually were used for the whole period. Also, the foreign returns sometimes 
had more detailed information than the Icelandic returns on Iceland’s exports but, 
especially, Iceland’s imports.25 On top of this, information about values of the exports 
and imports in the foreign returns enabled me to extend the research with an examination 
of margins of merchants.
Of course, standards in the making of trade returns have increased considerably 
since the late 19th century, and all trade returns from that time do have problematic 
aspects, no matter how well they were made. Even the best trade returns today, which 
are all based on customs records, have their small errors and inaccuracies.26 Hence, no 
one can expect to avoid all source problems when using past trade returns, and the 
following sections will be devoted to clarifying the main complications and describing 
how the datasets were built up.
explicitly, but they were also based on customs records. See the archive of Board of Trade, 
where the British returns were made, in the Public Record Office.
25 Note that apart from the under-reporting problem, a comparison of the merits of the 
Icelandic and the foreign returns is slightly difficult. This is because the foreign returns tend to 
classify goods by way of defining their characteristics (origin, substance, etc.), and it is 
sometimes difficult to identify the goods in question. The Icelandic returns, on the other hand, 
have several categories of specific goods, well identifiable, and then put the rest of merchandise 
in miscellany.
26 See, for example, Halldor Bjamason, ‘Tofluvidauki,’ part 2, pp 340, 343, 352, 353, 354.
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3. The Building of Datasets: Sources, Problems and 
Solutions
3.1. General Remarks
When starting to build the datasets, one of the first considerations was to decide what 
information to key in, i.e., how extensive the extraction of material should be. If a 
selective approach was employed, where should the dividing line between ‘main’ and 
‘minor’ items be drawn? Apart from that, it was not so easy to use quantity as a measure 
for this, because the trade returns not only used old units of weights and measures, but 
also to a large extent their individual systems of measurements, different by countries. 
Values were of limited help in drawing a dividing line, because in the case of Denmark 
they had to be calculated each time, and in the case of Norway information about the 
goods in trade and their quantities often had to be acquired first. Only British returns in 
1902-13 provided very accessible information about values of the goods in trade. These 
difficulties together effectively made the drawing of a dividing line impossible. But even 
if one would have settled for inconsistencies in the dividing line, price swings would have 
skewed the picture, and the exports and imports quantities of some goods would have 
crossed the dividing line with information lacking either before or after, distorting the 
calculation of indices. Also, the merchandise classification gradually became more 
disaggregated over time. This undermined the logic behind a dividing line and moving it 
later would have been impossible out of practical reasons, etc.
Apart from a frustrating experience of the Icelandic merchants’ records and 
significant difficulties lined up along this road, an economical use of my time relative to
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the prospective quality of the data produced, suggested that it was not feasible to draw a 
dividing line between ‘major’ and ‘minor’ goods in the trade. Therefore, soon the 
decision was made to include all goods in trade. Although demanding more time in 
keyboard work and new problems had to be tackled, this eliminated all the difficulties 
listed above. Most important, this increased the accuracy of the datasets and, thereby, 
the trade analysis. For example, the many smaller items of trade increased substantially 
in quantity over time, and they formed together an indispensable feature of the overall 
change in the commodity composition. In retrospect, it was a sensible decision to include 
all the items of trade, although they were aggregated later to get a summary of the main 
trends.
Having decided the extent of the data extraction, other considerations were 
relatively easy. One was which years I should select as my sample years. Taking every 
fifth year or so seemed suitable, but since I wanted to keep open the possibility of 
increasing later the number of sample years by adding a year in-between, it was not a 
sensible decision, because that would have produced uneven intervals. Using every 
fourth or sixth year solved the problem, and the first choice offered more sample years 
so it was opted for. Although time did not allow for adding later the mid year in-between, 
this decision conveniently offers scholars to do so in future research. A more important 
consideration was to decide the taxonomy that should be used to classify the goods in 
trade. It seemed relevant to consider systems that had been used in Icelandic trade 
returns in 20th century to facilitate a long-run comparison with the new datasets. 
However, this was not simple because the Icelandic trade statistics had gone through the 
same sequence of evolution as foreign trade returns. First, the Brussels List had been 
employed, then the Minimum List of the League of Nations, and finally the United 
Nations’ Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), which is now used in its 
third revision. Furthermore, since these taxonomies were much too broad to describe
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Iceland’s exports, limited in scope as they were, a special system (Icel. Hagstofuflokkun) 
was adopted by the Statistical Bureau of Iceland in the 1950s and used thereafter. It has 
been amended over time, but it is based on the SITC system, which has been used for the 
exports side by side with the Hagstofuflokkun. Finally, the historical trade statistics 
before 1914 that were published in 1997 were based on the Brussels List for imports and 
on Hagstofuflokkun for exports.27
In the view of this, it was desirable that the taxonomy used in the new datasets 
would be either of those two systems already employed for our period and the succeeding 
years, i.e., the Hagstofuflokkun or the Brussels List. However, it was decided to use the 
SITC system, 3rd revision (abbreviated SITC Rev3 in the thesis and the datasets). The 
Brussels List was rejected because it is an outdated system, and it can only be a matter 
of time, not whether, Icelandic trade data will be reclassified according to the SITC 
system, whichever version it will be. Besides, the major part of existing trade statistics 
for Iceland in 20th century, both by number of years and quantity of data, is already 
classified with some version of the SITC. Since our taxonomy had to accommodate both 
exports and imports, the SITC system rather than the Hagstofuflokkun was preferred. 
Owing to the source material and the objective of the research, it was neither practical 
nor necessary to use the detailed Hagstofuflokkun.
After these considerations, some of which had to be revised after the extraction 
of data started, a prolonged and laborious statistical work began. This entailed keying of 
relevant material into computer files, the construction of data, conversion of old 
measurement units into the metric tonne, creation of links between files, and computation 
of various aggregate figures in a host o f tables. Amounting to more than 20 MB now, the
27 Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna. Icelandic Historical 
Statistics, p 408.
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datasets are kept in a number of spreadsheet files in the Excel programme, version 5. In 
the building of the datasets, there were several problems that had to dealt with in the 
exploitation of these past trade returns and sources of error that is necessary to be aware 
of. Some of the general issues pertaining to this will be commented on below, but 
problems specific to individual trade returns by countries will be discussed when the 
datasets for each country will be described.
First, a few words about what is included in the foreign trade returns and what is 
not included. Perhaps most important is that ships and probably most boats too are 
missing. Although these goods nowadays are included in trade returns, ships and aircraft 
frequently are put aside, so as to locate regular exports and imports. However, these 
items belong to other goods in trade and they can affect the balance of payments 
considerably. In the case of Iceland in our research period, there were increasing imports 
of ships and boats, practically all of which is missing. At the other end of extreme is 
parcel post. It usually was not included in trade returns, but with the introduction of 
commission agents in the Iceland trade in the end of the century, this channel for small 
item merchandises no doubt increased in quantity and value. Also, with foreign 
merchandise catalogues, which seem to have been distributed in Iceland in the 1890s or 
1900s onwards, people could order goods in post. Parcel post, however, does not alter in 
any way the general picture of Iceland’s foreign trade, and it only underscores the 
increase in the quantities and values of trade that is already evident in the new datasets.
Concerning the material that is in the new datasets, there are several issues that 
need to be kept in mind when using the series. The possibility of misclassification cannot 
be precluded, and it can have two causes. One is that my understanding of the nature or 
the making of the good was wrong, but this no doubt is a negligible error because the 
specification of the goods usually was accurate enough. However, there is at least one 
instance of this, and it may act as a word of caution. According to Icelandic trade
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returns, no later than in the late 1900s, several cereals (oats, barley, and maize) were 
used as fodder. The foreign trade returns offer no indication of the use of these cereals, 
so they were assumed to be for human consumption (with a different SITC Rev3 
number). Of course, this is an insignificant error for the overall trade, but as an 
agricultural issue, this is of relevance. Another possible source of misclassification is the 
problem of compound groups. Usually, the break-down of goods in trade was sufficient 
for the precision employed in the classification (two to three digit SITC Rev3 numbers). 
But sometimes in the case of foodstuffs and manufactured goods, there was some 
uncertainty. It does not matter when the trade is studied in general, but when series for 
specific goods are scrutinised, this can be a problem, and would be a larger problem if 
the commodity groups in the new datasets were to be disaggregated in detail.
Related to the problem of compound groups of goods is that often do the 
Icelandic trade returns offer a more detailed break-down of exports and, occasionally, of 
imports too. Plagued with under-reporting as the Icelandic returns are, this is a valuable 
asset if consumption of individual goods is to be studied. For example, when exactly and 
it what quantities did small oil lamps spread out or sewing machines in Iceland? Or, 
from what species did the exported fish oil come? A possible solution would be to 
rework the figures in the Icelandic trade returns to percentages of an aggregated 
compound group and then transpose them to the respective compound groups in the new 
datasets. This would be relatively easy for many of the exports, but presumably a little 
harder for the imports, because of classification problems in the different sources. 
However, when examining specific aspects of production or consumption in the Iceland 
economy, exercises of this kind could potentially prove useful in conjunction with use of 
qualitative sources.
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When examining the exports or imports of particular goods in the datasets, a 
care must be taken not to rely on quantity or value series only. Usually, this is not a 
problem because there is information both about quantities and values. But sometimes, 
especially in the case of manufactured items (SITC Rev3 groups 7 and 8), the goods 
were only reported or registered by value. Therefore, looking at the imports of 
manufactured goods and articles by quantity only can be deceiving and make one under­
estimate the actual quantities traded. Related to the issue of quantities is the question 
whether the exports and imports are weighted inclusive or exclusive of packaging. The 
trade returns do not say anything about this, but presumably goods measured by non­
volume units were reported alternatively gross or net, depending on the nature or the type 
of packaging. In those cases when goods were reported by volume, it is of course net.
Converting all measurements in the foreign trade returns into the metric tonne 
(or kg) in the datasets was not an absolute necessity in itself. However, it was deemed 
that it facilitated a comparison of the quantities across goods, and this proved helpful in 
estimating broadly the outcomes of the new datasets when comparing their aggregate 
series to the Icelandic returns and their revision (the IceStat datasets). Besides, it is the 
modem practice to use the metric tonne, and since these old units in the trade data no 
doubt eventually will be converted to the metric system, a start is made here. Anyway, a 
minimum standardisation was necessary, if only because of the different national 
systems of measurements used in my sources. However, it is a well known fact that old 
units of measurement can be difficult to convert into a standardised system. In our case, 
the tough ones were primarily volume units, because the relative density of goods varies 
and affects the weight. Also, conversion of piece units, which sometimes were used, into 
weights is subject to estimates than can vary from one study to another. Therefore, the 
conversion constants that were used here can be disputed, and they do not always
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coincide with those conversion ratios used in the IceStat datasets.28 This partly owes to 
different, and sometimes conflicting, sources used, but possibly also to different views 
about the gross-net issue. Apart from that, varying precision in the sources employed 
and in the calculation of the respective scholar can affect the outcome. Although our 
conversion of measurements almost certainly is a minor source of error, it is, 
nevertheless, important to remember this if using or comparing the series in much detail.
3.2. Value Computations of the Exports and Imports
Although the conversion of the units of measurement to the metric tonne or kg would be 
an ample subject for explication, the calculation of the values of trade required so special 
methods, that it is important to be aware of how who they were. For the first, it was 
decided not to produce the values of imports on balance of payments basis. To be sure, 
balance of payments basis is useful in modem national accounting when transportation 
between countries usually is to some extent in the hands of the country under study. 
Then, incomes from transportation conveniently are entered in the invisible balance 
sheet. In the case of Iceland in our research period, there was small point in this practice, 
because no ships for inter-country transportation were owned by persons or companies 
in Iceland until 1914 onwards. Incomes from shipping were nil, and freight and 
insurance was paid to externally resident parties. Hence, imports were best produced on
28 As it happens, there is no standard work or compendium on units of measurements used in 
Iceland since the early modem period. Probably the most comprehensive examination of this is 
a special appendix to Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna. 
Icelandic Historical Statistics, pp 921-5.
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cif prices, instead of fob prices, which are used when the trade is on balance of payments 
basis; exports were on fob prices as usual.29 However, this method required estimates of 
freight and insurance costs because of the foreign trade returns that were used, and also 
because the Icelandic returns did not use fob and cif prices for exports and imports 
respectively (until 1909 and then only for imports).
To explain the situation and show what adjustments were made, we have 
conveniently laid out a table of the value basis of the exports and imports in the sources. 
The table also shows what cost items optimally would have to be subtracted or added to 
the value of merchandise to get the exports on a fob basis and the imports on a cif basis. 
Note that some of these adjustments could not be made for the thesis. Hence, the 
‘optimal adjustments’ in the title must be stressed.
29 The Economist Desk Companion, 2nd ed., p 68. Icel., Nat. Ec. Inst., Pjodhagsreikningar 
1945-1992, pp 42-3.
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Table A .l. Optimal Adjustments for Producing the Values of 
Exports on Fob Basis and Imports on Cif Basis, 1870 to 1913
Exports_______________ Imports
Initial Add* Subtract* Event. Initial Add* Subtract* Event.
Value Value Value Value
Base** Base Base** Base
Denmark ‘cif Fr. & Ins. fob ‘fob’ Fr. & 
Ins.
cif
Norway cif Fr. & Ins. fob fob Fr. & 
Ins.
cif
Spain and Italy DMW Marg. & Duty fob • • • .




1898-1906: DMW Marg. & Duty fob retail pr. Marg. & Tariff cif
1910-13: DMW Marg. & Duty fob cif cif
* United Kingdom 1870 to 1913 and other (unspecified) countries 1870 to 1894 
** Other countries than stated above 1898 to 1913
f Margins include packaging, warehousing, shrinkage, loading and unloading, etc., besides profit. 
— Fr. & Ins. stands for freight and insurance costs 
f f  DMW stands for Delivered at Merchant’s Warehouse
When calculating the fob and cif value of trade with Denmark, Norway and 
Britain (in fact UK and ‘others’), there were two ways to do this. One was to work from 
the values stated in the foreign trade returns, which offered cif values for Iceland’s 
exports and fob values for the imports. As the table indicates, this required estimates of 
freight and insurance costs. The other way was to work from the values in the Icelandic 
trade returns, which were DMW values and retail values respectively for exports and 
imports. This demanded knowledge of margins of merchants and levies paid on exports 
and imports. While information about levies could be accessed and calculated (with 
some estimates though and cumbersome calculations), margins of merchants were an 
empty box. Incidentally, the move of imports from retail values to cif values in 1909 
offered a unique opportunity to speculate about margins, and this was done in the 
contemporary Icelandic trade returns to produce standardised series for the imports. The
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IceStat datasets have revisions of these estimates, and there a 20% margins rate was 
transposed backwards for the imports series.30 In other words, the equivalence of 20% 
margins, besides tariff, was subtracted from the retail values of imports to produce them 
on cif basis. This, of course, involved a gross assumption about merchants’ margins over 
time, and for our study it was considered feasible to approach this from the other end. 
Therefore, it was decided to work from the values in the foreign trade returns and 
estimate freight and insurance costs, which probably were on a firmer ground than 
merchants’ margins. Unfortunately, this was not possible for the remaining countries, 
i.e., Spain, Italy, and Other countries (1898 onwards), because the only source of value 
information was the Icelandic trade returns. In the case of exports to these countries, 
either the DMW value had to suffice or the margins of merchants be estimated, adding 
them and export duty to the value. In the case of imports from them (until 1906), either 
the retail price had to do or margins be estimated and they subtracted along with tariff 
from the retail price (Table A.l).
As the new datasets stand now, the values of the goods in trade are calculated 
with a mixture of both approaches. In the case of Denmark, Norway, and Britain, the 
values of exports and imports are approximated fob and cif prices respectively, because 
the costs of freight and insurance were estimated. However, for Spain, Italy, and Other 
countries, DMW and retail prices stand behind the values of their exports and imports 
respectively. Note that exports and imports levies are not included, because of their 
relative small importance and difficulties in calculating them (see Appendix B). It would, 
of course, be desirable to make estimates of the merchants’ margins in the trade with 
Spain, Italy, and Other countries. However, there is no information available to do this,
30 Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna. Icelandic Historical 
Statistics, p 406.
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and, consequently, the share of these countries has to be considered as a minimum. The 
only information that might give a clue about the level of margins is an exercise that was 
carried out on the trade with Denmark (see Appendix B). But this has to checked further 
before these margins can be applied to other countries.
The estimates about the cost of freight and insurance were based on freight 
earnings in Norwegian shipping returns for our period. While the extent of information 
in the shipping returns changed over time, there always was some information about 
voyages of Norwegian ships between Iceland and other countries. Unfortunately, I did 
not have a full access to these returns, so I could not examine them as much as I would 
have liked, and sometimes I had to use returns lying near to the sample years instead of 
returns from the sample years themselves. Furthermore, the returns do not provide a 
uniform and consecutive data about the Iceland voyages of the Norwegian ships. 
Therefore, the series on freight are partly estimated and sometimes extrapolated, but they 
are always based on freight information about voyages between Iceland and the 
neighbouring countries. Perhaps the major source of uncertainty in the freight estimates 
is the country specification, because as yet it is not absolutely clear to me. Nevertheless, 
shipping statistics show that ships did not come from the Mediterranean countries to 
Iceland. Iceland’s imports, whether re-exports or not, mainly came from Scandinavia 
and Britain so we know that the ships came therefrom, and the freights apply to these 
countries. Since the distance between Iceland on one hand and Norway and Britain on 
the other is roughly similar, but about twice as long between Iceland and Denmark, the 
freight rates for Denmark were doubled. Note that the freight earnings in the Norwegian 
shipping returns applied only to ships entering Iceland, but it seems safe to assume that 
the freight rates were not very different on the outward voyage.
Getting plausible estimates of the freight rates was only half a victory because 
information was also needed about the amount of goods that could be accommodated in
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a register ton or a Kommercelcest (1 Kml. approximately 2 reg. tons). Here, a gross 
assumption was made because a fixed ratio between a register ton and a metric tonne 
was set for this calculation. Acting as a point of departure, the amount of timber that 
could be put in a Kml. or reg. ton, according to the Norwegian trade returns, was 
calculated. It ranged from being 1,066 to 1,557 kg per reg. ton. The density of most 
timber sorts is relatively low, at least compared to goods that have similar density as 
water, and timber is a bulky good that probably did not use the cargo capacity 
particularly well. Therefore, it seems justifiable to assume that on average more weight 
could be put in per register ton. This varies, of course, across goods, but it was decided 
to equal two tonnes of weight to one register ton. Because of the conversion of all goods 
to metric tonnes, the calculation of freight costs was simple. Even if one accepts this 
ratio between a register ton and a metric tonne as a reasonable estimate, the problem of 
the utilisation of the cargo capacity was left. Here, another assumption was made and it 
was fixed at 80%.31 This utilisation was taken into account in the freight rate estimate, 
and also the share of sailing ships to steam ships in shipping to Iceland. First, two freight 
rates were calculated, one for each type of ship. Then, the relative share of both types of 
ships as of all ships to Iceland was calculated. Finally, these shares were used to 
calculate a single annual rate for all ships in cargo transportation to and from Iceland 
(Table A.2).
Clearly the calculation of freight and insurance costs is a mixture of hard and 
fast data, many estimates, and extrapolation. It requires to be improved later with more 
information and checked for the staples in export and import. Hence, it must be taken 
with great caution in terms of individual goods. In fact, it must mainly be regarded as an
31 In fact, the rate of utilisation was put at 100% for steam ships in 1870, because they were 
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approximation of total freight and insurance costs for exports and imports respectively. 
Nevertheless, it is believed here that this method provides a way to offer a more reliable 
picture of the real fob values of exports and cif values of imports than the method used 
in the IceStat datasets does.
3.3. Comparison of the New Datasets and the IceStat Datasets
In the light of the source material for the new statistical datasets and the methods 
employed to produce the value series, it is of some interest to compare the results with 
the revised Icelandic trade returns, i.e., the IceStat datasets. How much do our results 
alter the previous picture of the trade flows? A quick comparison of the commodity 
groups was not possible because of the different classification systems, and since the 
IceStat datasets (the Icelandic trade returns) do not have information about the trade by 
countries before 1895, a country-specific comparison of the period thereafter was 
dropped. Instead, an overall quantitative comparison of the values of trade is offered 
(Fig. A.1). In the case of exports, it shows that the new datasets report about 20% more 
values from 1870 to 1886 than the IceStat datasets do. After 1886, the extra values fall 
to a level showing roughly 10 to 15% higher exports values than the IceStat data (Table 
A. 3). In the case of imports, the new datasets also report higher values in the beginning, 
but in contrast to the exports, the values actually fall below the values reported in the 
IceStat datasets and they reach a low point of 75% of the IceStat datasets in 1913 (Table 
A.4). In other words, according to the new datasets, there are always some exports
Figure A - ' I
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values missing in the IceStat datasets, but the IceStat datasets first understate the 
imports values and then overstate them.
The outcome gives a reason to ask if this is a divergence in value only but not in 
quantity. Since there are no uniform (standardised) quantity series available for imports 
in the IceStat datasets, they cannot answer this question for imports. However, there are 
uniform quantity series for exports and a comparison of them and our quantity series 
support our trend in the exports values. It is not plotted on the graph in Fig. A.l but the 
quantities of exports were always higher than the IceStat datasets state, and they were on 
the same level as the values of exports. It cannot be ascertained here, but it is probable 
that this broadly was the case in imports too. Now what explains the divergence in the 
value, and why are the trends in exports and imports so different? First, it has to be 
noted that the basis of the values in the two sets of data is not the same as we have 
already discussed. In the IceStat datasets, exports show DMW values while imports 
show retail values minus a transposed margins percentage and tariff. In the new datasets, 
exports are partly constructed fob prices and partly DMW values and the imports are 
partly cif values and partly retail prices. This is bound to produce different results to 
some extent.
There is also another source of difference between the two sets of data, although 
no doubt less important. Owing to the foreign trade returns used in the new datasets, 
their part of the exports and imports is reported as of in foreign port, not Icelandic port 
of entry. This is counter to standard practice where exports are reported in the port of 
departure and imports in the port of arrival. This means that no account is taken of 
shrinkage in handling (unloading and loading) and during voyages. While this is a 
negligible source of error, losses of ships and their cargo are more important. It is 
impossible to assess this marginal error with any certainty, but this causes a small
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understatement of exports and overstatement of imports, and it also produces a smaller 
balance (or deficit) of trade than it was in fact.
But even when taking these differences into consideration, exports were under­
reported in the IceStat datasets, which is not surprising given the source material. This is 
evident from the Denmark and Norway datasets. The extra imports values in the new 
datasets in the beginning also witness the same: an under-reporting in the Icelandic 
sources. Note, however, that estimates for under-reporting in the Britain datasets also 
add to the difference. But what is intriguing about the imports is that the new datasets 
report lower values than the IceStat datasets as time passed. Here, merchants’ margins 
evidently come to play. The exports suggest that the level of margins on exports broadly 
remained stable over time, but the imports indicate that the margins on imports rose 
substantially. In other words, there seems to have occurred a medium to long term 
change in the level of margins, and this will be probed into in chapter VII. Until now we 
have discussed general issues concerning the new datasets. However, the building of 
datasets for individual countries required various estimates and supplements to make up 
for lacunas and to extend the usefulness of the data. For details about these matters, I 
refer to the following sections, but first a short mention of the countries trading with 
Iceland in our period is in order.
During the second half of 19th century, only a few countries traded with Iceland. 
Because of the Danish monopoly of Iceland’s foreign trade until 1855, all countries that 
took up trade with Iceland after 1855 were doing so after 250 years of Danish 
dominance, and they had to compete with age-old trading relations. The first ones to do 
so were Norway and Britain. Norway had in fact had a special permission to bring 
timber to Iceland since 1836 and even before that time in name. But the British were 
relatively new in 1855, although they also had had a special permission to engage in the 
Iceland trade, but only for the past few years and it had been confined to exports of live
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horses.32 First after 1855, there were expectations that Spaniards would take up trade 
with Iceland and buy their traditional saltfish more directly, but this did not come true.33 
In the late 1880s, saltfish exports started to Italy (see Chapter IV), but other countries 
did not markedly enter Iceland’s foreign trade until about 1900 onwards. Trade with 
countries other than those five was negligible in the late 19th century, although we have 
no figures to support it with until 1895, but this trade grew quickly over time. 
Incidentally, there was some contraband trade, mainly with French fishermen who 
flocked to Icelandic waters and came ashore for provisions and out of other reasons. 
Icelandic woollens were particularly favoured by them although they bought other goods 
too.34 Evidently, the quantity of this trade is impossible to measure, and it makes no 
difference for the trade statistics analysis.
3.4. The Denmark Datasets
The datasets on Iceland’s trade with Denmark were predominantly based on Danish 
trade returns, which were straightforward and perhaps the easiest of all the foreign 
returns to work with. They gave quantity information about practically all goods, had a 
comparatively disaggregated commodity classification, and very detailed country-by- 
country distinctions until 1910. Then, the category ‘Other countries’ was started in the 
returns, and Iceland no doubt sometimes was put in this group in the case of relatively
32 horkell Johannesson, ‘Brot ur verzlunarsftgu,’ part 1, pp 236-7, 249.
33 Valdimar Unnar Valdimarsson and Halldor Bjamason, Saltfiskur i sogu pjddar, vol. I, p
34 Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna. Icelandic Historical 
Statistics, p 404.
APPENDIX A -  440
small imports and exports from the point of view of Denmark. Furthermore, there are 
unique accounts among the foreign trade returns used here of the definitions of trade in 
the Danish returns, and these can be found in the introductory text. The definition of the 
Danish customs zone changed over time, and there is nothing one can do about it, but it 
is useful to know of this.
On the other hand, the Danish trade returns had limited information about the 
values of the goods in trade. Before 1874, there were no direct information about values 
of trade, only national calculations using official prices, which were not market prices. 
From 1874 to the mid 1890s, the Danish returns offered two kinds of value information 
about trade. On one hand, there were national totals of the value of each good or 
commodity group in exports and imports individually. On the other hand, there were 
figures about the total value of imports to Denmark by countries, but there were no 
break-downs of these values and no information about exports of Denmark by countries, 
neither national figures nor disaggregated. In the mid 1890s onwards, information 
gradually became more extensive when there were offered total values of Denmark’s 
exports by countries and break-downs of exports and imports by countries.
The values in the Danish returns from 1874 onwards broadly were equal to cif 
prices on Iceland’s exports and fob prices on Iceland’s imports, but presumably not 
completely so. This is because exporters and importers were not required to give 
information about the value of goods. Instead, the Danish statistical bureau collected all 
kinds of information from wholesalers, auctioneers, and others, and the bureau composed 
on the basis of this information some kind of average prices, which were held to be 
typical of the actual prices of exports and imports. These prices were used for the value 
calculations in the new datasets but in 1870, a different approach had to be employed. 
Here, I used an index of retail prices in Denmark to work out the country’s export and 
import prices. Therefore, the values in Iceland’s trade with Denmark in 1870 must be
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regarded as rough estimates only. The use of Danish national values to calculate the 
value of Iceland’s trade with Denmark inevitably levelled out any country-specific 
differences in prices in the Danish data. But nothing could be done about it until a 
summary of the trade with each country was included in the Danish returns from the late 
1890s onwards. It specified the main items only, but some corrections to the average 
prices could be made for 1898-1913. Indeed, average prices of some exports and 
imports before 1898 were also modified on the basis of this information, although those 
alterations were bound to be a guesswork.
Useful as the value information in the Danish trade returns were to estimate 
values in Iceland’s trade with Denmark, ample evidence suggests that the value data 
calls for a revision, in particular until the late 1890s. Apart from the corrections in 
values made from the late 1890s onwards, there are both qualitative and quantitative 
sources, which show that the average prices composed by the Danish statistical bureau 
do not always reflect prices in the Iceland trade. In the case of imports, Jon Sigurdsson 
quotes instances of this from about 1870, and in the case of exports there is sometimes a 
curious mismatch of merchants’ purchase prices in Iceland and the sales prices of these 
commodities in Copenhagen. This mismatch emerges in a very small, if any, range 
between the two price levels, and sometimes in a negative range, which means that the 
purchase prices were lower than the sales prices.35 This is of direct relevance for the 
theory commented on in chapter II about merchants’ purchase prices of exports to 
Denmark exceeding their sales prices there. If  the theory is to be tested seriously in 
future research, then it requires accurate and reliable value data not only for exports, but 
also imports, because of their intrinsic connection in the trade of Iceland with Denmark.
35 Concerning imports, see Jon Sigurdsson, ‘Um verzlun og verzlunarsamtok,’ p 229. As for 
exports, I refer to the underlying base tables in my datasets, but these tables are too voluminous 
to reproduce.
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The price movements of Danish imports to Iceland presumably can only be identified 
with precision by examining the accounting records of merchant houses in the Iceland 
trade, if there is any workable information about this there.36 But in the case of Iceland’s 
exports to Denmark, there is a tolerably accessible and probably a workable price data. 
Incidentally, the Danish broker firm Simmelhag & Holm had a substantial part of the 
Iceland exports in its hands for a long time. More important, the firm published an 
annual summary report of their business activities where fluctuations in prices over the 
year are briefed and the quantities involved are stated. In fact, the reports are a very 
interesting newsletter about exports of Iceland generally, because comments on exports 
to other countries are included.
In spite of the potential usefulness of the Simmelhag & Holm reports, they could 
not replace the value information in the Danish returns. Therefore, this supplementary 
source of information was not used, and perhaps the main problem is accessing the 
reports. According to a commemorative booklet about the firm on its centenary in 1934, 
the Danish newspaper Berlingske Tidende published these reports for some time.37 They 
were also published separately, but it is not clear to me whether they were off-prints 
from the newspaper or copied by the newspaper. Unfortunately, the Berlingske Tidende 
is not in Iceland, and enquiries about the separate issues in the Danish and Icelandic 
national libraries and the Danish business archives have had no positive results.38 The 
existence of these separate issues is, however, evident from a few copies kept in the
36 Archives of a number of merchant houses in the Iceland trade is kept in the National 
Archives of Iceland, Economic History Department (hagsogudeild), but they often are 
incomplete. Some, but probably few, archives of merchant houses trading with Iceland are kept 
in the Danish National Business Archives (Erhvervsarkivet) in Arhus.
37 D. Petersen, Simmelhag & Holm, p 6.
38 These are the Royal Library, Pamphlet Department (Det Kongelige Bibliotek, 
Sm&tryksafdeling), in Copenhagen, the Danish National Business Archives (Erhvervsarkivet) 
in Arhus, and the National and University Library of Iceland, National Department 
(Landsbokasafii Islands -  Haskolabokasafn, bjbddeild), in Reykjavik.
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Library of the Central Bank of Iceland. Consequently, any work on the reports by 
Simmelhag & Holm will have to take place in a Danish library holding the newspaper.
The use of the foreign returns after 1895 gave an opportunity to test more 
extensively the suggestion made in the beginning of the chapter that the general under­
reporting in the Icelandic merchants’ records continued well into the 1900s and even 
longer. This suggestion was made by the examination of the exports quantities of several 
goods, most notably saltfish because it was mainly in the hands of permanent merchants. 
The comparison of the new datasets with the IceStat datasets supported it (see above), 
but it did not say anything about Iceland’s imports by quantity or whether the under­
reporting was country-specific. In the case of Denmark, this suggestion holds true 
because about 21-33% by quantity was missing in the imports therefrom in 1898-1906, 
but it fell down to 1-2% in 1910-13 (Table A.4). By contrast, examination of the 
exports to Denmark produced conflicting results. In 1898 and 1902 the Icelandic returns 
over-reported the quantity to Denmark by 10% and 3% respectively. In 1906 and 1910, 
15-18% by quantity were missing in the Icelandic source, but only 2% in 1913 (Table 
A.3).
3.5. The Norway Datasets
In contrast to the Danish source, the Norwegian trade returns were in many ways 
problematic to use. This owed mainly to the partial and slightly haphazard 
disaggregation of trade generally, and the trade returns were not as extensive and 
uniform over time as the Danish returns. Although the total value of trade with Iceland
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(exports and imports) always was stated, the breakdown of the goods varied 
considerably. Even large items of trade sometimes had to be located by way of exclusion 
and with calculations of quantities, values, and prices backwards and forwards. In the 
case of Iceland’s exports, this came mainly down on saltfish and herring, which were put 
in a combined group of ‘salted or dried fish’ (Norw. Fisk, saltet eller torret) during 
1886 to 1906. In the case of imports to Iceland, this emerged in a complete lack of 
specification of foreign goods (Norway’s re-exports) from 1870 to 1886. Since they 
were particularly large in Iceland’s imports from Norway in the beginning (60-70% in 
1870-74), this is a drawback, although the trade with Norway was not relatively large.39 
Another peculiarity of the Norwegian trade returns, and possibly linked to the non­
specification of foreign goods, is that ship provisions seem to be included in the trade 
returns right from 1870. Anyway, this was the case around 1900 and must be the 
explanation for occasional exports of salt and coal from Iceland to Norway, besides tiny 
exports of, for instance, coffee, sugar, and barrels.40 Salt and coal were imported to 
Iceland from Norway, and it is highly doubtful, to say the least, that those commodities 
were sold to Norway like any other exports of Iceland. Besides, there are qualitative 
evidence that salt at least was brought back to Norway by fishing ships if the fishing in 
Icelandic waters had failed 41
The combined group of saltfish and herring was dissolved by some guesswork 
and estimates on the basis of known or plausible facts in the Norwegian and Icelandic 
trade returns. Also, the lack of specification of imports in 1870 onwards was partly
39 I refer to the base tables in my datasets for imports from Norway, but they do not accompany 
the thesis, because they are too voluminous to reproduce.
40 I refer to the base tables in my datasets for exports to Norway, but they do not accompany 
the thesis, because they are too voluminous to reproduce. The inclusion of ship provisions in 
the Norwegian trade returns around 1900 is commented on in Icel., Min. of Icel., 
Landshagsskyrslur jyrir Island 1905: Verzlunarskyrslur 1904, p 9.
41 K. Shetelig Hovland, Norske seilskuter, pp 50 (twice), 88, 92, etc.
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reduced by certain estimates for salt.42 As for the peculiar salt and coal exports to 
Norway, both commodities were removed from Iceland’s exports, and the quantities 
subtracted from the quantities imported from Norway. Thereby, we located net imports 
of salt and coal from Norway to Iceland. Apart from saltfrsh and herring, guesswork 
sometimes had to be used in locating other exports and imports too, and because of all 
the guesses and estimates in the datasets for Norway, it would be desirable to check the 
most important series. That can only be done by consulting Norwegian customs records, 
if they exist, and, for certain commodities, the Icelandic customs records. 
Notwithstanding, even if there are errors and lacunas in the datasets for Norway, we 
have a picture of the main outlines of Iceland’s trade with Norway.43 As the datasets 
stand now, 94-100% of Iceland’s exports to Norway by value were identified with 
reasonable certainty. For imports, the rate is only 41-77% in 1870 to 1882, but 94- 
100% after that.44 True, this is not an accurate measure, and some of the values 
presumably would need revision. But they do not undermine the identification of the 
goods, rather they show that the values remain to be adjusted. This, however, tends to be
42 The imports of salt from Norway to Iceland were estimated on the basis of logic that there 
had to be some correlation between the amount of imported salt and the amount of exports 
where salt had been used. These exports primarily were saltfish and herring, because salted 
mutton was comparatively insignificant and domestic consumption presumably was not great 
or changing substantially. On the premise that herring and cod (for saltfish) catched by 
Norwegians mainly was exported to Nonray, the salt imports to Iceland from Norway were 
compared to the exports of herring and saltfish thereto. According to the new datasets for 
Norway, salt imports by quantity from 1890 to 1912 (when the figures are relatively reliable) 
usually equalled to 50 to 64% of the exports of saltfish and herring by quantity. Hence, the salt 
imports from Norway to Iceland from 1870 to 1886 were estimated by working out 60% of the 
herring and saltfish quantities.
43 Indeed, the Faroe Islands are included with Iceland in the Norwegian trade returns until 
1889. But in that year, no exports were reported from the Faroes to Norway (if they were any, 
they clearly were negligible), and imports to the Faroes from Norway were a fraction of 1% 
(Norw., Centr. Bur. of Stat., Tabeller vedkommende Norges Handel 1889, pp 64, 72). 
Therefore, it seems safe to conclude that the Norway’s trade with the Faroes not of no 
importance for the accuracy of the new datasets for Norway.
44 I refer to the base tables in my datasets for exports to and imports from Norway, but they do 
not accompany the thesis, because they are too voluminous to reproduce.
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difficult because the national and commodity values and prices provided in the 
Norwegian returns obscure variations in prices by countries.
Although at present the datasets for Norway are somewhat less accurate than the 
datasets for Denmark, the series for Norway excel over the Icelandic returns. They were 
particularly poor here because 37—49% by quantity of the imports were missing in 1898 
to 1910. In 1913, however, the Icelandic source over-reported the imports slightly (by 
4% by quantity, see Table A.4). As for Iceland’s exports to Norway, the Icelandic 
returns were far from the right, because in 1898 they over-reported the exports thereto 
by 61% by quantity, while they under-reported it by 44-89% in 1902-10. By contrast, 
in 1913 the Icelandic source over-reported the quantity slightly (by 3%, see Table A.3).
3.6. The Spain and Italy Datasets
Compared to Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom, the trade returns of Spain and 
Italy presumably were relatively poor in our research period. For some reason at least, 
they are never used to study the saltfish imports of Spain and Italy in late 19th and early 
20th century. Instead, consular reports are extensively used, although they tend to have 
lacunas and incomplete information. Therefore, it presumably makes small difference 
for the research although the trade returns of Spain and Italy were not available to me 
for consulting.
At it happens, saltfish was practically the only export commodity from Iceland 
to Spain and Italy in our period, and imports therefrom to Iceland non-existent to the 
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were used to estimate direct saltfish exports to Spain and Italy, one for 1870-94 and 
another for 1895-1913. The method employed for 1870-94 was the following (see Table 
A.5). From Iceland’s total exports of saltfish, as reported in the Icelandic customs 
records, I subtracted the quantities going to Denmark and Norway, as reported in their 
respective trade returns. From this figure I subtracted what Britain, according to its trade 
returns, had imported of saltfish and herring. Here, herring was included because the 
British returns put saltfish and herring in one group. To be on the safe side, I ran this 
calculation including herring, but this exercise produced absurd figures, which showed 
that herring was a negligible part of the British imports of cured fish. Hence, the residual 
outcome of this calculation with saltfish only showed what Spain and Italy had imported 
directly from Iceland. As for the individual share of each country, this was easy from 
1870 until the late 1880s, when only Spain was buying Icelandic saltfish. From the late 
1880s onwards, when Italy started buying saltfish from Iceland, the figures for both 
Spain and Italy are partly a guesswork. But they are based on estimated exports of 
saltfish and herring to Norway (as far as the Norwegian trade returns could be squeezed 
to give information about this) and the fact that owing to a discriminatory tariff in Spain, 
direct saltfish exports from Iceland to Spain were much smaller than before 1886 and 
after 1893, when a new tariff convention was reached. The values of the saltfish exports 
to Spain and Italy were calculated by multiplying the quantities with the average 
purchase prices of saltfish reported in the price reports of merchants in Iceland.45 Since 
these prices only produced DMW values, they are too low (below fob values) but they 
had to serve as a plausible estimate in the circumstances.
The method used for establishing the saltfish exports to Spain and Italy from 
1895 to 1913 was much simpler, and it had already been carried out in a published
45 In fact, the prices for saltfish were weighted average prices, based on unpublished
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work. First, the actual shares of countries in the saltfish exports, as reported by the 
merchants’ records, were calculated. Then, these shares were transposed to the higher 
figures in the customs records, thereby producing plausible estimates about the quantity 
of saltfish going to each country.46 The values, however, remained on the DMW basis, 
but they now were actual values, not average price values.
It goes without saying, that the calculation of saltfish exports to Spain and Italy 
from 1870 to 1894 in the new datasets is not conclusive. It would be desirable to work 
through the Icelandic customs records to obtain more reliable information about the 
saltfish exports, not only to Spain and Italy, but also to Norway and Britain. Therefore, 
the Icelandic customs records pose a great opportunity to get a more accurate picture of 
Iceland’s saltfish exports by countries, than the foreign trade returns or the Icelandic 
merchants’ records can offer, even after 1894. But while the customs records no doubt 
are the best source, it is a laborious task to work on them, and it was not considered 
possible to do this for the research.
calculations of the present author.
46 Halldor Bjamason, ‘Tofluvidauki,’ part 1, pp 244.
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3.7. The Britain Datasets47
3.7.1. First Attempt
The United Kingdom was influential in the development of Iceland’s foreign trade and its 
economy during 1870-1913.48 Therefore, it was most unfortunate that the UK trade 
returns turned out to be of limited use for a considerable part during the research period, 
extensive and informative as they are. The problem was that during 1871-1900, 
Iceland’s exports and imports were included in the UK trade returns with those of 
Denmark proper, the Faroe Islands, and Greenland. Before 1871, Iceland was stated 
along with the Faroe Islands and Greenland, but after 1900, Iceland was put with 
Greenland in the trade returns. The inclusion of Greenland after 1900 caused only a 
relatively small error for Iceland, but the figures during 1871-1900 constituted a real 
problem.
The first solution, which was attempted, was to use British and Danish trade 
returns jointly to locate the trade of Britain with Iceland. In the Danish trade returns, 
only exports and imports of Denmark proper with the United Kingdom were listed. If we
47 In the years 1870 to 1894, the datasets for Britain include, besides Britain herself, 
unspecified ‘other countries,’ i.e., all other countries than Denmark, Norway, Spain and Italy, 
and Britain. However, the category ‘Other Countries’ had a negliblible share in the Iceland 
trade until about 1900 onwards. The share of this category was only 0.2% and 2.3% by value of 
Iceland’s exports and imports respectively in 1895, according to the Icelandic trade returns. 
Note that even though the returns are inaccurate about the quantities and values of trade, they 
are tolerably correct about the share of each country. Anyway, a bias in this matter does not 
refute the fact, that ‘other countries’ until after 1895 were insignifcant in Iceland’s trade, and, 
hence, the discussion in this section will only deal with Britain. For an account about the share 
o f‘other countries’ after 1895, see a special section.
48 In the thesis, the terms United Kingdom and Britain are used alternatively. The British trade 
returns applied to the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland included), but trade between 
Northern Ireland and Iceland hardly existed. Therefore, and because of linguistic felicity, 
Britain is usually preferred.
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subtracted the imports of Denmark from Britain, as reported in the Danish returns, from 
the total exports of Britain, as reported in the British returns, to the Kingdom of 
Denmark, as reported in British returns, one could get Britain’s exports to Iceland, the 
Faroe Islands, and Greenland as a group. Similarly, if we subtracted the exports of 
Denmark proper to Britain, as reported in the Danish returns, from the imports of Britain 
from the Kingdom of Denmark, one could get Britain’s imports from Iceland, the Faroe 
Islands, and Greenland as a group. Since Britain’s trade with the Faroes definitely was 
insignificant and with Greenland almost certainly negligible, the British residual figures 
should give a relatively good proxy of the trade between Britain and Iceland.
This method was attempted but the results were far from satisfactory. The 
quantities that were supposed to be exported from or imported to Iceland were of a much 
higher level than was conceivable, sometime many times higher than Iceland’s total 
imports or exports of the commodities in question as presented by the Icelandic trade 
returns (even allowing for a generous under-reporting). Furthermore, some of the alleged 
commodities may have been exported or imported in small quantities, but since they are 
never listed in Icelandic trade returns, the quantities produced with this method were a 
mere fiction. All in all, this set of data as a measure of Iceland’s trade with Britain was 
completely invalid.
Why did this exercise turn out to be so unrewarding? The explanation is mainly 
the following. It is obvious that many of Britain’s exports that were reported in the 
British returns as going to Denmark went onwards from Danish territory to other 
countries (Norway, Sweden, etc.) without being cleared through Danish customs. And 
vice versa for Britain’s imports: Goods reported in the British trade returns as coming 
from Denmark were only passing Denmark on their way from other countries and not 
cleared by Danish customs. To be sure, this was in no way a strange practice by the 
standard of the day. A long established practice in the making of trade returns was
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precisely this. In the case of exports, they were assigned to the country where the ship 
would next touch harbour (when it was cleared). Analogously, imports were assigned to 
the country where the ship had last touched harbour before entering. Hence, the country 
that was buying or selling the commodity was not necessarily registered. However, that 
principle was in our period gradually replacing the older practice just described.49 With 
the benefit of hindsight, this was a hit or miss attempt because of the way trade returns 
were made. However, its advantage was that sources were printed and accessible, the 
British Board of Trade possibly had started using the buying/seller-country principle 
early on, and provided that transshipments and other stop-overs in Denmark were not 
very many proportionally, its results could be trustworthy. But, alas, it did not turn out 
to be that way.
3.7.2. Second Attempt
Since the attempt to use Danish and British trade returns jointly proved futile, a new 
method had to be applied for the sample years from 1874 to 1894. The trade in 1898 
was stated in the Icelandic trade returns, and they had to be used although the trade no 
doubt was under-reported. Two ways were possible to produce series for 1874 to 1894. 
One was to look for the originals of the British trade returns, or the underlying records, 
or some trade sources in Britain that had the necessary information. Another way was to
49 This transition in the making of trade returns was happening in Denmark, Norway and 
Iceland in the last decades of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. See the 
introductory text in the Danish and Norwegian trade returns, and legislation concerning 
Icelandic trade returns. Due to lack of explanatory text in the British returns, it is not clear 
when the buying/selling-country practice replaced the first/last-harbour principle.
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use the Icelandic trade returns as a base and subtract from the figures there the quantities 
stated in the Danish and Norwegian returns. That would give us all exports to and all 
imports from countries other than Denmark and Norway. Effectively, this meant that 
trade with the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and ‘other countries’ formed the residual.
Since there was no certainty that alternative British figures might be found, the 
second approach was selected. It was not without disadvantages, but it presumably 
would give a satisfactory proxy of the trade with Britain. The inclusion of Spain and 
Italy would cause no error in estimating Iceland’s imports from Britain because there 
were no imports therefrom, as far as is known. Exports to Spain and Italy were just 
about one commodity, saltfish, and a special method, described above, would enable us 
to separate the direct saltfish imports to the Mediterranean countries from the saltfish 
exports to Britain. As for the unspecified group of all other countries than Denmark, 
Norway, Britain, Spain, and Italy — namely ‘other countries’ — trade with them was 
negligible, even until the 1890s, and did not pose any problem. Last but not least, there 
was no chance this approach would fail in the same manner as the first attempt, because 
goods definitely were not transhipped in or passing through Icelandic ports.
This method was applied to locate goods exchanged between Britain and Iceland 
except for two: Exports of live sheep and live horses. This is because there was an easy 
way to improve the series for those two exports. Incidentally, Sveinbjorn Blondal had 
produced more accurate figures for live sheep exports with contemporary papers, but his 
figures, nevertheless, only stated quantities that he could document with his sources, so 
his series remained minimum figures in spite of their great improvements.50 In the case 
of British live animal imports, what was registered in the British trade returns as coming 
from the Kingdom of Denmark was almost certainly coming therefrom, but not by-
50 Sveinbjorn Blondal: Saudasalan til Bretlands.
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passing it. Hence, by subtracting exports of live sheep and horses from Denmark to 
Britain (according to Danish returns), the residual figure in fact applied to Iceland only; 
the Faroes and Greenland did not export live sheep and horses at all. The outcome of this 
exercise was that the figures for live sheep were nearly always slightly higher than 
Sveinbjorn’s — in spite of the number of sheep that died on the voyage. However, when 
Sveinbjorn reported a higher figure, it was to be preferred, of course.51 In the case of live 
horses, the exercise always gave higher figures than when simply subtracting Denmark’s 
and Norway’s imports of live horses (according to their respective returns) from the total 
exports quantities stated in the Icelandic returns.
The results of this second attempt were rather satisfying, because evidently they 
could not violate known or plausible facts about the trade between Britain and Iceland in 
1874 to 1894. There are, nevertheless, some sources of error and one is the fact that 
imports from Norway in 1870 and 1874 are substantially under-estimated in the new 
datasets, as we discussed above, and considerably too in the year 1878.52 Therefore, 
owing to our calculation method, these imports from Norway — insofar as they were 
reported at all by the Iceland merchants in their reports to local sheriffs — are ascribed 
to Britain. This, however, is a small weakness compared to the under-reporting in the 
Icelandic trade returns. Essentially, it can emerge in two ways, one of which is a more or 
less constant under-estimate of the quantities of goods reported, while the other is called
51 SveinbjOm Blondal says in his Saudasalan til Bretlcmds that the British trade returns are not 
accurate, and that they report lower imports of live sheep than Icelandic and Danish returns 
register exported thereto (p 12). Judging from the majority of the sample years in the new 
datasets, i.e., 1870, 1874, 1878, 1882, and 1886, Sveinbjom’s claim is not correct. Only in 
1890 and 1894 was Sveinbjorn able to document higher figures than my second attempt 
produced, and there was a substantial difference in 1890 for which I have no particular 
explanation. Either a part of the live sheep reported as coming from Denmark (according to the 
British returns) were in fact from Iceland, or there is some double-counting in Sveinbjom’s 
study.
52 This is not a problem in the case of exports, because there is a frill account of the exports of 
Iceland to Norway from 1870 and throughout the period.
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forth through individual and irregular lacunas because of non-reporting. Filling in gaps 
from non-reporting is bound to be a considerable guesswork, and this was not done for 
any of the imports or exports, although this fault inevitably causes an occasional under­
estimate of individual figures. Incidentally though, exports series of saltfish had in an 
earlier work been improved in this respect and these series were used here.53 Besides, a 
more important question was how much the general underreporting was, namely how 
much larger approximately the imports and exports really were. Fortunately, there are 
several clues to this and partial information that we may use to suggest the level of 
under-reporting in the exports and imports.
3.7.3. Under-Reporting in the Imports
When customs records for imports started in 1872, only alcoholic drinks were subject to 
tariff. Unfortunately, the import quantities of this type of good were not worked out until 
1883 onwards. Hence, this potentially useful source could not for this research provide a 
proxy of the under-reporting in the 1870s. However, there is an interesting clue to be 
observed in the extent of under-reporting in Iceland’s imports from Denmark in the year 
1870. Then, the elementary country distinction was still provided in the Icelandic trade 
returns, and Denmark formed an individual category, while all other countries formed 
another category. I did not make an exhaustive account of the imports from Denmark for 
1870, as they were reported by merchants in Iceland, but I examined ca 85% of it 
(measured by quantity). When the quantities of these particular commodities were
53 Halldor Bjamason, ‘Tofluvidauki,’ part 1, pp 238-40,252.
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compared to the quantities stated as going to Iceland in the Danish trade returns, some 
24% of the total sum was missing in the merchants’ records. The median was 31%, 
mean 35%, and standard deviation 25. Different measurements of these commodities in 
the two countries may explain some of the difference, but the largest part is probably due 
to the usual causes of under-reporting, i.e., to hastiness and carelessness in the making of 
the reports, and downright lacunas (non-reporting) owing to negligence of permanent and 
seasonal merchants.
After the data in the customs records for imports started to be aggregated and 
published (in the Icelandic trade returns), this source provided our second hint of under­
reporting in the imports. An unpublished statistical examination of these particular 
imports, which were so-called luxuries at the time, was kindly made available to me by 
the author, Magnus S. Magnusson, and it applied for the years 1886-1907. There, he 
had converted the different units of measurement into tonnes, and if we add the 
quantities of these goods up every year from each of the two sources, merchants’ records 
and customs records, the under-reporting in the first was on average 9% in this period. It 
is noteworthy that there was a gradual decrease from one level to another in the under­
reporting as time passed. It was greatest in the early years, 1886-91 (15-20%), 
fluctuated somewhat in 1892-94 (8-14%), after which it dropped notably (3-7%).54 The 
last phase in this development can probably be attributed to the new law in 1894 on 
official statistics recording (taking effect in 1895), where the standard was increased and 
the administration became stricter on the preparation of the merchants’ records and their 
return.
The third hint is the level of under-reporting by countries from 1898 onwards. A 
comparison of the foreign trade returns and the series in the Icelandic trade returns,
54 Magnus S. Magnusson, ‘Tollreikningar og vsk 1886-1907’ (table).
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unadjusted for the extra quantities in the Icelandic customs records for imports, allows a 
speculation about the level of under-reporting before 1898. In line with the under­
reporting by value (see the comparison of the new and the IceStat datasets above), it was 
also evident by quantity and it varied from about 30% to 70%. Incidentally, these are 
exaggerations of the under-reporting because often goods are reported by value only in 
the Icelandic returns in this period, not quantities. A quick examination of the 
discrepancy between quantities and values in the Icelandic source suggests, however, 
that as much as 20-50% by quantity or more is missing from the imports in the Icelandic 
returns.55
How do we interpret in a meaningful way these instances of under-reporting for 
the Britain imports dataset? The instance of Denmark in 1870 suggests that the general 
under-reporting was no less than ca 25%, possibly higher (see the median and the mean), 
though there were relatively huge swings, as the standard deviation witnesses (from zero 
to ca 50%). Magnus’ examination on the imports of several luxuries from 1886 to 1907 
indirectly supports this, because the under-reporting was as high as was 15-20% in the 
late 1880s. However, then it went down to 3-7% after 1894, which is in stark contrast to 
the huge under-reporting for Denmark, Norway, and Britain in 1898 onwards. The 
explanation probably is that while the under-reporting of goods subject to tariff 
decreased, the under-reporting of other goods increased because of rapidly growing 
diversification in imports from the 1890s onwards, both in terms of goods and mercantile 
channels between Iceland and other countries. Since it is impossible to say if there were
55 For example, in 1898 about 72% by quantity is missing in the Icelandic returns of the 
imports from Denmark (as reported in the Danish returns). However, in the Icelandic returns, 
ca 40% by value of the imports from Denmark had no quantity information. The 60% that had 
value information amounted to 9,450 tonnes. By assuming that the other 40% had similar 
weight as the 60%, the total import quantities from Denmark were 15,750 tonnes. This was 
only 45% of what the Danish returns reported as exported to Iceland in that year, so about 65% 
of the import quantities from Denmark are missing in the Icelandic returns.
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any secular changes in the level of under-reporting over time, it was decided to assume 
that it remained broadly similar and fixed at 20%. Thus, before subtracting the imports 
from Denmark and Norway from the Icelandic national figures, they were increased by a 
constant equivalent to 20% under-reporting. After 1898, the British trade returns became 
workable, and they were used instead of the Icelandic trade returns.
The estimated under-reporting level for the period from 1870 to 1898 is bound 
to produce uncertain imports series for Britain, but there are two other issues creating 
marginal error. First, some goods in the Icelandic trade returns had to be omitted because 
they were measured by value only instead of quantity. This is because figures in the 
other trade returns could not be subtracted from them for they are almost invariably 
based on quantity (weights or numbers). Furthermore, since the results were bound to be 
subject to some uncertainty, I used for the sake of convenience a summary table in 
Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson’s (editors), Hagskinna. Icelandic 
Historical Statistics, instead of a full account of the imports on the CD-ROM disc (see 
above). Hence, the smaller items of trade were omitted from 1870 to 1894. Because of 
these two reasons, the imports data in the Britain dataset probably reports the minimum 
quantities imported from Britain, although the estimated under-reporting rate no doubt 
creates a greater margin of error, either upwards or downwards, from one year to 
another.
The British trade returns, which became workable for the sample years 1902 to 
1913, are not subject to any under-reporting, but since the overall trade with Iceland was 
relatively insignificant for Britain, there is not a frill account of Iceland’s trade with her. 
The total values of exports to Iceland were reported, but then only the main items were 
listed separately (with quantity and value data), and the extent of this break-down varies 
by years. The share of identified imports was 83-87% by value in 1902-13 except for
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1906 when it was only 57%.56 Nevertheless, in comparison with the Icelandic trade 
returns, the British returns excelled because 23-33% by quantity was missing in the 
imports from Britain in 1902-10. In 1913, however, the Icelandic source became reliable 
(as in the case of Denmark and Norway too), and only 1% by quantity was lacking in the 
imports from Britain (Table A.4).
3.7.4. Under-Reporting in the Exports
A priori, one might expect that under-reporting would be the same in the exports of 
Iceland as in the imports. But it almost certainly was less in the exports, because they 
were relatively few and many of them exported in considerable quantities, while imports 
were numerous and many of them imported in small quantities that easily escaped 
reporting. Therefore, some clues were needed to ascertain a plausible under-reporting 
level for Iceland’s exports from 1870 to 1898, because for 1902 onwards, the British 
trade returns were used. In the case of imports from Britain, we had information about 
the under-reporting in 1870. However, this source was of no use here. The reason for 
this is that for nearly every export commodity, merchants over-estimated the quantities 
that would be exported to Denmark. Overall, this over-estimation amounted to 12% of 
the quantities actually exported from Iceland to Denmark as reported in the Danish trade 
returns. Since all other countries, including Britain, formed the other category in the 
trade returns, there was no help from there either. The explanation for the over­
estimation is this. When a ship was loaded in Iceland, it usually sailed to Denmark
56 My new datasets for Britain.
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(nearly always Copenhagen), and, hence, its whole cargo was ascribed to Denmark. But 
even if the ship did not change its course and sailed in fact to Denmark, it did not 
necessarily import into the country or clear through Danish customs the whole cargo. 
Instead, one of three things could happen: a) some of it was put in customs storage and 
later re-exported to other countries, b) the ship sailed onwards with a part of the cargo 
from Iceland, or c) part of the cargo was transhipped. This is way the Danish trade 
returns state lower figures than are reported in the merchants’ export records in Iceland.
Fortunately, the customs records for exports became a useful source here, 
although not until the 1880s onwards. Only fisheries’ products were subject to export 
duty, and the quantities reported in the merchants’ records (i.e., trade returns) and 
customs records were compared. When we added the fisheries’ products up every year, 
excluding saltfish though, and compared their quantities in both sources during 1886— 
1907, the total under-reporting turned out to be huge for most years, usually from ca 30 
to over 70%. This stemmed mainly from exports of herring and whale products, which 
were overwhelmingly and wholly respectively in the hands of Norwegian merchants and 
businessmen. Reports from them were always difficult to obtain, so substantial 
quantities of these exports are missing from Icelandic trade returns. Due to the large 
share of herring and whale products in the overall fisheries’ products, these under­
reporting figures were not typical for other exports.
However, exports of saltfish, which was under an export duty, were largely in 
the hands of Iceland based merchants and, hence, are a more accurate measure of the 
under-reporting. During 1882-1910, the mean was 11%, but as in the case of imports to 
Britain, the ratio was comparatively high in the beginning (24-5% in 1882-83). 
Thereafter it was on a much lower level, moving from 8-15% in the late 1880s to 3-
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12% around 1900, but then up again to 15-16% in 1909-10.57 While 1909-10 seem to 
be a deviation from the trend, the high percentages in 1882-83 can be interpreted as 
reflecting initial difficulties in starting effective control of the saltfish exports. So, 
excluding the two initial years and two last, besides ca five extreme years in-between, the 
general trend seems to have been slowly downwards. In general, it seems plausible to 
assume that saltfish exports were better reported than non-duty exports, because of the 
incomes to sheriffs for keeping a close eye on its exports. Hence, the general under­
reporting possibly was somewhat higher than for saltfish exports. Taking both these 
considerations into account, it was decided to set the initial under-reporting in Iceland’s 
exports in 1870 at 17%, after which if fell by one per cent for each sample year, ending 
in 10% in 1898.
Of Iceland’s exports to Britain in 1902-1913, 91-98% by value could be 
identified, which was a substantially better outcome than for Iceland’s imports 
therefrom.58 Incidentally, the Icelandic returns varied in their accuracy because only 2% 
by quantity were missing of the exports in 1902 and 9% in 1910, while 30% by quantity 
was missing in 1906, and the Icelandic source over-estimated the exports considerably in 
1913 or by 17% by quantity (Table A.3). This was a notable exception to the general 
increasing accuracy of the Icelandic returns in the end of our research period.
57 Halldor Bjamason, ‘Tofluvidauki,’ part 1, p 239.
58 My new datasets for Britain.
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3.7.5. The Under-Reporting Problem: Possible Future Solutions
Of all the datasets, the greatest uncertainty is in those for Britain, besides Spain and 
Italy. Because of the significant share of Britain in the exports and imports of Iceland 
from 1870 onwards, it is of some importance to produce plausible data series about this 
trade. A few suggestions will be made here concerning this. One remedy might be to 
extract aggregate data from the customs records for imports from 1872 to the 1880s to 
underpin the estimated under-reporting level for Iceland’s imports. But this would do 
nothing for the exports, of course.
Another option to improve the datasets for Britain in the 19th century would be 
to locate British sources. This is no problem for 1870 and the years preceding it, because 
the underlying records for the British trade returns are kept in Public Record Office. 
They contain a full account of both the exports and imports with Iceland (with which the 
Faroe Islands and Greenland are included). The period from 1871 to 1900 is a great 
problem because the records in the PRO group Iceland with Denmark proper, as the 
British trade returns do. Possibly, this could be solved by searching for relevant records 
from port authorities. A quick look at lists of port documents in the PRO did not produce 
positive results, and local archives might keep useful port records.
If archival sources cannot be found for all ports or are unmanageable for some 
reason, locating and extracting information from Bills of Entry might be worth 
considering as a supplementary source at least. Indeed, the Bills are a more workable 
type of source, because they are lists or papers that were published, although they are 
not kept in very many places in Britain. The Bills of Entry were issued weekly or more 
often, for some of the major ports of Britain, and they contain all kinds of information
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about shipping, besides some data on imports and exports going through the port.59 
These are huge volumes, so it presumably would need a well-funded project with 
considerable staff to plough through them, but they offer a wealth of information.
The period 1901 to 1913 is also a bit difficult in terms of the underlying sources 
of the British trade returns. These records have for some reason not been returned to the 
PRO, as the records until 1900, and a short attempt to locate them outside the PRO had 
no positive results. Presumably, the records exist somewhere in the custody of HMS 
Customs and Excise and later search, if initiated, would have to start there. The size of 
unidentified imports and exports for 1902 onwards might conceivably be reduced by 
trying to fill in with the Icelandic trade returns, but they are problematic in use because 
of repeated changes in the classification and sometimes inadequate information, besides 
often having different definitions of the goods compared to the British returns.
3.8. The Datasets for 'Other Countries’
Countries trading with Iceland from 1870 into the 1890s were practically none other 
than Denmark, Norway, Spain, Italy, and Britain. In 1895, the share of the category 
‘other countries’ was only 0.3% and 2.3% by value of Iceland’s exports and imports 
respectively, according to the Icelandic trade returns. However, the share of ‘other 
countries’ grew fast in the late 1890s onwards, and in 1913 their share was 10.3% and 
21.0% by value for exports and imports respectively. Of identified countries within the
59 E. Carson, ‘Customs Bills of Entry.’
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category ‘other countries’ in 1913, Sweden was the largest buyer of Iceland’s exports 
but Germany was largest in Iceland’s imports.60 All information about ‘other countries’ 
were copied from the Icelandic trade returns, and they show DMW values for exports 
and retail values for imports until 1910, when the imports were put on cif basis. Hence, 
the exports values are below proper fob values while imports from 1898 to 1906 are 
above cif values. To produce proper fob and cif values, it would be desirable to locate 
the trade returns of the countries trading with Iceland, but it was not necessary for this 
research.
60 Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna. Icelandic Historical 
Statistics, pp 448.
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The Problem of Externally Owned 
Exports and Imports
APPENDIX B -  642
The activities of Norwegian businessmen in the Iceland economy were an expression of 
foreign enterprise, and it produces certain definitional and statistical problems, when the 
foreign trade of Iceland is used as a yardstick of the production and consumption of the 
economy. The definitional problem is that their activities were on the boarder of the 
economy, because the Norwegians partially imported the factors used in their 
production, and, consequently, the payments to these factors did not stay in Iceland. 
Hence, the economic impact of their activities was not as great as it had been if factors 
had wholly been attracted from the domestic economy and the payments to factors had 
been put in circulation internally. The statistical problem is that since they tended to live 
in Norway and only stay in Iceland during the summer, sometimes using straw-men to 
facilitate this, sources are scattered and no doubt lacking sometimes. Also, the scholarly 
literature about their activities in Iceland is meagre. The reactions to these two problems 
concerning the datasets will be discussed in turn below.
The economic activities of Norwegians in Iceland consisted predominantly of 
herring fishing and whaling. Sometimes, the Norwegians were merchants too and opened 
shops, but in that case they usually settled down in Iceland. Anyway, the herring fishing 
and whaling was prosecuted partly with Norwegian labourers and solely with Norwegian 
capital (money and capital goods) and entrepreneurship. Perhaps the main impact on the 
domestic economy was through labour that the Norwegian entrepreneurs needed for 
salting the herring (women mostly) and working in the whaling stations (unskilled men). 
But there were also payments (rent or purchase) for the use of land and state revenues 
through export duties and import tariffs. Because of the partial importation of the factors 
of production and the resulting leakages (see Chapter II), the exports of herring and
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whale products do not accurately portray the production of the domestic economy, which 
one usually thinks of in relation to exports and the economy in general.
To portray more precisely the actual production and consumption of the 
domestic economy, one has to subtract those exports where external factors of 
production were used in their production from total exports, and subtract those imports 
that were used by the foreign enterprises from total imports. This distinction is difficult 
to make, and it is an ample subject in itself to do a separate research on this. Therefore, 
only a rudimentary attempt was made here to distinguish between externally and 
internally owned exports and imports (see Table B.BAL/ALL-2). The method is 
discussed in Chapter VI, so I will only recapitulate this. On the production side, all 
exported whale products were owned by Norwegians and the major part of herring. On 
the consumption side, salt, coal, and all barrel material (tuns and staves) from Norway 
was assigned to the Norwegians enterprises. It goes without saying that this estimate of 
the share of externally owned imports and exports, as of all imports and exports, is 
bound to be a guesswork. However, the remaining (internally owned) goods no doubt 
reflect better consumption and production of the domestic economy itself, rather than 
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Index Considerations Concerning the 
Terms of Trade Computations
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1. Existing Trade Data and their Comparison with the 
New Datasets
Measurement of terms of trade, which are presented in chapter VI, is bedevilled with all 
the usual index problems. We will discuss here the choice of index types, their difference 
from earlier indices used in calculations of Iceland’s terms of trade, and the varying
i
outcomes by different methods using the same or similar data. The terms of trade series 
produced in this research are not the first of its kind. The first computations of Iceland’s 
terms of trade in our research period were price indices and an unit price (net barter) 
index made by Gudmundur Jonsson in his PhD thesis, ‘The State and the Icelandic 
Economy,’ in 1991. Although annual series, the indices were based on a handful of 
commodities only and intended as a rough indicator of the movements and the levels of 
the terms of trade.1 Later, this work was not only extended in time (stretching from 
1862/64 to 1994) but also refined and improved very much in Gudmundur Jonsson and 
Magnus S. Magnusson’s (editors) Hagskinna. Icelandic Historical Statistics.2
In Hagskinna, a Laspeyres (base) index was used for both the price and volume 
indices of exports and imports, but the index was chained at certain points of time. The 
indices started in 1862/64 and were chained in 1876 and in 1895, besides in 1913/1914. 
The number of goods included in the computations and their share in exports and
1 Gudmundur Jonsson, ‘The State and the Icelandic Economy,’ pp 384-6.
2 Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, Hagskinna. Icelandic Historical 
Statistics, pp 560, 915 (Fig. 34).
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imports indices varied over time. These statistics of the terms of trade series in 
Hagskinna and in the present research are conveniently set out in the following table.
Table C.l. Statistics Concerning Computations of Indices 






IceStat Datasets (Total Exports) 77-99% 32-41
New Datasets:
Total Exports 90-99% 9
Internally Owned Exports 84-98% 8
Imports
Value of Number of
Imports included Imports included
IceStat Datasets (Total Imports) 48-84% 15-45
New Datasets:
Total Imports 74-95% 32
Internally Owned Imports 72-95% 32
Sources: Gudmundur Jonsson and Magnus S. Magnusson, eds, 
Hagskinna. Icelandic Historical Statistics, p 409 (table).
The New Datasets.
While the number of imports included in our indices was not much less than in the 
IceStat indices (15 items were used only for a short period of time), the number of export 
items included was only nine and eight for total and internally owned exports 
respectively. The low number of export items, but a relatively high percentage of exports 
included, is due to the fact that a good part of the exports was compound groups of 
goods, owing in the main to the foreign sources used. This low number of exports is a 
potential drawback because it can disguise two kinds of changes, namely quality changes 
and introduction of new commodities. Both problems, which cause a bias in the outcome, 
can be tackled to some extent, but only with special calculations in conjunction with
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estimates.3 This was not embarked upon here so this conceivable defiance remains for 
later improvement. However, the new datasets have the advantage over the IceStat 
datasets in that the share of exports and imports included generally was higher. It does 
not show here, but the relative share of exports and, especially, imports that were 
included in my computations tended to fall towards the end of the period, when the trade 
started to diversify significantly. Therefore, accuracy of the indices could be increased 
by including more exports and imports in the computations.
2. Choice and Calculations of Base Indices in the New 
Datasets
For the present research, it was decided to use a Laspeyres (base) index for the 
computation of volume indices. The objective of a volume index is to measure the 
fluctuations in the quantities exported and imported at fixed prices, and a Laspeyres 
index was found to serve this objective best. There was no point in using current prices 
for the construction of the volume indices, because this method means that the level of 
volume at any one year is only comparable in absolute terms to the previous sample 
year. Hence, the method obscures the fluctuations in the absolute levels of the volume 
over time. By using a fixed base year for the prices, however, the comparison of volume 
levels at any point of time is enabled. Also, the calculation of income terms of trade was
3 Gamaliel Sveinsson, ‘bjodhagsreikningar & fostu verdi,’ pp 77-9.
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deemed to be more realistic by using base rather than current type for the exports volume 
index. Hence, the prices of 1870 were used as a base for both volume indices.
By contrast, the objective of a price index in a trade analysis is to measure the 
fluctuations in the prices of goods exported and imported. Laspeyres index does a poor 
job at this for it logically excludes changes in the commodity composition and tends to 
delay their inclusion, even if the index is chained at intervals. A Paasche index 
immediately includes the changes and reflects far better the actual fluctuations in the 
preferences of internal consumers (in the case of imports) and in the actual shifts in 
production in the economy (in the case of exports). If one was measuring, say, domestic 
prices over time, irrespective of consumption and production considerations, a Laspeyres 
index would certainly be aptly suited. However, if one wanted to see how consumers and 
producers responded to those price changes, a Paasche index would be the correct 
choice. Therefore, which index is used depends on whether or not the objective with the 
price indices is to measure this responsiveness in the foreign trade, rather than to 
measure price changes per se. The only drawback in using a Paasche type for price 
indices is, as discussed above, that absolute price levels are obscured when any points of 
time in a series lying far away from each other are compared. Strictly speaking, a 
particular level in, say, an annual series is only comparable to the previous year. That is 
the price one has to pay for the advantage of seeing producers’ and consumers’ 
responses to movements in prices, but it is a small price if the price fluctuations are 
moderate over time. Only if they are huge or fluctuate heavily does the price become 
higher.4
4 Some of the general observations here concerning indicing are briefed in F. Caswell, Success 
in Statistics, p 155. While Caswell’s book is succint, a lengthy discussion about technicalities is 
in K.A. Yeomans, Statistics for the Social Scientist, vol. 1, pp 129-48. A very useful source is 
A. Olgaard in ‘Mere om indextal’ who discusses index series problems methodologically and 
shows different computations of Denmark’s terms of trade.
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Because of the different nature of a base (Laspeyres) and current (Paasche) 
index, it is a well known fact that their choice can affect very much the outcome. This is 
perhaps the most evident variable in making indices although issues, such as the size of 
sample and method of calculating, are pertinent to the usual index problems, whether 
computing price or volume indices. Because of these considerations, the opportunity was 
used to test the different types of indices on the material in the datasets and to compare 
the results internally and with existing indices. Starting with the price indices, it is clear 
that the base type admirably conveys the medium to long term changes in the price 
movements over time, while the current type patently obscures them (Fig. C.l and C.2). 
Thus, in the case of exports, the base type shows how the prices sagged broadly in the 
middle of our period (from the late 1880s to late 1890s), but climbed again to a similar 
level as in the beginning (Fig. C.l). Prices of imports, however, shows a long term 
downward swings from the late 1870s to the early 1900s, after which they began to rise 
again (Fig. C.2). By contrast, the current price indices for exports and imports mainly 
shows fluctuations around a remarkably stable level, and particularly irregular 
oscillations in the case of export prices. The divergence of the current index from the 
base index in the case of exports Suggests that producers from the late 1880s to the early 
1900s countered the downwards trend by shifting to other exports. Consumers, however, 
concurrently but slowly opted for more expensive imports, and this happened a little 
while after the downwards price trend started. (Note though that externally owned 
exports and imports blur this trend.) Interesting as these price trends per se are, our 
purpose was to reveal the actual responses to the price movements in the foreign trade, 
and current type index shows exactly this.
A comparison with the IceStat indices is interesting. The data is, of course, 
altogether different, but the IceStat indices essentially should broadly agree with our 
base type indices. As it happens, the patterns in the volume indices for exports and
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imports broadly harmonise (Fig. C.3 and C.4), but the new datasets’ index is on a higher 
level because of considerable adjustments for under-reporting. In the case of the price 
indices, there are similarities between the two computations but there are notable 
differences too. The pattern in the IceStat export price index fits well with the pattern in 
our export price index except in the end, because while ours only moves onto a similar 
level as in the beginning, the IceStat index surpasses it markedly in the very end (Fig. 
C.l). In the case of imports, both indices show the price fall well, but the IceStat index 
does not witness any rise in prices towards the end of the period. Now, the different data 
material and contrasting methods of working out fob and cif prices explain the difference 
in the outcomes, but which of the two sets of indices are more correct? The principal test 
to this is the share of exports and imports included in the calculations, besides the 
accuracy of the basic data itself. On these accounts, there can hardly be any no doubt 
that our indices are more reliable than the IceStat indices. However, to do justice to the 
IceStat indices, it is possible that another method was used calculating the base type 
index than was employed here. The editors of the Hagskinna do not state whether they 
used an aggregate or relative calculation for the price index (and the volume index). This 
should not be of major consequence, but it may explain a part of the difference. In our 
computations, a relative index was used for it shows a greater sensitivity to the 
proportional price (or volume) change of each commodity than an aggregate index does.5
5 F. Caswell, Success in Statistics, pp 153-5.
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3. The Implications of Different Types of Indices on 
the Outcome of Terms of Trade
Given the variations in the outcome depending on whether I used a base or current type 
of index on my data material, the calculation of unit price terms of trade produced 
anticipated results. Since the patterns and the levels of the current (Paasche) indices for 
exports and imports coincided rather well, it was no surprise that the unit price (net 
barter) terms of trade in general remained on the same level over time and showed a 
pattern similar to the base indices (Fig. C.5). (Note that unit price index for internally 
owned exports and imports was practically the same as for total exports and imports, so
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the extreme years are not caused by shifts in imports or exports by foreign enterprise.6) 
By contrast, the distinct, yet moderate, difference in the patterns and the levels of the 
base price indices for exports (Fig. C.l) and imports (Fig. C.2) obviously was bound to 
produce a new pattern and another level of the unit price index. But what is a bit 
surprising is to see how well this outcome coincided with the unit price index that was 
computed so differently (on the basis of current indices), see Fig. C.5. In other words, it 
does not seem to matter much whether a unit price index is calculated on the basis of 
current or base price indices, because both broadly give the same outcome. However, 
this is only a suggestion of a possible rule or a principle, based on Icelandic data only, 
and the choice of method for calculating price indices remains of major importance. As 
for the IceStat unit price index, it resembles very much our base index, although it is 
based on altogether different data material (Fig. C.5), until 1910-13, and this shows that 
it broadly gave a correct impression of the pattern of Iceland’s unit prices in the foreign 
trade except for the end of the period.
By way of concluding, these remarks show that the making of price indices is the 
really critical issue in the production of terms of trade series, because the computation of 
volume indices is much more straightforward. What is imperative is to be certain about 
what kind of questions one wants to answer with price indices. The choice of index type 
rests on that. But it is important not to confuse this consideration with the choice of price 
index type for income terms of trade, which merely requires current price index to meet 
its end. Apart from this, the Icelandic data suggests that there are no methodological 
complications about the choice of index type for the calculation of the unit price index. It 
possibly tends to be similar irrespective of the type of price indices employed. Finally, 
concerning the comparison of the new and the IceStat indices, the new indices broadly
6 Table C.BAL/ALL-3.
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support the patterns and, less though, the levels already revealed by the IceStat indices. 
However, there are considerable divergencies in the price and volume indices in the mid 
1900s onwards, which reproduce themselves in derived indices. Since the new datasets 
must be considered more complete and accurate than the IceStat datasets, the new 
indices should be preferred.
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Margins of Merchants in the Iceland Trade: 
The Case of Denmark
APPENDIX D -  661
In Chapter VIII I presented the outcome of my computation for gross margins of 
merchants in Iceland’s trade with Denmark. It remained an important country in the 
foreign trade of Iceland and information about prices in Icelandic sources mainly come 
from Danish merchant houses. Therefore, it was natural to focus on the trade with 
Denmark. However, it should be able to do similar computations for other countries 
trading with Iceland, provided that the necessary basic information exists. The problem 
is that, nevertheless, that this kind of computation is not possible for all the countries all 
the time during my research period. To facilitate an understanding of the information 
needed for this kind of examination, a scheme is offered in the following table.
Table D .l. Adjustments for Producing Merchants’ Margins 
on Exports and Imports in the Iceland Trade, 1870 to 1913






Denmark fob Duty & DMW Val. Margins cif Tariff & Retail Val. Margins
Norway
1870-94: fob Duty &... cif Tariff & ...
1898-1913: fob Duty & DMW Val. Margins cif Tariff & Retail Val. Margins
Spain and Italy ••• Duty & DMW Val. • M . • •
UK and ‘others’* fob Duty & DMW Val. Margins cif Tariff & Retail Val. Margins
Other countries** . .. Duty & DMW Val. ••• . .. Tariff & Retail Val. . ..
* United Kingdom 1870 to 1913 and other (unspecified) countries 1870 to 1894 
** Other countries than stated above 1898 to 1913
*** Margins on imports in 1910 and 1913 cannot be calculated because of the move from a retail price 
basis to a cif basis in 1909 onwards
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The table indicates that this kind of examination would also be possible for Britain, 
although the Icelandic price data presumably applies slightly less to this trade flow. 
However, for the trade with Norway this exercise would require substantial estimates or 
extrapolations until 1898. This is because in this period there are no information about 
prices of Norwegian goods in Iceland (retail values) or Icelandic goods going to Norway 
(DMW values) as the table shows. From 1898 onwards, the calculation of margins for 
Norway would be possible. For all other countries, the examination of margins was not 
possible, because we have no data on fob prices of exports or cif prices of imports. As 
Table A.l in Appendix A showed, in the case of Spain, Italy and Other countries, we 
needed the rate of margins to produce fob prices of exports and cif prices of imports, and 
here we need that fob and cif prices so this cannot be resolved without further 
information outside.
The examination of margins in the trade with Denmark meant that the Danish 
classification of goods had to be used as a basis, and price information picked from the 
Icelandic returns, which had another arrangement of classifying goods in trade. This 
posed some problems which were solved alternatively with merging, disaggregation, and 
some estimates. For all goods in trade, except for saltfish, the DMW and retail values 
were based on unweighted average prices, but weighted prices would presumably only 
have increased the accuracy of the results marginally.1 Optimally, the export and import 
levies should also be subtracted from the fob and cif values as Table D.l indicates. 
However, this was slightly problematic because information about export duties and 
import tariffs by goods are not available. There are only aggregated figures about these 
state revenues by years, and the totals have to be broken down by goods and then
1 Weighted average prices for saltfish were used only because they existed among unpublished 
material of the present author and saltfish was a large staple in the exports. Incidentally, the 
weighted and unweighted average prices of saltfish were relatively similar and this presumably 
applies also to other exports and most imports in the long run.
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transposed to the quantities in the datasets.2 However, a brief check on the sums of these 
export and import levies in individual cases suggested that they entailed a relatively 
small increase to the value and, hence, this calculation was not embarked on. This has 
the effect of producing higher margins for merchants, and the higher as time passed 
(because more goods became subject to levies), but it almost certainly does not skew 
much the outcome of the examination on the overall level and the trend of the margins.
2 This is a slightly convulated calculation that does not need explication here, since it was not 
made.
Appendix E
International Trade in Commodities 
Relevant for Iceland: Selected Price Series
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Table E.1. Selected Price Series for Wool in International Trade, 1870-1913







All Wool to Denmark ( Sheep and Lambs' Wool to the UK (UK
Price per 
Tonne
Index Price per 
Tonne
Index Price per 
Tonne
Index
1870 1 328 81 90 2 680 124 2 368 139
1874 2 025 123 128 3 000 139 2 416 141
1878 1 609 98 106 2 800 129 2 305 135
1882 1 479 90 105 1 900 88 2 041 119
1886 1 081 66 80 1 627 75 1 511 88
1890 1 426 87 86 1 846 85 1 712 100
1894 1 237 75 63 1 496 69 1 415 83
1898 1 047 64 73 1 578 73 1 360 80
1902 1 145 70 82 1 564 72 1 251 73
1906 1 868 113 99 1 921 89 1 698 99
1910 1 437 87 102 1 394 64 1 696 99
1913 1 647 100 100 2 162 100 1 710 100
Sources: W.A. Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, pp 280-81. 
Danish and British trade returns 1870-1913.
Table EXP/ALL-10.
Index: 1913 = 100
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Table E.2. Selected Price Series for Meat in International Trade, 1870-1913
Year Export Prices of 
Icelandic Mutton (Icel.
Imported Mutton
All Meat to Denmark (All Meat to Nonway(N Meat (Salted or Fresh) to the UK (U
Price per 
Tonne
Index Price per 
Tonne
Index Price per 
Tonne
Index Price per 
Tonne
Index
1870 328 53 900 119 600 86 1 001 149
1874 360 58 1 000 132 600 86 1 006 149
1878 384 62 580 77 609 87 1 049 156
1882 398 64 640 85 590 84 1 199 178
1886 312 50 371 49 400 57 781 116
1890 393 63 595 79 350 50 747 111
1894 343 55 521 69 370 53 684 102
1898 366 59 596 79 410 59 701 104
1902 431 69 611 81 460 66 655 97
1906 439 70 548 72 500 71 628 93
1910 437 70 661 87 510 73 650 96
1913 623 100 757 100 700 100 674 100
Sources: Table EXP/ALL-10. Danish, Norwegian, and British trade returns 1870-1913.
Index: 1913 = 100
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Table E.3. Selected Price Series for Live Sheep in International Trade, 1870-1913
Year Export Prices of 
Icelandic Live Sheep (l<
All Imported Live 
Sheep & Lambs to the UK (I
All Imported Live 
Sheep & Lambs to Norway (Nc
All Imported Live 
Sheep & Lambs to Denmark (L
Price per 
Tonne
Index Price per 
Tonne
Index Price per 
Tonne
Index Price per 
Tonne
Index
1870 331 76 693 115 400 60 400 69
1874 330 76 856 142 536 80 444 77
1878 422 97 982 162 533 80 311 54
1882 369 85 918 152 600 90 333 58
1886 296 68 781 129 666 100 267 46
1890 383 88 784 130 667 100 267 46
1894 320 74 670 111 400 60 244 42
1898 267 62 599 99 498 75 356 62
1902 357 82 625 103 402 60 378 65
1906 402 93 613 101 399 60 533 92
1910 392 90 712 118 399 60 511 88
1913 434 100 605 100 667 100 578 100
Sources: Table EXP/ALL-10. British, Danish, and Norwegian trade returns 1870-1913.
Index: 1913 = 100
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Table E.4. Selected Price Series for Live Horses in International Trade, 1870-1913
Year Minim. Exp. Prices of 
Icel. Horses (IceLExp.)
All Imported Live 
Horses to the UK (UK:I
All Imported Live 
Horses to Norway (Nor
All Imported Live 
Horses to Denmark (Dl
Live Horses from 
'Denm.'/lcel.* to the UK (Dk
Price per 
Tonne
Index Price per 
Tonne
Index Price per 
Tonne
Index Price per 
Tonne
Index Price per 
Tonne
Index
1870 166 59 1 590 79 640 56 1 719 93 349 114
1874 163 58 2 312 115 1 054 92 1 925 105 1 200 391
1878 173 62 1 583 79 1 152 101 858 47 1 004 327
1882 121 43 1 248 62 820 72 1 001 54 377 123
1886 139 50 894 44 800 70 858 47 286 93
1890 154 55 905 45 800 70 855 46 343 112
1894 151 54 1 245 62 1 000 87 858 47 399 130
1898 156 56 1 387 69 1 334 116 1 018 55 375 122
1902 167 60 1 328 66 1 149 100 941 51 260 85
1906 181 65 1 558 77 959 84 915 50 254 83
1910 245 88 1 876 93 1 145 100 1 118 61 311 102
1913 280 100 2 011 100 1 145 100 1 842 100 307 100
Sources: Table EXP/ALL-10. British, Danish, and Norwegian trade returns 1870-1913.
Index: 1913 = 100 * 'Denmark' 1870-98, 
Iceland 1902-13.
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Table E.5. Selected Price Series for Saltfish in International Trade, 1870-191:
Year Export Prices of 
Icelandic Saltfish (Icel
All Exported 
Saltfish from Norway (f
All Exported 
Salted/Dried Fish from Denm. (D
All Imported 
Saltfish to Denmark (I
Price per 
Tonne
Index Price per 
Tonne
Index Price per 
Tonne
Index Price per 
Tonne
Index
1870 272 70 348 61 268 48 270 50
1874 308 79 360 63 300 54 300 56
1878 281 72 356 63 330 59 300 56
1882 363 93 440 77 460 82 400 74
1886 233 60 260 46 160 29 150 28
1890 267 68 320 56 375 67 340 63
1894 237 61 280 49 520 93 500 93
1898 237 61 330 58 340 61 310 57
1902 333 85 430 75 330 59 340 63
1906 373 95 513 90 435 78 420 78
1910 365 93 480 84 390 70 380 70
1913 391 100 570 100 560 100 540 100
Sources: Table EXP/ALL-10. British, Danish, and Norwegian trade returns 1870-1913.
Index: 1913 = 100
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Table B
Year All Imported 
Saltfish to Norw. (Nor
Imported Saltfish 
from Iceland to the UK (Ic
All Fish, from 
'Denm.Vlcel.* to the UK (C
All Imported 
Saltfish, etc. to the UK (U
Price per 
Tonne
Index Price per 
Tonne
Index Price per 
Tonne
Index Price per 
Tonne
Index
1870 0 0 266 73 368 78
1874 0 0 345 95 649 137
1878 0 0 312 86 763 161
1882 0 0 315 87 688 146
1886 0 0 263 72 613 130
1890 0 0 270 74 658 139
1894 0 0 254 70 590 125
1898 0 0 279 77 587 124
1902 0 295 77 295 81 403 85
1906 0 318 83 319 88 454 96
1910 460 84 347 90 317 87 432 91
1913 550 100 384 100 363 100 473 100
Sources:
Index: 191:
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